Judicial Discretion

In the Matter of: Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC; DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc.; Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Acceptance Corp.; Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.; and Asset Backed Securities Corporation Respondents.

ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE AND DESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO SECTION 8A OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECTION 21C OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING FINDINGS, AND
IMPOSING A CEASE-AND-DESIST ORDER

Abstract. Nel dibattito sulla prova specialistica, in particolare scientifica, si evoca spesso una formula, “Iudex peritus peritorum”, per rendere l’idea dell’autonomia valutativa riservata al giudice anche in questa sfera. Tuttavia, non solo l’idea si particolarizza in varianti molteplici e difficili da discernere, ma neppure è chiaro quali di esse siano compatibili con l’epistemologia giudiziaria accolta nel nostro sistema penale. Il presente saggio tenta di affrontare entrambi i problemi. Dopo aver illustrato le grandi articolazioni del ragionamento probatorio specialistico, nonché i principali modi in cui il giudice può contribuire al suo svolgimento, esso sottopone a critica questi ultimi, considerati come altrettante immagini del iudex peritus peritorum.
Abstract. In the debate on the specialized evidence, especially on the scientific one, the formula “Iudex peritus peritorum” is often evoked to express the idea of the evaluation autonomy reserved to the judge also in this sphere. However, not only does the idea differentiate itself into multiple and difficult to discern variants, but it is not even clear which of them are compatible with the judicial epistemology accepted in our criminal system. This essay attempts to address both problems. Having illustrated the great articulations of the specialized evidential reasoning and the main ways in which the judge can contribute to its development, it critically scrutinizes the latter, considered as many images of the iudex peritus peritorum.

The mechanism for cancellation of bail is provided in law in order to ensure that justice will be done to the society by preventing the accused who had been set at liberty by the bail order from tampering with the evidence in a heinous crime. At the same time, cancellation of bail takes away the liberty granted by the Constitution and affirmed by an order of the Court, which granted bail. Taking note of the fact that cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made, it has been emphasized that the same should always be exercised very sparingly by the court of law.

PROBLEM: School officials throughout the United States have adopted zero tolerance
policies to address student discipline, resulting in an increase in out-of-school
suspensions and expulsions. The introduction of police on school campuses also
increased the referral of students to the juvenile courts. Although school personnel
generally view zero tolerance policies as a constructive measure, this approach denies
recent research on adolescent brain development that mischief is a foreseeable
derivative of adolescence.
METHODS: A case study method examined one juvenile court’s innovative
multi-integrated systems approach related to the adverse trends associated with zero
tolerance policies.
FINDINGS: A multi-disciplinary protocol resulted in more effective youth assessments
that reduced out-of-school suspensions and school referrals; increased graduation
rates by 20%; and decreased delinquent felony rates by nearly 50%. The
resulting protocol changed how the system responds to disruptive students by
significantly reducing out-of-school suspensions and school referrals, and putting
into place alternatives as well as providing community resources to address the
underlying causes of the behavior.
CONCLUSION: A multi-systems approach that targets the reasons for disruptive
behavior improves student educational and behavioral outcomes.

This thesis examines the influence of the governments of the Member States of the European Union (EU) on the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Part One develops an analytical framework inspired by  Giddens' structuration theory, which offers both a general understanding of the ECJ decision-making process, and helps assess governments' influence in and on that process. It identifies and exposes the evolving internal (i.e. organisational, procedural, substantive and normative) and external (i.e. legal, political, economical and social) structures which impact on judicial decisions at EU level, and agents that take part in and shape this process (i.e. ECJ judges, Advocate General and staff, EC institutions, national judges, individuals, companies, interest groups, academics, journalists, national MPs, actors of the civil society, etc.), so as to provide an understanding of how varying actors-structures combinations may open or close governmental opportunities for influence in and on the ECJ decision-making process.
In Part Two, it engages in an examination of the various means by which national governments participate in that process, by acting either outside the Court, collectively (i.e. control over the Court’s procedures, powers and jurisdictions, over the legal framework, over the political process, etc.) or individually (i.e. criticism of the ECJ, political appointments or non-compliance), or inside the Court, especially by taking part in preliminary reference proceedings. This analysis leads to conclusions on national governments’ capacity to influence Community case law and on the desirability of such influence, within the context of democratic and pluralist decision-making and law-making at EU level.

