History of Religious Freedom

В статье анализируется процесс регистрации в 1906-1916 годах 95 общин старообрядцев Томской губернии, отражённый в официальной губернской прессе. Характеризуется отношение представителей разных толков и согласий к самой регистрации и инициировавшему её государству. Делается вывод о наибольшей вовлеченности в процесс официальной регистрации общин двух согласий -- старообрядцев, приемлющих священство Белокриницкой иерархии, и поморского законобрачного согласия. Определяются отдельные вопросы, требующие дальнейшего изучения.
The article analyzes the process of registration in the years 1906-1916 95 communities of old believers Tomsk province, reflected in the official provincial press. Characterized the attitude of the representatives of different denominations to the Desk and requested it to the state. The conclusion about the greatest involvement in the process of official registration of communities of two concerts -- believers have adopted the priesthood Belokrinitskaya hierarchy, and Pomeranian legally-marriage denomination. Put certain questions that require further investigation.

This Dictionary of Freedom of Religion or Belief is published by the Astronist Institution through its imprint press Astral Publishing and will stand as the third entry in the Institutional Reference Works series. This Dictionary of Freedom of Religion or Belief provides a vast selection of terms covering all areas of religious liberty advocacy, the history of freedom of religion, human rights violations effecting religious freedom, current affairs and the mechanisms that the United Nations and other key organisations have put in place to ensure religious and belief freedoms are protected for every human being around the world. Compiled by Cometan, this dictionary follows on from the Concise Dictionary of Astronism (First Edition; 2020) and The Institutional Dictionary of Astronism (First Edition; 2021).

[From the back cover:] "As [Edmund S.] Morgan re-creates the evolution of [Roger] Williams's thoughts on the nature of the church and the state, he captures the institutions that informed Williams's worldview, from the Protestant Church in England to the Massachusetts government in the seventeenth century."

This article rethinks the problem of religious (in)tolerance by analyzing the 2015 deportation of three " Hindu priests " from a Caribbean nation for the practice of obeah. Defined popularly as " witchcraft " or " African tradition, " obeah was first criminalized as the alleged inspiration for the largest slave uprising of the eighteenth century British Caribbean. I argue that the recent deportations in a nation that constitutionally enshrines freedom of conscience foregrounds some of the foundational limits of liberal secularism. I trace a genealogy of liberalism to critique the secular ideal of the " freedom from difference. " I suggest that attempts to invoke " spirituality " as a more inclusive idiom for denigrated forms of " not-religion " such as obeah extend rather than eliminate these limits of liberal secularism. I close by drawing some parallels with anti-Muslim nationalism in the U.S. and suggest some ways of thinking about a trinary formation of religion, not-religion, and secular power in modern nation-states.

From amazon.com:
""Whoever needs an act of faith to elucidate an event that can be explained by reason is a fool, and unworthy of reasonable thought." This line, spoken by the notorious 18th-century libertine Giacomo Casanova, illustrates a deeply entrenched perception of religion, as prevalent today as it was hundreds of years ago. It is the sentiment behind the narrative that Catholic beliefs were incompatible with the Enlightenment ideals. Catholics, many claim, are superstitious and traditional, opposed to democracy and gender equality, and hostile to science. It may come as a surprise, then, to learn that Casanova himself was a Catholic. In The Catholic Enlightenment, Ulrich Lehner points to such figures as representatives of a long-overlooked thread of a reform-minded Catholicism, which engaged Enlightenment ideals with as much fervor and intellectual gravity as anyone. Their story opens new pathways for understanding how faith and modernity can interact in our own time.

Lehner begins two hundred years before the Enlightenment, when the Protestant Reformation destroyed the hegemony Catholicism had enjoyed for centuries. During this time the Catholic Church instituted several reforms, such as better education for pastors, more liberal ideas about the roles of women, and an emphasis on human freedom as a critical feature of theology. These actions formed the foundation of the Enlightenment's belief in individual freedom. While giants like Spinoza, Locke, and Voltaire became some of the most influential voices of the time, Catholic Enlighteners were right alongside them. They denounced fanaticism, superstition, and prejudice as irreconcilable with the Enlightenment agenda.

In 1789, the French Revolution dealt a devastating blow to their cause, disillusioning many Catholics against the idea of modernization. Popes accumulated ever more power and the Catholic Enlightenment was snuffed out. It was not until the Second Vatican Council in 1962 that questions of Catholicism's compatibility with modernity would be broached again.

