Norwegian Foreign Policy

Policy Coherence for Development means working on wider aspects of development in addition to development aid, such as trade, migration, investments, climate change and security. It goes across government departments, and includes coordination with other national and international actors.

Norwegian governments have expressed their commitment to ensuring Policy Coherence for Development on several occasions, latest in the Jeløya Declaration, which constitutes the political platform of present Prime Minister Erna Solberg’s government (2018). Norway is also committed to achieve the sustainable development sustainable development goals of Agenda 2030 where Policy Coherence for Development is a specific target (SDG 17).

The purpose of this evaluation is to contribute to:

- Increased knowledge on initiatives undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Norwegian actors to ensure policy coherence for development
- Shed light on dilemmas emerging from contradictions between international development objectives and other Norwegian objectives,
- Knowledge about how Norwegian efforts to ensure policy coherence for development play out at country level. Myanmar is a case study in the evaluation because an increasing number of actors, both traditional and non-traditional development actors, have engaged in the country in the recent years.

The Sino-Norwegian relationship is in many ways a case that demonstrates, in extremis, some of the key traits characterising the ties between China and the Nordic region. Firstly, it effectively demonstrates the range of reciprocal benefit to be garnered from economic and cultural cooperation between the eastern and the north-western edges of the Eurasian continent. Secondly, Sino-Norwegian relations are also a stark example of a central dilemma for Nordic countries in their relations with China, namely how to handle the normative issues that arises when stated core interests of the Chinese government are at odds with central tenets of a liberal political order. The relationship between China and Norway thus showcases some of the broader issues faced by small states navigating a multipolar world where economic, political and normative power is in increasing flux. The six-year political boycott that has been a defining feature of Sino-Norwegian relations this decade, made Norway an outlier case of substantial international interest. The political and economic outcomes of the frozen relationship, and the path back to normalisation between Oslo and Beijing, are however not as much atypical as they are representative of a range of broader trends and principles in Chinese economic strategy and foreign policy. The case of the fallout between Norway and China is thus an instructive one for a range of actors on the global arena.

The Arctic archipelago of Svalbard is under a limited form of Norwegian sovereignty and its settlements – among the northernmost in the world – are sites of activity by a range of states, most notably Russia. Norway's Svalbard policy has historically focused on marginalizing Russian influence. Through the use of informal diplomacy involving the creation of an economically diverse town (Longyearbyen, population around 2,070) and the promotion of scientific research, Norway is consolidating its control over the archipelago. At the same time, however, it risks losing authority within Svalbard due to the strengthening of local democracy in Longyearbyen and the increasing opportunities in Svalbard for the involvement of non-traditional Arctic actors such as the Asian economic powers. This article considers the historical basis for the present situation in Svalbard as well as the complex results of Norway's attempt to achieve its foreign policy through informal diplomacy.

In a rapidly changing strategic context, long-standing assumptions regarding military concepts must be re-evaluated. The Norwegian Swarm is a proposed alternative to the current Norwegian landpower operational concept. Any concept must build on a solid theoretical foundation in order to identify strengths and weaknesses as early as possible. This theoretical foundation should rely on rigorous analysis of empirical observations. If not, it runs the risk of recycling established assumptions and does not contribute to a constructive military theoretical debate. The research question of this thesis thus becomes: Can the Norwegian Swarm defeat a Russian limited surprise attack, assessed by empirically based military theory? The premise for the study is a limited strategic attack against Finnmark in the period up until year 2050. NATO-support is eliminated as a factor. 
The thesis uses abbreviated dynamic systems modelling methodology and, based on empirical observations, constructs the National Defence Model. The arguments underpinning the model strive to be explicit and transparent, so as to allow further studies to test its validity or expand upon the model. The National Defence Model illustrates that Norway, as a small power with defensive strategic goals, is best served by pursuing a prolonged war against a larger invader. Own forces that are able to infiltrate unseen and attack along multiple axes deliver the best chance of attaining a beneficial casualty rate. Conscious use of strategic communication to shape the dominant narrative appears as an important method of maximizing the probability of victory. 
When inserted into the National Defence Model against Russian forces in Finnmark, the Norwegian Swarm is characterized by being a resilient and time-consuming concept. It is very difficult to neutralize, even when the enemy enjoys a highly favourable situation at the onset of hostilities. In this situation, the Swarm likely will have to conduct a prolonged war lasting for months or even years. This thesis does not assess whether Norwegian political and popular will can endure a war of this duration. It does conclude, however, that if Norway is prepared to endure the hardships for as long as needed, the Norwegian Swarm gives the country the ability to independently defeat a limited attack by Russia.

