Nuclear security

Since its inception, nuclear technology has evoked a sense of zeal as well as awe because of its immense constructive and destructive potential. By now, the world has come a long way, experiencing both: around 540 nuclear reactors operating in 31 countries producing 372,000 mWe (13.5 percent of the world's electricity) 1 , radioactive materials used in many sectors enriching human life; on the other hand, two nuclear bombs have been used in war and around 19,000 more are stockpiled; during the same time, three major nuclear accidents occurred, 2 resulting in some human suffering, and misuse of nuclear material by non-state actors is widely apprehended. therefore, the balance sheet may be argued to be mixed, implying that we succeeded as much we failed with nuclear technology. after the fukushima nuclear disaster, what would be the fate of nuclear technology or which direction the nuclear energy discourse will move in has been a matter of speculation. this study, premised on the assumption that nuclear technology or nuclear energy cannot be ignored as it has an edge over other forms of energy, argues for a better management paradigm by looking beyond the design basis threats to address inherent loopholes. deconstructing the real and assumed threats (accident, misuse, and terror), this study prescribes a dr Sitakanta Mishra is a research fellow at centre for air Power studies, New delhi. 1. World Nuclear association, "Nuclear Power in the World today", http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf01.html 2. chernobyl (ussr), 1986; three mile island (usa) 1979; and fukushima (Japan) 2011.

In facilities and activities involving use of radiation sources, safety and security measures have in common the aim of protecting human life and health and the environment. In addition, safety and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner, so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not compromise security measures. This work reviewed issues related to establishing a clear interface between safety and security of radiation sources. The Government, the Regulatory Authority and licensee/registrants and other relevant stakeholders should work together and contribute to ensure that safety and security of sources is ensured and well interfaced. A Radiotherapy facility has been used as case study

Introduction
Among the problems discussed in this study is the issue of national security, broadly defined. Recognizing the need for safe existence of citizens, it is impossible not to note that we live in an increasingly global world, so discussion of the Republic of Poland national security can not be limited only to the territory of our motherland. Without a doubt, both in nationally and internationally a key role in shaping world security play safety regulations. In this work, the authors undertook a collective development of specific threats to the modern safety and security management organization (in terms of a complex and problematic) and
the development of attitudes and education standard for safety. The aim of this work is the exchange of views among representatives of various research and teaching centers and representatives of practices:
• Contemporary problems of safety and civilization threats
• Legal framework of internal security of the Republic of Poland and international security
• Dilemmas of internal security management
• Education and upbringing for security
Finally, we would like to thank the reviewers of this book - Prof. dr hab. Piotr Majer and Dr Ivan Iurlo whose valuable comments were received on the final shape of this study.
We also thank all the authors, representing various research centers, universities and institutions by which arose in this paper.
Prof. zw. dr hab. Bronisław Sitek
Mgr Aleksandra Ukleja

The study analyses the relationship between the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT and various initiatives and institutions ('clubs') based outside the NPT framework, which aims to improve and strengthen the Treaty. The study identifies conflicts and possible synergies and proposes options for developing and improving the interaction between the NPT and 'clubs' in order to increase the overall efficiency.
The report describes facts about the various non-proliferation 'clubs', and also analyses and formulates conclusions about the various international initiatives in non-proliferation. The subject is vast and the report therefore cannot naturally go in depth but provides useful information for those working in the area, but also for those generally interested. The report contains several ideas that can be studied further.

The paper outlines modern trends in the formation of the regional nuclear non-proliferation regime in the Asia-Pacific region, focusing on its challenges as well as recent accomplishments. International regimes theory (seen from different angles in major schools of thought in International Relations) forms the methodological basis of the research.

The study analyses the relationship between the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT and various initiatives and institutions ('clubs') based outside the NPT framework, which aims to improve and strengthen the Treaty. The study identifies conflicts and possible synergies and proposes options for developing and improving the interaction between the NPT and 'clubs' in order to increase the overall efficiency.
The report describes facts about the various non-proliferation 'clubs', and also analyses and formulates conclusions about the various international initiatives in non-proliferation. The subject is vast and the report therefore cannot naturally go in depth but provides useful information for those working in the area, but also for those generally interested. The report contains several ideas that can be studied further.

