Neurolaw

This paper responds to continuing commentary on Velmans (2002a) “How could conscious experiences affect brains,” a target article for a special issue of JCS. I focus on the final question dealt with by the target article: how free will relates to preconscious and conscious mental processing, and I develop the case for preconscious free will.  Although “preconscious free will” might appear to be a contradiction in terms, it is consistent with the scientific evidence and provides a parsimonious way to reconcile the commonsense view that voluntary acts are freely chosen with the evidence that conscious wishes and decisions are determined by preconscious processing in the mind/brain.  I consider alternative interpretations of how “conscious free will” might operate by Libet and by Mangan and respond to doubts about the extent to which the operations of mind are revealed in consciousness, raised by Claxton and Bouratinos. In reconciling commonsense attributions of freedom and responsibility with the findings of science, preconscious free will can be shown to have practical consequences for adjudications in law.

On November 11, 2007, as the 2008 U.S. presidential election was kicking into high gear, the New York Times ran a now infamous op-ed column “This is your brain on politics” (Iacoboni et al., 2007). The author team was led by Marco Iacoboni, a professor of psychiatry at the University of California at Los Angeles. Iacoboni and his coinvestigators hoped to harness the power of brain-imaging technology, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in particular, to ascertain the political preferences of a sample of undecided voters. Like many proponents of the use of fMRI for real-world applications, they began with the assumption that brain-imaging data could help them discern preferences that prospective voters are either unable or unwilling to acknowledge. “Our results reveal some voter impressions on which this election may well turn,” the scientists proclaimed. As revealed by fMRI, voters’ brains ostensibly displayed marked ambivalence toward Hillary Clinton; while viewing her, th...

La obra colectiva que tengo el honor de presentar es el resultado de los trabajos llevados a cabo en el seno del proyecto de investigación del que he sido investigador principal: “Neurociencia y Derecho Penal: nuevas perspectivas en el ámbito de la culpabilidad y tratamiento jurídicopenal de la peligrosidad” (DER2009-09868), financiado por el Ministerio de Innovación y Ciencia de España. El núcleo de la investigación se centra en el enorme vendaval producido en los últimos tiempos a raíz de las investigaciones en el ámbito de la neurobiología acerca del carácter determinado del comportamiento humano a partir de los experimentos llevados a cabo por el neurólogo estadounidense Benjamin Libet (1916-2007) en los años setenta del pasado siglo, y los pronunciamientos de famosos especialistas de este ámbito de conocimiento sobre las repercusiones que acarrearían para el sistema actual de responsabilidad penal y las bases sobre las que éste se asienta.

De preventie van criminaliteit staat hoog op de maatschappelijke en politieke agenda.
Naast een juridisch speelt hierbij ook een psychiatrisch kader een belangrijke rol. De
laatste jaren gaat veel aandacht uit naar de neurofysiologie, neurobiologie en genetica.
Sommigen hopen dat op inzichten uit deze vakgebieden gebaseerde detectie-, interventie-
en beoordelingspraktijken beter en effectiever zouden zijn. Het is echter nodig om
tijdig te reflecteren op de mogelijkheden en beperkingen van een dergelijke aanpak en
ook op de ethische en maatschappelijke implicaties ervan. Dit artikel bespreekt implicaties
van achtereenvolgens de vroege detectie van risicokinderen en preventie van antisociaal
gedrag en beoordelingsprocedures pro Justitia van verdachten van een ernstig
vergrijp.

Induzidas pela polícia e aceitas pela justiça, falsas memórias condenam inocentes 26/09/18 por Fausto Salvadori • 'Nossa tradição punitivista desconfia de inocentes', arma o pesquisador Gustavo Noronha de Ávila, para quem os reconhecimentos sem provas se tornaram 'uma forma rápida de encontrar um culpado'.