What makes a peace nation? In this article it is argued that the Norwegian foreign policy of peace is rooted in an historical self-understanding of Norway and Norwegians as particularly peaceful, an identity which was first articulated around 1890. Norwegians hold a strong liberal/meliorist belief that the world can become a better place, and that Norway has an important role to play in this process. However, this general belief in peace and a Norwegian peaceful exceptionalism has been expressed in different ways over the last 120 years. Around 1900, the ideal was a passive state and an active people working for peace, while from around 1920 it was accepted that the state needed to take more active part. Where international peace activism was associated in particular with UN peacekeeping during the Cold War, and peace mediation during the 1990’s, increasingly a broader panoply of ‘good’ issues have been tied to an ever expanding notion of
peace. The last two decades have also seen increased Norwegian participation in offensive military actions, couched at least partly in terms of peace. That the Norwegian attachment to peace remains strong while still allowing for support to military action suggests both that the Norwegian
self-understanding as a peace nation is deeply rooted and that it allows for a self-righteous understanding of ‘peace through war’.

Статья посвящена отношениям государств Скандинавско-Балтийского региона (Дания, Латвия, Литва, Норвегия, Финляндия, Швеция, Эстония) и Украины в военно-политической и экономической сферах. Интерес этих государств к Украине сформировался задолго до событий 2013—2014 гг., стал приобретать явственные очертания уже после «оранжевой революции» и оформился в процессе реализации программы «Восточное партнерство». Наиболее активными игроками на украинском треке в своих субрегионах являются Швеция (до 2014 г. — один из наиболее крупных инвесторов в украинскую экономику) и Литва, начавшая в 2015 г. поставлять на Украину летальные вооружения. Государства Скандинавско-Балтийского региона предоставляют хотя и символическую (в сравнении, к примеру,  с выделяемыми средствами на помощь развитию), но значимую в масштабах украинской экономики финансовую помощь. Финансирование традиционно направляется на цели совершенствования системы государственного управления, институтов демократии, прав человека (включая гендерное равенство), проведения системных экономических реформ, устойчивого развития, в том числе вопросы энергосбережения/энергоэффективности, и др. Сотрудничество в военной сфере носит со стратегической точки зрения также скорее символический характер. Диаметрально противоположная оценка ситуации на Украине продолжает оставаться важнейшим камнем преткновения в отношениях России и государств региона, что не дает оснований надеяться на скорое смягчение их «основанной на ценностях» внешнеполитической линии на российском направлении.
The article is devoted to the relations of the Scandinavian-Baltic region states (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden) and Ukraine in the military-political and economic spheres. These countries had engaged in Ukrainian affairs long before 2013−2014. This happened soon after «the Orange Revolution» and, then, the trend became more pronounced during the implementation of the program «Eastern Partnership». The most active actors on the Ukrainian track in their subregions are Sweden (until 2014 — one of the largest investors in its economy) and Lithuania, which in 2015 started to supply lethal weapons  to Ukraine. The countries of the Scandinavian-Baltic region provide financial assistance to Ukraine which is symbolic compared to development aid, but considerable for Ukrainian economy. Financing is traditionally directed to promotion of effective public administration, democracy, human rights (including gender equality), systemic economic reforms, sustainable development (including energy efficiency), etc. From a strategic perspective, military cooperation of the Scandinavian-Baltic region countries with Ukraine is nominal as well. Against this background, completely divergent assessment of the situation in Ukraine continues to be the most important stumbling block in the relations between Russia and the states of the region. This does not give any grounds for early softening of their value-based foreign policy towards Russia.

