Law and Jurisprudence

Until the 1960s, governmental limits on speech and expression,
particularly around issues of pornography and obscenity, were
common. These restrictions were enacted to reinforce a set of
standards that had broad support among the American people.
Since the 1960s, we have seen a great expansion of the right to
free speech and expression. Today, however, the libertarian consensus has fractured. The new censorship that favors regulating
hate speech confronts the underlying premises of the old censorship. Rather than comparing and contrasting the libertarian position with the censorship of hate speech position, as is so often
done, in this article, I will compare and contrast two pro-censorship
positions, one group favoring the censorship of hate speech, the
other favoring the censorship of pornography and obscenity. My
purpose is not to advocate for censorship. Rather, my idea is to
examine and explain the different rationales that exist in the two
opposing approaches to censorship, to better judge the merits of
censorship and free speech.

The theory of justice as laid down by John Rawls has left an indelible impression in the field of law and politics. He has focused on the ideologies of liberty, equality and fair opportunity to all. He advocated the etiquettes of equality and social welfare. His theory encompassed the concept of redistributive justice with the analogy of original position and veil of ignorance. His theory was somehow foreshadowed by the framers of the Indian Constitution. It is very relevant in the current scenario specifically in underdeveloped and developing nations like India. In India, we have that the concept of redistributive justice which has been incorporated in the Preamble, the articles of the Constitution and many of the Indian laws. It helps us narrow the gap between the rich and the poor by meeting the needs of social and economic justice. In this research project, we will explore how Rawls' theory is adopted by the Indian legislators and the judges, and how far it has been successful in solving the pressing social, political and economic issues in India.

Hugo Grotius was a Dutch national and a Republican philosopher. He is regarded as the father of philosophic al school of jurisprudence. In his famous work 'The Law of War and Peace', Grotius stated that natural law springs from the social nature of man and the natural law as well as positive morality, both are based on the nation of righteousness. Natural justice is the justice indeed with truth. The rules of human conduct emerge from right reason and they receive public support of the coercive force of the state but the census of public disapprobation. The view of Grotius was that the agreement of mankind concerning certain rules of conduct is an indication that those rules originated in right reason.
Kant gave modern thinking a new basis which no subsequent philosophy could ignore. The Copernican Turn' which he gave to philosophy was to replace the psychological and empirical method by the critical method by an attempt to base the rational character of life and world not on the observation of facts and matter but on human consciousness itself.
Transcendental idealism presented itself in a pure and uncompromising form in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. To him, the starting point and center of all philosophical thinking is and must be the intelligent human ego. Not only the forms of our cognition, as Kant had taught, but also the content of our perceptions and sensations, were regarded by Fichte as the product of our consciousness. “All being, that of the ego as well as that of the non-ego, is a certain modality of consciousness; and without consciousness there is no being.”  The non-ego, that is, the word of objects, is in Fichte’s view, nothing but a target for human action, a domain for the exertion of the human will which is able to shape and transform this world.
The rational human ego is viewed as free by Fichte in the sense that it sets its own goals and is capable of attaining them; in other words, the actions of human beings are determined solely by their own will.  Since, however, human egos stand in relations of interaction with other human egos, their respective spheres of freedom must be adjusted and harmonised. Thus Ficthe, like Kant, considered law as a device for securing the coexistence of free individuals. Every man must respect the freedom of every other man.

This paper examines possible ways in which the legal process is influenced by money-related considerations – sometimes to a dramatic extent - and considers ethical implications and practical reflections on the administration of justice. 

Financial considerations can have a direct or indirect impact on the legal process, both technically (funding availability and ability) and psychologically (the importance attributed to financial considerations in human decision-making processes). 
In many cases – money can be seen as a moving force in the legal process, from the moment a person contemplates the idea of initiating it; throughout the process; and even after a judgment is reached.

With the 2013 application Tanudjaja v. Attorney General of Canada, a Charter challenge based indirectly on the right to housing, many jurists and housing rights’ champions have been revisiting the question of access to social housing as a basic human right in Canada. This thesis attempts to answer the question of what that right means in a jurisdiction where it is has only recently been enshrined in Federal statute, given that in the constitution, judicial decisions and statute, the right remains nonjusticiable. It adopts innovative theoretical concepts such as Judicial Internalisation, Incrementalism, and other developments in transnational and international human rights law in considering the legal implications of Charter doctrines for the legal recognition of the right to housing in Canada. As well as examining, the international, constitutional, legal history and current status of the right to housing, notably in interpretations of the Canadian Charter, but also in the federal and sub-national contexts with regards to modern policy and legislative initiatives that drive the discourse associated with economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, the dissertation examines the way in which these discussions might legally reinforce a substantive right to social housing in Canada. It sets out to determine what the best legal avenues for future litigation of housing rights in Canada might be, and what obstacles the exercise of such a right must overcome in the current legal climate, given the division of powers in Canada, and the traditional reluctance of law makers and the judiciary to give it legal effect.

