Civil-Military cooperation

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"The Global Study on the implementation of resolution 1325 is an important part of the United Nations global agenda for change to better serve the world’s most vulnerable people. As noted by the HighLevel
Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, changes in conflict may be outpacing the
ability of United Nations peace operations to respond effectively. Any reforms must include gender equality and women’s leadership as central ingredients.

The Global Study offers new evidence, ideas and good practices that can help generate new commitments and implement old ones. Let us not squander the potential dividends of gender equality for peace and
development. Empowering women to end and prevent conflicts is essential and urgent." - Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General.

Sexual and gender-based violence is widespread in conflict-affected environments. The field of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence is active and constantly expanding. Recent research and analysis are drawing attention to the complexity of this form of violence, reflecting a shift away from simplified narratives. They also point to the need for a more inclusive understanding of sexual violence, which acknowledges, for example, male victims and survivors, as well as the experiences and motivations of perpetrators.

The wealth of information, activity and debate that characterises this field can be daunting. This paper offers an introductory overview of conflict- related sexual and gender-based violence, in particular for those who are beginning their involvement with the subject—whether they are civilian, military or police. It examines a number of dominant patterns of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict-affected environments. It surveys a range of causes and motivations that can contribute to the perpetration of this form of violence, and explores persistent gaps and weaknesses in current efforts to deal with such violence. Throughout the report, where relevant, information is provided about what is being done to prevent and respond to conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, with a sampling of efforts from the international, regional and domestic levels.

As part of our responsibilities under Australia’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, the ACMC has funded and provided technical subject matter expertise for the Women, Peace and Security: An Introductory Manual, launched today by the Chief of the Defence Force General David Hurley and Ms Julie McKay, Executive Director UN Women and Gender Adviser to CDF.

The ACMC and the Australian National Committee for UN Women have worked together to develop and publish a Women, Peace and Security training manual. The purpose of the manual is to increase understanding in the Australian Defence Force of Australia’s commitment to and engagement with UNSCR 1325 (including through the National Action Plan) and the broader Women, Peace and Security agenda.

The Women, Peace and Security training manual will be used as a general reference guide for training sessions with civil and military audiences and will form part of the training package that Defence is developing on Women, Peace and Security.

This book, a version of my Master thesis, describes the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal in the 1960s. During this period, Portugal was a right wing dictatorship and fought colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. On the other hand, the international position of FRG became more «normalized» and it was able to develop a foreign policy on its own. However, the political and military support to its ally in NATO, Portugal, brought some criticism from the Third World countries. When the SPD arrived to power, in 1966, the federal government began to distance itself from the colonialist regime.
Nonetheless, the military support of Bonn was one of the reasons for the lasting Portugueses colonial wars.

Armed conflicts and natural disasters are inherently gendered crises; they can affect women, men, girls and boys in profoundly different ways. It is increasingly accepted that understanding these differences—or adopting a gender perspective—improves the effectiveness of responses to these crises, as well as the efforts of policy-making, advocacy, research and training institutions that focus on them. A gender perspective is more frequently recognised as a core requirement for all personnel involved in these efforts. However, there are many who are expected to engage with gender issues, yet remain unfamiliar with them. For this audience, there is a dearth of literature that provides an introductory overview of gender issues in crisis environments.

This paper is intended to be an educational and awareness-raising
resource for those who are beginning to engage with gender issues
in crisis environments, whether they are civilian, military or police. It
examines gender dimensions commonly observed in conflict and disaster environments, such as differences in casualty trends, risks, threats, vulnerabilities, needs, opportunities and stresses. It provides examples of the operational benefits of a gender perspective and the harmful consequences resulting from the absence of a gender perspective.

The Communication and Complex Emergencies Project is a collaboration between the University of Adelaide’s Applied Communication Collaborative Research Unit (ACCRU) and the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC). The project’s main objectives are to highlight the role of communication, including new and social media, in complex emergencies and in support of humanitarian assistance.

The work focuses on ‘what we know’ and in doing so maps out a broad array of knowledge while focusing on the functions, strengths and limitations associated with various forms of media, from social networking and social media to radio, television, print and video. The work has a number of outputs that are designed to support each other, including:
•Social Networking, Social Media: an Annotated Bibliography
•Social Networking, Social Media: Issues Paper
•Communication and Complex Emergencies: Resource Guide.

This background paper outlines issues that emerged from research commissioned by the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) in early 2013 to map international perspectives and trends in security sector reform (SSR).

The concept of SSR has evolved over the last two decades to describe a range of efforts to improve the security of a state and its citizens through an effective, affordable, accountable and transparent security sector. In all cases, but particularly for conflict-affected states, SSR is about governance of the security sector. Many Australian government departments and agencies, civil society and other organisations have contributed to SSR throughout the post-Cold War period.

One trend observed in war-to-peace transitions after the Cold War is that the more expansive peace processes that follow complex civil wars still centre on first gaining agreement about future security arrangements. Some of the most common provisions in peace agreements include restructuring the security apparatus, demobilisation, and re-establishing civilian oversight over state security institutions. These ambitious goals mean timing, sequencing and political legitimacy are critical to achieve meaningful reform within and between those institutions. Transitional political arrangements after conflict—in place until the first post-conflict elections—were shorter (under two years) in many cases in the 1990s, and in recent coup cases. However, transitional arrangements have been in place much longer in several recent civil war cases (four to seven years). This has resulted in significant post-conflict strengthening and restructuring of armies and police forces before elected legitimate leaders and parliaments are in place, often embedding the composition of security institutions that were legacies of the conflict. Research points to a more sustainable peace if former enemies are incorporated into, and share power in, state security institutions.

SSR has emerged as one element of a broader set of priorities for countries navigating their return from violent conflict. The research mapped improvements to international responses before and since the landmark Brahimi Report in 2000.

This paper examines the articulation of the SSR concept in the development, peace and security communities. At the time of writing, there were five peacekeeping and five political missions with explicit SSR mandates from the UN Security Council, with the growth of political missions (Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Burundi and Nepal) a recent phenomenon. The paper discusses what SSR has come to encompass, including principles that underpin international support. Sovereignty is a fundamental principle for national actors receiving support in this area, and evaluations stress the need to be adaptable and to tailor each program. The politics of funding SSR is also examined, and found to manifestly affect how international actors support SSR. The paper concludes with a summary of the SSR community and its civilian capacity.