Among the problems discussed in this study is the issue of national security, broadly defined. Recognizing the need for safe existence of citizens, it is impossible not to note that we live in an increasingly global world, so discussion of the Republic of Poland national security can not be limited only to the territory of our motherland. Without a doubt, both in nationally and internationally a key role in shaping world security play safety regulations. In this work, the authors undertook a collective development of specific threats to the modern safety and security management organization (in terms of a complex and problematic) and the development of attitudes and education standard for safety. The aim of this work is the exchange of views among representatives of various research and teaching centers and representatives of practices:
• Contemporary problems of safety and civilization threats
• Legal framework of internal security of the Republic of Poland and international security
• Dilemmas of internal security management
• Education and upbringing for security
Finally, we would like to thank the reviewers of this book - Prof. dr hab. Piotr Majer and Dr Ivan Iurlo whose valuable comments were received on the final shape of this study. We also thank all the authors, representing various research centers, universities and institutions by which arose in this paper.

Prof. zw. dr hab. Bronisław Sitek
Mgr Aleksandra Ukleja

This textbook on nuclear security culture was commissioned by the IAEA as guidance for practitioners and university students. It is based on my own experience as the lead drafter of IAEA publications on this subject in the agency's nuclear security series and other relevant documents. The book covers the concept and model, self-assessment and enhancement methodologies as well as their applications to different types of facilities and organizations. The full text is available at the website of IAEA International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN)

Nuclear security culture – an emerging and widely recognized practice – serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security. In fact, many International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications and the Nuclear Security Summits have highlighted the vital role of nuclear security culture and raised its status to the same level as physical protection and material accountancy. Consequently, there is a great need to include the concept of nuclear security culture and its self-assessment methodology in existing nuclear security education and training programs as a cross-cutting topic and as a means to improve the efficiency of the currently applied learning methods. This paper outlines the importance of including training modules on nuclear security culture and its self-assessment as a way in which to improve and complement existing nuclear security education and training programs.

Political instability, the rise of the right-wing political leadership and an increase in the number of terrorist organisations operating from and gaining the support of the Pakistani establishment are reasons that have nations concerned about the safety of nuclear assets within Pakistan. Compounding the problem is the well-established proliferation network of Pakistan that has supplied nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran. Thus, the US is apprehensive about the safety and security of nuclear weapons and nuclear installations in Pakistan. The US recognises that there are a number of vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s security apparatus and has repeatedly offered to help Pakistan secure its nuclear weapons and keep them safe.

Nuclear security culture – an emerging and widely recognized practice – serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security. In fact, many International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications and the Nuclear Security Summits have highlighted the vital role of nuclear security culture and raised its status to the same level as physical protection and material accountancy. Consequently, there is a great need to include the concept of nuclear security culture and its self-assessment methodology in existing nuclear security education and training programs as a cross-cutting topic and as a means to improve the efficiency of the currently applied learning methods. This paper outlines the importance of including training modules on nuclear security culture and its self-assessment as a way in which to improve and complement existing nuclear security education and training programs.

Computer security is recognized as an important aspect of nuclear security: Effective measures, which include computer security education, have been integrated into nuclear security recommendations and systems. At this stage, it is crucial to understand and evaluate the current state-of-play, as perceived by (potential) recipients of education. With this understanding , informed guidance about future strategic directions can be made, to ensure that initiatives provide the most benefit to participants and the sector. The contribution of the paper is twofold: first, results from a campaign for gathering requirements elucidate the state of computer security in the nuclear sector. Participants from thirteen countries across different roles and organization types engaged in questionnaires that aimed at identifying the state of education within their organizations, as well as impediments, perceived risks, recommendations for future interventions and key improvements for increased awareness and protection. Second, insights from the process and its results identify a set of challenges and recommendations for implementing user-and stakeholder-centered thinking in the given setting. This includes critically reflecting approaches to implement an iterative consultation process and to embed user involvement tools into the process, such as audience participation and personalized electronic questionnaires. The paper concludes with recommendations both for the design of requirements gathering processes and improved computer security training and exercises in the nuclear sector.