Launched by Ms Frances Adamson, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 7 June 2017, State Support for Peace Processes: A Multi-Country Review was produced as part of the Australian International Conflict Resolution Project at the University of Melbourne and commissioned by the Development Policy Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The report explores how Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States of America have approached supporting peace processes. It aims to identify concrete steps for Australia to consider in enhancing its approach to supporting peace and stability, including improving its capacity to support peace processes through whole of government approaches. The report was prepared by researchers at the University of Melbourne led by Prof John Langmore, Dr Tania Miletic, Dr Aran Martin and Mr Nathan Shea, and includes chapters from experts around the world who have advised on the w...

Norway’s perception that it is a ‘peace nation’, embodied in the annual presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo since 1901, has been shaped by its traditions of social solidarity, egalitarianism, consensual approaches to resolving conflict, absence of a colonial history, and its economic dependence on a rule based international order. In 1993, the Oslo Peace Accords affirmed peacemaking’s place within foreign policy, and defined the ‘Norwegian Model’ of peacemaking, characterised by a close partnership between the Norwegian state and academic and humanitarian organisations. This was underwritten by generous and long
term humanitarian aid in conflict affected areas.

Through the 1990s, the Norwegian model of peacemaking was highly resistant to institutionalisation and capture by the state, drawing heavily on informal NGO networks held by State Secretary Jan Egeland, which attracted increasing state funding in a positive feedback loop. From 2000 onward, Norwegian peacemaking activity experienced increasing institutionalisation as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) adjusted to the exit of Egeland and sought to adopt long term and consistent approaches.  Based on extensive evaluation of past interventions, the current institutional structure features a section within the Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs dedicated to peace and reconciliation work with 14 employees and a budget of approximately AUD $105 million working in close coordination with the NGO sector.

Norway’s experience underlines the importance of managing the tension between a flexible and effective framework for peacemaking which incorporates the NGO and development community and resists potentially harmful procedural capture by the state, and the need to create durable state institutions in order to sustain peacemaking within foreign policy over long time frames. States seeking to learn from Norway’s experience can consider adopting a general strategic framework for peacemaking to ensure consistency and coherence in the context of the country’s broader foreign policy, coupled with specific peacemaking strategies in response to a given conflict, which cannot be pre-determined.  Modest institutional structures are required to support this approach, including: a) a standing inter-departmental peacemaking committee or unit responsible for overall strategy, coordinating personnel, reviewing capabilities and ensuring coherence between interventions and broader peacemaking strategy; b) an analytical unit of the standing committee to monitor conflicts and undertake intervention need and feasibility assessments; c) a strategic evaluation group; d) a mediation standby roster; e) core funding to support the standing committee and sub units; and, f) contingency funding arrangements to enable rapid responses to emerging crises.

Bjorn Engesland is the Secretary General of the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and a former Prairie Talks speaker. His article on empire and Russia appeared in the February 19th, 2015 edition of Aftenposten. I have provided a translation of the article for its value in the debate on Russia's recent actions.
Link to original article: http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/Imperiedrommer-og-andre-mareritt-7905661.html

I Norge har Internasjonal Politikk som fag på høyere nivå tradi¬sjonelt hatt et anvendelsesområde avgrenset til sivile utdannings¬institusjoner, som universiteter og høgskoler. Profesjoner driver profesjonsbygging som en del av sin virksomhet. Offiserskorpset kan betraktes som en profesjon. Offiserene har historisk og tradisjonelt tilhørt eliten i samfunnet. Artikkelen analyserer hvordan de militære utdanningsinstitusjonene forholder seg til Internasjonal Politikk som fag. Artikkelen analyserer introduksjonen av IP-faget i pensum og fagplaner ved Hærens krigsskole, i lys av den generelle internasjonaliseringen av Forsvaret etter den kalde krigens slutt. Hva er fagets anvendelsesområde for kunnskapsprodusentene i Forsvaret? Hvilken status har IP-faget i den militære utdanningen?