The civil-military-police community is as diverse as it is broad. It contains a wide range of actors who employ a variety of methodologies and techniques, use unique equipment and often pursue different objectives in service of different masters. Diversity is a strength of the civil-military-police domain, although a common understanding is required between community members to realise that strength. The range of different terminology employed across the civil-military-police community can make it difficult to form a common understanding.

Strategic level decision making should be driven by shared information
and understandings. A Civil-Military-Police Language Guide can help
ensure that information sourced from the operational level is precise,
consistent and unambiguous. The demand for these qualities increases
during crises.

In response to overseas natural or man-made disasters and complex
emergencies, the Australian Defence Force, the Australian Federal
Police, Australian Government agencies and the aid community often
find themselves operating in the same physical space as one another. Unfortunately, a lack of understanding and confusion over stakeholder
roles, responsibilities, cultures and terminologies can impede
communication and coherency in program implementation, leading to
reduced effectiveness in meeting the needs of the host population.
Issues—such as shrinkage of humanitarian space due to restrictions on
humanitarian access; perceptions regarding subordination of
humanitarian principles; the tensions that arise between political,
humanitarian and military objectives within integrated multi-agency
stabilisation efforts; and the increase in the number of organisations
and individuals operating in these environments—all serve to add a
degree of confusion and potential for discord. However, experience has
shown that improved mutual understanding of the roles, mandates,
principles, cultures and objectives of the various civil-military
stakeholders enhances constructive engagement, dialogue and
communication both prior to and during deployments. With this
dialogue and communication comes greater opportunity to achieve
maximum benefits for people and nations affected by natural disasters
and conflict.

To this end, the Australian Civil-Military Centre and the Australian
Council for International Development—in collaboration with the
Australian Defence Force, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian
Agency for International Development, Australian non-government
organisations, and the Australian Red Cross—have developed this
document, Same Space—Different Mandates. Building and expanding
upon a UK Ministry of Defence document, Same Space—Different
Mandates aims to improve the collective understanding of civil-military
stakeholders responding to international natural disasters and complex emergencies and, in doing so, to create greater opportunity for
constructive engagement amongst them.

It is our hope that this document will influence policy and become a
useful educational tool to support all stakeholders engaged in disaster
and conflict response, as well as help inform better field practices
through improved collective dialogue, communication and interaction.

The Australian Government’s Guiding Principles for Civil-Military-Police Interaction in International Disaster and Conflict Management (the Guiding Principles) has been developed by the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) in collaboration with the departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), Defence (ADF), Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Attorney-General’s (AGD), the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID). The Department of Immigration and Citizenship and the Treasury have also reviewed and contributed to the Guiding Principles.

RESUMO
O Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso estuda o Sistema Integrado de Monitoramento de Fronteiras (SISFRON), dentro da lógica da cooperação interagências e das relações civis militares. O TCC analisa os desafios que o SISFRON encontrará ao ser implementado na região amazônica. Partindo da ideia de que a Amazônia brasileira é uma região com características urbanas e não uma imensa floresta despovoada, o TCC apresenta as problemáticas da região, sobretudo a ação das redes ilícitas transnacionais que atuam na área. Procura-se compreender como as Forças armadas percebem e respondem a essas ameaças. Por fim, o TCC examina o funcionamento e a organização do SISFRON, como ele é tratado nos documentos brasileiros de defesa e sua situação atual.

Palavras-chave: Cooperação interagências. Relações civis-militares. Defesa. SISFRON. Amazônia. Fronteira.

ABSTRACT
This course conclusion work, presents a study of the Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON), within the logic of the Interorganizational Cooperation and the Civil-military relations area. This work analyzes the challenges of SISFRON in a future application in the Amazon region. Understanding the Brazilian Amazon as a region of urban characteristics and not an immense uninhabited forest, this work presents the problematics of the region, especially the action of the transnational illicit networks and, seeks to understand, how the military perishes and responds these threats. Lastly, analyzes the SISFRON functioning, organization, how it is presented on the brazilian defense documents and their current situation.

Key Words: Interorganizational Cooperation. Civil-Military relations. Defense. SISFRON. Amazon. Border.