Esse capítulo visa discutir algumas noções sobre a Neurolaw (Direitos Neurais, Neurolei ou Neurodireito), sobretudo no que concirna às biotecnologias que possam influenciar no tratamento desse noviciário tema jurídico. O texto se estrutura de forma a: (i)  apresentar as perspectivas e os problemas que envolvem esses direitos (ii) ilustrar alguns reflexos no campo jurídico da personalidade, tal qual sua compatibilidade com disposições já aplicáveis à outras biotecnologias (iii)  apresentar os reflexos dessa tecnologia nos diversos campo do Direito Civil. O problema de pesquisa é como dar tratamento condigno a esse novo campo ante ausência de diplomas legais próprios e a emergência incipiente de fatores materiais. Prima-se pela hipótese de que, embora não haja tratados específicos para lidar com esse novo campo, ferramentais hermenêuticos e diretrizes gerais já existentes em nosso ordenamento, tal como uma olhar jurídico interdisciplinar, podem nos conduzir a um rico tratamento jurídico desses temas. Hipótese essa cuja conclusão tende a corroborar. À mingua de textos em periódicos indexados e eventos que tratem a esse respeito, ainda mais especificamente no campo do Direito Civil, vê-se proeminente lacuna de pesquisa a ser preenchida.

Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the human brain. Such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. This paper assesses the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to respond to these emerging issues. After analyzing the relationship between neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.

Il presente lavoro ha l'obiettivo di ricomporre, seppur per sommi capi, il dibattito che si è aperto nell'ordinamento giuridico italiano a seguito dell'irrompere delle neuroscienze nel diritto giurisprudenziale. Difatti, tecniche di neuroimaging e indagini di genetica comportamentale sono entrate nelle aule giudiziarie italiane avvicinando il nostro Paese agli Stati Uniti d'America, mentre, tutto sommato, negli altri Stati europei la giustizia continua a mostrare una certa prudenza rispetto all'utilizzo endoprocessuale di queste nuove tecniche. Le riflessioni che seguono, pertanto, riguarderanno alcune problematiche inerenti il rapporto tra diritto e neuroscienza in una prospettiva di ordine costituzionale.

Este texto examina críticamente cómo la orientación genético-evolucionista de las ciencias biológicas actuales, implícita en los estudios neurocientíficos, puede vincularse a estudios en  ética, política y derecho. Relevante es analizar cómo el discurso de las neurociencias, en sus diversas variantes metodológicas, se emplea como herramienta de interpretación y explicación en muchos discursos disciplinarios.

Alla luce delle più recenti scoperte sul cervello umano e sulla presenza di "automatismi" (ossia, azioni compiute involontariamente), il diritto deve rivedere le proprie convinzioni sotto i profili dell'imputabilità e della colpevolezza, in ambito penale, e della capacità di agire, in ambito civile, al fine di avvicinare il più possibile la concezione giuridica dell'uomo a quella biologico-scientifica.

At the end of the nineteenth century the Italian physician and anthropologist Cesare Lombroso established the foundations of criminological sciences by introducing a biological theory of delinquency, which was later discredited and replaced by the sociological approach. The theory of the " born criminal " was poor in methods and analysis, and turned out to be controversial in its formulations, assumptions, and mostly in its predictions. However, recent research in behavioral genetics and neuroscience has brought back some version of the Lombrosian idea by providing evidence for the genetic and biological correlates of criminality. This research has been impacting legal proceedings worldwide. In this paper, I compare the Lombrosian and the contemporary scientific meanings of "heredity" and "predisposition" to aggressive and violent behavior, by highlighting theoretical similarities and differences in the two approaches. On the one hand, the paper is arguing against the idea that contemporary theories are radically deterministic, while on the other hand it aims at rehabilitating the intellectual image of Lombroso by showing that the denigration of his brilliant work by his successors was unjustified.

This paper will examine how advancing neuroscientific technologies may impact on the fundamental human rights of the citizen accused. The paper takes an exploratory approach to analysis; the techniques explored throughout the paper are in their infancy and yet to permeate the criminal justice process of England and Wales. As such technology develops, other jurisdictions may start relying on the technology and they may be utilized more frequently in criminal trials in countries around the world; which may influence the techniques use in England and Wales. The paper will argue that adversarial criminal justice process of England and Wales should be concerned with both the domestic and international developments in “lie detection” technology. Furthermore, England and Wales should resist any advances to utilize the technology at the pre-trial investigation or trial stage. The paper will conclude that there is a role for neuroscientific evidence to play in the criminal justice process; we just need to ascertain the parameters for its use.

