Nuclear Safety

The WWR-M is a light-water cooled and moderated heterogonous research reactor with a thermal output of 10 MW. The final decommissioning planning for the Kiev’s research reactor WWR-M is in progress now. The general dismantling strategy consists of the dismantling and removal of the separate bulky elements as whole pieces without preliminary segmentation. The dismantling of the primary cooling circuit is considered as one of the key tasks; a separate dismantling design has been developed. The baseline principles of the technical solution and safety assessment are presented in the given paper.

This brief paper is to explain one of my ideas relating to deep space propulsion. This paper explains what I call the "Nuclear Thermal Pulsejet Engine" and how we can use vacuum of space to cool a small nuclear reactor down for future nuclear powered spacecraft.

Nuclear power accidents repeatedly reveal that the industry has an incomplete understanding of the complex risks involved in its operation. Through analyzing the investigation of a nuclear power incident in Sweden in 2006, I show how the industry’s learning
practices shape recurrent normalization of risk regulation after such surprises. Learning is shaped through institutionalized measures of sufficiency and particular “risk objects” (e.g.
human factors and safety culture) created through learning from previous events. Subsequent regulatory measures are shaped through improvement scripts associated with these risk objects. These learning practices exclude alternative conceptual perspectives to understand and address safety-critical incidents. Latent risks will therefore produce similar events in the future. The article contributes to the literature on organizational learning, policy making, sensemaking and normalization in complex systems. To improve learning from incidents and regulation in high-hazard industries, social scientists and a wider circle of stakeholders should be included in the regulatory and post-incident
examination processes.

In February this year, at the École de Guerre in Paris and at the Munich Security Conference, France’s President Emmanuel Macron again reiterated the need to strengthen European autonomy in foreign and security policy and presented yet another proposal in this area. This time he offered to launch a strategic dialogue on the role of the French nuclear deterrence in Europe’s collective security. Although the proposal is addressed to all of France’s European partners, the most important response will come from Germany. Official reactions in Berlin have so far been consistent with the German approach to French defence initiatives – Germany declared it is ready for such a dialogue but remains cautious about its goals. Berlin does see the need to boost Europe’s role in foreign and security policy and recognises Paris as its most important partner in this field. However, Germany’s approach differs considerably from that of France. Berlin prefers to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy and the European pillar in NATO, rather than build European strategic autonomy under French leadership. At the same time it does not necessarily have the required political will and military means to back up its own rhetoric.

Since its inception, nuclear technology has evoked a sense of zeal as well as awe because of its immense constructive and destructive potential. By now, the world has come a long way, experiencing both: around 540 nuclear reactors operating in 31 countries producing 372,000 mWe (13.5 percent of the world's electricity) 1 , radioactive materials used in many sectors enriching human life; on the other hand, two nuclear bombs have been used in war and around 19,000 more are stockpiled; during the same time, three major nuclear accidents occurred, 2 resulting in some human suffering, and misuse of nuclear material by non-state actors is widely apprehended. therefore, the balance sheet may be argued to be mixed, implying that we succeeded as much we failed with nuclear technology. after the fukushima nuclear disaster, what would be the fate of nuclear technology or which direction the nuclear energy discourse will move in has been a matter of speculation. this study, premised on the assumption that nuclear technology or nuclear energy cannot be ignored as it has an edge over other forms of energy, argues for a better management paradigm by looking beyond the design basis threats to address inherent loopholes. deconstructing the real and assumed threats (accident, misuse, and terror), this study prescribes a dr Sitakanta Mishra is a research fellow at centre for air Power studies, New delhi. 1. World Nuclear association, "Nuclear Power in the World today", http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf01.html 2. chernobyl (ussr), 1986; three mile island (usa) 1979; and fukushima (Japan) 2011.