Le sfide del settore della sicurezza oggi chiamano in causa il ruolo contemporaneo di attori sia civili, pubblici e privati, sia militari ed è sempre più necessario creare sinergie operative e collaborazioni istituzionali al servizio dello Stato, usando, laddove possibile, gli stessi mezzi per soddisfare uguali necessità. In alcuni settori, come per esempio in quello spaziale, questo viene realizzato già da tempo; in altri, invece, succede solo in maniera contingente, come risposta a una crisi o a un’emergenza.
Tutte le diverse articolazioni delle Forze Armate italiane sono dotate della capacità di fornire alla comunità servizi di utilità anche in settori diversi dalla sicurezza collettiva e che esulano, pertanto, dalla loro prerogativa istituzionale di deterrenza e difesa del territorio e delle libere istituzioni. Per tale ragione, sono in grado di concorrere, con l’impiego di personale, mezzi e materiali, a interventi coordinati dagli altri dicasteri in caso straordinaria necessità/urgenza, di ricostruzione e stabilizzazione.
Dalla sistematizzazione di tali collaborazioni, oggi frammentarie, possono derivare sinergie operative, riduzione delle duplicazioni di ruoli e, quindi, risparmi per il bilancio statale, a vantaggio di migliori e più efficienti servizi per la collettività.
Il duplice uso delle capacità della Difesa per scopi non militari è una risorsa per il Paese che, se resa sistemica, consentirà di accrescere la resilienza1 di fronte alle minacce di natura umana o naturale, supportando al contempo alleati e partner2.
A tal fine, la ricerca evidenzia la necessità di rendere strutturata e standardizzata la cooperazione civile-militare, attraverso lo sviluppo della capacità di pianificazione congiunta delle attività, l’adeguamento del quadro normativo di riferimento e lo sviluppo della conoscenza reciproca delle competenze e delle modalità operative delle diverse amministrazioni civili e militari. Occorrerà, inoltre, incrementare le esercitazioni condivise e, infine, ricercare e progettare insieme nuovi mezzi e tecnologie che possano essere funzionali ad attività di tipo militare o/e civile.
L’approccio sopra descritto, è stato riassunto efficacemente con la definizione “multi- purpose-by-design”3 ideata dal Centro Innovazione Difesa (CID)4 del III Reparto “Politica militare e pianificazione” dello Stato Maggiore della Difesa (SMD III Rep./CID) insieme al gruppo di lavoro e al Writing Team5 impegnati nella stesura del Concetto Strategico Capstone 02 (CC 02 - SMD) “Il duplice uso delle capacità della Difesa per scopi non militari e a supporto della resilienza nazionale”6.
Per supportare scientificamente la propria attività, SMD III Rep./CID ha chiesto al
CeMiSS (Centro Militare di Studi Strategici) di inserire l’argomento del presente studio nel
piano della ricerca 2017. I lavori del CID e il presente studio sono stati sviluppati in maniera
coordinata.
Lo scenario delle minacce internazionali e nazionali, analizzato nel primo capitolo, fa
presagire che in futuro le collaborazioni della Difesa con le altre Istituzioni ed Enti civili tenderanno a crescere ancora di più, perché è prevedibile che la frequenza di emergenze e disastri di origine naturale o antropica aumenterà come, pure, si incrementeranno le crisi di natura sociale, economico e culturale capaci di dare vita a disagio sociale e, in casi estremi a movimenti insurrezionali e fenomeni terroristici.
Pertanto sia la Difesa Civile, che si occupa delle situazioni di crisi del Paese sotto il controllo del Ministero dell’Interno/Dipartimento dei Vigili del Fuoco, del Soccorso Pubblico e della Difesa Civile, sia la Protezione Civile, che sotto la competenza della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, interviene in favore della popolazione nei casi di emergenza, vedranno aumentare la loro attività e, con questa, crescerà l’esigenza dei concorsi del Ministero della Difesa.
D’altra parte, le Forze Amate giocano un ruolo essenziale nella gestione delle pubbliche calamità e in altri casi di straordinaria necessità e urgenza perché offrono velocità di dispiegamento e, soprattutto, assetti di comando e controllo (C2), logistici, di trasporto e comunicazioni prontamente utilizzabili e rispondenti alle esigenze di un’emergenza.
In compenso, dalle attività di risposta alle emergenze e da tutte le altre attività a duplice uso le Forze Armate ricevono, oltre a effetti favorevoli sull’immagine e un’ulteriore occasione di addestramento e formazione, un contributo all’ottimizzazione dei costi dell’equipaggiamento e dei macchinari perché l’esistenza di un mercato più grande (a duplice uso, appunto), che può fare uso delle stesse tecnologia/competenze, favorisce la riduzione dei costi e garantisce il raggiungimento di maggiore efficienza.
Le collaborazioni della Difesa di natura non militare in atto sono analizzate nel capitolo 2; il capitolo 3 esamina, invece, i concorsi in emergenza e in caso di crisi ed evidenzia alcune aree di miglioramento.
Nelle conclusioni si afferma che, al fine di potenziare gli effetti positivi del duplice uso delle capacità della Difesa per scopi non militari, sarebbe utile elaborare una strategia nazionale dedicata, da condividere, coordinare e varare di concerto con le altre amministrazioni, con le imprese e con il mondo della ricerca e dell’università, basata sull’analisi e sulla classificazione di tutte le collaborazioni attuali e potenziali e sulla standardizzazione delle capacità.
Si tratta, cioè, di produrre - in maniera condivisa e multidimensionale - una vision sul duplice uso, fondata su una valutazione economica più chiara del peso che il duplice uso già riveste per il Paese, e del valore aggiuntivo, espresso in termini di “utilità pubblica”, che potrebbe derivare non solo per la Difesa ma, attraverso l’apparato statale, per tutti i cittadini, “dal rendere domani sistemico ciò che oggi è ancora frammentario”.

The Afghanistan: Lessons from Australia’s Whole-of-Government Mission Report, commissioned by the Department of Defence, in coordination with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Federal Police, outlines the strengths, good practices and challenges of Australia’s mission in Afghanistan at the whole-of-government level.
While each overseas mission has its own particular circumstances and context, there are important lessons that we can take away from the Afghanistan experience.
This Report highlights 17 such lessons to enhance how we work across government and improve cooperation for complex missions of the future.
Key lessons include:
• Involving all relevant departments and agencies in whole-of-government policy development and planning from the outset;
• Establishing a senior level inter-agency group to oversee policy development and provide a high-level nexus with the National Security Committee of Cabinet and the Secretaries’ Committee on National Security;
• Recognising the value of civil-military co-leadership in the field;
• Agreeing principles and protocols be developed at the outset of the mission to define working relationships and responsibilities between different services and agencies; 
• Undertaking collective mission preparation involving military, civilians and police, including exercises focused on developing cross-agency relationships at the headquarters level;
• Establishing a cross-agency public affairs capability to highlight the whole-of-government nature of the mission;
• Synchronizing posting and deployment cycles for civilian, military and police personnel;
• Tasking the Australian Civil-Military Centre with providing a standing whole-of-government lessons learned capability for overseas missions.

"Abstract:
The end of the so-called "Cold War" has seen a change in the nature of present threats and with it to the overall role and mission of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in 1991 also removed the original raison d’etre of the Alliance: the prospect of having to repel a Soviet led attack by the Warsaw Pact on the West.

Multimodal, low intensity, kinetic as well as non-kinetic threats to international peace and security including cyber war, low intensity asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges, resources security, retrenchment from globalization and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were identified by NATO as so called "Hybrid Threats" (cf BI-SC Input for a New NATO Capstone Concept for The Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Enclosure 1 to 1500/CPPCAM/FCR/10-270038 and 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040, dated 25 August 2010).

Having identified this kind of emerging threat, NATO is working on a comprehensive conceptual framework, (the Capstone Concept) which provides the framework for identifying and discussing such threats and possible multi-stakeholder responses. In essence, Hybrid Threats faced by NATO and its non-military partners require a comprehensive approach allowing a wide spectrum of responses, kinetic and non-kinetic by military and non-military actors (see "Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach," dated 4 March 2011, p 1-10, paragraph 1).

This short article introduces the reader to a new form of global threat scenario and the possibilities of response and deterrence within their wider legal and political context."

