Biodefense

The article discusses the threat of bioterrorism and the importance of biodefense in the wake of COVID-19. In other words, it questions if the U.S. biodefense system is ready for a potential bioterror attack by bringing up some of the catastrophic impacts of the pandemic on individuals, economies, and institutions.

Abiotic factor is one of component or factor in environment who has influenced to organism. Abiotic factor is divided into two categories, they are Physical resourch and physical factors for defense organism's life. The measuring of abiotic factors can use the measuring tools, like lux meter, anemometer and weather meter. The function of this practical work are knowing the component of abiotic environment, knowing the principal, work method, and the method of using measuring's tool of abiotic factors and can explain influencing abiotic component for enivironment. Keyword : abiotic factors, Physical resourch, physical factor, lux meter, anemometer and weather meter. ABSTRAK Faktor abiotik merupakan salah satu komponen atau faktor dalam lingkungan yang mempengaruhi organisme. Faktor abiotik terbagi menjadi dua kategori yaitu sumber daya fisik (physical resource) dan faktor fisik (physical factors) yang berfungsi sebagai pertahanan hidup bagi organisme. Pengukuran faktor abiotik lingkungan dengan menggunakan alat lux meter, anemometer, dan weather meter yang memiliki fungsi berbeda beda. Praktikum ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui komponen abiotik lingkungan, mengetahui prinsip, cara kerja, dan cara menggunakan alat-alat pengukur faktor abiotik lingkungan serta dapat menjelaskan pengaruh komponen abiotik terhadap lingkungan. Kata kunci : faktor abiotik, sumber daya fisik, faktor fisik, luxmeter, anemometer, dan weather meter.

A growing gap of distrust exists between the people and Western public health systems that grow more complex and antagonistic with each passing year. This distrust and antagonism has greatly accelerated with the arrival of a newly declared pandemic through the global proliferation of SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus and its new disease, COVID-19. The public health system relentlessly blames internet misinformation and conspiracy theories for the distrust, while much of the public cites a much deeper history and track record of medical incompetence, malpractice, corporate and political motivations, corruption, and years of dishonesty by the public health system that has been steadily unravelling for many decades with the rise of chronic disease predating the arrival of the internet. The science and medical industrial complex is rooted in a complex network of interrelationships both official and informal that function like a bureaucracy. These structures naturally bring together problematic elements such as egoic drives based on reputation, profiteering, political agendas, policy, prestige, peer-pressure, political correctness, corruption, intelligence, espionage, and many other obstacles that when left to fester and accumulate within such structures, will undoubtedly work in opposition to its initially-stated purpose of maintaining the health and well-being of its people. This paper will address some of the more intrinsic, causal factors that more appropriately address why so few trust the public health system, institutionalized science, and the medical industrial complex.

Disease is a force that shaped the world, with mortality exceeding war even in the 20th Century. The since the turn of the 20th Century, biological warfare includes religious fanatics being the sole executors of intentional biological attacks with the exception of WWII Japan. A framework and strategy for surveillance and response is laid out with an emphasis on medicine as the primary detector and response system.

If our potential adversaries are understood, publicity drawing the attention of bioterrorists to plausible bioweapons is the primary contribution the NSABB makes by censorship recommendations. Attempting censorship by attracting the entire world’s attention to information of concern is obviously counterproductive.
It is equally problematic to curb research in an attempt to prevent those outside our borders from understanding how to create bioweapons. That horse is, “Out of the barn and in the next county”. Locking the barn door is not going to change this. Proliferation of molecular biology, vaccine and other knowledge across the world has already taken place. Thus, the best course is to make sure that we understand what human bioterrorists could do as well as we understand what nature can do. To date, nature has been the worst bioterrorist, but in theory human engineering can be worse.
Medicine is biodefense. The focus needs to be on response capability and surveillance, just as in any other infectious disease control. Attempting to track, outwit or contain terrorists should be left to clandestine intelligence services that are equipped to understand and interdict them. Perhaps it is true that such capabilities in our clandestine services are poorly developed or directed. The remedy for that, though, is to work to improve matters by prodding politicians rather than operate independently in attempts at interdiction that may be counterproductive. Science, law enforcement, the military and intelligence services need to work together and understand each other’s appropriate roles.

