Small States

Pointing to a number of informal dynamics in small societies that are supposed to
enhance cooperation and consensus, traditional studies on power-sharing posit that small states are
‘most likely’ candidates for stable, multiethnic democracy. These assumptions are, however,
challenged by the case study literature on small states which highlights a variety of informal
patterns that undermine democratic governance. Addressing this contradiction, the present paper
provides an in-depth analysis of power-sharing politics in Suriname, a small, culturally
heterogeneous country in South America that initially figured as a prominent case in consociational
theory. The analysis reveals that the smallness of Suriname strongly affects and shapes the nature
of democracy in the country. On the one hand, clientelism ensures that members of each ethnic
group included in power-sharing arrangements have access to state resources and services, thus
providing a large measure of political stability. On the other hand, clientelism undermines the
functioning of multiethnic democracy by a host of negative side effects, among which economic
and social dependency of citizens, executive dominance and authoritarian politics, endemic
corruption that goes largely unpunished, and state predation by elites. The upshot is that whereas
power-sharing arrangements in small societies might indeed be facilitated by a small population
size, there is a heavy price to pay in terms of the quality of democracy.

During the reign of James II/VII Stuart (1685-1688), the political, diplomatic and cultural relations between the British court and the Italian states flourished as never before. This was due above all to the Roman-Catholic faith of the king and the lively personality of his consort Maria Beatrice d’Este («Mary of Modena»), while the growing English economic power was acquiring commercial dominance in the Mediterranean area. With the help of thousands of unpublished papers, the book by Alessandro Cont reconstructs the British diplomatic network in Italy during this period, the personalities and orientations of the ministers of Italian princes accredited to the court of Whitehall, the queen’s dynastic policy and the peculiar characteristics of her Italian entourage of chaplains, servants, artists and musicians.

Georgia, a small state in the South Caucasus, is the most ardent supporter of Euro-Atlantic integration in the entire post-Soviet region. Georgia’s possible membership in NATO looms large not only in terms of politics in the South Caucasus but increasingly in the tense relations between Russia and the West. In July 2018, NATO extended an official invitation to Macedonia, thereby processing its eighth enlargement. Zooming in on Georgia and Macedonia’s performance on membership requirements is a one-of-a-kind litmus test of perspectives of Georgia’s membership in NATO. The comparative analysis unveils that Georgia has outperformed Macedonia in all key areas of reforms and that NATO still pays more attention to geopolitical aspects of membership, rather compatibility with the Alliance’s requirements.

After its transition to democracy and decolonization in the mid-1970s, Portugal’s main external focus shifted from Africa and the Atlantic to Europe. Yet past priorities continued to occupy an important place in the foreign policy of this small state. Drawing on the literature on Europeanization, this paper examines the impact of European Union membership on Portuguese foreign policy by focusing on the case of Mozambique, one of Portugal’s largest former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. Pointing to some national adaptation, the findings highlight Lisbon’s important efforts to project its priorities onto the EU level and preserve some freedom of maneuver in relation to its ex-colony. This study brings a more in-depth and nuanced picture of the EU’s impact on Portuguese foreign policy than the one usually found in the existing literature. Moreover, it corroborates the usefulness of the concept of Europeanization to explore the specific European dynamics that influence and shape the national foreign policies of EU member states.

While the efforts of great powers to export their regimes to small states is well studied in the literature, the role of mass opinion in small states where great powers compete for influence remains under-theorized as a factor that can shape small state preferences over foreign alliances and policies. This paper investigates the causes of individual-level variation in foreign policy preferences toward major powers in small states with big neighbors. Using recent public opinion data from Georgia, we propose a conceptual framework based on three factors-political paternalism, economic status, and religiosity-to explain why some individuals in small states prefer closer ties with different major powers. We find support for all three factors influencing foreign policy attitudes toward Russia, but not America. As great powers continue to pursue policies that encourage their preferred political orders in small states, the analysis of foreign policy preferences in such states will become increasingly vital to our understanding of world politics. Russia's resurgence, including its ongoing intervention in Ukraine and its previous actions in Georgia and Moldova, sent a clear signal to all former Soviet Union member states that there will be deadly consequences, in addition to energy and economic sanctions, for turning away from Russia and pursuing closer ties with the West. The tepid US response to these crises has also made it obvious that the United States is unwilling to use military force against Russia to defend its interests in non-NATO countries, particularly those on Russia's periphery. Some have even called into question NATO's resolve to respond militarily in the event of a Russian invasion into NATO countries, chiefly the Baltics, which has recently engaged in a series of war games in anticipation of a potential Russian invasion.