Me cabe el inmenso honor de presentar al lector una obra única, compuesta por un total de cuarenta contribuciones redactadas por prestigiosos especialistas procedentes de diversas universidades e institutos científicos de Alemania, Argentina, Brasil, España, Italia, México, Perú, Portugal y Suiza. Todos ellos forman parte de un nutrido equipo de investigadores de carácter interdisciplinar y absolutamente internacionalizado, que han sumado sus esfuerzos en el marco del Proyecto de Investigación (Programa I+D+I orientada a los retos de la sociedad) Derecho penal y comportamiento humano (RTI2018-097838-B-I00) concedido por el Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades de España. Como investigador principal les debo un agradecimiento inmenso y me siento orgulloso del resultado que hemos sido capaces de alcanzar, sin olvidar la vocación de continuidad bajo el “paraguas” que nos proporciona el logo diseñado en la UCLM y que hemos llamado Neuroartificial Criminal Law, en alusión al campo de estudio que resulta de la interrelación entre Derecho penal, Neurociencias, Neurotecnologías e Inteligencia Artificial. Partiendo de los trabajos previos que dieron lugar a la obra Neurociencias y Derecho penal. Nuevas perspectivas en el ámbito de la culpabilidad y tratamiento jurídico-penal de la peligrosidad (Madrid: Edisofer / Montevideo-Buenos Aires: BdeF, 2013) y de la ya casi inabarcable bibliografía surgida entretanto, nos propusimos tratar de ofrecer el “estado del arte”, abordando una serie de temas de la máxima actualidad que se proyectan a su vez hacia el futuro. Es más, se puede decir, en gran medida, que los contenidos que ahora se proponen tienen un carácter claramente innovador y vanguardista, que suponen un desafío enorme no solo en los campos del Derecho penal y la Neurociencia, sino también en otros muchos, tales como el de la Psicopatología forense, la Inteligencia Artificial, la Filosofía, las ciencias que se ocupan del estudio del comportamiento humano, y cualquier saber que se pregunte en términos epistémicos por la complejidad del mundo actual y los peligros que se ciernen para los derechos humanos. Si hace una década nos parecía evidente que los penalistas estábamos llamados a atender con urgencia los temas clásicos de legitimación del castigo ¬desde, al menos, una doble perspectiva, filosófico-dogmática y constitucional– tal y como lo habíamos hecho siempre pero esta vez a la luz de la investigación sobre el cerebro, quien se asome a este extenso volumen comprobará sin mayor esfuerzo que esa preocupación no solo estaba justificada, sino que ve claramente confirmada por los vertiginosos avances que se están produciendo desde el campo neurotecnológico y algorítmico.

To what extent do neuroscientific studies or computational models of human mental states have an impact on an understanding of legal guilt? Based on a brief literature review, studies undertaken in the nascent field at the intersection of neuroscience, law and computation already reveal evidence that there is a neurobiological basis for the predicates of legal guilt. This suggests that the commonsense theories of mental states that the legal system has formulated over time, correspond with neurological findings. In other words, our legal concepts correspond, to some extent, with our observations of the brain’s processes. At the same time, the empirical evidence suggests that there are important ways in which the correspondence could be strengthened. The neurological findings relate to brain imaging of subjects in simulations meant to replicate certain legal mental states, the effect of lesions in certain regions of the brain, and the relative maturity of adolescent brains and their predisposition to risk-taking.

This paper has had the benefit of kind input from Prof Christos Papadimitriou, and Jacob Porters, during the Computation and the Brain course taught by Prof Papadimitriou at Columbia Engineering during Fall'19.

Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in criminal trials as part of psychiatric testimony. Up to now,
“neurolaw” literature remained focused on the use of neuroscience for assessments of criminal responsibility.
However, in the field of forensic psychiatry, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened,
whereas dangerousness and risk assessment gain increasing importance. In this paper, we argue that the introduction
of neuroscientific data by forensic experts in criminal trials will be mostly be used in the future as a
means to evaluate or as an indication of an offender's dangerousness, rather than their responsibility. Judges
confronted with the pressure to ensure public security may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and
data as an objective and reliableway of evaluating one's risk of reoffending. First,weaimto showhowthe current
socio-legal context has reshaped the task of the forensic psychiatrist,with dangerousness assessments prevailing.
In the second part,we examine froma critical point of viewthe promise of neuroscience to serve a better criminal
justice systemby offering new tools for risk assessment. Thenwe aim to explainwhy neuroscientific evidence is
likely to be used as evidence of dangerousness of the defendants. On a theoretical level, the current tendency in
criminal policies to focus on prognostics of dangerousness seems to be “justified” by a utilitarian approach to
punishment, supposedly revealed by new neuroscientific discoveries that challenge the notions of free will and
responsibility. Although often promoted as progressive and humane, we believe that this approach could lead
to an instrumentalization of neuroscience in the interest of public safety and give rise to interventions which
could entail ethical caveats and run counter to the interests of the offenders. The last part of this paper deals
with someof these issues—the danger of stigmatization for brain damaged offenders because of adopting a purely
therapeutic approach to crime, and the impact on their sentencing, in particular.

This article investigates how the neuroscientific studies can become useful to unveil the “mute” dimension of law and determine its “appearance”. It is not a coincidence that a sensible anthropologist such as Roderick MacDonald imagined law as an iceberg where its emerged peak, visible above the water, represents the written law, while the most substantial submerged part represents all the implicit and inferential aspects of the law. Looking at the historical reality, the image is far from being defined. After broadly rethinking some of Rodolfo Sacco's reflections about the existence of "mute law", here the following considerations attempt to highlight the importance that neurosciences could have in forming the theoretical basis of the sources of law by better defining the physiology of the regulatory production processes.

Published in the Springer Journal Neuroethics
Available here: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12152-015-9243-6?wt_mc=internal.event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst

Neil Levy argues that the degree to which psychopaths ought to be held blameworthy for their actions depends on the extent to which they are capable of mental time travel--episodic memory and episodic foresight.  Levy claims that deficits in mental time travel prevent psychopaths from fully appreciating what it is to be a person, and, without this understanding, we can at best hold psychopaths blameworthy for harming non-persons.  In this paper, I build upon and clarify various aspects of Levy’s view.  Specifically, I begin by outlining the neurobiological data on mental time travel, and I argue that psychopaths, or at least some psychopaths, indeed appear to have the deficits Levy ascribes to them.  I then expand upon the legal implications of his argument.  I use an analogy between juveniles and psychopaths to argue that the penological justification for retributive punishment against psychopaths ought to be substantially diminished.

The object of this paper, which ranges over subjects such as law, neuroscience, mirror neurons, modularism and language, is the study of the evolutionary origin of law. This is a question at the margins of the more general field of neurolaw, already prominent at the international level but still confined, in Italy, to niche legal elaborations.

This essay takes steps from Vittorio Villa’s theory of legal interpretation. Its epistemological foundations are analyzed through Villa’s critic to descriptivism and his own constructivist perspective. Such reading outlines a few problems, concerning both the nature of the “conceptual patterns” and their role in cognitive processes. The question about the pre-linguistic dimension of cognition is taken as starting point for a comparison with some outputs of cognitive neurosciences. The notion of “intentionality” becomes the connection thread for investigating requirements and limits of the dualistic paradigm which lays beneath some typical oppositions, such as: “perceiving vs. acting”, “knowing vs. evaluating”, “reason vs. emotions”. As a conclusion the essay will show a few possible implications of the adoption of a non- dualistic perspective in the field of legal studies and practices.

En este texto se reflexiona acerca de las interfaces existentes entre una práctica novedosa denominada mejoramiento neural farmacológico en relación con las neurociencias, neuroética y neuroderecho. Describe los efectos que esta práctica produce en la cognición de sujetos sanos y, cómo su consumo está siendo problematizado por la literatura especializada, a varios niveles. La literatura destaca los aspectos éticos, de justicia distributiva y los jurídicos en las distintas fuentes del derecho, tanto a nivel funcional como conceptual.

This issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy contains three papers on a topic of increasing importance within the field of ‘‘neurolaw’’—namely, the implications for criminal law of direct brain intervention based mind altering techniques (DBI’s). To locate these papers’ topic within a broader context, I begin with an overview of some prominent topics in the field of neurolaw, where possible providing some references to relevant literature. The specific questions asked by the three authors, as well as their answers and central claims, are then sketched out, and I end with a brief comment to explain why this particular topic can be expected to gain more prominence in coming years.

Com muita alegria, recebi a notícia, há alguns anos, de que a obra Neurociencias y Derecho Penal seria traduzida para o português pela equipe formada para esse ingente trabalho pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Ciências Criminais. Devido a dificuldades para além do aspecto acadêmico, que felizmente foram superadas, o projeto foi atrasado e agora aparece sob a coordenação de meus queridos colegas, Paulo César Busato, Alexis Couto de Brito, João Paulo Orsini Martinelli e Alberto Silva Franco. Para mim, pessoalmente, como para todos os autores da versão em espanhol editada por BdeF , é uma fonte de grande satisfação e constitui uma verdadeira honra. Em nome de todos eles, gostaria de expressar meus sinceros agradecimentos por esta iniciativa a todos que contribuíram para sua materialização. Além disso, é claro, a Editora Tirant lo Blanch por acolhe-la sob seu prestigiado selo editorial. Como aparece na apresentação original, trata-se do resultado de um trabalho realizado no Projeto de Pesquisa, do qual fui investigador principal, “Neurociência e Direito Penal: novas perspectivas no campo da culpabilidade e do tratamento jurídico-criminal da periculosidade” (MICINN-DER2009-09868), financiado pelo Ministério da Inovação e Ciência da Espanha. Esse mesmo órgão concedeu um projeto adicional, atualmente em andamento, intitulado Direito Penal e Comportamento Humano (MICINN-RTI2018-097838-B-I00), no qual esperamos continuar aprofundando, não apenas nas bases teóricas, mas também na vertente aplicativa de um objeto de estudo tão complexo à luz dos avanços que estão ocorrendo neste momento (https://blog.uclm.es/proyectodpch/). Stefan Zweig já concebeu o Brasil como Ein Land der Zukunft e disse que se o paraíso existe em algum lugar do planeta, não poderia estar longe daqui. Bem, acredito que o livro que tenho a honra de apresentar seja útil neste país maravilhoso e, em geral, em todo o campo de língua portuguesa.

Self-driving vehicles have recently started to come into society with the promise of reducing road accidents, and together with them came the need for new and suitable regulations. What constitutes the main source of concern is the possibility of such vehicles to find themselves in dilemmatic situations where they will autonomously have to make life-or-death decisions. For this reason, we will conduct a brief disquisition to understand how people react to the same dilemmatic problems and discuss whether it is possible for the same principles to apply to machines as well.

""L’idée d’une fondation naturelle des normes (morales ou juridiques)
rencontre à juste raison de nombreuses résistances. Après avoir dans un premier temps exposé ce qui justifie ces résistances, je décrirai comment certains philosophes, armés des récents développements en sciences cognitives, ont tenté de donner un nouveau sens à l’idée d’une fondation naturelle de ces normes. Je conclurai néanmoins que leurs contributions ont en général un
apport plutôt sceptique, en permettant de repérer les normes qui ne sont pas fondées plus que celles qui le sont.""

Los rápidos avances en neurociencia y neurotecnología abren un conjunto de posibilidades sin precedentes en el acceso, colecta, diseminación y manipulación de datos del cerebro humano. Estos desarrollos plantean importantes desafíos a los derechos humanos que deben abordarse para evitar consecuencias no deseadas. Este
trabajo evalúa las implicaciones de los diferentes usos de las neurotecnologías en relación a los derechos humanos y sugiere que el marco actual de derechos humanos puede no ser suficiente para responder a estos desafíos emergentes. Después de analizar la relación entre neurociencia y derechos humanos, identificamos cuatro nuevos derechos que pueden ser de gran relevancia en las próximas décadas: el derecho a la libertad cognitiva, el derecho a la privacidad mental, el derecho a la integridad mental y el derecho a la continuidad psicológica.