One of the most important lessons learnt so far from the conflict in Ukraine is that 25 years after the end of the Cold War, Europe is no longer at the centre of the United States´ security calculations. Consequently, the US will only judge NATO´s usefulness by its concrete results in terms of how the European allies themselves make a substantial contribution in handling the conflict

Launched by Ms Frances Adamson, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade on 7 June 2017, State Support for Peace Processes: A Multi-Country Review was produced as part of the Australian International Conflict Resolution Project at the University of Melbourne and commissioned by the Development Policy Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The report explores how Canada, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States of America have approached supporting peace processes. It aims to identify concrete steps for Australia to consider in enhancing its approach to supporting peace and stability, including improving its capacity to support peace processes through whole of government approaches. The report was prepared by researchers at the University of Melbourne led by Prof John Langmore, Dr Tania Miletic, Dr Aran Martin and Mr Nathan Shea, and includes chapters from experts around the world who have advised on the w...

Citation for published version (APA): Haugevik, K., Fägersten, B., Gunnarsson, P., Jokela, J., Sørensen, C., Thorhallsson, B., & Wivel, A. (2018, Jun 1). Nordic responses to Brexit: Making the best of a difficult situation. (7 ed.) Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). NUPI Policy Brief Vol. 2018 No. 7 http://www.nupi.no/en/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Nordicresponses-to-Brexit-Making-the-best-of-a-difficult-situation

This article theorises containment as a diplomatic response mode for states when faced with potentially harmful attacks on their international identity and reputation. Despite widespread agreement in International Relations (IR) scholarship that identities matter in the context of state security, studies of crisis management have paid little attention to ontological security crises. Scholarly literature on public diplomacy has concerned itself mainly with proactive nation branding and reputation building; work on stigma management has privileged the study of how ‘transgressive’ states respond to identity attacks by recognising, rejecting or countering criticism. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we make the case that states do not perform as uniform entities when faced with ontological security crises – government representatives, bureaucratic officials and diplomats have varying roles and action repertoires available to them. Second, we argue that containment is a key but undertheorised part of the diplomatic toolkit in crisis management. Unpacking containment as a crisis management response mode, we combine insights from IR scholarship on emotions and diplomacy with insights on therapeutic practices from social psychology. We substantiate our argument with a case study of how Norwegian government representatives, bureaucratic officials and diplomats responded to escalating international criticism against Norway’s Child Welfare Services following a wave of transnational protests in 2016. A key finding is that whereas the dominant response mode of government ministers and bureaucratic officials was to reject the criticism, diplomats mainly worked to contain the situation, trying to prevent it from escalating further and resulting in long-term damage to bilateral relations.

This article examines how Norway, a veteran EU outsider by choice, works on a day-to-day basis to compensate for its lack of formal voice in EU institutions. After Norwegian voters' second rejection of EU membership in a national referendum in 1994, Prime Minister Brundtland observed that Norway now must be prepared to use “the back door” to reach EU policy-makers. I suggest that for Norway, a key alternative route to the EU decision-making table has gone through bilateral partnerships. I identify two chief variants of this bilateral trajectory, what I term long-term and rotating bilateralism. Firstly, Norway has pursued long-term ties with selected bilateral partners within the EU system. Secondly, it has systematically strengthened its diplomatic presence in the member state holding or about to take over the rotating presidency of the EU Council. I conclude with some reflections on the relevance of Norway's “bilateral experience” for Britain, as a future EU outsider.

How do some relationships between states come to be seen as more ‘special’ than others – by politicians, journalists, scholars and the wider public? And what impact, if any, do recurring public claims of ‘friendship’ and ‘specialness’ have on the interaction practices that states engage in on a day-to-day basis and over time? A considerable amount of IR scholarship has sought to explain why extensive and close inter-state cooperation and alliances emerge; to identify under what circumstances; and to map the historical development, thematic scope and policy implications of such cooperation. However, few studies have systematically and in light of theory set out to examine the everyday processes through which amicable relationships between states come to evolve and unfold differently. That is where the present dissertation aims to add value. Employing an understanding of inter-state relationships as on-going social processes, I view particular relational identities between states such...