Ulrich Lehner tells, for the first time, the forgotten story of these reform-minded Catholics. As Pope Francis pushes the boundaries of Catholicism even further, and Catholics once again grapple with these questions, this book will prove to be required reading."

This essay argues that Bunyan, especially through the narratives of his encounters in Restoration courts and imprisonment within a church-state system, provided a concrete, tangible model for political resistance that inspired American dissenters in their struggle for religious freedom, liberty of conscience and the abolishment of church-state systems.

L’art. 16 della Dichiarazione dei diritti dell’uomo e del cittadino del 26 agosto 1789 afferma: «Una società, nella quale la garanzia dei diritti non sia assicurata e la separazione dei poteri fissata, non ha una Costituzione». Non per questo la Rivoluzione francese riuscì a garantirli, essendo priva di un organismo, indipendente dalle maggioranze temporanee e provvisorie, che potesse impedire abusi e oppressione da parte di tali maggioranze. Secondo i giacobini, che seguivano le teorie illuministiche di Jean-Jacques Rousseau sulla «volontà generale», essa non poteva che manifestarsi attraverso l’Assemblea nazionale, intesa come corpo rappresentativo dell’intera cittadinanza.

I princìpi della Rivoluzione francese continuarono a diffondersi con Napoleone, seppure il condottiero corso sia stato autore di una svolta autoritaria, e la Restaurazione non riuscì ad impedirne la rivendicazione popolare, fino alla concessione di costituzioni ottriate ed al definitivo avvento delle democrazie parlamentari, che pongono la libertà di espressione tra i diritti fondamentali che lo stato ha l’obbligo di garantire.

Risalendo il fiume della storia ritroviamo sempre una contrapposizione tra diritto e forza o tra legge positiva (nomos) e legge della natura (physis), ma constatiamo che entrambe le prospettive e le pratiche del diritto sono efficaci, se è vero che gli esseri umani non hanno sino ad ora abbandonato né l’una né l’altra prospettiva argomentativa sull’origine e sul fondamento della legge. Ma da dove viene il diritto?

È possibile tentare di giustificare i diritti umani a partire da Dio, dalla Natura, dallo stato, persino dalla Storia o dalle consuetudini. Forse una più modesta argomentazione potrebbe individuare nei diritti costituzionalmente garantiti e protetti un rimedio, uno strumento di difesa nei confronti di abusi che si sono storicamente realizzati. Nulla di sacro o naturale, dunque, bensì una debole, ma imprescindibile, forma di difesa, la quale andrà a sua volta difesa contro i tentativi di utilizzarla per fini contrari a quelli per cui è stata codificata (come le più recenti dichiarazioni dei diritti non mancano di constatare).

The definition of "theocracy" has perplexed scholars for many centuries.  Some argue that theocracy exists only when religious leaders are also the actual, official political leaders and, as such, impose their particular theological views on the populace at large.  This essay argues that effective control of a polity by religious leaders and their theology is dispositive, regardless of the governmental organization that exists on paper.  For example, Roger Williams pointed out that in many theocracies (including that of seventeenth-century Massachusetts Bay) "the Magistrate is but the Ministers Cane through which the Clergy speaks . . . ."  "The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody" (London, 1652), 131.  The present essay was incorporated, with some additions and revisions, into Appendix B of Alan E. Johnson's book "The First American Founder: Roger Williams and Freedom of Conscience" (http://www.amazon.com/First-American-Founder-Williams-Conscience/dp/1511823712/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1436397728&sr=1-1).  For a summary of some of the points in this book, see the author's YouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCOlUZaehYk7WmwW8v9oBMzQ) about Roger Williams, including an interview (https://youtu.be/mGRl5lIbdYY) with the author about this book.

Note:  The sentence and citation on page 5, n.1, in this article referring to John M. Barry's book on Roger Williams should be qualified by Barry's remarks elsewhere in his book:  "Technically, the Bay was not a theocracy. Consistent with the admonition to render unto Caesar the things that were Caesar’s, and to God those which were God’s, the plantation prohibited a minister or church officer from simultaneously holding a government office. (For this reason some historians have argued that Puritan Massachusetts actually advanced the concept of separation of church and state.) But if not a theocracy, Massachusetts was theocentric."  Barry, Roger Williams, 169.  As discussed in this article, I disagree with the position that Massachusetts Bay was not a theocracy.