This chapter investigates whether the often misused and misunderstood concept of the buffer state remains significant in the post-Cold War era. With this in mind, we focus on the case of Ukraine and its relations with Russia and the West. We suggest that, as the conditions of cooperation and competition between Russia and the West have been significantly different from those of the past, both of them do not perceive small states between them as buffers. Nudged in between great powers, small states that in the past could have played the role of buffer, have now become objects of the competition between great powers and their integration projects. We conclude that small states lying uncomfortably in-between great powers remain vulnerable to pressures from their more powerful neighbours; their domestic politics and policies and their external relations are invariably influenced by their geography. However, their own decisions at home and abroad still matter.

This chapter looks at Cyprus as a status seeker in the Eastern Mediterranean and sheds some new light on Cyprus’ role in the region as well as on the study of small state status in the discipline of the International Relations. The authors investigate Cyprus’ status seeking strategy, assess its effectiveness and discuss its impact, by exploring its relationships with the great powers, the EU and with its neighbours in the region. Their findings indicate that Cyprus’ status seeking strategy has been successful. The Republic of Cyprus is being recognized as a key player in the region, as a “good power” and a useful partner. Moreover, the authors suggest that Cyprus status seeking strategy has laid the foundations for changes in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, they argue that in the case of Cyprus status seeking is not an end in itself. Cyprus seeks to better its position and harness the gains from that improvement. Thus, this chapter shows that even a small, occupied, peripheral small state can succeed in status seeking and improve not only its status, but also enhance conditions for cooperation, peace, stability, security in a region. That said, the authors underline that changes in the Eastern Mediterranean are at an embryonic stage and Cyprus’ advanced status in the region remains fluid and vulnerable.

Small economies are usually classified by the size of their GDP. Among the small states, which can be determined by various criteria, there are many small economies. Smallness of the economy influences the vulnerability of the state, and if it is connected with the other potentially negative factors (land-locked or island position) or reliance on a few export products, it can create vulnerable economies. Concurrently, smallness of the economy can be an advantage, since it provides better conditions for faster economic growth and makes transformations of the economy easier. This article brings a quantitative comparative study of the small economies, classified by the size of their total GDP. Sets of macroeconomic data (foreign direct investment [FDI] net inflows in current US$ and GDP in current US$; external debt and GDP) were studied, for which the correlation between the FDI and GDP was calculated (for 40 smallest economies), as was the regression analysis between the FDI net inflows (independent variable) and the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), as well as between the FDI net inflows and the growth of external debt for the 10 smallest economies between 1981 and 2014. The results were used to describe if there is a significant connection between FDI and external debt and if it can be mathematically modeled. All the data were taken from the web pages of the World Bank. The correlation analysis for FDI and GDP for the same years was also done. The countries that were studied had the smallest 40 economies in the world in 1981 (starting year) and in 2014 (final year), regardless of their land area, population, and geographical position. To examine the influence of the smallness of economy, the 15 largest world economies were studied as control group.

Reflecting their diminutive size and protracted existence as sovereign states, the political systems of the four European microstates – Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino – contain various idiosyncratic elements, as well as some unique political institutions. The chapter offers an in-depth analysis of the political systems, international relations and economic and societal characteristics of these four European microstates. Moreover, European integration and the exploitation of niche markets have provided these very small states with great opportunities. Yet, as with other small states, such occasions are always accompanied by risks and vulnerabilities.