Australia has a strong record of contributing to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Among the first to be deployed under UN auspices, Australian troops monitored the ceasefire between Dutch and Indonesian forces in 1947. Since that time Australians have served in more than 50 United Nations and other multilateral peace and security operations around the world.

As the nature of peace operations has evolved, so too has Australia’s contribution and engagement. We remain committed to active participation—as a dependable partner—in efforts to build peace and stability in our region and globally.

This report seeks to capture the experiences, innovations and practical lessons that have emerged over the last two decades from Australia’s contributions to peace operations in support of our regional neighbours—Papua New Guinea’s Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste.

The analysis of peace operations in these three countries highlights the strength of partnerships between the operations and the local leadership, and underlines the core principle that in order to have a sustainable impact, peace operations must be aligned with local priorities and support local capacities.

Regional participation has been a key feature of successful peace operations in Australia’s neighbourhood, and this report draws out the significant advantages of the regional dimension to the operations in these three countries.

We are grateful for the valuable advice and guidance provided by representatives from the governments of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste during the preparation of this report. We are also grateful for the insights and advice received from a number of people who were part of these peace operations on the ground. We would like to acknowledge the important contributions of Australia’s regional partners to the success of the operations addressed in the report.

We also acknowledge the excellent work of the Australian Civil-Military Centre in producing this report. It is a further demonstration of the Centre’s success in strengthening national civil-military capacities to prevent, prepare for and respond to conflicts.

We hope this analysis will be a useful resource for ongoing and future peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts within our region and beyond, and provide a practical contribution to national, regional and global dialogues on peace, security and development. We commend it to anyone working in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding domains.

Contemporary peace operations have evolved tremendously from the traditional peacekeeping operations of only a couple of decades ago, with peacekeeping objectives increasingly encompassed within a broader peace-building agenda. It is against this backdrop that this paper attempts to take stock of the current attitudes towards peace operations in Southeast Asia and to forge a way forward for ASEAN states’ more active engagement within the region and more specifically, with the broader emerging peace-building agenda. ASEAN States have often come under criticism for their limited engagement in peace operations. For example, it has been noted that although approximately 40% of armed conflicts have occurred in the wider Asian region, justover 10% of multilateral peace operations have been undertaken there. In the case of Southeast Asia, this is often put down to political and strategic factors – in particular, strong adherence to a traditional understanding of state sovereignty and non-interference. At the same time, however,it must be acknowledged that ASEAN countries have not been completely passive vis-à-vis involvement in regional and international peace operations. In particular, Indonesia, Malaysia andthe Philippines have substantial experience in the provision of uniformed peacekeeping personnel globally. Where ASEAN states have engaged militarily however, it is observed that it has often been in the context of traditional peacekeeping activities, rather than in complex missions that may require peace enforcement. For many other ASEAN countries, they either continue to lack the military capabilities or involvement in peacekeeping operations has simply not been a part of their military doctrines. Consequently, while overall ASEAN’s normative framework has typically engendered a degree of hesitation on the part of some states to intervene militarily – specifically within the ASEAN region and in complex operations – some countries have demonstrated a willingness to contribute militarily to peace operations.

The European Union has for some time claimed that the organization possesses comparative strength vis-à-vis other organizations in regards to conducting comprehensive peace support operations with a focus on civil-military interaction. This study sets out to investigate how far the European Union has reached in implementing a Comprehensive Approach to its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations. This is done by examining the institutional and conceptual conditions for civil-military interaction within the EU. The report concludes that even though substantial institutional development has taken place, the organization has not fully managed to take advantage of all its potential to apply a Comprehensive Approach. The main reason for this is the continuous transformation that the organization has undergone, which has made long-term strategic approaches towards civil-military interaction difficult to establish. The reforms of the Lisbon Treaty provide the EU with new opportunities to establish and implement comprehensiveness. Once the current state of transformation has settled, the organization needs to focus its attention on developing conditions for long-term strategic civil-military interaction. In addition to the institutional conditions, this also applies to the conceptual situation. The development of conceptual capability for the implementation of a culture of coordination has currently lagged behind operational requirements. It is however an area of much importance if the EU is going to be able to implement a Comprehensive Approach to its peace support operations.

Keywords: Civil-military interaction, Comprehensive Approach, Civil-military relations, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Common Foreign and security Policy (CFSP), Peace Support Operations,  European Union, Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)

Although long-established military virtues, such as honor, courage and loyalty, are what most armed forces today still use as guiding principles in an effort to enhance the moral behavior of soldiers, much depends on whether the military virtues adhered to by these militaries suit a particular mission or military operation. Clearly, the beneficiaries of these military virtues are the soldiers themselves, fellow-soldiers, and military organizations, yet there is little that regulates the behavior of soldiers towards civilian populations. As a result, troops trained for combat in today's missions sometimes experience difficulty in adjusting to the less aggressive ways of working needed to win the hearts and minds of local populations after major combat is over. It can be argued that today's missions call for virtues that are more inclusive than the traditional ones, which are mainly about enhancing military effectiveness, but a convincing case can be made that a lot can already be won by interpreting these traditional virtues in different ways.

This volume offers an integrated approach to the main traditional virtues, exploring their possible relevance and proposing new ways of interpretation that are more in line with the military tasks of the 21st century.