El artículo aborda dos cuestiones de método jurídico. La primera es la de si en los casos convencionalmente no resueltos (los que en principio admiten más de una respuesta) los jueces deciden discrecionalmente o tienen el deber de hallar la mejor respuesta (la única correcta). La segunda cuestión es la de cómo deben debatir los magistrados cuando se enfrentan a un caso que, en principio, admite más de una respuesta. El desafío teórico para juristas prácticos radica en que, por lo general, tienden a dar respuestas incompatibles entre sí a estas dos cuestiones.

This work considers to what extent judicial discretion can be said to exist in the UK legal system. It then considers that discretion with reference to the theories of Professor Ronald Dworkin. Then, the ‘one right answer’ thesis of professor Dworkin is critiqued with reference to case law of the Scottish and United Kingdom superior courts, and other relevant jurisdictions.

The foremost expression of judicial discretion in Scotland - the exercise of the ‘nobile officium’ is considered. This is the courts power to depart from law to ensure justice. This power is considered in the context of Ronald Dworkin’s treatment of principles.

The article concludes by attempting to rebut arguments against discretion by positing that such power is necessary and valuable in a common law system. Finally, conclusion is reached that the ‘one right answer’ theory cannot be posited with sense in Scotland, a common law system with civilian roots.

RESUMO

Por intermédio da presente pesquisa, sumarizar-se-á as concepções da interpretação do direito na sociedade ao redor da história, contudo preocupando-se em destrinchar qual o papel do juiz, assim como se é cabível, a ele, fazer uso de uma discricionariedade para adequação das normas ao caso concreto. Assim, compreendendo a atividade exercida, e o porquê de ela existir, este trabalho divide as concepções sobre a interpretação do direito em duas categorias (positivismo e pós-positivismo), ressaltando, em cada, dois de seus principais bastiões e defensores – assim como suas percepções e concessões (ou não) ao discricionarismo. No caso do positivismo jurídico aqui se apresentam Hans Kelsen e Hebert Hart, enquanto ao pós-positivismo se apresentam Robert Alexy e Ronald Dworkin. Assim, por meio desses autores, estabelecer-se-á a relação, para eles, entre direito e moral (se é que pode haver alguma) dentro de um sistema jurídico de interpretação de normas e sua aplicabilidade ao caso concreto – apresentando-se, adicionalmente, eventuais críticas gerais a cada uma das duas vertentes formuladas e como tais jusfilósofos percebem o papel da discricionariedade dentro da interpretação do Direito. Após esse arcabouço teórico e, sobretudo, histórico, debruçar-se-á sobre a recepção, em território brasileiro, de teorias positivistas e pós-positivistas, assim como a atuação da suprema corte brasileira (Supremo Tribunal Federal) na aplicação dessas teorias em duas de suas recentes decisões, e suas eventuais consequências. Ao fim há a exposição de uma possível solução – e de maneira justificada –, à luz do pós-positivismo jurídico, ao problema interpretativo de normas – e de posturas discricionárias –, assim como uma ponderação sobre se é possível uma eventual tentativa de vinculação do Direito e da moral dentro do ordenamento jurídico brasileiro.

Palavras-chave: Positivismo Jurídico; Pós-Positivismo Jurídico; Discricionariedade; Voluntarismo; Interpretação Jurídica.