This chapter enquires into the methods and tools that small states can use to influence decision-making in the EU and the UNSC. It examines the structural weaknesses of small states within these organisations, and how they can compensate for them in order to have a say within these organisations. While the UNSC and EU are very different organisations, small states can adopt similar strategies to exert influence in these bodies. To overcome their structural weaknesses, small states need to acknowledge their limitations, have the political will to try to exert influence, set priorities, develop diplomatic skills and knowledge, develop a positive image, build coalitions, take initiative and exploit the special characteristics of their small public administrations. Due to the small size of their public administrations, small states can rely on the informality, flexibility, and the autonomy of their diplomatic forces. A strategy based on these features can bring negotiating success in these organisations.

Small states can achieve influence and power in the international system by implementing some status-seeking strategies oriented to upgrade their relevance towards the hegemon. This essay will try to discern some ‘status markers’ in order to identify properly a consistent strategy and then it will be observed if Singapore, Qatar and Rwanda fulfil these markers. We will conclude it is possible to identify status-seeking strategies, and the analysed three countries are implementing their own in a similar way. Thus, they achieve a "sit at the table" of the international system despite having no material resources.

Original at: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/333570

By September 1939, Luxembourgish diplomatic efforts to see the neutral status of the Grand Duchy reaffirmed by a multilateral declaration of the European powers had reached a dead end. With the outbreak of hostilities, the country found itself caught between the Maginot and Siegfried Line, hence risking to become a battle-contested area between the war-waging armies. To make the situation even more difficult, neutral Luxembourg could not call upon a strong military to protect its national integrity but had to rely merely on its 700-head strong Force Armée. Besides their numerical inferiority, these armed forces were – due to their police-like character – neither organized, trained nor equipped to meet the requirements of a “real” military deployment along the national borders facing Germany and France. Worst of all, an internal order even forbade the troops to use their weapons in case of an enemy invasion – seemingly making it a national military without any military value or raison d’être in the face of the imminent conflict.
This contribution aims to discuss the role of the Luxembourgish armed forces in the Phoney War by analysing their functions and tasks through military documents in the Foreign affairs section of the Luxembourgish National Archives. By examining the steps and measures taken by the Force Armée in face of the conflict, the paper focusses on its potential room for manoeuvre, its role and its actual raison d’être in the Phoney War. In the face of a largely inexistent Luxembourgish military historiography, the contribution finally also tries to provide a clearer picture of the Luxembourgish armed forces before 1940 in general by giving deeper insight into the institutional characteristics and dispositions of the Force Armée.

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kaip tarptautinių santykių disciplina apibrėžia ir aiškina mažų valstybių problematiką. Išskiriant pagrindinius klausimus, formuluojama iki šiol mažų valstybių studijų lauke plačiai netaikyta post-struktūralistinė teorinė ir metodologinė prieiga, kreipianti dėmesį į mažumą, kaip šalies identiteto dimensiją, ir reikšmes, kuriomis buvimas maža valstybe yra formuluojamas, siejamas arba sietinas su saugumo bei užsienio politika. Pateikiama Lietuvos ir Naujosios Zelandijos atvejų analizė ir jų palygini-mas pristatant pagrindines mažumą apibrėžiančias reikšmes, jų santykį su saugumo bei užsienio politika. Remiantis atlikta analize, pasiūlomi į studijų lauko plėtojimą referuojantys principai, kurie gali būti svarbūs toliau tiriant ir aiškinant mažas valstybes. Justinas Lingevičius – Vilniaus universiteto Tarptautinių santykių ir politikos mokslų instituto tarptautinių santykių ir diplomatijos magistro programos absolventas. Straipsnis parengtas pagal VU TSPMI 2016 m. apgintą magistro darbą (el. paštas: justinas. lin@gmail.com).

In this chapter we try to address the issues pertinent to small new EU member states following the accession to the EU. We first provide a brief overview of historical developments leading to EU accession. We then focus on the events leading up to the recent financial and economic crisis and the effects it had on Latvian economy. We argue that small states do not have sufficient capacity to react to and defend themselves from the major economic shocks, especially in context of free flows of capital and labour.