The potential threat of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus has spurred the need to develop reliable countermeasures. Since the virus has yet to mutate into a form readily transmissible in humans, a cogent plan for MCMs and their distribution has yet to be put in place. The scientific community remains divided as to the best way to proceed, leaving some institutions to move forward on their own, sometimes in direct opposition to common sense.

The best primer for constructing a legal framework surrounding bioterrorism is a wonderfully researched and incisive book by Professor Victoria Sutton.  Sutton brings a vast background of experience and expertise to her book, titled Law and Bioterrorism, which is in fact the first legal textbook in the field of law and bioterrorism.


The book begins with a brief examination of the history of law and bioterrorism, from ancient biological warfare to modern times.  Drawing upon the lessons of this history, Sutton discusses historical events such as the use of anthrax in World War I, and further examines the rapidly growing concern over the use of biological weapons which led to the 1925 Geneva Convention. 


Further, Sutton’s work is a great resource for counter-terrorism efforts, as most of her work centers on the necessity of dealing with legal issues that arise as a result of a bioterrorist attack.  Law and Bioterrorism is without question a must-have textbook for anyone teaching or studying in this critical area of the law. 


Whether in terms of the history of bioterrorism or laws and policy matters associated with bioterrorism, Sutton performs admirably.  She has successfully created a valuable tool to aid the international dialogue in assessing the threat of a bioterrorist attack, and, as such, Law and Bioterrorism should be compulsory reading for any academic course in this area.

Keynote Address: PowerPoint.  The Future of Biodetection Systems Workshop was held to bring together industry, academia, national labs, and federal agency personnel in an interactive process, to develop a roadmap for research and development investment in biodetection.  Sponsored by Los Alamos National Laboratory, September 26 & 27 2006.

The threat of biological weapons and potential for terrorists to disrupt economies and societies by introducing pathogens into the food supply and livestock is now being taken seriously by government agencies. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has in place an overall biosecurity system designed to prevent the harmful introduction of plant and animal pathogens into America's system of agriculture and food production. Biosecurity and biocontainment are words describing programs for infectious disease control that (1) reduce/prevent the introduction of new diseases onto an operation from outside sources and (2) reduce/prevent the movement of infectious diseases on the operation. Since September 11, all USDA inspectors have been placed on heightened alert at ports of entry and in meat and poultry slaughter and processing plants, and security has been increased at appropriate USDA facilities. 

Note: U.S. Representative for Agricultural Security: U.S. Medicine Institute for Health Studies Forum "Food, Air, Water, and Terrorism: Assessing the Risk," sponsored by the Department of Defense, Global Emerging Infections System and Annapolis Center. 29 January 2002. The paper "Agricultural Security and Emergency Preparedness: Protecting One of America's Infrastructures," Stephen M. Apatow, Humanitarian Resource Institute, was a reference point for agricultural security.