What happened, in the years leading up to Valentine's Day 2014, that made a canister of nuclear waste burst open and spew out fire underground at a US facility for the long-term disposal of radioactive military waste? According to one widely publicized scenario, a simple run-of-the-mill typo led to organic kitty litter mistakenly being used to soak up liquid in the drum instead of another kind of absorbent material. This ultimately led to a reaction that made heat and pressure build up in the drum, causing it to erupt. But was that "simple" clerical error symptomatic of a much deeper, system-wide problem-- involving a US Energy Department plan to rush the pace of nuclear waste disposal? What were the political, social, and financial elements involved in making Los Alamos' waste drum #68660 erupt that February night? What can be done to prevent similar accidents – which can have price tags of hundreds of millions of dollars or more – from happening again in the future? A cultural anthropologist spent 10 weeks onsite after the event, logging 43 interviews and trying to answer these questions. Here is what he found.

In recent years, rapid increase in energy demand has become one of the most controversial and problematic issues. To solve this problem, states have been trying to find the cheapest and most productive ways in order to supply more energy. In this project; Turkish new nuclear energy policy will be investigated by considering how much and in what ways the environmental, political, international and economic determinants are considered in decision making process by the Turkish government.

Nükleer santral kazaları tüm gezegeni tehdit ediyor. Gelişmiş geçinen Rusya’sından, Japonyası’na, ABD’sinden Fransa’sına kadar,  herhangi bir kaza sonrası santralde çalıştırılan işçiden, bölge halkına ve hem o ülkenin hem yakın coğrafyadaki ülkelerin vatandaşlarının hem de kontamine olmuş ürünleri satın olmak zorunda bırakılan çok uzak ülkelerin tüketicilerine kadar herkes büyük yalanlar, bilgi saklamaları ve en temel sağlık haklarından dahi mahrum bırakılmaktadır.
Bütün bunları değerlendirmek için, üzerinden geçen makul sürelerle verilerin daha belirginleştiği Çernobil ve Fukişima kazalarında nasıl uygulandığını bu kitapta okuyacaksınız. Öylesine ki Japonya gibi bir ülkede, nükleer kazadan sonra yapılacak ilk iş olan iyot tabletlerin dağıtımı bile yapılmamıştır ve sonuçları daha şimdiden çok ağır olmuştur.

Peki Çernobil’de yaşananlar, Fukişima’da başarıya alışmış ve teknolojiye belki de dünyada en çok inanan Japonlara ders oldu mu? Kitap bu karşılaştırmanın da izini sürerek, bir yanıyla da güç sahiplerinin eğilimlerinin, sivil toplumun etkililiğinin, tıp camiasının örgütlüğünün, bilim insanlarının bağımsızlığının ve gazetecilerin cesaretinin önemini sorguluyor. Biz özellikle Türkiye’de artık çok iyi biliyoruz ki vatan hainliği ile sevgisi arasındaki çizgi, iktidarın tercihine kalmıştır. Bir şekilde her iki kazadan da en çok zararı görme ihtimali olan insanların, örtbas etmelere değil, sonuçlarıyla oynanmış raporlara değil, nükleer lobisinin finanse ettiği araştırmalara ve boş umutlara değil, güvenilir bilgilere ve desteğe ihtiyacı vardır. Kaldı ki bütün kazanın 300 yıla kadar sürecek etkilerini ortadan kaldırmak için, yine bu en çok zarar gören yurttaşların vergileri kullanılıyor.

Nükleer serpintinin cinsi, yarılanma ömrü ve bunların bitkiler, hayvanlar genel olarak doğal ekosistem üzerindeki etkileri ise insan merkezli düşünenlerin dahi ihmal edemeyeceği düzeydedir çünkü bunların çoğu dönüp dolaşıp besin ya da su olarak insanlar tarafından tüketilmektedir. Ancak dünyaya başka bir gözlükle bakmayı becerebilenler için, ömürleri çok kısa olan mavi kelebeklerin nasıl etkilendiği de önem taşır. Ömürlerinin kısalması, kanat uzunlukların azalmasının yanı sıra yeni nesillerdeki mutasyonlar, gelecek için çok kaygı vericidir.

İronik bir gelişme ise, nükleerden elde edeceğimiz enerji olmazsa yaşam durur sloganları atan lobicilerin söylediklerin tam tersine, kazadan sonra 17 adet nükleer güç santralini (toplam reaktör sayısı 48) kapatan, hem de bu kadar teknoloji ve elektrik bağımlısı bir ülke olan Japonya o zamandan beri nükleer enerjiye muhtaç olmadan yaşamıştır ve bugün de tekrar çalıştırılan 2 reaktör dışında nükleersiz yaşamaktadır.                     