Law’s Dominion is a detailed study of Jewish communal autonomy in the century prior to the French Revolution.  Set in the city of Metz, this new examination of a vibrant prerevolutionary community draws on a wide spectrum of unknown and underutilized legal sources that tell a story about community, religion, and family that has not been told before. Concentrating on the community’s leadership, public institutions, and judiciary, Law’s Dominion challenges the commonly held assumption that Jewish life was in a steady state of decline before the French Revolution. To the contrary, it presents a portrait of a robust community that integrated religious values and civic consciousness, interacted with French society, and showed remarkable signs of collaboration between Jewish law, general law, and the French judicial system.

The focus of Law’s Dominion is the emergence of “the rule of law” as the basic principle of Jewish social and political organization. Law served as the community’s core cultural value and as the foundation for the relationship of the Jews to the state and the surrounding society. Through the process of juridification—the institutionalization of law and judicial frameworks—vast areas of communal life were subsumed under the authority of the law, particularly as the community took greater notice of external legal and judicial systems. Building on the author’s previous works, Law’s Dominion offers new evidence of how practitioners of Jewish law, as well as its consumers, navigated the Jewish and French systems. Communal registers of the Metz Kahal, judicial records of the rabbinic court and Metz Parlement, rabbinic responsa literature, and the French translation of Jewish law commissioned by French authorities furnish a wider framework and  broader context for the analysis of Jewish law, legislation, and public policy. By focusing on prevailing norms, mechanisms of change, and emerging patterns of legal culture, Law’s Dominion seeks to understand how rabbinic and lay leaders struggled to meet challenges to their authority.

Central to the inquiry undertaken in this new volume is the question of how religion functioned in the early modern period and the degree to which it served the goals of social cohesion and corporate identity. Religion continued to exert a formative, if occasionally contested, impact on the values embraced by communal leaders and on the boundaries that defined relations with the state and society. Rituals embodied modes of thinking about historical origins, about interactions with the surrounding culture and society, and about identification with particular cultural traditions. 

In addition to embodying the foregoing themes, legal texts pertaining to family offer entrée into a web of culture and relationships for which there is virtually no other documentation. The majority of cases that came before the Metz Beit Din were related, either directly or indirectly, to inheritance, guardianship of children, marital property, sexuality, and the participation of women in the judicial process. Rulings in these areas, and the legal mechanisms that evolved in response to changing social and economic conditions, contain images of women and family that are strikingly at variance with representations conveyed in prescriptive legal sources alone.

Emerging from this analysis is a new narrative that reconsiders central themes of pre-modern Jewish history:  the nature and scope of Jewish communal autonomy; the relations between the Jews and the state; Jewish interaction with the surrounding society and culture; the multifaceted nexus between acculturation and modernization; lay-rabbinic relations; the role of religion in early modern culture; and transformations in family life.

In sum, Law’s Dominion seeks to elucidate the complicated role of law in the life of a community that faced significant internal and external challenges to its precarious political condition, religious ethos, and cultural identity.


Contents

Introduction

Part 1: Foundations

1  Jewish History through a Legal Lens
   Rabbinic Responsa Literature
   Communal Registers (Pinkasim)
   Lay and Rabbinic Court Records
   Law as a Cultural System
   The Production of the Metz Pinkas Beit Din

2  The Foundations of the Metz Kehillah
   Return to France and the Establishment of the Metz Community
   Ritual and Identity
   Material Culture
   Economic Integration

Part 2: Community, Governance, Authority

3  Communal Autonomy and Governance
   Electoral and Administrative Procedures
   Consumption and Social Status
   Poverty and Social Welfare
   Juridical Autonomy and Recourse to Non-Jewish Courts
   Policing Religious and Cultural Boundaries

4  Lay and Rabbinic Judicial Authority
   Lay and Rabbinic Tribunals
   Sources of Law
   Judicial Procedure
   Functions of the Beit Din

5  Navigating the Challenges of Multiple Jurisdictions
   Language
   Production of Bi-lingual Documents
   Patterns of Litigation in the Beit Din
   Judicial Behavior of the Metz Beit Din
   The Acquaintance of the Beit Din with French Law and Judicial Procedure
   Navigating the Two Systems
   The Impact of French Law on Rabbinic Jurisprudence

Part 3: Family Affairs


6  Guardianship and Inheritance:  Managing Family Estates
   Guardianship
   Inheritance
   Testamentary Charity

7  Women, Marriage, and Property in Legal Perspective
   Betrothal and Marriage
   Marital Property
   Women in Credit and Commerce