Torture and inhumane treatment of prisoners was the iconic human rights issue of the 1970s. Scholars credit Amnesty International and other non-governmental organizations for the growing public outcry and for the international diplomacy that led to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984). Little is known about the dynamics between civil society and governments in this process. This article examines Sweden’s anti-torture efforts and its entanglement with Amnesty International, its Scandinavian neighbors, and the Netherlands. With varying levels of commitment, these governments issued inter-state complaints against Greece at the Council of Europe in 1967, drafted and secured the adoption of a UN declaration against torture in 1975, and initiated the decision to make a convention in 1977. On several occasions, Sweden took charge, reflecting its new ambitions in human rights as part of its emerging ‘active foreign policy’. Tracking specific initiatives, the article brings into focus an often-forgotten group of states, uncovers the dynamics between these and NGOs anti-torture efforts, and reveals the central roles of the legal entrepreneurs who designed and timed initiatives from within their government’s foreign ministries.

I denne temautgaven av Internasjonal Politikk ser vi nærmere på hva Storbritannias EU-uttreden vil kunne bety for Norden og de enkelte nordiske land. «Brexit» markerer etter alt å dømme et veiskille i europeisk politisk historie, og vil prege europeisk politikk i mange år fremover. Brexit vil også med all sannsynlighet vaere av stor betydning for de nor-diske landene – Danmark, Finland, Island, Norge og Sverige – som hører til i det nordvestlige hjørnet av Europa og historisk sett har hatt tette bånd til Storbritannia. Uavhengig av sin formelle tilknytning til EU, vil de alle måtte redefinere sine forhold ikke bare til Storbritannia, men også til Europa og EU post-brexit.

Hovedlinjene i norsk utenrikspolitikk kan finnes i sentrale lover,
budsjettdokumenter og utenrikspolitiske redegjørelser. Samtidig har
det de siste ti årene foregått en rekke interessante diskusjoner om
interessebegrepet i norsk utenrikspolitikk, og utenrikstjenesten har
selv tatt grep for å få en bedre samlet empirisk og konkret forståelse av
de faktiske vurderinger av norske interesser og arbeid med å fremme
disse ved utestasjonene. Denne rapporten utvikler videre én side ved diskusjonen om norske interesser, og presenterer for første gang resultatene fra en kvantitativ spørreskjemabasert analyse av hvordan norske interesser oppfattes og vurderes, og hvordan det arbeides med norske interesser ved norske utestasjoner.

A non-EU state and member of the European Economic Area (EEA)
since 1994, Norway enjoys a unique legal, political and practical
relationship with the EU. This policy paper discusses what the EU’s
increased openness to differentiation in association models and
decision-making procedures could mean for a highly integrated third
country like Norway, especially within foreign, security and defence
policy. Based on interviews conducted in 2020 and 2021, we highlight
three observations: First, Norway’s current association model – the EEA
agreement plus some 70 bilateral agreements – is generally seen to
have served Norwegian interests well, although both Europhile and EUsceptic interviewees see EU–Norway relations as asymmetric. Second,
the EU’s openness to differentiated solutions is generally welcomed, and
considered to give Norway opportunities and leeway. Finally, Norwegian
EU membership is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. Reasons
include well-functioning association agreements, two negative votes on
EU membership, and the continued and growing strength of EU-sceptic
political parties in the Norwegian Parliament.

Torture and inhumane treatment of prisoners was the iconic human rights issue of the 1970s. Scholars credit Amnesty International and other non-governmental organizations for the growing public outcry and for the international diplomacy that led to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984). Little is known about the dynamics between civil society and governments in this process. This article examines Sweden’s anti-torture efforts and its entanglement with Amnesty International, its Scandinavian neighbors, and the Netherlands. With varying levels of commitment, these governments issued inter-state complaints against Greece at the Council of Europe in 1967, drafted and secured the adoption of a UN declaration against torture in 1975, and initiated the decision to make a convention in 1977. On several occasions, Sweden took charge, reflecting its new ambitions in human rights as part of its emerging ‘active foreign policy’. Tracking specific initiatives, the article brings into focus an often-forgotten group of states, uncovers the dynamics between these and NGOs anti-torture efforts, and reveals the central roles of the legal entrepreneurs who designed and timed initiatives from within their government’s foreign ministries.