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ABSTRACT

Throughout this research, it will be summarized the conceptions of Law interpretation in the society around history, nevertheless unraveling the role of the judge, as well as if it is appropriate to him the use of a discretionary posture to adjust the Law to a case. Thus, understanding the activity performed, and why it exists, this work splits the theories of Law interpretation into two categories (positivism and post-positivism), but emphasizing, in each, two of its main bastions and defenders – as well as their perceptions and concessions (or not) to discretionary. For a positivist perspective, Hans Kelsen and Hebert Hart are presented, while, for a post-positivism perspective Robert Alexy and Ronald Dworkin are presented. Thereby, through these scholars, it will be established their perspectives on a possible relationship between Law and morality (if any at all) within a legal system of interpretation of norms, and its applicability case to case. Also, it will be pipelined the general critics drafted toward each of the two aspects of interpretation of Law and how each one of these scholars perceive the role of discretionary within it. So, after a theoretical and historical framework, it will be addressed the reception of positivism and post-positivism in Brazil, as well an analyses of recent decisions portrayed by the Brazilian supreme court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) in the application of both theories – and its consequences. In the end, it will be exposed to a possible solution, guided by the legal post-positivism, for the problem surrounding the interpretation of Law – and discretionary postures – as well as the possibility (or not), to link Law and morals within the Brazilian legal system.

Keywords: Positivism; Post-Positivism; Discritionarity; Voluntarism; Interpretation of the Law.

1. У цьому дослідженні суддівський розсуд розглядається як суб’єктивний вибір одного з можливих варіантів у тлумаченні та застосуванні права та у встановленні фактів, що здійснюється суддею. Це не виключає існування інших підходів до визначення цього поняття.
2. Різні (й істотно різні) варіанти тлумачення права є невідворотними, оскільки невід’ємною ознакою будь-якої мови, у т. ч. юридичної, є багатозначність.
3. Варіанти тлумачення не можуть бути оцінені у площині «істинний-хибний». Обрання одного варіанту не означає, що він «правильний» або «істинний». Обрання такого варіанту підпорядковується певним, дуже суб’єктивним, критеріям або принципам, які спрощено можна описати вибором «кращого» (більш «розумного» і «справедливого») варіанту. Це не виключає можливості допущення при тлумаченні явних помилок чи недоречностей – наприклад, порушення законів формальної логіки.
4. При оцінці доказів, суддя завжди робить лише припущення щодо фактів, діючи на підставі наявної інформації, яка, теоретично, завжди може виявитися неповною або неправдивою. Хоча висновок щодо фактів може бути оцінений в площині «істинний-хибний», така оцінка також завжди буде суб’єктивною і також завжди буде ґрунтуватися на інформації, яка теж може виявитися неповною або неправдивою.
5. Правова система повинна завжди допускати різні тлумачення права, так само, як і відмінності при встановленні фактів, надаючи суддям, що здійснюють свої функції добросовісно, імунітет від будь-якої відповідальності.
6. Принцип, згідно з яким суддя, що добросовісно здійснює правосуддя, не повинен підлягати юридичній відповідальності, закріплений у загальновизнаних міжнародних стандартах у сфері судочинства.
7. Відповідно до міжнародних стандартів у сфері судочинства, у разі виходу судді за межі допустимого суддівського розсуду можлива дисциплінарна (у разі грубої недбалості або злого умислу), цивільна (у разі злого умислу та, відповідно до деяких підходів, грубої недбалості) та кримінальна (у випадку злого умислу) відповідальність.
8. Дисциплінарна відповідальність за дії поза межами допустимого суддівського розсуду можлива як у випадку, коли закон встановлює спеціальну формулу (формули) проступку, так і у випадку, коли у ньому закріплена лише загальна формула проступку (наприклад, шляхом її опису лише як «невиконання службових обов’язків»).
9. Суддівський розсуд підлягає не лише обмеженням, які позитивно передбачені законом, але також певним загальним правилам. Ці правила загалом можуть бути сформульовані наступним чином: (1) сфера суддівського розсуду поширюється на варіанти, які не сприймаються юридичною спільнотою як явно незаконні («неправильні»); (2) кожен суддя зобов’язаний обрати варіант, який він або вона вважає найкращим; (3) вибір не може бути випадковим чи свавільним і потребує пояснення.
10. Правило sub judice на даний час не є частиною позитивного регулювання. Воно не розширює імунітету, який надається судді при здійсненні суддівського розсуду. Тому не існує загальної заборони щодо притягнення судді до відповідальності у справах, що не закінчені розглядом, яке б розуміння «незакінченої розглядом справи» ми не обрали.
11. Потреби у закріпленні у законі правила sub judice як загальної формули не існує. Натомість, міркування, які лежать в основі правила, повинні враховуватися при розгляді кожної конкретної справи з тим, щоб не справляти на суд невиправданого і надмірного тиску, який міг би непропорційно вплинути на його незалежність.
12. Принцип res judicata не надає судді будь-якого імунітету. Крім того, будь-які факти, встановлені у судовому рішенні, що не є зміненим чи скасованим, не мають преюдиційного значення для органу, що вирішує питання про притягнення судді до відповідальності.
13. Відмежування «грубої недбалості» від «звичайної» недбалості чи дій, вчинених добросовісно, є питанням практики, а не формулювання абстрактних формул. Перелік прикладів, в яких суддя був притягнутий до відповідальності за «грубу недбалість», буде набагато більш інформативним, ніж загальні дискусії щодо значення цього терміна.
14. Рішення, що суперечить панівному підходу, не повинно розглядатися як «помилка», якщо більшість правової спільноти сприймає підхід, обраний суддею, як добросовісний – навіть якщо сам підхід спільнота не поділяє.
15. Очевидна помилка може сягати рівня грубої недбалості у випадку, якщо дії судді не лише суперечили певним формальним правилам, але і не відповідали загальним, засадничим уявленням про справедливість та розумність, прийнятим у правовій спільноті.
16. Злий умисел передбачає наявність наміру правопорушника (у цьому випадку – судді). Прояви злого умислу судді рідко можна знайти у його чи її позапроцесуальній поведінці (хоча це також можливо). У більшості ситуацій про умисел судді свідчать його процесуальні дії.
17. Умисел може підтверджуватися, наприклад, відсутністю мотивування рішення, усуненням особи, питання про права і обов’язки якої вирішене судом, від судового розгляду, явним виходом за межі юрисдикції суду, повторністю допущених порушень, відхиленням від звичайної практики судді, включаючи строки розгляду справи. Втім, всі ці прояви слід розглядати у контексті конкретної справи. Не існує загальної формули чи переліку, які б дозволили встановити наявність умислу.