Bütün bu kazaların bize öğrettiği bir önemli unsur ise, tıpkı küresel iklim değişikliği gibi, nükleer santraller de bulundukları devletlerin sorumluluğundan fazlasını, yani bütün gezegende yaşayanları ilgilendiriyor. Bu nedenle hangi ülkede yapılırsa yapılsın, yarın onun olumsuz etkilerine maruz kalacak tüm insanların bunlara direnmeye hakkı vardır.

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
VISITS TO AUSTRALIA BY NUCLEAR POWERED OR ARMED VESSELS: Contingency Planning for the Accidental Release of Ionizing Radiation
Australian Government Publishing Service
Canberra

This paper summarizes some of the major improvements and features of the Emergency Preparedness and Response developed to face scenarios with Extensive Damage, aspect that has taken particular emphasis after the events happened at the Japanese Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. After the so called “stress test" and taken as one of the main references the work developed by the United States, important enhancements are being applied in the nuclear industry both in Spain and internationally. The aim is to review both the historical origin and evolution suffered after the accident at the Japanese nuclear power plant, and the fundamental aspects of Emergency Management that, taken into account its extended nature, have to be addressed by specific strategies that can prevent damage to the fuel and / or mitigate their potential consequences, when the plant response, considered normal, is severely affected. Improvements initially proposed as part of the response to hostile acts, bo...

Water chemistry of the Primary Heat Transport System (PHT) of CANDU – Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors profoundly influences the transport of corrosion products around the
Heat Transport System (HTS), where they can be deposited as crud on steam generators, feeder pipes and on the fuel. Fuel cladding can be covered with deposits which have precipitated from the coolant as a result of temperature changes or non-optimal coolant pH. Precipitation of deposits in-core must be avoided as far as possible, as it leads to fouling of the fuel, loss of heat transfer efficiency, and increased radiation fields.
In the recent years a Canadian NPP experienced increased instances of black deposits being observed on fuel bundles discharged from one of the units. The black deposits were
initially observed in 2008 during in-bay fuel inspections. Since then it has been determined that all the discharged fuel bundles have black deposits on them and that observed deposits have been increasing in size (thickness and surface area). This negative trend has persisted through to 2012, when one of fuel bundles was observed with significantly larger
deposit than previously seen. Initial analysis of the deposit indicated it to be iron oxide (magnetite). Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) of carbon steel feeder pipes is the primary
source of iron, which deposits as magnetite on HTS surfaces. . The black deposits have predominantly been located immediately downstream of the bearing pads of the fuel bundle. Deposits have also tended to form on the bottom-downstream quadrant of the fuel bundles.
The deposits were most prevalent in low power channels, but some deposits have been observed on high power channels.
It was reported by the utility that the PHT system chemistry has been maintained in specification for most of the time during normal operation but the chemistry control during outages was inadequate. Due to design constraints, purification circuit was not available during outages and ion-exchange columns and filters could not be utilized. pH control was also less than optimal due to air ingress during outages.
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) imposed a 3% derating on the power to maintain the safety margins. The utility implemented changes to the chemistry specifications
and is operating the unit at a slightly higher pH range. The utility has also since implemented design changes to permit purification and filtration of PHT system during outages.
CNSC has been closely monitoring the situation and recommended additional monitoring and reporting requirements to the utility. This paper will describe the chemistry optimization, improvements to the filtration system and other efforts undertaken by the utility to reduce
crud deposit on the fuel.

In its 1992 assessment of "The safety of Nuclear Powered Ships", the government's Special Committee on Nuclear  ropulsion estimated how hazardous it would be for nuclear  ships to use New Zealand ports. Unfortunately, the Special Committee failed to evaluate the hazards in terms of the  product of risk and impact and thus failed to recognize that the day-by-day hazard of nuclear accidents accrues from rare catastrophes--almost Chernobyl-sized accidents.