8  Conclusion and Epilogue

Glossary
Bibliography
Index

Il recente libro "Oltre la legalità" di Paolo Grossi, Presidente emerito della Corte costituzionale, volendo stimolare riflessioni critiche sul futuro del diritto, porta con sé un rischio: che lo smascheramento, da parte dello storico fiorentino, della moderna superbia costruttivista, venga degradato ad apologia del creazionismo giudiziale. Se davvero così fosse, non avrebbero tutti i torti quei critici che segnalano come la crisi della fattispecie porti con sé una minaccia ai valori portanti della moderna civiltà del diritto.
Ad avviso di chi scrive, invece, il realismo di Paolo Grossi opera sì una rivalutazione del diritto giurisprudenziale, ma sempre nel quadro di un più ampio ripensamento dei processi di produzione del diritto - specie di quello contemporaneo. Processi ai quali partecipano anche, ma non solo i giudici.

The recent book "Beyond legality" by Paolo Grossi, President emeritus of the Constitutional Court, wishing to stimulate critical reflections on the future of law, carries a risk with it: that the exposure, by the Florentine historian, of the modern constructivist pride, could be degraded to an apology of the "judicial creationism". If this were really the case, those critics who point out that the crisis of the "case" (fattispecie) carries with it a threat to the fundamental values ​​of the modern civilization of law, would not be completely wrong.
In the opinion of the writer, however, Paolo Grossi's realism does indeed carry out a re-evaluation of jurisprudential law, but always within the framework of a broader rethinking of the productive processes of the law - especially of the contemporary one. Processes participated also, but not only, by the judges.

Nel rapporto tra filosofia e giurisprudenza, il primo termine funge da soggetto e il secondo da predicato: si dà – si è sempre data nella storia umana – una riflessione filosofica sull’insieme di attività che hanno a che fare con la vita del diritto.

In the relationship between philosophy and jurisprudence, the first term acts as the subject and the second as the predicate: there has always been, during the human history, a philosophical reflection on the set of activities that concern the life of the law.

Nell'ambito della tutela del consumatore, l’intreccio tra uomo e macchina non solo segna un mutamento di paradigma, ma apre scenari fino a qualche tempo fa imprevisti. Così che il destino del consumatore, ad avviso dell'Autore, dipenderà proprio dalla sua capacità di fare un uso proattivo delle macchine, comprendendone il linguaggio e facendo dialogare con esse la propria intelligenza. Solo in tal modo si può offrire un’interpretazione coerente alla recente svolta digitale del parametro di “consumatore medio”, inteso, in ossequio al Considerando 18 della Direttiva n. 29/2005CE, come consumatore “normalmente informato e ragionevolmente attento ed avveduto”.

In the context of consumer protection, the intertwining between man and machine not only marks a paradigm shift, but opens up scenarios that were unexpected up until some time ago. So that the fate of the consumer, according to the Author, will depend precisely on his ability to make proactive use of machines, understanding their language and making his own intelligence dialogue with them. Only in this way can an interpretation consistent with the recent digital turning point of the "average consumer" parameter be offered, parameter understood, in compliance with Recital 18 of Directive no. 29 / 2005CE, as a consumer "normally informed and reasonably observant and circumspect".

In the space of ten years, a number of novel and unique legal developments have arisen in different jurisdictions around the world with one element in common: a declaration of the Rights of Nature, and a direct attribution of this jurisprudence to watercourses in their respective contexts. This thesis uses a hydro-socio-legal approach to analysing three of these developments as case-studies, identifying why they have occurred, the tensions involved, and the institutional and governance issues that they seek to address or are responding to. This work frames the analysis around an evaluation of environmental constitutionalism, and legal personhood, which informed their selection. This evaluation is prefaced by a prior discussion of key ideas in the theoretical discourse pertaining to the appropriate form of a right for non-human entities, and whether natural objects can have identifiable, and representable, interests. This work concludes that sufficient sophisticated recognition and processing of information about socio-hydrologies in respective contexts can innovate water law to enable responsive governance regimes, and the achievement of this depends on whether jurisdictions are prepared to open themselves to new approaches, legitimate stakeholder relationships with watercourses, and technological solutions that can enrich empirical understandings of fair resource allocation and utilisation for both nature and society.

Résumé : L’État français fit, dans les années 2000, face à une série de réclamations, effectives ou potentielles, relatives à sa nationalité émanant d’Écosse, de l’île Maurice et du Québec. Elles posèrent la question de l’interaction entre d’anciennes législations, et l’actuel cadre juridique concernant les naturalisations ou réintégrations dans la nationalité française. Cet article se propose de faire l’inventaire des textes concernant ces trois régions, de comparer les cas et d’évaluer la diversité des situations, rendues parfois obscures par le recours sélectif à une documentation hétérogène qui permet un refus systématique par les autorités.