This paper aims to critically analyse the testimonies concerning Athenian impiety trials of the classical period. First, it reaffirms the arguments that some of them must have been an invention of Hellenistic and later authors. Second, it presents a likely political background behind the historical cases. Third, it discusses a number of legal issues, along with new arguments concerning the procedures employed. Finally, it examines some less well-known material from the fourth century BCE. Overall, it seeks to provide a possibly coherent and comprehensive framework of Athenian impiety trials based on their shared characteristics.

The task to reshape governments in the countries confronted with the Arab Spring prompts the question whether there are necessary conditions to realize a stable society that simultaneously seeks to eliminate the elements that have led to the uprisings. Acknowledging some constitutional rights seems indispensable in such a process. I argue that such a state of affairs is indeed the case, at least now that the ‘old’ justifications to differentiate between people do not suffice anymore. That is not to say that the countries involved will have identical laws in each respect, but merely that a common basis has to be realized, manifested in political and legal equality, so this given does not derogate from the fact that each country’s specific legislation needs to be shaped in the light of its own history. Such a basis has no ‘moral’ character, but is simply a necessary condition to prevent sedition.

This thesis analyses the role of theology in the birth of classical liberal political philosophy in the West. It aims to show that, like every system of ideas, liberalism is indebted to theology and metaphysics, and that Christian theology has played a major role in the birth thereof. It eventually argues that in the early modern age, liberal political theory was grounded on very basic premises that were borrowed from Christian
theology.

Freedom of Religion or Belief can be limited as an exceptional measure, to reestablish order and public security, or in the case of an epidemic as an exceptional measure and with the fulfillment of the following terms: 1. to be provided by law 2. to serve purposes of the political body in its whole (protection of security, public order, health, etc.) 3. to be nondiscriminatory in language and application 4. to strictly serve the purpose and announced period. W

Il volume ripercorre la genesi e l’evoluzione delle libertà di manifestazione del pensiero negli ordinamenti politici, a partire del V secolo a.C., analizzando, nel contesto storico, gli aspetti filosofici e giuridici di quello che è divenuto oggi un diritto fondamentale riconosciuto a livello internazionale. L’opera analizza, quindi, il connubio indissolubile tra libertà di stampa e costituzionalismo ed limiti alla libertà di manifestazione del pensiero, in particolare in relazione all’istituto della privacy. L’evoluzione millenaria del pensiero filosofico, politico e del diritto, a partire dalla pòlis greca, ha portato a considerare il diritto a manifestare liberamente il pensiero con la parola, con lo scritto e con ogni altro mezzo di comunicazione (art. 21 Cost. italiana), tra i diritti naturali (e per questo fondamentali). Non si tratta di un diritto riconosciuto ai soli cittadini di uno Stato, ma a tutti gli uomini. La libertà di manifestazione del pensiero è riconosciuta da tutte le moderne Costituzioni adottate degli Stati democratici, sancita dalla Dichiarazione universale dei diritti dell’uomo dell’Onu del 1948 e tutelata dalla Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali del 1950 e dal Patto internazionale di New York sui diritti civili e politici del 1966. L’affermazione di questo diritto è frutto di un percorso durato duemila e cinquecento anni, a partire dalla Grecia del V secolo a.C. (contrapposizione nomos e physis), passando per la Rivoluzione francese ed il periodo napoleonico, che hanno segnato la conquista definitiva della libertà di opinione, divenuta nel frattempo libertà di stampa.

Данная книга посвящена широкому кругу вопросов, связанных с
проблемами формирования государственно-конфесиональных от-
ношений и правовым регулированием свободы совести в Россий-
ской Федерации. Особое внимание авторы уделяют переломному в
истории религиозной свободы в России законодательству, а именно,
перспективам свободы совести после принятия антитеррористиче-
ского пакета, больше известного как закон «Яровой», который поста-
вил под жесткий контроль миссионерскую деятельность религиозных
объединений. В связи с этим анализируется сложившаяся судебная
практика, парадоксы российского восприятия религии в публичной
сфере, мифы и страхи российского общества.
При подготовке книги использовались материалы, опубликован-
ные на сайте Информационно-аналитического центра «Сова».
Издание предназначено для широкого круга читателей, интересу-
ющихся ролью религии в современном мире.