La distinction du fait et du droit est une problématique centrale dans l'organisation des voies de droit. Elle exerce en effet, au-delà d'une variété de formes et de significations, une influence décisive sur l'office du juge ainsi que sur la fonction des autorités soumises à son contrôle. Pour appréhender pleinement la portée qu'elle revêt dans l'équilibre des pouvoirs établi par la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, il est nécessaire de se défaire de toute préconception de la distinction du fait et du droit (notamment au regard des pratiques observées en droit interne), afin de comprendre comment le juge de l'Union européenne exerce un pouvoir de détermination à son égard, que ce soit dans le contrôle de validité des actes juridiques ou dans les voies de recours dirigées contre des actes juridictionnels. Dans cette opération, elle reste toutefois soucieuse d'assurer l'acceptabilité de ses décisions, et prend donc en considération certaines contraintes juridiques qui se présentent à elle dans son office. Autorité normatrice et ordonnatrice, la Cour de justice en tant qu'interprète authentique utilise en réalité la distinction du fait et du droit comme un instrument de répartition des compétences entre les différents acteurs concernés par la réalisation du droit de l'Union européenne. Elle définit ainsi, à travers la détermination de la distinction du fait et du droit dans chacune de ses manifestations, l'habilitation que leur confère le système juridique. En ce sens, elle apparaît comme la juridiction suprême de cet espace normatif.

The legislation alone cannot make justice available to citizens in society. Seeking equality in an unequal society is a task demanding concerted action on the part of the individuals, the community, government and the judiciary on a continuing basis. This is what women as a class must realize in their struggle for equal justice in the democratic republic of India.

This dissertation considers whether the provision of the Islamic law of qisas and diyat in Pakistan is justifiable in light of how it is employed to evade punishment for honor killings, thereby producing an environment in which the freedom of women, and men, is severely limited. This research paper first examines the law itself, and its historical and religious context, to demonstrate why it has persisted. Second, it evaluates the inadequate attempts to curtail honour killings, the considerable shortcomings of these reforms, and the contemporary relevance of qisas and diyat—if any—in the modern criminal justice system. Finally, this dissertation identifies the issues central to honour killings, such as the institutional biases at the heart of law enforcement and the judiciary, the inferior position of women in Pakistani society, and the tribal structures that perpetuate honour killings—all in the context of human rights and by studying the significant body of case law on the subject. In light of the findings, the issues detailed, and the areas that have been highlighted for reform, this dissertation concludes that the current model of qisas and diyat is unjustifiable and in immediate need of change.