Presented Master thesis reveals transformation of Lithuania's foreign policy under framework of Eastern Partnership programme in 2009-2014, thus assessing, whether Lithuania's foreign policy has experienced a shift from small state policy to smart state strategy.
Supervisor: dr. Laurynas Jonavičius
Defended at Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science on January 20, 2015. Mark - 9.

2013. aasta alguses võttis Vabariigi Valitsus vastu uue riigikaitse arengukava. Artikkel püüab otsida vastuseid küsimustele:
Kas arengukava reformiga loodud uus juhtimismudel muudab Eestit sõjaliselt tugevamaks või haavatavamaks? Kas Eesti riigikaitses toimub ikka liikumine võimalikult  detsentraliseeritud manööversõjapidamise idee suunas
või pigem tagasi tsentraliseeritud stiili ja kurnamissõja meetodite poole? Ukrainas asetleidvate sündmuste taustal muutub eriti oluliseks ka küsimus, kas Eestil on uue juhtimismudeli käivitamiseks ikka piisavalt aega. Ehk teisisõnu: ega üleminekuperioodiga teki siiski ohtlikku lünka kaitsevõimes?

¿Qué efectos recíprocos produce la interdependencia asimétrica entre China y dos pequeños Estados latinoamericanos, Ecuador y Costa Rica, en el periodo 2001-2015? Para contestar la pregunta central y las preguntas subsidiarias del libro, se recurre a las principales teorías y conceptos de las Relaciones Internacionales como disciplina de estudio. Se analiza a la interdependencia asimétrica como una situación en la que se producen efectos recíprocos como resultado de un contexto de intercambio entre los países. Sin embargo, de dicho intercambio se derivan costos recíprocos que no son necesariamente simétricos y, por tanto, los beneficios mutuos no están garantizados (Keohane y Nye 1977).

Disponible en: https://www.flacso.edu.ec/node/111?id=7553

The cases of Singapore and Switzerland present a fascinating puzzle: how have two small states achieved similar levels of success through divergent pathways? Are both approaches equally sustainable, and what lessons do they hold for each other? While Singapore is the archetypal developmental state, whose success can be attributed to strong political leadership and long-term planning, Switzerland's success is a more organic process, due to the propitious convergence of strong industries and a resilient citizenry. Yet throughout the course of their development, both countries have had to deal with the dual challenges of culturally heterogeneous populations and challenging regional contexts. Edited by Yvonne Guo and Jun Jie Woo, with forewords from Ambassadors Thomas Kupfer and Tommy Koh, Singapore and Switzerland: Secrets to Small State Success features contributions from distinguished scholars and policymakers who explore the dynamics of two small states which have topped international rankings in a dazzling array of policy areas, from economic competitiveness to education to governance, but whose pathways to success could not be more different.

During the development of the traditional schools of international relations (IR) after the Second World War, a wide range of tools were invented to analyze the foreign policy of
small states.Nonetheless, small state theory has not been frequently applied within Central European states, partly because of the regional tendency to place more emphasis on empirical than on theoretical research. However, the application of the advances made within small state studies (SSS) to Central European countries – in order to learn whether the theoretical predictions observations are met with in reality – promises important and fruitful results both at the theoretical and practical levels. In this paper we seek to put this in practice, comparing some of the most general expectations of SSS with the actual foreign policy of Hungary after the regime change.

This paper examines the experience of Switzerland within the greater discourse of neutrality in international relations. When many scholars or policy makers discuss neutrality, they often draw upon the experience of the Swiss. Switzerland has, since the early 19th century, constructed an identity as a neutral state. Unlike nearly every other neutral European in modern political history, Switzerland has been successful. In this paper we show the Swiss as an outlier in the dialogue on neutrality. Switzerland has been far more successful at neutrality than any other state for reasons of culture, history and international recognition. Neutrality as a policy has been largely a failure for most states. The Swiss, however, possess three major attributes that allow them to succeed and prosper in their role as neutral. First is the incorporation of an armed deterrent into the national culture. Second is the provision of neutrality as a collective good. Finally is the solidification of Swiss neutrality into international law, custom and convention over nearly 200 years.