The effort to reclaim liberalism will require some understanding of what kind of liberalism to reclaim.  What is liberalism?  What has happened historically such that it needs to be reclaimed?  These turn out to be difficult questions.  In this essay I propose a theoretical account of liberalism, a way of understanding what it is and why it has undergone such dramatic changes over the course of its history.  At the heart of my account is the claim that liberalism did not come into being as an independent historical phenomenon but was rather a contingent aspect of a much broader, more powerfully sweeping historical movement, the “modern quest for freedom,” which predates liberalism, gives rise to it, and eventually overtakes it—at which point the quest for freedom itself (notoriously) retains the name “liberalism” in the United States for reasons partly principled, partly expedient.  The theory of liberalism on offer here occupies the bulk of this essay, but it is not the only contribution I hope to make.  My account of liberalism facilitates a unique assessment of some of its current weaknesses.  And this in turn makes possible a concrete analysis of what an effort to reclaim liberalism might look like.  In the end, I argue that the politics of warring freedoms (what contemporary liberalism has in part become) should give way to a markedly different conception of politics, which I call the politics of liberal truce.

The four Sunni schools of Islamic Law developed the consensus that male apostates must be put to death, and most also agreed that female apostates be dealt with in the same way. The sourcebooks of Islam, however, are not so unambiguous. The Quran certainly promises punishment for adultery in the hereafter, but punishment in this life is not as clear. Jurists and others cited a number of verses to support death as the punishment, as well as traditional sayings attributed to the messenger of Islam. This brief article for The Encyclopedia of the Bible and its Reception (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007-) appears in this pdf (cols. 470-471) following several articles on apostasy from other angles.

La recente riforma dell’art. 24 della Costituzione messicana, approvata dal Senato federale il 28 marzo 2012, rappresenta l'ultimo capitolo della storia dei rapporti tra lo Stato e la Chiesa cattolica nel Paese, più volte segnati nel corso del XX secolo da momenti di tensione o di aperto conflitto. Con l’ultima modifica dell’art. 24 non si chiude tuttavia il periodo delle riforme costituzionali relative a tale ambito: a questo riguardo un documento licenziato dalla Commissione parlamentare competente afferma esplicitamente che il riconoscimento del diritto alla libertà di culto, che costituisce l’oggetto precipuo dell’art. 24, potrà aprire la strada verso un’ulteriore revisione degli artt. 3, 5, 27 e 130 della Costituzione, oltre che della Ley de Asociaciones Religiosas y culto Público del 1992.

J. Doomen and A. Ellian (eds.), De strijd van gelijkheid en vrijheid. The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2015. This study inquires the extent of freedom of expression in the present era. I wrote a chapter (pp. 107-123) and co-authored the general introduction (pp. 9-24).

The essay critically discusses the graduation report of Roderigo Lopez, a Portuguese student proclaimed artium et medicinae doctor at the Paduan Studium in 1559. The meticulous analysis of the document and the reconstruction of the social, political, scientific and academic context of the time, allows us to recognize a celebrity of the 16th century in the Lusitanian student Roger Lopez (1517/1525-1594). He was personal physician of Elizabeth I of England and an important intermediary between the last court of the Tudors, Portugal and Spain of Philip II; he was finally sentenced to death by quartering. Shakespearean scholars believe that the poet was inspired by Lopez personal tragedy to outline the figure of Shylock, the Jew of the Merchant of Venice (about 1596-1598). The article proposes the thesis according to which the Paduan student is the future Elizabethan doctor, as many biographical information and some aspects of the English literary masterpiece seem to confirm. This would finally explain what prompted the Portuguese to move to England, how he was able to make such a prestigious career and to enjoy such a vast credit at court, and why he was executed. That was a complex story in which Francis Walsingham’s stay in Padua and Lopez’s real adherence to Judaism could have played a decisive role. The true archetype of Shylock could therefore have been a «Paduan» doctor.