Abstract : In the 2000s, the French state faced a series of complaints, actual or potential, relating to its nationality, emanating from Scotland, Mauritius and Quebec. They raised the question of the interaction between old legislation and the current legal framework concerning naturalization or reintegration into French nationality. This article aims to make an inventory of the texts concerning these three regions, to compare the cases and to evaluate the diversity of the situations, made sometimes obscure by the selective recourse to heterogeneous documentation which allows a systematic refusal by the authorities.

Nella società digitale, il tema del diritto all’oblio ha acquisito un’importanza sempre crescente. Ed è così che, non per opinabile decisionismo giudiziale, bensì a causa dei limiti intrinseci alla capacità della fattispecie astratta di disciplinare il caso concreto di una società sempre più complessa, le corti di giustizia, non potendo fondare le proprie pronunce su inequivoci riferimenti normativi, si sono trovate a riempire il diritto all’oblìo di contenuti non sempre omogenei e coerenti.

In the digital society, the issue of the right to be forgotten has acquired an ever increasing importance. And it is thus that, not due to questionable judicial decision-making, but because of the intrinsic limits to the ability of the abstract case (fattispecie) to regulate the concrete case in an increasingly complex society, the courts of justice, unable to base their rulings on unequivocal regulatory references, find themselves filling the right to be forgotten with contents that are not always homogeneous and coherent.

En puridad etimológica, la jurisprudencia sería la ciencia los prudentes, tal y como la definió Ulpiano: «Iurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, justi atque injusti scientia». Sin embargo, la acepción que aquí nos interesa es mucho más restringida, al referirse a aquella doctrina establecida de forma reiterada por el

Che il nichilismo si possa declinare in modi molto diversi lo si legge già nel dialogo a distanza "Über die Linie" intercorso tra Jünger e Heidegger. Per il primo, il nichilismo va individuato nel processo planetario di svanimento dei valori, di cui il soggetto farebbe bene a riappropriarsi. Per il secondo, al contrario, è proprio la rivendicazione di centralità da parte del soggetto la radice profonda del nichilismo.

The fact that nihilism can be declined in very diversionary ways can already be read in the long-distance dialogue "Über die Linie" between Jünger and Heidegger. For the former, nihilism is identified in the planetary process of the fading of values, of which the subject would do well to re-appropriate. The latter, on the other hand, attributes the profound root of nihilism precisely to the claim of centrality on the part the subject.

Il saggio ripercorre il pensiero forte di Giuseppe Benedetti teso, sino agli ultimissimi scritti, alla ricerca continua, muovendo dal pensiero di Nietzsche e di Heidegger, di un nuovo or- dine, scandito dall’identità plurale del diritto europeo e dalla attuazione dei princìpi, guidata da una argomentazione capace di convincere e persuadere.

The essay retraces the strong reflection made by Giuseppe Benedetti aimed, up to his latest works, at a continuous research, moving from Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s thoughts, of a new order, marked by the plural identity of European law and the implementation of principles, guided by an argumentation capable of convincing and persuading.

Ora che, compiutosi il giro del millennio, le tecniche delle neuroscienze, di scansionamento dell’attività cerebrale, hanno fatto ingresso nelle aule di Tribunale, risulta chiaro che il nostro tempo, troppo spesso identificato con il senno del ‘post’, almeno sotto questo profilo rappresenta il compimento della modernità e non la presa di congedo da questa. E che, forse, è giunta per il giurista l’ora di chiedersi: che cosa significa davvero essere responsabili di ciò che facciamo?

Now that, having completed the turn of the millennium, the techniques of neuroscience have entered the courtrooms, it is clear that our time, too often identified with the hindsight of the 'post', at least under this profile represents the fulfillment of modernity and not the taking of leave from it. And that, perhaps, the time has come for the jurist to ask himself: what does it really mean to be responsible for what we do?

The use of algorithms as mechanisms to make decisions in an automated way has been increasingly expanded to a wide range of fields from private companies to online copyright enforcement. Nevertheless  in digital copyright enforcement by intermediaries it is not clear what exactly is being enforced and how it affects society as a whole. In addition, as the software companies are private they do not grant access to the source code of algorithms on the grounds that they are protected by Copyright Law and Trade Secrets regulation.
In this vein, in order to provide a holistic analysis of the problem it is necessary to begin with an overview of the effects that automated decision making produce on society; later, some of the main flaws will be addressed: biases on the software, the indeterminacy of the language and its difficultness to translate concepts into codes, the technical black-box, issues with transparency, accountability and the collision with copyright law. Afterwards, a particular analysis will focus on algorithm decision making by private companies and how to interpret the General Data Protection Regulation –especially the controversial right to an explanation (article 22) - along with a review on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Finally, an assessment on online copyright enforcement and its relation with Data Protection will be provided, together with relevant ECJ cases.