Si la situation sécuritaire en Côte d’Ivoire s’est grandement améliorée depuis 2011, des incidents ont toujours lieu ponctuellement et conservent un potentiel de déstabilisation qui justifie un effort continu de réforme du secteur de sécurité (RSS).
Le président Ouattara a fait preuve d’une grande volonté politique en soutenant la mise en œuvre d’un processus de RSS. Ce processus a avancé en dents de scie, mais la création d’un Conseil National de Sécurité (CNS), doté d’un secrétariat et la publication de « stratégies » donnant des objectifs définis à la réforme ont permis de la poursuivre sur la durée. Le système (imparfait) d’évaluation incite notamment l’ensemble des institutions du secteur concernées par les réformes à renforcer leurs efforts. A ce titre, on peut dire que la RSS à l’ivoirienne est un modèle d’appropriation. Le vote des lois de programmation « sécurité et défense » peuvent laisser présager une accélération du rythme des réformes, au cours du second mandat d’Alassane Ouattara, pour l’instant sur les segments les moins problématiques. Reste à améliorer les relations entre les différentes forces de sécurité et surtout à réformer l’armée pour réduire le rôle des comzones (ex-commandants de zone), qui existent toujours, même si les plus influents ont été en partie marginalisés. Il s’agit également de rendre l’armée plus représentative de la nation ivoirienne et à renforcer sa cohésion au sein de celle-ci. Cela étant, le choix d’Alain-Richard Donwahi, l’ancien secrétaire du CNS, comme nouveau ministre délégué à la Défense en Côte d’Ivoire, devrait faciliter la réforme de l’armée dans le sens voulu par le président et le CNS.
Comme ailleurs, la difficulté pour la Côte d’Ivoire consiste à réformer sans politiser les institutions de sécurité. C’est un vrai problème dans un pays où les trois derniers présidents sont arrivés au pouvoir dans un contexte de violence armée. Il est légitime de s’interroger dès à présent sur les moyens de dissuader les candidats à la succession d’Alassane Ouattara d’abandonner cette option. Un membre du GIGN cité au sein de cette Étude affirme : « la Côte d’Ivoire est plus violente que l’Irak ou l’Afghanistan car on ne sait jamais ce qui va se passer ». Tout semble calme, tranquille puis soudain, tout dégénère. Réussir à réformer le secteur de sécurité, c’est aussi rendre le pays plus prévisible. Tout le monde n’y a pas intérêt et l’enjeu est donc de transformer le jeu politique et de recomposer les forces armées, afin que tous soient contraints à une certaine forme de stabilité.

**Please note the stakeholder section of this publication is currently being revised and updated to reflect Departmental changes**

In response to overseas natural or man-made disasters and complex
emergencies, the Australian Defence Force, the Australian Federal Police, Australian Government agencies and the aid community often find themselves operating in the same physical space as one another. Unfortunately, a lack of understanding and confusion over stakeholder roles, responsibilities, cultures and terminologies can impede communication and coherency in program implementation, leading to reduced effectiveness in meeting the needs of the host population. Issues—such as shrinkage of humanitarian space due to restrictions on humanitarian access; perceptions regarding subordination of humanitarian principles; the tensions that arise between political, humanitarian and military objectives within integrated multi-agency stabilisation efforts; and the increase in the number of organisations and individuals operating in these environments—all serve to add a degree of confusion and potential for discord. However, experience has shown that improved mutual understanding of the roles, mandates, principles, cultures and objectives of the various civil-military stakeholders enhances constructive engagement, dialogue and communication both prior to and during deployments. With this dialogue and communication comes greater opportunity to achieve maximum benefits for people and nations affected by natural disasters and conflict.

To this end, the Australian Civil-Military Centre and the Australian Council for International Development—in collaboration with the Australian Defence Force, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Agency for International Development, Australian non-government organisations, and the Australian Red Cross—have developed this document, Same Space—Different Mandates. Building and expanding upon a UK Ministry of Defence document, Same Space—Different Mandates aims to improve the collective understanding of civil-military stakeholders responding to international natural disasters and complex emergencies and, in doing so, to create greater opportunity for constructive engagement amongst them.

It is our hope that this document will influence policy and become a useful educational tool to support all stakeholders engaged in disaster and conflict response, as well as help inform better field practices through improved collective dialogue, communication and interaction.

This paper explores the relationship between security and development, with a focus on how different types of violence inhibit development in fragile and conflict-affected states.

This paper is based upon a comprehensive literature review of separate pieces of research including academic studies, datasets and policy analysis. It explores statistics and figures that illustrate the barriers that insecurity poses to achieving development outcomes in fragile and conflict-afflicted states. It also examines these dynamics in detail in four countries: Afghanistan, Solomon Islands, South Sudan and Timor-Leste.

The assignment was not to come up with policy recommendations per se; rather it was to present a comprehensive synopsis of how different types of violence shackles and inhibits development in fragile and conflict-affected states. The research team believes that the material presented will be of use to inform policy debate and development, including in the field of security sector reform.

The analysis is contextualised by focusing on three types of violence: political, criminal and interpersonal. The barriers these different types of violence pose to development is presented throughout the report, and embedded in the country case studies.

The statistics uncovered in the course of the project are stark and unnerving. These statistics, among others, are used to highlight the barriers that different types of violence pose to development. It is not only the financial cost, but also the broader institutional and social costs that generate a series of barriers for meaningful development. Through synthesising these statistics, this paper contributes to the understandings of the links between security and development, paving way for policy recommendations and lines of action for Australia and development practitioners.

This report examines the governmental organizational structures used in three Australian-led interventions in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the Southwest Pacific regions: Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands. Whole-of-government efforts requiring coordination across many parts of the Australian Government characterized each of these unique operations, in which different organisational approaches were used to manage the participation of various agencies.

During the course of the research, it became apparent that, over time, numerous lessons were learned as branches of the Australian Government gained experience in how best to interact with one another and manage complex operations of this type. The report describes the key Australian agencies that participated in the three operations, the coordinating mechanisms they adopted, and the specific roles they played. In addition to providing insights that should be useful for the preparation and conduct of operations outside Australia, the information in this report also should be useful in terms of better whole-of-government operations inside Australian territory.

Grazie a un approccio innovativo, l’autore fa luce sulla seconda fase delle
Guerre d’Italia, un periodo sin qui poco studiato, indagando le complesse
relazioni fra i molteplici attori coinvolti nel conflitto che contrappose gli Asburgo ai Valois per il controllo della Lombardia e dell’Italia settentrionale, nel più ampio contesto della lotta per l’egemonia continentale. Impegnate in quest’asperrima contesa, tra il 1536 e il 1558 le due grandi potenze attinsero a piene mani alla ricchezza dei propri sudditi tramite la tassazione, investendone in larga parte il gettito nella difesa (o nella conquista) dello Stato di Milano, ganglio vitale dei possedimenti asburgici in Europa. Le risorse fiscali tuttavia risultarono insufficienti ad alimentare l’enorme sforzo strategico teso a conservare o smantellare l’assetto peninsulare configurato dalla pace di Bologna del 1530. In un’epoca caratterizzata da profondi mutamenti nella tecnologia bellica, lo scontro violento tra due visioni politico-strategiche inconciliabili, anziché condurre a una rapida risoluzione del conflitto, originò una lunga e dispendiosa guerra di logoramento, durante la quale divenne essenziale il ricorso all’aiuto finanziario, militare e organizzativo dei “privati”, in particolare dei maggiorenti italiani.
Chiamati a prestare servizi strategici di varia natura, i sostenitori degli
Asburgo ottennero, quale ricompensa, il favore di Carlo V, che si concretizzò nella concessione di giurisdizioni feudali, privilegi fiscali et similia. Il potere sovrano poté dunque combattere la sua “guerra globale” solo riconoscendo e aggregando alla propria causa altri poteri, saldamente radicati nelle società e nei territori dell’Italia settentrionale.