The chapter deals with peculiarities of establishment of the regional
nuclear nonproliferation regime in the Asia Pacific as well as its condition in the modern period. From the standpoint of research methodology, the paper actively utilizes advances of the international regimes theory. The author analyses premises of the formation of different aspects
comprising nuclear nonproliferation system in the Asia Pacific region,
from military and politics (e.g. positive security assurances provided
to NNWSs) on out to economy (in particular, with regard to the situation
on the nuclear energy and raw materials market). Special attention is paid
to the pressing problems of nuclear nonproliferation, NWFZs in the region and their functioning and role of the nuclear factor on the agenda
of the regional organisations. In spite of certain legal discrepancies intrinsic to the nonproliferation regime in the APR, states of the region
make a significant contribution to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
and disarmament globally.

In this book, I argue that there is a need to revisit Perrow’s seminal contribution, Normal Accidents. I discuss conceptual and empirical changes in the past three decades and show the relevance of thinking our current situation with the help of this classic book when confronted to these changes; hence, the prefix “post”.

In 1980, the Bechtel Group, the conglomerate then and now in charge of maintaining and securing several of the nuclear facilities on US soil, commissioned a " Human Interference Task Force " (HITF), which would " investigate problems connected with the postclosure, final marking of a filled nuclear waste repository. " The task of this report, which was later submitted to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission via the US Department of Energy, was " to devise a method of warning future generations not to mine or drill at that site unless they are aware of the consequences of their actions. "  As future civilizations might not be able to understand any of the human languages used today, or to decipher mathematical equations, nor to be perceptive to any other of our signs, the task boiled down to communicating danger beyond the confines of our own cognitive framework. Among the specialists involved was Thomas Sebeok, a noted semiotician, who proposed a disquieting idea: the foundation of a new religion that would ensure the transmission of the relevant information pertaining to the nuclear waste repositories: The Atomic Priesthood

Ce qu’on lit dans la grande presse
est vrai - la recherche et le
développement de l’utilisation de
l’énergie nucléaire constituent
le tournant de l’histoire de
l’humanité - mais, comme souvent
hélas, cela est vrai pour des raisons
complètement différentes de celles
qui sont mises en avant. En effet, le
nucléaire est, constitutivement, une
industrie funeste. Trois arguments
doivent être repris à cet égard.

In 1984, New Zealand became a nuclear- free country, prohibiting the entry of nucleararmed
and nuclear-powered vessels to domestic ports. This caused a rift with the United States.
Today, the ban on nuclear arms is no longer a factor straining U.S.-New Zealand relations. Therefore,
the thesis focuses on the ban on naval nuclear reactors which remains an impediment to a
better relationship between New Zealand and the U.S. The thesis uncovers the various lines of
argument advanced by both proponents and opponents of the ban to analyze the options on how
to proceed with the ban on nuclear-powered ships. Numerous interviews with selected actors in
the debate surrounding nuclear-propelled ship visits provide the methodological centerpiece and
allow for a focus on the current political situation.
The thesis begins with a historical and theoretical overview of the emergence of antinuclearism
in New Zealand. After that, it examines concerns about the safety of naval nuclear
reactors, the importance of symbolism and morality, as well as aspects regarding national identity
and the ‘clean-green’ image. Next follows an analysis of the ban’s impact on the economy and
defense relations. Then, the thesis looks at how the nuclear- free legislation is perceived abroad,
what the likelihood of future nuclear ship visits is, and how the United States has contributed to
the prolongation of the row with New Zealand. Afterward, the thesis establishes that there are
four potential courses of action a New Zealand government can follow. The government can
·  extend the applicability of the nuclear-free legislation to extraterritoriality,
·  repeal the legislated ban while maintaining the ban as policy,
·  remove the ban on nuclear-propelled ships altogether,
·  maintain the status quo.
The thesis finds that neither the first nor the second option is a feasible course of action. Moreover,
a government intending to repeal the ban would have to ascertain in a referendum or public
discussion whether the public would support such a move. Since the circumstances for having a
public discussion on this sensitive topic are currently not present, the status quo will remain.