Väitöstyön tarkoituksena on tuottaa opetushenkilöstön eli kunnan viranhaltijoina toimivan opettajan ja rehtorin harkintavallasta kokonaiskuva kunnan järjestämän perusopetuksen kurinpitotilanteessa. Tutkimusaihe on ajankohtainen, sillä oppimisympäristön häiriö- ja turvallisuutta vaarantavien tilanteiden lisääntymisen johdosta opetushenkilöstölle on lisätty lailla toimivaltaa kurinpitokeinojen käyttöön. Tämä on aiheuttanut sen, että opetushenkilöstön asemaa kurinpitotilanteessa tarkastellaan nykyisin pikemminkin oikeudellisista lähtökohdista kuin perinteiseen tapaan opetuksen asiantuntijan näkökulmasta.

Tutkimuksessa keskitytään vain sellaisiin kurinpitotilanteisiin, joissa opetushenkilö käyttää tosiasiallista julkista valtaa eli hänen tulee tehdä päätös kurinpitokeinon käyttämisestä hyvin nopeassa ajassa oppilaan aiheuttamassa häiriö- tai turvallisuutta vaarantavassa tilanteessa. Tutkimuksessa systematisoidaan paitsi ne oikeudelliset ja muut normatiiviset niin myös tosiasialliset tilanteessa huomioitavat seikat, jotka vaikuttavat opetushenkilöstön harkintavaltaan. Harkintavallan kokonaisuuden koostamiseksi tavoitteena on tuottaa mahdollisimman laaja verkostomainen kokonaisuus, jossa eri näkökulmat sekä eri näkökulmien väliset, mahdollisesti ristiriitaisetkin suhteet yhdistyvät. Verkostokokonaisuuden kautta on tarkoitus tarkastella perusopetuslain muutosten vaikutuksia, kuten opetushenkilöstön tosiasiallisia mahdollisuuksia toimia lainsäätäjän tarkoittamalla tavalla sekä ylipäätään koulumaailman oikeudellistumisen vaikutuksia.

La demora judicial ha motivado sucesivas reformas en la administración de justicia penal bonaerense. Estas reformas han tenido como efecto el adelantamiento del momento resolutivo del proceso penal a la etapa de garantías. Esta tendencia se ha acentuado con la introducción audiencias orales tempranas en el año 2005. Este artículo analiza en detalle las prácticas que han surgido a raíz de estos cambios. Se busca en particular comprender los efectos que han tenido la introducción de los diversos mecanismos de solución alternativa de conflictos (juicio abreviado, suspensión de juicio a prueba y mediación) y de las audiencias orales tempranas. Para llevar a cabo este análisis se recurre a entrevistas con los propios actores judiciales, la observación de sus prácticas judiciales diarias y el análisis de datos estadísticos sobre el uso de estos mecanismos alternativos.

In the accepting of the operation of the law in different countries it has been evident that scheduling conference is part  of the trial process. This has however been greatly accommodated in the laws and practice, but deposition has not been accorded the same with my study basically pointed on the East Community, it is a procedure yet to be adopted.

Much empirical analysis has documented racial disparities at the beginning and end stages of a criminal case. However, our understanding about the perpetuation of — and even corrections for — differential outcomes as the process unfolds remains less than complete. This Article provides a comprehensive examination of criminal dispositions using all DWI cases in North Carolina during the period 2001-2011, focusing on several major decision points in the process. Starting with pretrial hearings and culminating in sentencing results, we track differences in outcomes by race and gender. Before sentencing, significant gaps emerge in the severity of pretrial release conditions that disadvantage black and Hispanic defendants. Yet when prosecutors decide whether to pursue charges, we observe an initial correction mechanism: Hispanic men are almost two-thirds more likely to have those charges dropped relative to white men. Although few cases survive after the plea bargaining stage, a second c...