There appears to be a growing convergence between the police and the military of Western developed states. This has been argued to be problematic for a number of reasons, including the fact that this is out of step with current post-conflict peacebuilding efforts that aim to ensure a strict separation of these two agencies. This paper investigates the police-military relationship in contemporary peace operations from a number of different angles. It considers points of convergence and divergence both in theoretical terms and in different case studies, and investigates doctrinal developments that have been undertaken in recent efforts to demarcate these two roles more clearly. The paper argues that there are continuing significant functional and symbolic differences between these two agencies. Furthermore, there are practical and normative advantages to be gained from utilising police and military in distinctive ways in contemporary peace operations, and more needs to be done to establish what those appropriate ways for utilising those different agencies actually are in various security contexts.

With the exception of Papua New Guinea, the number of illicit small arms likely to be in circulation in Western Pacific island countries is not particularly large or widespread. The region remains relatively ‘gun free’ as Philip Alpers’ recently proclaimed. Supply is not bountiful, controls in the form of regional and national laws are sound, disarmament and amnesties have been somewhat successful, and demand is neither strong nor state or region-wide—Papua New Guinea being the exception.

In broader context, the Pacific Institute for Public Policy points out that:


The Pacific has seen its share of coups and conflict, but deserves recognition for being a largely peaceful region … It also has a wealth of traditional mechanisms to end conflict … It is worth bearing this in mind as the region develops a more ‘bottom-up’ approach to contemporary security issues.

The project conducted a strategic assessment, rather than a detailed stocktake, of the illicit small arms in the Western Pacific island region with a focus on Fiji, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (excluding Bougainville). As anticipated, most of the illicit small arms in the region come from within the countries studied and are largely recirculated within them. However, there are pockets where weapons transgress borders, but this is not particularly organised or substantial. There are also trends with new weapons entering the region, but these are mostly imported by or with the knowledge or approval of the national governments. That makes illicit small arms in the Western Pacific island countries less of a transnational problem and more one for national governments. There are also five additional region-wide trends linked clearly and potentially to small arms proliferation. They were outside the scope of this project, but are worth bringing to attention and they are discussed briefly in this report.

International organisations and national non-government organisations (NGOs) have been at the forefront of activism and information on small arms in the Pacific. Yet after more than a decade, the Nadi Framework and Goroka Gun Summit, both grand initiatives, remain largely dormant. In part, this reflects the reality that many illicit small arms—firearms essentially—are sourced from inside the country in which they are used, and recycled multiple times within it, and that the security sector has been, or remains, both a source of supply and driver of demand. This is particularly so for the Royal Papua New Guinea constabulary.

The problems with illicit small arms in the Western Pacific are indicative of societal and governance problems and should not be seen as an isolated phenomenon. As such, this report cautions against any isolated firearms ‘fetish’  responses, or for the issues raised to be seen solely as ‘a gun problem’. As Wondemaghen noted, fears generated by media stories of armed violence ‘generates a temptation to reach for simple, often punitive solutions to multi-faceted complex problems’. As such, this report makes suggestions regarding illicit small arms control and broader, societal factors that may mitigate demand in the three focus countries.

The research indicates tangible factors are a strong driver of demand and that the ‘motives and means’  hypothesis holds true. Small arms, mostly firearms, are sourced for personal or property protection, to participate in tribal fighting, to perpetrate crime, to coerce and influence political activities, but not to create state-wide conflict or coup against an extant government. In parts of Papua New Guinea there appears to be a constant overt demand for firearms, for both the tangible reasons listed above, as well as the more intangible predilection towards wanting firearms for the status they bestow on the user. However, this avenue of research could not be confirmed in this project.

Conclusions that can be drawn from the research are that the hallmarks of the region are overt demand and supply in Papua New Guinea, reduced and low demand in Solomon Islands and Fiji, and internal supply, including the skills to build home-made firearms.

Finally, the relationship between the civilian legal market of sporting and recreational shooters and the illicit market is emotionally potent. Globally and regionally, civilian stocks are leaked onto the illicit market. However, the position of this paper is that the Pacific sporting shooters are an informed and engaged stakeholder in small arms control, and that in many cases ‘providing a path to legal firearms possession’, including its safe storage and use, can be one element of effective small arms control.

In the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world, the frequency of intra-state conflicts and conflict waged by armed internal groups as well as natural disasters and man-made catastrophes have been on a perceptible increase. On the international stage, the armed forces of many sovereign nations are engaged in such environments on peacekeeping, support, and enforcement as well as relief operations in conjunction with humanitarian organisations. The competency of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) has been embraced by many nations and deployed in peace operations to promote cooperation and coordination between civil actors, civilian international governmental, non-governmental organisations and military forces in addressing issues which aid in speedy resolution of disputes and restoration of humanitarian norms. This thesis explores the Austrian Armed Forces approach to CIMIC, as well as the Austrian methodology both domestically and internationally in promoting and deploying more effective CIMIC competencies and discourses.

The Military Legitimacy Review

http://militarylegitimacyreview.com/

(formerly The Military Legitimacy and Leadership Journal)



Informed Commentary on Might and Right

Military Legitimacy is about the balance between might and right.  It is a relative concept that differs in times of war and peace.  In wartime, national survival is paramount with defeat of the enemy by overwhelming military force the ultimate test of military legitimacy.  In peacetime the legitimacy of military operations is governed by legal and moral standards and values in both the US and the area of operations.  These standards and values are often in conflict, making the public support required for political and military legitimacy problematic.  That was a painful lesson learned first in Vietnam and confirmed more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The focus of The Military Legitimacy Review (formerly The Military Legitimacy and Leadership Journal of 2009 & 2010) is on peacetime military operations—those operations other than war such as counterinsurgency, stability operations and nation-building.  Combat is often an integral part of peacetime military operations, especially in the early stages, but strategic success is more dependent upon achieving political objectives than military objectives, and superior military force is never a substitute for the lack of legitimacy.  In fact, large deployments of US combat forces and the use of excessive force in hostile cultural environments can turn a military victory into political defeat.