La pandemia di Covid-19, tutt’ora in corso, ha coinvolto l’intero pianeta, scuotendone gli assetti e gli equilibri di carattere politico, sociale ed economico. Su di essa si sono addensate innumerevoli narrazioni, che spesso parlano di un evento epocale, simile a una pestilenza apocalittica capace di sconvolgere il mondo e imprimergli una nuova forma. Questo studio si prefigge lo scopo di analizzare alcuni aspetti della pandemia, cercando, nei limiti del possibile, di procedere a un’analisi che dissolva le nebbie che questo profluvio di narrazioni ha finito per generare. Nello svolgere questo tentativo, ci si è avvalsi di uno specifico strumentario teorico, derivante in particolare dalla geografia politica, dalla geopolitica, dagli studi strategici e dalla ricerca filosofica sulla biopolitica. Inoltre, si è cercato di contemperare la necessità di un’analisi quanto più possibile oggettiva con il tratto soggettivo che, inevitabilmente, caratterizza ogni ipotesi geopolitica. La trattazione riguarda, in particolare, alcuni specifici temi che sono stati considerati di cruciale rilevanza per comprendere come il mondo sia entrato nella pandemia, come l’abbia affrontata e quali caratteri potrà avere nel futuro. Ci si è dunque focalizzati sulla guerra biologica e la biodifesa, sulla disarticolazione del sistema globale, intesa come crisi dalla globalizzazione sin qui conosciuta, sul ruolo dello Stato nella pandemia, seguendo le traiettorie di gestione dell’emergenza e i differenti approcci nel contrasto al virus, su alcune rilevanti tendenze del sistema economico e, infine, su quali siano le linee di conflitto nel mondo post-pandemico, azzardando quindi una prognosi sui futuri equilibri globali. In definitiva, si è cercato di spiegare come, dal punto di vista geopolitico e geostrategico, sia opportuno evitare un’eccessiva enfasi sul carattere epocale della pandemia di Covid-19: essa è infatti una scossa sismica che, lungi dal rappresentare un evento palingenetico, ha semmai accelerato numerose tendenze preesistenti e ampliato alcune linee di faglia, contribuendo a sospingere il pianeta verso una fase storica di rinnovata competizione tra le potenze, in cui numerose credenze caratteristiche dell’epoca d’oro della globalizzazione appaiono destinate a rivelarsi illusorie. Quasi che il virus abbia lacerato il velo che separa la Volontà dalla Rappresentazione, senza per questo aver apportato cambiamenti rivoluzionari alla struttura intima del mondo.

Multizone network airflow analysis is used to analyze stack and mechanical system effects on the distribution of three representative biological agents in a prototype 40 story building. This approach relies on mass balances to compute airflow and contaminant transfer between the building zones. The analysis considers stack effects caused by cold outdoor temperatures, unintended positive and negative pressurization of the floor on which the release of the agent occurs, and three levels of contaminant removal using a combination filter/UVGI system. The results show that vertical shafts,

Environmental Health Perspectives (EHP), an online publication by the Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS), Volume 112, Number 1, January 2004.

In the wake of September 11th and recent anthrax events, our nation's bioterrorism response capability has become an imminent priority for policymakers, researchers, public health officials, academia, and the private sector. In a three-day workshop, convened by the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Emerging Infections, experts from each of these communities came together to identify, clarify, and prioritize the next steps that need to be taken in order to prepare and strengthen bioterrorism response capabilities. From the discussions, it became clear that of utmost urgency is the need to cast the issue of a response in an appropriate framework in order to attract the attention of Congress and the public in order to garner sufficient and sustainable support for such initiatives. No matter how the issue is cast, numerous workshop participants agreed that there are many gaps in the public health infrastructure and countermeasure capabilities that must be prioritized and addressed in order to assure a rapid and effective response to another bioterrorist attack.

Stephen M Apatow, President, Director of Research and Development, Humanitarian Resource Institute and founder of the media company, SMAMedia Communications has been honored to be one of three recipients of the 2002 ProMED-mail Award for Excellence in Outbreak Reporting on the Internet.

This paper is in two main sections. The first provides a high level strategic and policy assessment about the threats, risks and knowledge gaps at the growing interconnections between the digital and the biological worlds. The exponential growth in the global biosciences and bioeconomy over the last 20 years has generated advancements in molecular biology including synthetic biology and biotechnology and significant innovations in medicine, health, energy, and defense. 1 Nevertheless, the public and private sector must come together to enable further legitimate and interdisciplinary research and development in the wide field of biology and across the bioeconomy that is also mindful of the security dimensions associated with such activity. The second part investigates key technical, policy, legal and ethical mitigation measures that will likely impact on BCS related threats and risks. The paper concludes with a series of key recommendations for action by multilateral institutions, nations and the private sector in the global biosciences and bioeconomy.