The general, but false, perception of migrant smuggling through Indonesia, a large, archipel-agic country, is that smugglers operate entirely on their own. In fact, the more complex smuggling operations rely on broad networks of foreign organizers as well as local intermediaries and ground staff. In 2011, the Indonesian legislature introduced a severe minimum sentence for any involvement in migrant smuggling with the expectation that the judiciary would apply the sentence in all future cases. However, some judges proceeded to hand down sentences below the statutory minimum, arguing that the punishment is not commensurate to the relatively minor roles played by locals. This article examines how judges at all levels of the judiciary did so in ten related cases. In conclusion, it argues that statutory sentences are not mandatory in Indonesia and that, by applying below-minimum sentences, judges not only maintain judicial independence; they also effectively exercise a judicial review fu...

Este trabajo analiza las formas en que pueden reglamentarse los derechos fundamentales y el modo en que esto puede incidir en el cumplimiento de los objetivos del proceso penal. Para esto, primero se muestra que el análisis del tema debe ser sensible a los desacuerdos que pueden generarse al precisar las exigencias de los derechos y discutir sobre sus posibles reglamentaciones. Luego, mediante la tipología conocida como «reglas» (normas más precisas) y «estándares» (normas más vagas), se exponen dos modelos que permiten identificar las principales alternativas disponibles según reduzcan o amplíen, respectivamente, la discrecionalidad judicial para tomar decisiones en el proceso. Asimismo, se argumenta que un modelo puede ser atractivo para imponer límites más fuertes al poder estatal, mientras que el otro puede encontrarse en mejores condiciones para aumentar la eficiencia del proceso en la búsqueda de la verdad.

This Article, which is part of a symposium on “Law and Ethics at the Frontier of Genetic Technology,” examines an unprecedented experimental study published in Science.  The Science study indicated that psychopathic criminal offenders were more likely to receive lighter sentences if a judge was aware of genetic and neurobiological explanations for the offender’s psychopathy. This Article contends that the study’s conclusions derive from substantial flaws in the study’s design and methodology. The hypothetical case upon which the study is based captures just one narrow and unrepresentative component of how genetic and neurobiological information operates, and the study suffers from serious omissions that affect the validity and reliability of its results. It is important to call attention to these problems given that the study’s widely-publicized findings are likely to bolster inaccurate perceptions regarding the dangers of allowing behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases. This Article concludes with a detailed discussion of a number of recent criminal cases involving behavioral genetics evidence. Familiarity with such cases may improve the real-world applicability of future experimental studies exploring the influence of genetics evidence on criminal cases.

This research empirically examined indicators of charging and sentence reduction and the criminal sanctions meted out to a representative sample of felons convicted in one midwestern state court. A multivariate analysis of prosecutorial and judicial discretion examined the injluence of case, personal, social, and criminal justice process factors. The utility of sentencing guidelines for achieving fairness and justice in criminal justice policy and practices was assessed.

Karl Llewellyn's critique of the canons of statutory interpretation led to a decline in their use for several decades. His critique, however, faced sustained resistance from some corners of the academy and the judiciary. Although this resistance has had only a selective uptake, it animated a gradual revival of the canons and brought the state of scholarship to an impasse that is for the most part partisan. In this article, I examine the semantic canons from a deeper level and argue that a universal assumption about them is false. Said assumption is that, although not dispositive, the semantic canons at least offer some reasons in favour of or against a candidate interpretation. Inclinations to rely on the semantic canons are also based on this assumption, although it is an assumption that the critics of the canons also share. I argue that this assumption is false because the semantic canons are a class of rules that are by nature not reason-giving. This provides a new ground against giving the semantic canons deliberative weight in questions of statutory interpretation.

(Forthcoming in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. Penultimate draft).

In order to set anew the question about the nature of argumentation and about the responsabilities of the judges in plural deliberative democracy, Dworkin made two main distinctions ; the first analytically divide the issue of the juridiction and the issue of adjudication ; the second divide in the judge's responsabilities, their responsabilities in argumentation and their responsabilities in the coordination of their action.

This was my Juris Doctor thesis which I wrote and defended at the De La Salle University Manila College of Law.