The IAEA International Standards for Tissue Banks published in 2003 were based on the Standards then currently in use in the USA and the European Union, among others, and reflect the best practices associated with the operation of a tissue bank. They cover legal, ethical and regulatory controls as well as requirements and procedures from donor selection and tissue retrieval to processing and distribution of finished tissue for clinical use. The application of these standards allows tissue banks to operate with the current good tissue practice, thereby providing grafts of high quality that satisfy the national and international demand for safe and biologically useful grafts. The objective of this article is to review the IAEA Standards and recommend new topics that could improve the current version.

The paper approaches the questions "To what extent has the Mexican state help reframe the global nuclear security debates, and what factors constitute the rationale behind the articulation of this participation in nuclear security?" It gives a historical perspective to Mexican interests and policy in multilateral nuclear security debates throughout the development of the nuclear age.

The use of passive gamma and neutron signatures from fission indicators is a common means 6 of estimating used fuel burnup, enrichment, and cooling time. However, while characteristic fission 7 product signatures such as 134 Cs, 137 Cs, 154 Eu, and others are generally reliable estimators for used 8 fuel burnup within the context where the assembly initial enrichment and the discharge time are 9 known, in the absence of initial enrichment and/or cooling time information (such as when applying 10

There is an emerging consciousness in India of the importance of nuclear security and safety. Motivated by a combination of rapid growth in its civil nuclear sector, heightened scrutiny of recent nuclear accidents around the world, and the deteriorating regional security environment, India has pushed to adopt measures to strengthen and enhance its nuclear security and safety governance structures. India recognizes that the various recent global nuclear security initiatives are in its own
best interest and has been an enthusiastic participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process. Today, India demonstrates a greater willingness to showcase its nuclear security arrangements before the
public and has undertaken many institutional, legal, and operational reforms to maintain international regime compliance.

This study takes a comprehensive look at India’s approach to nuclear security and critically examines the physical security measures the country has put in place. Particular focus is placed on the evolution and strengths, as well as weaknesses, of the country’s nuclear security institutions, instruments, practices, and culture. Given that the strengthening of India’s nuclear security governance is an ongoing endeavor, the paper also puts forward a number of policy recommendations.

Illegal movements of nuclear and radioactive materials, for terrorist,
political or illegal profit, within and between States continue to occur,
presenting health and safety threats to the personnel involved as well as to the general public. To guarantee conducting these movements in a safe and secure manner, they should be subject to extraordinary regulatory, administrative, safety and engineering standards and procedures. This paper intended as an outline of the response mechanisms required to deal with illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. The framework outlined in this paper provides an elementary scientific facts, and basis for operational and tactical response measures, considering the nature of incidents, which will vary greatly in both scale and the types of response required.

Calculated Ambiguity is a policy applied by the nuclear weapon states on negative security assurances given to the non-nuclear states. The goal of these assurances is to guarantee that states that have abstained from nuclear weapons will not be attacked by these weapons. The article demonstrates how these assurances have been watered down since the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, in the 60s. In "Renegotiating the Nuclear Order: A Sociological Approach" I have applied the "sociology of technology" in order to understand the non-nuclear states´ potential policies to counter this trend. As a result the study focuses on states that belong to the nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ-states). These states have a treaty-based commitment to a nuclear weapon-free status and the nuclear weapon states are, in a protocol to the treaties, required to confirm this status and to refrain from nuclear attacks. As ambiguity is built into these assurances the article explores a process by which the NWFZ-states, by walking out of a NPT Review Conference, could achieve unconditional guarantees. The case of the "Mexican amendments" from the early NPT-negotiations is selected as a parallel example to empower the NWFZ-states for collective action. Nevertheless, this implies that the NWFZ-states be organized, not only regionally, but also globally. The article concludes with a comment on how these unconditional assurances could form a critical step towards a nuclear weapon-free world.