This Manual is concentrating with Philosophical School of Law. Philosophical School concerns itself chiefly with the relation of law to certain ideals which law is meant to achieve. It investigates the purpose of law and the measure and manner in which that purpose is fulfilled. The Philosophical Jurists regards law neither as the arbitrary command of a ruler nor the creation of historical necessity. To them Law is the product of human reason and its purpose is to elevate and ennoble human personality.
The Philosophical School is interested primarily in the development of idea of justice as an ethical and moral phenomenon and its manifestation in the principle applied by the Courts.
Different School of Laws have been developed throughout societies. Though there are a number of Schools of Thoughts, only four of them are dealt with here under. They are Idealism School of Law, Positivism School of Law, Sociological School of Law, and Legal Realism School of Law. You may deal other Schools in detail in your course on jurisprudence.

L’utilizzo di strumenti sempre più sofisticati di raccolta, aggregazione, trattamento e circolazione dei dati ha posto il legislatore e le autorità di regolazione di fronte a problematiche in parte nuove. Il cui elemento più significativo è costituito dal crescente utilizzo dinamico dei dati e dall’effetto di «retroazione» che esso può determinare sul loro titolare, nel momento in cui quei dati costituiscono il presupposto per assumere provvedimenti nei suoi confronti e/o influenzarne le scelte.

The use of increasingly sophisticated tools for the collection, aggregation, processing and circulation of data has placed the legislator and regulatory authorities in front of new problems. The most significant element of which is the growing dynamic use of data and the "feedback" effect that it can determine on their owner, when those data constitute the prerequisite for taking measures against him and / or influencing his choices.

Il presente lavoro intende riflettere criticamente sul contributo di Vittorio Frosini al tema della tolleranza civile, affrontato dal filosofo del diritto nello scritto La tolleranza civile nell'Italia dell'Ottocento. La cultura cattolica liberale, in alcuni dei suoi più autorevoli esponenti -da Manzoni a Mazzini -, viene elogiata da Frosini per la significativa promozione della tolleranza civile, e rappresenta, oggi, una lezione di libertà da preservare.

The paper aims at analyzing the issue of religious tolerance, which the legal philosopher Vittorio Frosini dealt with in his writing La tolleranza civile nell'Italia dell'Ottocento. Catholic liberal culture - as expressed by some of the most representative characters of the Italian 19th Century, from Manzoni to Mazzini - is praised for its endorsement of religious tolerance, representing today a lesson of freedom that must be learnt.

L'idea di una macchina che decide viene respinta soprattutto perché, volenti o nolenti, essa ha "un che di familiare". Essa inquieta perché ci somiglia, e ciò tanto più oggi che essa avanza una «pretesa» di essere soggetto, di pensare e decidere in vece dell'uomo. La macchina è "das Unheimliche" (Freud, 1919) perché l'uomo ben sa di essere anche una macchina: una macchina certo animata da un principio motore geniale e misterioso, ma pur sempre una macchina. E dunque la macchina che egli ha provato a respingere è il suo altro, il suo fantasma.

The idea of ​​a machine that decides is rejected above all because, like it or not, it has "something familiar". It disturbs because it resembles us, and this even more so today that it makes a "claim" to be a subject, to think and decide in place of men. The machine is "das Unheimliche" (Freud, 1919) because man knows he is also a machine: a machine certainly animated by a brilliant and mysterious motor, but still a machine. And so the machine he tried to reject is his alter-ego, his ghost.

The political economy of colonial Natal was based on a coercive and hierarchical racial order. Over decades, the white colonists struggled to assert their power over the indigenous inhabitants of the colony, and to force them off their land and into wage labour in service of the white colonial economy. This process resulted in ongoing resistance on the part of the indigenous population, which ultimately manifested as a series of rebellions and revolts throughout the colonial period, and which were met with force by the white colonists. White colonial ideology was shaped by the violent and adversarial nature of the social, political and economic relations between white and black in the colony. It was also influenced by the broader global context, within which colonisation was justified by racist variants of the theory of Social Darwinism. Driven by a strange mix of deep insecurity and fear on the one hand and racist paternalism on the other, the white settlers of colonial Natal devel...

"Oggettività esistenziale dell’interpretazione" raccoglie e rimedita gli studi condotti da Giuseppe Benedetti in tema di ermeneutica giuridica in un arco temporale di circa 25 anni.
Nell’era della tecno-scienza, il giurista è chiamato a riscoprire la propria missione di "custode del senso". Proprio in ciò consiste il messaggio di cui l’ermeneutica si fa portatrice: nell’invitare il soggetto a interpretare le cose del mondo, prima che con il rigore del "metodo", con umile abnegazione di sé, apertura mentale e fraterna pietas.

"Existential objectiveness of interpretation" (G. Benedetti) collects and remediates the studies conducted by Giuseppe Benedetti on the subject of legal hermeneutics over a period of about 25 years.
In the era of techno-science, the jurist is called to rediscover his own mission as "guardian of meaning". This is precisely the message that hermeneutics carries: inviting the subject to interpret the things of the world, other than with the technical "method", with humble abnegation, open-mindedness and fraternal "pietas".