This work begins from the premise that studies of judicial decision-making models constitute an already-established field in political and legal theory in foreign jurisdictions.

A general overview of the most relevant concepts and related studies are presented, as well as an introduction to the three most widely accepted models: Legal, Attitudinal and Strategic. From this, the research posits whether these three judicial decision-making models are at all relevant or applicable to our jurisdiction. To do this, the study undertook a textual analysis of the Supreme Court en banc ruling on Imbong v. Ochoa, as well as the separate opinions of each of the other concurring and dissenting Justices. Imbong v. Ochoa was chosen not only in view of its highly controversial aspect but more so, the sheer number of its separate opinions (nine)- a necessity for a study that attempts to look into how a Judge/Justice reasons.

The study finds that all three judicial decision-making models are relevant and applicable to our jurisdiction. The Legal model's dominance is apparent, but an increasing popularity of the Attitudinal model is present in a few of the separate opinions. The Strategic model cannot be established as clearly owing to the study's limitations and the nature of the model itself. All three models do not seem mutually exclusive.

The title of this text suggests that in the past several years the Court of Justice has been showing signs of passivism in some of its most prominent cases related to the 2015/2016 refugee influx into the EU. Such Court's behaviour will be labelled as «judicial passivism». The aim of this paper is, first, to define the term “judicial passivism”, second, to identify examples of the Court’s passive behaviour and, third, to determine the reasons for such behaviour and its impact on the future development of EU law in general and EU migration and asylum law in particular. The phenomenon of judicial passivism will be discussed by looking at the judgments of the Court of Justice in the area of migration and asylum: the judgments on the EU-Turkey Statement, the judgment on humanitarian visas in X & X,4 and the judgments on the Western Balkans route in A.S. and Jafari. The text will connect the judgments on the EU-Turkey Statement and in A.S. and Jafari with the February/March 2020 developments at the Greek-Turkish border and the EU leaders’ reaction thereto. It will also consider future Member States’ and CJEU’s behaviour by discussing the implications of the ECtHR’s judgment in N.D. and N.T.

Using a comparative case study design, this thesis explores the impact on the Mexican federal judiciary of steep rises in violent crime, proliferation of armed organised crime groups, greater involvement of the military in crime control activities and the government’s ‘war on organised crime’. The thesis develops ‘enemy penology’ as a theoretical framework based on the observation that the Mexican government has increasingly conceptualised offenders as enemies and called for an explicitly militarised criminal justice response. Drawing on this theoretical framework, the thesis analyses qualitative data from two different sites – a ‘crime control as warfare’ scenario (highly militarised state) and an unchanged context (less militarised state). Findings are examined within the enemy penology framework and also drawing on theories of judicial behaviour and judicial roles in order to explain the overarching finding that judges seem to have insulated themselves from the ‘enemy penology’ promulgated by the government.

Analysis of 40 written judgements in drug cases and 28 semi-structured interviews with judges (drawn from a total of 56 interviews achieved during the fieldwork) indicated that decision making, guilt determination and sentencing were almost identical in the two locations despite stark differences in context. In both locations, the study observed an inclination to privilege police evidence, high conviction rates despite poor prosecutorial performance and insufficient evidence, and a tendency to impose minimum sentences. Interviewees discussed these issues as well as the impact of armed criminality, military involvement in crime control and judicial independence.

Overall, the Federal judiciary appeared to be not influenced by the enemy penology paradigm reproduced by public officials and criminal policies. Mexican judicial behaviour was found to be strongly shaped by a formalistic and legalistic understanding of judicial duties where accuracy in law interpretation is expected, disregarding other goals, including politics and policy considerations. This understanding is enhanced by the judiciary through strict observance of precedents, reversals and enhancing law-interpreter and ritualist judicial roles. Nonetheless, the empirical data also showed that judges’ views and opinions are informed by strategic goals, attitudes, motives, managerial needs and the pursuit of self-respect and recognition. In sum, examining court judgements and judges’ views about deciding cases in the light of the prevalent ‘enemy penology’ provided a rich understanding of the way decision-making in criminal matters is constructed by judges as well as the complex and often contradictory layers that comprise the image and role of the Mexican federal judge.