Military legitimacy is based on public perceptions of military operations, so that it is a reflection of civil-military relations.  Overseas religious and cultural conflicts are the most obvious threats to the legitimacy of US military forces, while in the US civil-military issues are more subtle but nevertheless real.  That is because the US military is an authoritarian regime within a democratic society, and its communal values—such as concepts of duty and loyalty to the military mission—represent a potential threat to libertarian civilian values.  And because the military controls the nation’s most coercive powers, there is the danger that an isolated military and conflicting military and civilian values could undermine civil-military relations and threaten the legitimacy of the US military.

The following topical categories will be used to organize papers, articles and commentary on the website (see sidebar):

1. Religion and culture as they shape values, law and public support as standards of military legitimacy.

2. Democracy, human rights and the rule of law in foreign policy and as standards of military legitimacy.

3. Military legitimacy and leadership and how they relate to civil-military relations

4. Civil affairs as an operational concept and a civil-military capability.

5. Lessons learned in legitimacy and how they shape the future.

The purpose of The Military Legitimacy Review is to facilitate the exchange of ideas among those interested in the interplay of might and right and the role of the military as the ultimate extension of foreign policy.  It is our hope that the ideas expressed in the articles and opinions on this website will further the cause of peace and promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law as fundamental concepts of legitimacy throughout the world.  Unfortunately, we have a long way to go, but we believe that the US military has a vital role to play in promoting a lasting peace, so long as our might is right.

Who are “we”—those who bring you The Military Legitimacy Review?  We have all been military lawyers with experience in Special Operations Forces, whose doctrine has long embraced legitimacy as a primary operational principle.  We all understand that military legitimacy involves much more than compliance with the law and we want others to understand the dynamics and central role of legitimacy in peacetime military operations.

De Oppresso Liber (Free the Oppressed)! Secure The Victory!

Kevin Govern, Editor-in-Chief

Rudy Barnes, Jr., Publisher and Managing Editor

Larry Rubini and David Gordon, Editorial Board

At the 2005 World Summit of the United Nations, more than 170 Heads of State and Government accepted three interlinked responsibilities, which together constitute the principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). First, States accepted their primary responsibility to protect their own population from mass atrocity crimes. Second, they pledged to assist each other in fulfilling their domestic protection responsibilities. And finally, as members of the international community, they assumed the collective responsibility to react, in a timely and decisive manner, if any State were ‘manifestly failing’ to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes. Those three responsibilities are now commonly summarised in the language of R2P’s ‘three pillars’.

Among the key constitutive elements of the principle of R2P, prevention has been deemed by many as the single most important. Scholars and policy-makers alike concede that it is both normatively and politically desirable to act early to prevent mass atrocity crimes from being committed—rather than to react after they are already underway. Yet, while the more general topic of conflict prevention has been—and continues to be—a subject of explicit discussion by policy-makers, an important field of inquiry for academics, and a crucial area of advocacy for civil society groups, there has been comparatively less attention paid to the prevention of the four specific crimes related to R2P. Too often, as in the original report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, there is an assumption that more general conflict prevention concepts and frameworks can be borrowed for the purpose of thinking strategically about what the prevention of R2P crimes entails. However, this way of conceptualising R2P’s prevention dimension is increasingly being challenged. As the International Peace Institute notes in a 2009 report: ‘The references to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity … give [Responsibility to Protect] a distinctive focus and imperative.’ This working paper seeks to develop a more specific strategic framework for the prevention of mass atrocity crimes, which can serve to inform the use of particular prevention tools.

Since 1999, Australia has increasingly deployed the military in joint, combined, interagency environments as part of a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. Despite some successes, a number of barriers between the contributing agencies continue to interfere with attempts to synchronise disparate elements of national power into a unified national effort.

The paper examines these barriers through the lens of Australian operations in Timor-Leste, the Solomon Islands and Afghanistan to determine how these barriers can be overcome and strives to broaden institutional perspective for members of the civil-military-police community.

The paper concludes that incompatible organisational culture is the most significant impediment to Australia’s whole-of-government approach but argues that some differences in organisational culture provide the whole-of-government approach with its greatest strength.

Differences in organisational perspective offer diversity in thinking, challenges the status quo, prevents group-think and leads to superior outcomes. By raising awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of different organisational cultures in interagency operations,
practitioners and planners will be better placed to overcome the impediment of different organisational cultures and instead leverage them to better synchronise the application of the national power.

International responses to conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies are diverse and multifaceted. Different actors – among them non-government organisations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) protection mandated organisations, UN peacekeeping forces, both military and police – all have a role to play to mitigate the impact of armed conflict on civilian populations.

Over the last 13 years a significant amount of work has been done to improve the international community’s response in relation to the protection of civilians (POC). This has been led by different actors – the UN Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the humanitarian community made up of UN humanitarian agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and NGOs – all working in the same complex humanitarian contexts.

Despite the development of POC, there is a perceived ‘disconnect’ between the understanding of different forms of protection, the different disciplines practising or working on the POC, and the different guidance and legal regimes imposing obligations on both state and non-state actors in the area of protection.

This paper is the first contribution to a broader research project that aims to determine whether the perceived disconnect between actors involved in protection work is real or anecdotal. By exploring the evolution of protection language and policy through the UN Security Council, DPKO and the humanitarian community, it is possible to develop an improved understanding of some of the reasons  for distinct protection policies and definitions that exist between different actors. Some initial variations in the interpretation of POC are quick to emerge, giving rise to additional questions about how the distinctions can be better understood.

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a Guerra Civil Síria através da relação entre o povo sírio e suas
Forças Armadas, que ainda gozam de grande popularidade no país. As Forças Armadas da
República Árabe da Síria remetem aos ideais fundadores do Estado Sírio, como um símbolo de
“coesão nacional”, e cuja importância remonta às guerras contra Israel. Questiona-se ainda o
papel dos rebeldes como grupo opositor legítimo, devido à composição de “jihadistas”
estrangeiros em seus quadros e às atrocidades e limpeza étnico-religiosa contra a população civil
nos territórios por eles ocupados

February 2014

The Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) has supported the Humanitarian Futures Programme (HFP) of King’s College London to undertake a research project, the Private Sector Challenge, which examined the role of the private sector in light of Australia’s own overseas commitments and the interface between the private sector and the military.