Prendendo le mosse dal convegno di studi: "Il diritto nel tempo, il tempo nel diritto" (organizzato nel dicembre 2014 da Luigi Di Santo, Dipartimento di Economia e Diritto dell'Università di Cassino e del Lazio Meridionale), si analizza il rapporto tra diritto e tempo, punto di passaggio essenziale per ogni studioso di diritto. Dal civilista al penalista, dal costituzionalista al processualista, dal lavorista all'internazionalista.

Starting from the conference: "The law within time, the time within the law" (held in December 2014 by Luigi Di Santo at the Department of Economics and Law of the University of Cassino and Southern Lazio), the relationship between Law and Time is analised, for it establishes an essential crossing point for every jurist. From the civil to the criminal lawyer, from the constitutionalist to the proceduralist, from the labourist to the internationalist.

Il tema della satira è intrinsecamente problematico, perché solleva il potenziale conflitto tra la libertà di espressione e la tutela del sentimento religioso, soprattutto nel contesto di una società multietnica e multiculturale in cui sarebbe ormai necessario aggiornare il principio di laicità.
Allo stesso tempo, per il filosofo del diritto esso costituisce un'emblematica sfida, giacché segnala come su alcune questioni di principio ci si debba interrogare a partire da un’analisi della casistica giurisprudenziale nazionale e sovranazionale, senza muovere solamente dalle discipline vigenti a livello nazionale, spesso non esaustive.

The issue of satire is inherently problematic, for it raises the potential conflict between freedom of expression and the protection of the religious sentiment and, more generally, the need to update the principle of secularism in the nowadays multi-ethnic and multicultural reality.
However, the issue constitutes an emblematic challenge for the philosopher of law, since it signals that, on some questions of principle, we must investigate starting from an analysis of national and supranational case law, and not only assessing the rules in force at the national level, which are not always exhaustive.

La parola "effettività" dice due cose di Vettori: la sua attenzione alla dimensione temporale della vita sociale e la sua sensibilità per le concrete condizioni dell'individuo.
Pur restando cioè attento a preservare il valore delle forme e delle procedure, che hanno fatto la storia della civiltà giuridica occidentale - seguendo la lezione del Maestro, Giuseppe Benedetti - Vettori pone il fuoco della sua indagine sulle effettive tutele che il diritto riesce ad offrire alle attese di giustizia, in un'attitudine realistica che volge lo sguardo non all’uomo in universale, ma alla concreta condizione dell’individuo, qui ed ora, scolpita da Heidegger come da-Sein.

The word "effectiveness" says two things about Vettori: his attention to the temporal dimension of social life and his sensitivity to the concrete conditions of individuals.
Hence, while remaining careful to preserve the value of the forms and procedures that have made the history of Western legal civilization - following the lesson of the Master, Giuseppe Benedetti - Vettori focuses his investigation on the effective protection that the law can offer to our expectations of justice, adopting a realistic attitude that looks not at "man" in the universal, but at the concrete conditions of the individual, here and now, as highlighted by Heidegger in da-Sein.

La crisi di certezze è innegabile e, a sentire gli esperti di logica della complessità, insuperabile. Ma non per ciò l’itinerario diviene fine a se stesso. È vero, invece, che il viaggio trasforma il viaggiatore. È per questo che, ad avviso di Benedetti, il nostro tempo è chiamato a compiere l’impresa più difficile: ripensare la modernità, liberarla sia dalla tracotanza pianificatrice e discriminatrice che dal disincanto scettico, e salvarne il messaggio di civiltà.

The crisis of certainties is undeniable and, according to the experts in the logic of complexity, unsurpassable. But this does not mean that the itinerary becomes an end in itself. It is true, on the contrary, that the journey transforms the traveler. This is why, in Benedetti's opinion, our time is called to carry out the most difficult task: rethinking modernity, freeing it both from the planning and discriminatory arrogance and from the skeptical disenchantment, and save its message of civilization.

Oggi, che le migliori intelligenze del pianeta sono impegnate nella lotta contro il COVID-19 e nella gestione politica ed economica dei suoi effetti, abbiamo imparato, tra le molte lezioni, che persino l'intelligenza artificiale non è onnipotente. Negli ultimi anni, essa ha rivoluzionato la medicina e sempre più lo farà. Questi mesi, però, ci hanno avvertiti che l’intelligenza artificiale può riconoscere e classificare un virus, e così aiutare a curare una patologia, solo a partire da ciò che sa, richiamando e processando dati già acquisiti. Di fronte al fenomeno sconosciuto, l’intelligenza artificiale ha bisogno di tempo.