This article theorises containment as a diplomatic response mode for states when faced with potentially harmful attacks on their international identity and reputation. Despite widespread agreement in International Relations (IR) scholarship that identities matter in the context of state security, studies of crisis management have paid little attention to ontological security crises. Scholarly literature on public diplomacy has concerned itself mainly with proactive nation branding and reputation building; work on stigma management has privileged the study of how ‘transgressive’ states respond to identity attacks by recognising, rejecting or countering criticism. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we make the case that states do not perform as uniform entities when faced with ontological security crises – government representatives, bureaucratic officials and diplomats have varying roles and action repertoires available to them. Second, we argue that containment is a key but undert...

Omleggingen av Forsvaret er gjenstand for kontinuerlig debatt blant norske politikere, offiserer, forskere og i media. Hovedspørsmålet som artikkelen analyserer er i hvilken grad og hvordan skiftende internasjonale utviklingstrekk påvirker norsk forsvarspolitisk diskurs og praksis? Artikkelen analyserer i hvilken grad de nye internasjonale operasjonene på 1990-tallet grep inn i etablerte forestillinger om og praksiser knyttet til norsk forsvarspolitikk, samt hvilke motkrefter dette utløste. Mens analysen viser stor grad av kontinuitet i diskursen og i militære praksiser i perioden 1990-2005, ser overgangen fra et unipolært, USA-dominert internasjonalt system til et mer multi-polært internasjonalt system bestående av flere maktsentra i perioden etter 2005 ut til å påvirke norsk forsvarsdiskurs og Forsvarets virksomhet relativt raskt. Hvordan kan dette forstås?

Den norske staten har hatt overordnet og dels direkte styring med den norske.energisektoren siden begynnelsen av 1900-tal-let. Kommuner og fylkeskommuner har vert viktige medspil-lere i kraftsektoren, mens petroleumssektoren i hovedsak har veert styrt pa statlig niva. Utvikling og modning av begge indust-tiene, mer liberale akonomiske tankesett, og i dé senere rene gradvis mer europeiserte markeder og politikk, har bidratt til at statens forvaltningsrolle etter hvert har fatt en mer, om enn ikke entydig, regulativ rolle. Staten har beholdt en stor grad av. offentlig kontroll, men den nye offentlig-private miksen har blitt mer regulativ og innebzrer mindre statlig innflytelse over daglig drift, og starre innslag av selskapsbeslutninger. Del-liberaliseringene har blitt gjennomfert med stor grad av tvert-. politisk enighet. Noc tradisjonelt heyre-venstre skille har det _ ikke vert i norsk energipolitikk. Enigheten har imidlertid slate noen sprekker de siste 4tene. Miljo-og klimahensyn har kom-met med styrke inn i debatten. Samtidig har overferingskabler for kraft til andre land og forholdet til EUs energipolitikk fatt starve oppmerksomhet. Kimaendringer og postmaterialistiske verdier motes na tydeligere i konflikter om skonomisk vekst, energi, natu, milje og klima, og forholdet til EU, pa tvers av ' det tradisjonelle hoyre-venstre skillet. Denne artikkelen drefter hvordan den norske energipolitik-ken har balansert nzringenes utvikling, endrede markedslibe-rale og politiske rammebetingelser, og milja-og klimahensyn. ISBN 978-82-92945-65-0