The 2017 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was negotiated at the UN over the objections of nuclear-armed and -allied states and established a global categorical ban on nuclear weapons framed in terms of humanitarianism, human rights and environmentalism. The TPNW also placed ‘positive obligations’ on states to assist victims of nuclear weapons use and testing and remediate contaminated environments. States and NGOs from the Pacific region advocated for a strong treaty text, particularly its positive obligations. They were influenced by the region’s history as a site of nuclear weapons testing in Marshall Islands, Kiribati and French Polynesia/Te Ao Maohi; the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone’s precedent; and earlier diplomatic efforts and activism linking denuclearization with decolonization. In doing so, Pacific and other formerly colonized states flipped the ‘standard of civilization’ script embedded in humanitarian disarmament law and applied it to their former colonizers. The paper demonstrates the agency of small states—the ‘-Pacific’ part of ‘Asia-Pacific’—in multilateral policymaking on peace and security, often overlooked in international relations scholarship. It draws on my participant observation in the Nobel Peace Prize-winning advocacy of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) during the TPNW negotiations.

Assumptions have developed around the benefits of internationalisation; for example, that it promotes cultural integration and harmony, improves the quality of education and research, and improves country and institutional reputations internationally. A range of coercive, normative and mimetic influences have pushed most small states with mass or universal higher education systems to embrace the concept of internationalisation. By adopting a stakeholder analysis approach in one small state – Lithuania – this research investigates the successes, failures and challenges of internationalisation in improving the quality of higher education provision. It was found that internationalisation can present both opportunities and challenges to small states. However, the overwhelming consensus among the range of stakeholders who participated in this study was that the benefits of internationalisation far outweigh the threats and disadvantages. The paper concludes with a set of generalisable recommendations for small states that possess mass or universal higher education systems.

This article interrogates the undercurrents of small states foreign policy and the determinants of foreign policy making in small states. It question small states are positioned in the web of international relations with other player, such as large states. The research is guided by the assumption that small states are somewhat limited by domestic and external factor, which are the driving catalysts of international relations agendas. The analysis aims to determine how the smallness of a state can be a challenge, and how small states can survive the limitations of their smallness. The article makes use of Liberalism/Neo-Liberalism theories of International Relations (IR) Studies.

What happens to an imperial economy after empire? How do economics, security, and ideology interact at the new state frontiers? Does trade always break down ideological barriers? The eastern borders of Poland, Latvia, and Estonia comprised much of the interwar Soviet state’s western frontier – the focus of Moscow’s revolutionary aspirations and security concerns. These young nations paid for their independence with the loss of the Imperial Russian market. Łódź, the “Polish Manchester,” had fashioned its textiles for Russian and Ukrainian consumers; Riga had been the Empire’s busiest commercial port; Tallinn had been one of the busiest – and Russians drank nine-tenths of the potato vodka distilled on Estonian estates. Eager to reclaim their traditional market, but stymied by the Soviet state monopoly on foreign trade and impatient with the slow grind of trade talks, these countries’ businessmen turned to the porous Soviet frontier. The dissertation reveals how, despite considerable misgivings, their governments actively abetted this traffic. The Polish and Baltic struggles to balance the heady profits of the “border trade” against a host of security concerns shaped everyday lives and government decisions on both sides of the Soviet frontier. Drawing on government archives, business records, and periodicals from seven countries, the dissertation uncovers the changing composition and scale of these “semi-contraband” (and fully-contraband) flows that Soviet authorities struggled to stem. It reveals the centrality of cross-border Jewish networks to this trade, and the implications of this centrality for Polish and Latvian Jews. It traces (and maps) the proliferation of hundreds of government-sanctioned “barter stations” along Poland’s, Latvia’s, and Estonia’s Soviet frontiers, and profiles their operators and visitors. While these bustling shops supplied smugglers with goods, they supplied the Bolsheviks with a tangible, everyday manifestation of hostile capitalist encirclement. In the end, the dissertation suggests that by linking Soviet consumers with the outside world against Moscow’s wishes, the ports and distilleries of Riga, Tallinn, and Tartu and the cloth factories of Łódź inadvertently fashioned the foundations of the interwar Iron Curtain.