Keywords: Jews – William Shakespeare – Portugal – Elisabeth I – Francis Walsingham

"Die Freiheit des Glaubens, des Gewissens und die Freiheit des religiösen und weltanschaulichen Bekenntnisses sind unverletzlich" (Artikel 4.1 und 4.2 GG). Religionsfreiheit ist ein Grundrecht und steht jedem Menschen bedingungslos zu. Es findet seine Schranken nur in den Grundrechtspositionen anderer. Die gesetzgeberische Regelungsbefugnis ist in der grundgesetzlichen Ordnung auf diesen Ausgleich von Grundrechtskollisionen eng begrenzt. Das Grundgesetz bietet zudem Religionsgemeinschaften die Hand des Staa-tes zur Kooperation. Dieser deutsche religionsverfassungsrechtliche Sonderweg ist in Zeiten von Säkularisierung und religiöser Pluralisierung ins Gerede gekom-men. Soll Religion nicht Privatsache sein und der Staat sich hier nicht völlig her-aushalten? Muss nicht Schluss sein mit althergebrachten Rechten der Kirchen? Und was wird mit dem Islam in Deutschland? Wo hat die weltanschauliche Neutralität des Staates ihren Platz und wo ist sie nur Vorwand, um die Religi-onsfreiheit von Gläubigen einzuschränken? Diese Fragen im Rahmen deutscher verfassungsrechtlicher Tradition und menschenrechtlicher Anforderungen zu beantworten, ist die aktuelle Herausfor-derung der Religionspolitik.

La questione della libertà religiosa in ambito cattolico. Il Vaticano II: la dichiarazione "Dignitatis Humanae" e il Magistero Pontificio in tema di libertà religiosa dal Vaticano II ai giorni nostri. Elaborato svolto nell'ambito dell'insegnamento: "Diritti fondamentali: l'esercizio della libertà di pensiero, di coscienza, di religione" tenuto dal professor Francesco Zannini, nell'anno accademico 2019-2020 del Master di secondo livello: Diritto delle migrazioni. Le politiche migratorie, presso l'università degli Studi di Bergamo. Paolo Cugini (matricola n. 1072100) SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione. 2. La novità della Dignitatis Humanae. 3. La proposta. 4. Il Magistero pontificio in tema di libertà religiosa da Paolo VI a Francesco. 4.1. Paolo VI e il contributo alla conferenza di Helsinki. 4.2. Giovanni Paolo II. Passi verso il dialogo tra le religioni come via della pace. 4.3. Benedetto XVI. La fatica del dialogo. 4.4. Francesco. La fatica che paga: la dichiarazione di Abu Dhabi. 5. Conclusione.

Данная статья представляет собой публикацию с комментарием письма советских верующих о гонениях на монахов Почаевской лавры. Публикуемый документ хранится в архиве Кестонского центра по изучению религиозной политики и общества (Университет Бэйлор, Техас, США), ранее в архиве Кестонского института (Оксфорд, Великобритания). Попав на запад в 1964 г., он сыграл немаловажную роль в распространении информации о религиозных преследованиях в СССР в годы хрущевской антирелигиозной кампании и конкретно в учреждении Кестонского института в 1969 г. Публикация письма сопровождается вступительной статьей, которая вводит письмо в контекст холодной войны на «религиозном фронте», и комментариями справочного характера.

This is the publication of a letter from Soviet believers about persecutions of the monks of Pochaev Lavra, Ukraine. This letter is preserved
in the Keston Center for Religion Politics and Society at Baylor University, Texas, USA, earlier in the Keston Institute (Oxford, UK). This
document reached the West in 1964 and played an important role in
spreading the information about antireligious assaults in the USSR
in the years of the Khrushchev rule and particularly in the establishment of the Keston Institute in 1969. The publication is accompanied
with an introductory note that places the document within the Cold
War “religious front” context, and reference commentaries.

The attached PDF contains the title page, copyright page, epigraphs, and table of contents for "The First American Founder: Roger Williams and Freedom of Conscience" by Alan E. Johnson (available in paperback and Kindle editions at Amazon websites throughout the world).  For additional information, see http://www.amazon.com/First-American-Founder-Williams-Conscience/dp/1511823712/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1436397728&sr=1-1.

The Church-State conflict in revolutionary Mexico was one of the most relevant issues in Pius XI' pontificate. The paper focused on some aspects of Vatican diplomacy in regard to this, particularly on the intervention on behalf of Mexican Catholics at the Sixth Panamerican Conference (Havana, 1928).
- - -
Il conflitto tra Stato e Chiesa nel Messico rivoluzionario rientra a pieno titolo nei temi caratterizzanti del pontificato di Pio XI. Il presente contributo evidenzia alcuni aspetti dell'azione diplomatica della Santa Sede a favore della Chiesa cattolica messicana, concentrandosi in particolare sull'intervento vaticano in occasione della VI Conferenza panamericana dell'Avana (gennaio-febbraio 1928).