The complexities and uncertainties that increasingly face the international humanitarian community far transcend the capacity of any one sector, government or institution to deal with their consequences effectively. New approaches are needed to expand the concepts of humanitarian action and humanitarian actors, and in so doing, to engage with those regarded as ‘non-traditional humanitarian actors’.

This report by the Humanitarian Futures Programme enhances the understanding of civil-military-police stakeholders of the contribution of the private sector in crisis situations, including its form, roles, and trajectories of engagement. It looks at four case studies: Indonesia, Philippines, Solomon Islands and Somalia to examine the role the private sector (excluding private security companies) in natural disaster response and conflict and stabilisation. It also provides a guide to a simulation that the ACMC and the Humanitarian Futures Programme ran in October 2013 to assist Australian humanitarian policy makers and planners identify non-traditional humanitarian actors’ value-added and comparative advantages in different crisis contexts.

In the twenty years since the end of the Cold War, Australian not-for-profits (NFPs) have found a range of ways to support societies manage transitions from warfighting postures to modes of peaceful coexistence, and from military governments to civilian-led democracies. In managing the transitions, these societies have relied heavily on the expertise and relative neutrality of national and international civil society organisations. These organisations have helped national political and military leaders find and return to a path of reconciling former combatants and enemies, and deciding how to re‑establish viable security institutions that respond to civilian control and enjoy sufficient public trust. Very little information has been collected to understand the nature and scope of these experiences, however, so in 2013 the Australian Government tasked the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) to commission a survey of Australian NFP work in support of security sector reform (SSR). Specifically, SSR is understood to be a concept that ‘evolved over the last two decades to describe a range of efforts to improve the security of a state and its citizens, through an effective, affordable, accountable and transparent security sector. In all cases, but particularly for conflict-affected states, SSR is about the governance of the security sector.’

Conducted in partnership with the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), the hypothesis has been that while SSR is central to any political process in societies emerging from conflict, it is a difficult space for Australian NFPs to work in. Some NFPs choose not to work on these issues, and others who do find many roadblocks. Early interviews identified that the NFP SSR-related activities are likely to be concealed behind other humanitarian or development language, can be isolated from larger political engagement and peace processes, can be very difficult to find funding for, and policy makers and practitioners are uncertain of its impact.

Seeking to identify who is doing what where, and to understand some of the risks and opportunities they confront, the author approached the research from several angles:
•17 Australian NFPs completed an online survey that asked about SSR and about four cases: Afghanistan, Solomon Islands, South Sudan and Timor-Leste
•46 Australian and international experts were interviewed
•25 participants attended a workshop to debate the interim findings of the research in Canberra in December 2013
•additional NFP case studies were subsequently commissioned and included in this report.

Timor-Leste, which includes the enclave of Oe-Cusse Ambeno in the Western part of Timor Island, has an area of 14,919 square kilometers and is administratively divided into 13 districts and 67 sub-districts. The last census, concluded in 2010, determined that the total population was about 1, 114 534. Both Portuguese and Tétum are the official languages. In April 1974, the Portuguese empire crumbled and for Timor-Leste the time had come to gain independence. The withdrawal of the Portuguese military and government allowed for the full-scale invasion by the Indonesian Armed Forces on the 7th of December 1975 and the stage was set for a long and bloody war. In the first three years of warfare the structure of Fretilin was almost totally destroyed. Under the revitalised struggle led by Xanana Gusmão it was concluded that there was a need to adopt maximum flexibility through genuine guerrilla warfare. Two decades of growing unity and common purpose led to the vote of independence on 30 August 1999 and the subsequent total withdrawal of Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) from the territory on 1 November 1999, marking the end of 24-year war. After almost ten years of nationbuilding, the identification of national priorities and successful implementation of strategies to move ahead, constitute a trademark of Timorese governance.

Decades of peace operations, stabilisation efforts and disaster relief have resulted in widespread agreement about the civil‑military imperative in international responses to natural disasters, armed conflict and complex emergencies: to be effective, traditionally unconnected participants must now more often work in coordinated partnerships.
Progress is being made to develop comprehensive, integrated approaches at both the national (‘whole-of-government’) and the international (‘whole-of-system’) levels. But there are still questions remaining such as: what next for civil‑military effectiveness? What are the primary civil‑military capabilities? What capabilities will be required in future conflicts and disasters? Where should policy makers,
force developers, planners, practitioners and analysts focus their attention in the years to come?

To examine these questions and advance this important discussion, the Australian Civil‑Military Centre hosted the third annual Civil‑Military Interaction Seminar at Walsh Bay, Sydney from 7 to 10 November 2011.1 Framed by the theme ‘Civil‑Military Effectiveness: building tomorrow’s capabilities’, the aim of the seminar was to highlight current trends in civil‑military practice and discuss future needs in seeking to avert, mitigate and respond to conflicts and disasters.

The notion of the ‘Strategic Corporal’ in conflict is a necessary, but not sufficient concept. This idea recognises what we have long known. Effective operational outcomes rely on having good leaders at every level who know what they are doing. Military leadership, whether it is of an army or an infantry section, is something that we recognize easily. However, we must recognize, and make better preparations for the fact that we are already deploying civilians into conditions of modern warfare. These ‘complex’ operations range from counter-insurgency, stabilisation and reconstruction to peacebuilding, where even relatively junior officials and non-government organization representatives are making decisions with long-term strategic ramifications.

Even short of conflict, overseas deployments will involve military and civilians working together in humanitarian relief and disaster response. Natural disasters are often as politicised as warfare, the main distinction being that while the military will lead in combat operations, in virtually every other circumstance the military only supports the civil lead. Yet while our analysis of military leadership requirements is highly developed, our appreciation of the civilian leadership requirements for complex operations hardly exists. We need to develop a concept of the ‘Strategic Civilian’.

This article first appeared in The Small Wars Journal (March 2016).  It is re-printed here, unchanged, with the permission of the author in accordance with  Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Original publication available at:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-strategic-civilian-challenges-for-non-combatants-in-21st-century-warfare