In that article I try to understand a scheme of trafficking from North Korea to China that had been organized by a then-North Korean state employee. That former state employee claimed to had smuggled several types of items and goods, including uranium ore and tungsten, to China's Far East before escaping to South Korea. For understanding that person's scheme, by help of my doctoral project's main interpreter in 2015 I personally interviewed that former participant of that illicit cross-border trade. That person's scheme had not worked without corruption, particularly by priorly paying bribes to North Korean security personnel. The article is included in the conference proceedings of the Kriminologische Gesellschaft. It is available for free. Please see pp. 304 - 312 of the 2018-published conference proceedings of the 2017-annual conference of the German Criminological Society Kriminologische Gesellschaft e.V. by using the following link: http://www.krimg.de/drupal/files/9783942865944.pdf

Undoubtedly, energy production and their sustained growth constitute a relevant factor for ensuring the economic and social development of any country. Considering the different available energy sources that the world can use to satisfy the foreseeable increase in energy demand in the coming years, particularly for the production of electricity, at least for the next decades there are only a few realistic options available to reduce further the CO2 emissions, to satisfy the foreseeable demand of electricity, and to have secure supply of energy.
One of these options is the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation. If this is true, then, why the public opinion of several countries is against the use of this type of energy sources? One of the reasons is the negative impact of an accident in a nuclear power plant for the human beings and for the environment. The second reason is the possible military uses of certain nuclear installations used for the generation of electricity. The third reason is the nuclear waste generated by nuclear power plants.

This thesis argues that South Australia should establish a state-owned repository for the permanent disposal of the world’s high-level nuclear waste (HLNW).  Lethally radioactive, HLNW is the longest-lived nuclear waste.  It can be proliferated, and poses a hazard to human health and the environment.  A critical examination of the risks to safe, long-term storage reveals a stark truth: most nation-states could not safely, or should not, host an HLNW repository.  But South Australia’s ancient deep geology, coupled with optimum meteorological and hydrological conditions, can quarantine radioactivity from the biosphere for the millennia HLNW needs to decay to safer levels: for two billion years, the Gawler Craton successfully contained Olympic Dam’s radioactivity.  The politics of nuclear waste are even more toxic than climate change politics.  Finding a site for Australia’s small volume of short-lived, relatively innocuous, low- and intermediate-level waste (LLNW and ILNW) has been contentious, let alone seriously considering what could effectively be eternal guardianship in this state for the world’s growing volume of long-lived HLNW.  This is a debate we have not yet had either ingenuously or rationally, but, as will be argued here, it is in both our state’s interests and our world’s to have it.

Overt nuclearization by India and Pakistan in May 1998 threw up doctrinal challenges for the strategist communities of the two countries 2 , which had until then been conveniently swept under the carpet. International pressures with regard to non-proliferation as well as safety and security of nuclear warheads and other nuclear facilities, especially after 9/11, restricted the space for free though process available to the strategists of both the countries. The doctrines that have so far emerged reflect more of apologists' standpoints with respect to international concerns, rather than offering robust doctrinal statements focused at operational intent. Having preponderance in conventional arms, India subscribed to 'No First Use' concept but, soon after, started diluting it by attaching conditionalities to it 3 ; and having un-matching. http://www.idsa-india.org/an-feb-1.01.htm, (accessed on November 11, 2015). " India's "minimum credible nuclear deterrence" doctrine and "no first use" policy are based on the concept of deterrence by denial, rather than deterrence by punishment. Should deterrence ever break down, India will have to pay an enormous price for a nuclear first strike by an adversary before launching massive punitive retaliation. Nuclear doctrine has to be ultimately tested in the crucible of operational reality. Across the entire spectrum of conventional conflict, the first use of nuclear weapons by India does not make sound strategic sense. The real distinguishing feature of India's nuclear doctrine is that it is anchored in India's continued commitment to global, verifiable and non-discriminating nuclear disarmament " .

The problem of commercial cyber espionage is insidious, widespread and ever-present, but many other cyber challenges are just as real, and some that currently seem abstract nevertheless need to be taken seriously. The nuclear domain is a case in point: nuclear weapons, materials and facilities are vulnerable to accidents, sabotage or theft, in incidents that can have a cyber dimension. Cyber attacks on nuclear facilities are known to have occurred in the recent past, others could have gone unreported, and numerous scenarios can be envisaged that could have destabilizing or even catastrophic consequences for humankind. This Policy Brief explores cyber threats of varying degrees of probability in the civil and military nuclear spheres: it assesses the measures that are being taken to improve cyber security at nuclear facilities and makes recommendations for next steps to improve the governance of sensitive nuclear information.