Malgré l'intérêt unanime vis-à-vis des concepts d’Ethique et de
Liberté, les différents héritages socioculturels maintiennent jusqu’à nos jours un clivage important entre différentes prises de position  relatives aux problèmes posés par le développement sociétal et l’impact des nouvelles technologies sur la vie des hommes. On pourrait dire que le vingtième siècle est le siècle non seulement de changements importants et profonds aux niveaux des sciences, des sciences appliquées et des sciences humaines et sociales, mais aussi que c’est le
siècle des défis lancés dans toutes les directions, de leurs retombées et des réactions auxquelles ils ont donné lieu.

La complémentarité de ces deux concepts, quand il s’agit de la personne humaine comme monôme sociétal, explique ce double intérêt. En effet, la Liberté est cet élément intrinsèque qui permet à la personne humaine de se définir à partir de son « choix libre », alors que l’Ethique est l’élément extrinsèque qui
régit les aspects relationnels dans ce qu’ils ont d’absolu. Ceci explique pourquoi ces deux concepts se sont développés  constamment avec le temps. Jusqu’à nos jours ce développement est sujet à des débats sans fin et à des remises en cause permanentes.

En ce début du  vingt et unième siècle, le débat reste grand ouvert particulièrement au niveau de la réflexion théologique : Où se place cette réflexion dans le cadre général du débat sur l’homme et sa Liberté ? Du débat sur l’Ethique et l’impact du sociétal sur le développement de la pensée religieuse à
cet égard? Du débat sur le regard critique à avoir vis-à-vis des prises de position considérées jusque là comme immuables et incontournables à partir d’une vision « évangélique » du monde.

El conformismo histórico parece ser la única respuesta permitida a quienes, en un afán que suena a escabroso, destacan la opacidad de las libertades modernas, especialmente de aquellas que integran el nicho más preciado de la Ilustración, desde Bayle hasta Kant, cual es el de la libertad de conciencia y de religión.
A fin de exorcizar tal incómoda sensación, que condiciona paradójicamente nuestra libertad de razonar, se hace necesario considerar ese nicho en su génesis conceptual e histórica. En otros términos, para comprender enteramente el sentido de la libertad de conciencia y de religión moderna es imprescindible apreciarlas no sólo en su momento estático actual, en su presente inmediato, sino también en el despliegue de su idea en el tiempo. Es lo que intenta hacer este artículo en sus lineamientos generales.

Dissenter Protestantism and Pietist and revivalist movements have played an important, but seldom recognized, role in the emergence and development of an independent civil society, democracy, religious freedom and freedom of expression, the struggle against slavery, and the feminist movement. The article begins with the example of the Oberlin community and College in Ohio and then focuses on the emergence of dissenter Protestantism in seventeenth-century England, its continuation in the US, and similar developments in places like Germany, Sweden, and South Africa. The article also shows how effects of this history are reflected in quantitative studies undertaken within the social sciences. Using theories from sociology, moral psychology, and other behavioural sciences, it is argued that this social role of dissenter Protestantism is an effect of a complex combination of theology, practices, and institutions together with specific historical circumstances. The theology is not unique, but the emphasis on following Jesus Christ and sanctification is important. Other factors include the role of friendship and thick social networks, a relative egalitarianism, a certain distance and independence from dominant institutions and cultures, and the creation of self-organized and relatively autonomous organisations. The combination of these theological and social elements leads to the opening of free spaces that make the development of different or new practices possible. Also important is the ability to unite reasoning and affective powers and the specific practices and institutions one can enter and grow into. The article ends with a short theological reflection on sacramentality.

This essay articulates and defends a global normative paradigm of religious freedom: a minimum standard of respect for religious freedom that is rooted in human dignity and consistent with a variety of cultural and constitutional frameworks. This paradigm is fleshed out in three arguments: an argument about transcendence; an argument for a certain dualism about religion and politics, and an argument regarding regulation. The first focuses on the concept of religion; the second, on that of freedom; and the third, on rights. The first shows that, though the concept of religious freedom has rightly been expanded to protect nonbelievers as well as believers, all legal systems and constitutional frameworks should be open to the idea of transcendence as such, in order to protect the transcendent dimension of the human person. The argument for dualism calls for an interdependent dualistic structure that guarantees autonomy for both political and religious communities while imposing limits on the principle of laïcité and to theocratic impulses. Finally, the argument for regulation defends the power of political communities to regulate specifically those religious matters which affect the public sphere.