Nowadays, when the best brains on the planet are engaged in the fight against COVID-19 and in the political and economic management of its effects, we have learned, among many lessons, that even artificial intelligence is not omnipotent. In recent years, it has revolutionized medicine and more and more will do the same. These months, however, have warned us that artificial intelligence can recognize and classify a virus, and thus help treating a disease, only starting from what it already knows, recalling and processing already acquired data. When facing an unknown phenomenon, therefore, the artificial intelligence needs time.

The purpose of this article is to make a rational reconstruction of the use of the proportionality test in contexts of judicial adjudication of constitutional social rights. This reconstruction will be developed in two stages. Firstly, I will deal with the question of whether the proportionality test regarding omission (that is, in cases of positive rights) exhibits or not a different structure with respect to its (better known and developed) regarding excess (that is, in cases of negative rights). Secondly, I will describe the rules and forms of argumentation implied in the use of the proportionality regarding omission, which constitute its respective sub-tests of suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu. Lastly, I will present a brief summary.

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تسليط الضوء على خطاب الكراهية لا سيما في تجلياته الدينية، وتحاول تبيان آثاره على الحقوق والحريات وفي مقدمتها حرية الدين والمعتقد، وتتوغل أكثر في البحث عن فعالية منهج الشريعة الإسلامية في التعامل مع هذا الخطاب، والضمانات التي تقدمها لحماية حرية المعتقد من أخطاره، استجابة لحاجة الفقه الإسلامي لمثل هذه الدراسات من جهة، وحاجة المجتمعات الإسلامية والإنسانية عامة إلى ما يساعدها على التخلص من شر هذا الخطاب الذي يعج به واقعها من جهة أخرى، وتصل إلى نتيجة مهمة وهي أن الشريعة الإسلامية تمتلك رصيدا أخلاقيا وتشريعيا يشكل منهجا شاملا ومتكاملا للتعامل مع هذا الخطاب تتفوق به على النظم القانونية الوضعية، هذا المنهج لا يتوقف في علاجه لخطاب الكراهية عند المقاربة الجزائية كما هو شأن القوانين الوضعية غالبا، بل يقدم مقاربة شاملة تعمل على الحيلولة دون ظهوره ابتداء، إذا ما وجد الخطط والاستراتيجيات التي تحسن فهمه واستثماره وتقديمه إلى العالم.

Il presente lavoro prende le mosse dalla lezione di Robert Alexy "Data und die Menschenrechte", nella quale lo studioso tedesco ha discusso un episodio di "Star Trek", intitolato "La misura dell'uomo", che tratta dei diritti rivendicati da un androide di nome Data. Ci si chiede, allora: i diritti umani dovrebbero essere riconosciuti a un androide? Ed esiste una distinzione metafisica tra uomini e macchine?

This word starts from Robert Alexy’s lecture “Data und die Menschenrechte”, where the German scholar discusses an episode of “Star Trek” called “The Measure of Man”, dealing with the rights claimed by an android named Data. The question thus is: should human rights be acknowledged to an android? And is there any metaphysical distinction between men and machines?

The discourse surrounding the punishment of offenders within a society reveals much about the particular ideological underpinnings of power within that society. Penal discourse within colonial societies is particularly interesting in that it traces the specific contours of the racist ideologies which characterise those societies. This article is focused upon penal discourse within the Colony of Natal towards the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Within the colony at this time, the race of an offender was becoming increasingly important in determining the type of punishment, treatment and training considered appropriate for that offender. This article is focused-in particular-upon the discourse surrounding the punishment of "European" offenders in colonial Natal. It is submitted that the punishment of these offenders raised all sorts of ideological problems for the colonists, since the offenders in question were members of the white "master race". The following central themes within the colonial penal discourse of the time are discussed: first, the role that "shame" and "degradation" were considered to play in the punishment of white-but not black-prisoners; second, the perceived need to train white-but not black-prisoners in skilled work, to enable white prisoners to find employment upon leaving prison; and, third, the perceived need to keep white-but not black-prisoners out of the public gaze, in particular avoiding situations in which white prisoners could be seen being punished alongside black prisoners and subject to the control of black prison guards. Examining the precise contours of the penal ideology which underpinned the punishment of offenders in colonial Natal may be useful in understanding certain of the foundations of racist penal thinking during subsequent periods of South African history, including the notorious apartheid era.

Questo lavoro cerca di presentare il pensiero di Villey, Cotta e Hervada sui rapporti tra il diritto e la filosofia politica. Dopo aver collocato il pensiero di questi autori nel quadro storico del fine della modernità, l'autore cerca di sistemare i loro argomenti secondo i seguenti elementi: i diritti al di sopra dello stato, l'universalità del diritto, il ritorno dell'aspetto relazionale e il binomio diritto-politica, la giurisprudenza come scienza pratica.