This study compares the American and Canadian television coverage of the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan with that of the Chernobyl (Chornobyl) accident in Ukraine. These two disasters were the biggest accidents involving nuclear plants in the world. The first research question is whether political factors, such as Japan, in contrast to Ukraine, being an ally of the United States and Canada, affected the coverage of these accidents by American and Canadian television networks. The second question is whether the U.S.-Canada differences in the coverage of the Fukushima and Chernobyl disasters reflected differences in the American and Canadian political cultures. Previous studies generally have focused on the media coverage of a single nuclear accident, and they typically were limited to the media reporting in one country. This paper uses content analysis of television news reports concerning the Fukushima and Chernobyl disasters for more than one year since the beginning of the nuclear accident in Japan in March 2011. It analyzes more than 250 references, comparing the two disasters in news programs of the most popular TV networks in the U.S. (ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox) and Canada (CBC and CTV). Specific news reports are identified with the help of keyword searches of transcripts of the television programs in the LexisNexis database. The content analysis involves both a general comparison of the Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear accidents and a comparison of specific aspects, such as causes of the accidents, radiation release, liquidation of disasters, and health consequences. The study shows the importance of political factors in the media coverage of the nuclear disasters. It offers support for the indexing model and finds significant differences in the coverage by ideological orientation in the U.S. and public versus private networks in Canada. Convergence in the coverage outweighs political culture differences between the U.S. and Canada.

The paper deals with the licensing nuclear power plants; it focuses primarily on the licensing process implications into the international nuclear market. Nowadays there are twenty-six countries that are planning to build new nuclear facilities, and thirty-seven where nuclear reactors are proposed; on the other hand, there are mainly ten international reactor vendors. At international level, there are few vendors that have sufficient resources, capabilities and experience to carry out the design and delivering of a nuclear power plant in the international market; On the other hand, the licensing processes are strictly dependent on national law frameworks, and on the nuclear policies. The paper proposes a comparison of six licensing processes (the ones established in Finland, France, Italy, South Korea, USA and UK), and analyzes its main features and implications; the IAEA licensing process is taken as reference point. The objective of the paper is to propose a systemic approach for considering the licensing procedures. The framework proposed enables facilitating the licensing management and inferring the main features of licensing contexts. The paper concludes with a forecast of the nuclear licensing context, especially with respect to the fourth generation of nuclear reactors.

The Fukushima nuclear accident has generated doubts and questions which need to be properly understood and addressed. This scientific attitude became necessary to allow the use of the nuclear technology for electricity generation around the world. The nuclear stakeholders are working to obtain these technical answers for the Fukushima questions. We believe that, such challenges will be, certainly, implemented in the next reactor generation, following the technological evolution. The purpose of this work is to perform a critical analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident, focusing at the common cause failures produced by tsunami, as well as an analysis of the main redundant systems. This work also assesses the mitigative procedures and the subsequent consequences of such actions, which gave results below expectations to avoid the progression of the accident, discussing the concept of sharing of structures, systems and components at multi-unit nuclear power plants, and its eventual inappropriate use in safety-related devices which can compromise the nuclear safety, as well as its consequent impact on the Fukushima accident scenario. The lessons from Fukushima must be better learned, aiming the development of new procedures and new safety systems. Thus, the nuclear technology could reach a higher evolution level in its safety requirements. This knowledge will establish a conceptual milestone in the safety system design, becoming necessary the review of the current acceptance criteria of safety-related systems.