NUPI Siden 1990 har det skjedd en omfattende globalisering og internasjonali-sering av politikken. Nye transnasjonale og overnasjonale aktører utfordrer i økende grad suverene staters makt. Globaliseringen og internasjonalise-ringen har i praksis visket ut skillet mellom utenriks-og innenrikspolitikk. I Europa har EU-landene i tillegg opplevd stor grad av «europeisering» som følge av integrasjonsprosessen. Men også land utenfor EU, inkludert Norge, har blitt gjenstand for «europeisering» gjennom samarbeidet med EU på en rekke områder. I dette bidraget argumenterer jeg for at slike endrede internasjonale rammebetingelser for norsk utenrikspolitikk har styrket fagstatsrådenes rolle og makt, til dels på bekostning av utenriks-ministerens. Jeg skal saerlig se på hvordan ett av fagdepartementene, For-svarsdepartementet, og i noen grad også Statsministerens kontor, utfordrer Utenriksdepartementets posisjon som «eier» av norsk utenrikspolitikk. Utfordringen fra EU Utenriksministeren har det overordnete ansvaret for norsk utenrikspoli-tikk, herunder ansvaret for å koordinere arbeidet på dette saksområdet. Som en direkte følge av internasjonalisering og globalisering har imidler-tid norsk utenrikspolitikk blitt utsatt for et funksjonstap. De fleste fagdepartementer håndterer saker som tidligere som oftest lå under Uten-riksdepartementet (UD), enten i en egen internasjonal avdeling eller på 1. Paperet er basert på et innlegg på NUPIs jubileumskonferanse, 17. november 2009.

Omleggingen av Forsvaret er gjenstand for kontinuerlig debatt blant norske politikere, offiserer, forskere og i media. Hovedspørsmålet som artikkelen analyserer er i hvilken grad og hvordan skiftende internasjonale utviklingstrekk påvirker norsk forsvarspolitisk diskurs og praksis? Artikkelen analyserer i hvilken grad de nye internasjonale operasjonene på 1990-tallet grep inn i etablerte forestillinger om og praksiser knyttet til norsk forsvarspolitikk, samt hvilke motkrefter dette utløste. Mens analysen viser stor grad av kontinuitet i diskursen og i militære praksiser i perioden 1990-2005, ser overgangen fra et unipolært, USA-dominert internasjonalt system til et mer multi-polært internasjonalt system bestående av flere maktsentra i perioden etter 2005 ut til å påvirke norsk forsvarsdiskurs og Forsvarets virksomhet relativt raskt. Hvordan kan dette forstås?

In the first decades after the Second World War, Britain was Norway's No. 1 ally, as evident in strategy documents as well as in the wider foreign policy debate. Today, Britain still stands as a key Norwegian ally, but the UK–Norway relationship receives far less political and public attention. Why does Britain feature so little in current Norwegian foreign policy strategy and debate? In this article, I argue that Britain's reduced presence cannot be understood merely by looking at changes in strategic and material factors – we must also examine how Norway's foreign policy identity vis-à-vis Britain has evolved. Analysing foreign policy debates in the Storting since 1945, I find that the British presence faded gradually. In the early post-war years, Britain was portrayed as a 'political lodestar' for Norway. Since the mid-1970s, however, representations of Britain have been more sporadic, and more fragmented. It is the absence of an explicit, overarching relational identity in which Norwegian foreign policy towards Britain can be anchored that arguably makes relations with Britain prone to be neglected in the everyday formulation and practice of foreign policy.

I tiårene etter andre verdenskrig var Storbritannia Norges uttalt viktigste allierte, med en sentral plass i norsk utenrikspolitisk strategi og i det utenrikspolitiske ordskiftet. Storbritannia er utvilsomt fortsatt materielt og strategisk viktig for Norge, men er i dag lite til stede i norsk utenrikspolitisk strategi og debatt. Hva har skjedd? I denne artikkelen forklarer jeg hvorfor strategiske og materielle forklaringer bør suppleres med en analyse av hvordan Norges identitet vis-à-vis Storbritannia gradvis har endret seg.

SAMMENDRAG
I tiårene etter andre verdenskrig var Storbritannia Norges uttalt viktigste allierte, med en sentral plass i norsk utenrikspolitisk strategi og i det utenrikspolitiske ordskiftet. Storbritannia er utvilsomt fortsatt materielt og strategisk viktig for Norge, men er i dag lite til stede i norsk utenrikspolitisk strategi og debatt. Hva har skjedd? I denne artikkelen forklarer jeg hvorfor strategiske og materielle forklaringer bør suppleres med en analyse av hvordan Norges identitet vis-à-vis Storbritannia gradvis har endret seg.