The present work seeks to present the thought of Villey, Cotta and Hervada with regard to the relationship between the right and political philosophy. Having contextualized the thought of these authors in the historical framework of the end of modernity, the author seeks to categorize the elements of their thought on the subject according to the following elements: right above the political state, universality of right, the return of the relational aspect and the “right-politics” relationship, jurisprudence as practical science.

Nel tempo post-moderno la tradizionale gerarchia delle fonti appare stravolta, la legge ha perso il suo primato, le regole vengono formulate a vari livelli. E all'atto della decisione, il giurista si trova spesso privo di una regola scritta chiaramente individuabile ed inequivocabilmente applicabile, al punto che egli, la soluzione del caso, si trova spesso a doverla inventare - per dirla con Paolo Grossi.
In questo contesto, il Seminario di studi su "Processi cognitivi e cognizione giurisdizionale" ha rappresentato una felice occasione per riflettere sulla misura e sui modi in cui l’era delle macchine digitali sta modificando i processi cognitivi e decisionali del giurista.

In the post-modern era the traditional hierarchy of sources appears distorted, the law has lost its primacy, the rules are formulated at various levels. And in the act of decision-making, the jurist often finds himself lacking a clearly identifiable and unequivocally applicable written rule, to the point that he often finds himself having to invent the solution - using the words of Paolo Grossi.
In this context, the conference on "Cognitive processes and jurisdictional cognition" represented a good opportunity to reflect on the extent and on the ways the era of digital machines is changing the cognitive processes and the decision-making of the jurist.

The right to keep and bear arms. The militia. The Second Amendment includes both. Yet, the relationship between the two, and why they are connected in the Second Amendment, are opaque, shrouded in an archaic, stilted sentence structure and subject to the vagaries of an original public trying to extract an original meaning. The first part of the Second Amendment seems to be a black-swan preamble that justifies the amendment's existence. The second part seems to recognize an existing right. Every argument, however, fails to connect the amendment's two parts. We should stop to consider what it means that the amendment is so incredibly difficult to understand. Either: one, we seriously misunderstand the amendment; two, the Framers were sloppy and broke a "no preamble" rule; three, the Framers were incompetent at expressing themselves; or finally, the Framers didn't have a meeting of the minds and the amendment has no real meaning. The literature has failed to consider that we might be completely wrong about the Second Amendment. Instead, the last three arguments are made, often implicitly, and the Framers are assumed to be incompetent at, and inadequate for, the task of drafting the amendment. We know, however, that the Constitution was written with great care, by people at least as smart as us, who had at least as much awareness of their place in history, as we have of ours. So let's presume that we have seriously misunderstood the amendment rather than engaging in the blood sport of arguing against the Framers' competence. "The Framers could not have anticipated...," is the phrase we use to dismiss their ideas and begin our ad hominem argument. This article argues for their ideas, their idealism, and their practicality, by making the philosophical argument. That argument asserts that basing every provision of the Constitution on a philosophical analysis of the underlying issues was critical to creating a stable document; one that would change only when we find that the original analysis was flawed. The philosophical mind of James Madison was engaged to accomplish this goal. This article clarifies the Second Amendment by asking and answering a series of important questions: 1) If the Second Amendment mentions the militia, and the Constitution mentions the militia, could those two things be related? 2) Does the Second Amendment modify the militia clauses of the Constitution? 3) If so, who wanted those clauses modified? and 4) Is there something wrong with the militia clauses of the Constitution? The answers to these questions are: 1) yes, 2) yes, 3) the Antifederalists, and 4) yes. Of the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights, nine address subjects on which the Constitution was silent. The Second Amendment is different. It reaches back into the Constitution and changes it. The Antifederalists thought the power of the federal government over the militia was despotic, tyrannical, absolute. They used the Second Amendment to fix that.

The political economy of colonial Natal was based on a coercive and hierarchical racial order. Over decades, the white colonists struggled to assert their power over the indigenous inhabitants of the colony, to force them off their land and into wage labour in service of the white colonial economy. This process resulted in ongoing resistance on the part of the indigenous population, including a series of rebellions and revolts throughout the colonial period, which were met with force by the white colonists. White colonial ideology was shaped by the violent and adversarial nature of the social, political and economic relations between white and black in the colony. It was also influenced by the broader global context, within which colonisation was justified by racist variants of the theory of Social Darwinism. Driven by a strange mix of deep insecurity and fear on the one hand, and racist paternalism on the other, the white settlers of colonial Natal developed a variant of white supremacist ideology with a special flavour. Nowhere was this more apparent than in their near obsession with flogging as the most appropriate manner of dealing with African offenders in particular. By closely examining a series of public debates that took place in the colony of Natal between 1876 and 1906, this contribution seeks to excavate the various nuanced strands of thinking that together comprised the ideology of white supremacy in the colony at that time.