Abstract: On 26 April 1986, the world has witnessed an obscure nuclear explosion that transpired by the former Soviet Union, which resulted with perpetual consequences in every aspect of political science and anthropology. This case study examines the political repercussions of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and its impacts on the state failure of the Soviet Union. The accident is illustrated by looking at its tragic environmental causes and socio-political impacts on the Soviet society and its disintegration. This project combines differentiated analyses on relevant aspects such as environmental degradation, national economy, socio-political impact and foreign interpretations of the disaster, in order to emphasize overall influence and political repercussions of the Chernobyl accident on state failure. Environmental degradation of states may lead to failure and transformation; these can be political processes such as fusion, globalization, and integration. But at the same time, probability of fragmentation, fission and disintegration of states rest at as high possibilities. The Chernobyl accident happened during the period of tremendous changes such as political restructuring and introduction of democratization, thereof, it played a major role on the collapse of the Soviet Union and became an
`invisible game maker` of the democratic movement.

Nuclear safety governance should move towards a more robust regime including elements of international monitoring and verification. This is needed because nuclear energy production is likely to grow and new reactors will have different global dispersal, veering towards less experienced countries. In addition, there is growing interest in international and multilateral collaboration on disposal of mounting nuclear waste. Unlike existing improvements that came in response to nuclear disasters (by accident), it makes sense to implement all these elements at once (by design). While a comprehensive global governance regime must include elements of verification and enforcement, more transparent international oversight would also improve global nuclear safety through public pressure. The monitoring and enforcement of such a globally organized regime could be introduced at regional or otherwise supranational level. In this paper, we argue that a robust global nuclear safety regime is not only necessary but also feasible provided it manages to address the following potential hurdles: i) the tensions in international security politics, ii) the stickiness of national sovereignty and iii) industry resistance to additional restrictions and to issues of proprietary commercial information. These objections will be elaborately reviewed in the paper.

The core-melt in Fukushima-Daiichi Unit 1 represents a new class of severe accidents in which combustible gas from core degradation leaked from the containment into the surrounding air-filled reactor building, formed there a highly reactive gas mixture, and exploded 25 h after begin of the station blackout. Since TMI-2 hydrogen safety research and management has focussed on processes and countermeasures inside the containment but the reactor building remained unprotected against hydrogen threats. The code GASFLOW-MPI is currently under development to simulate hydrogen behaviors, including distribution and combustion, for scenarios with containment leakage. This paper describes a first analysis of the hydrogen explosion in Unit 1. It investigates gas dispersion in the reactor building, assuming a leak at the drywell head flange, shows the evolution of a stratified, inhomogeneous H 2 eO 2 eN 2 esteam mixture in the refueling bay, simulates the combustion of the reactive gas mixture, and predicts pressure loads to walls and internal structures of the reactor building. The blast wave propagated essentially sideways, which explains why all side walls were blown out and the ceiling just collapsed onto the floor of the refueling bay. The blast wave propagation into the free environment was also simulated. The over-pressure amplitudes are sufficiently high to cause damage to adjacent buildings and to injure people. The hitherto existing presumption that the blow-out panel of Unit 2 was removed by the Unit 1 explosion can be confirmed which likely prevented a hydrogen explosion in the Unit 2. GASFLOW-MPI provides validated models for the integral simulations of leakage related core-melt scenarios. Furthermore, the code contains extensively tested submodels for catalytic recombiners, igniters and burst foils, which allow design of new hydrogen risk mitigation systems for currently unprotected spaces in reactor buildings. ScienceDirect j o urn al h om epa ge: www.elsev ier.com/locate/he i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n e n e r g y x x x (2 0 1 7) 1 e1 3 Please cite this article in press as: Xiao J, et al., GASFLOW-MPI: A new 3-D parallel all-speed CFD code for turbulent dispersion and combustion simulations Part II: First analysis of the hydrogen explosion in Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1, International Journal of Hydrogen Energy (2017), http://dx.

Evaluation of potential high-level nuclear waste repository sites is an area where geophysical capabilities and limitations may significantly impact a major governmental program. Since there is concern that extensive exploratory drilling might degrade most potential disposal sites, geophysical methods become
crucial as the only nondestructive means to examine large volumes of rock in three dimensions. Characterization of potential sites requires geophysicists to alter their usual mode of thinking: no longer are anomalies-being sought, as in mineral exploration, but rather their absence. Thus the size of features
that might go undetected by a particular method take on new significance. Legal and regulatory considerations that stem from this different outlook, most notably the requirements of quality assurance (necessary for any data used in support of a repository license application), are forcing changes in the
manner in which geophysicists collect and document their data.