The current emphasis on the need to protect radioactive sources from being used for malicious purposes makes it imperative to explore and shape an appropriate culture-based response. Promoting a robust security culture is consistent with the international legal instruments and standards, including the Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and IAEA guidance publications. This promotion would be dependent upon the successful implementation of relevant self-assessment tools and a series of culture indicators, both of which would serve as benchmarks to take a culture's measure and identify practical ways to improve security. This approach must adjust the generic IAEA model and self-assessment methodology for nuclear security culture in order to accommodate the specific requirements in operation when using radioactive sources. Though the IAEA's concept of security culture and its self-assessment recommendations are designed to be generic in order to apply to a wide range of facilities and activities, the modifications proposed in this paper are needed to make those recommendations more user friendly and consistent with the security risks and requirements. The distinct features of the proposed recommendations, to be reflected in the new design of security culture, can be summarized as: continued prevalence of safety orientation, application in diverse work environments, multiple and intermodal transport, integration of host organizations into overall security regime, mobile and portable operation, limited security awareness and resources, and disposal challenges. These special features also justify a differentiated approach to security culture inside organizations licensed to use radioactive sources. More frequent and more concerted efforts, including training and self-assessment, are expected to focus on a select group of employees who have direct relationships with radioactive sources (e.g. management teams, security personnel, operational staff, technicians and others). For other employees, efforts would be made concurrently to engage them in the process of raising security awareness, a less proactive endeavor than the development of security culture. The proposed differentiation is a targeted approach designed to make time and resource investment in training and culture assessment commensurate with specific roles and responsibilities of individuals. This risk-based approach can facilitate a more robust and sustainable security regime for radioactive sources throughout their life cycle, i.e. from cradle to grave.

The international community stresses the necessity to report discrepancies in security procedures and build an environment conducive for fostering security culture inside organizations that handle nuclear or radiological materials. In reality, however, there have been a number of instances where reports on nuclear security were not encouraged by organizations or were left without needed corrective actions. Such an attitude, where reports on security matters, instead of serving as an internal 'early warning signal' leading to enhancement of security, have been put aside or entered the public domain after external reporting, is to a great extent caused by a lack of knowledge on how to deal with them and what drives people to report. This article aims to study challenges and drivers for reporting in the nuclear and radiological sector. First, it discusses the meaning of whistle-blowing and reporting. Secondly, it demonstrates how reporting is encouraged by the international community through IAEA guidance and Nuclear Industry Summit statements. Then by using survey data received from 56 participants, the study examines factors influencing reporting. This analysis is supported by an overview of some real-life examples related to reporting or raising concerns about security procedures in organizations that handle nuclear or radiological materials.

Nuclear security culture – an emerging and widely recognized practice – serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security. In fact, many International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) publications and the Nuclear Security Summits have highlighted the vital role of nuclear security culture and raised its status to the same level as physical protection and material accountancy. Consequently, there is a great need to include the concept of nuclear security culture and its self-assessment methodology in existing nuclear security education and training programs as a cross-cutting topic and as a means to improve the efficiency of the currently applied learning methods. This paper outlines the importance of including training modules on nuclear security culture and its self-assessment as a way in which to improve and complement existing nuclear security education and training programs.

Communities of nuclear workers have evolved in distinctive contexts. During the Manhattan Project the UK, USA and Canada collectively developed the first reactors, isotope separation plants and atomic bombs and, in the process, nurtured distinct cadres of specialist workers. Their later workplaces were often inherited from wartime facilities, or built anew at isolated locations. For a decade, nuclear specialists were segregated and cossetted to gestate practical expertise. At Oak Ridge Tennessee, for example, the informal ‘Clinch College of Nuclear Knowledge’ aimed to industrialise the use of radioactive materials. ‘We were like children in a toy factory’, said its Director: ‘everyone could play the game of designing new nuclear power piles’. His counterpart at Chalk River, Ontario headed a project ‘completely Canadian in every respect’, while the head of the British project chose the remote Dounreay site in northern Scotland because of design uncertainties in the experimental breeder reactor. With the decline of secrecy during the mid-1950s, the hidden specialists lauded as ‘atomic scientists’ gradually became visible as new breeds of engineers, technologists and technicians responsible for nuclear reactors and power plants. Mutated by their different political contexts, occupational categories, labour affiliations, professional representations and popular depictions, their activities were disputed by distinct audiences. This chapter examines the changing identities of nuclear specialists and the significance of their secure sites. Shaped successively by Cold War secrecy, commercial competition and terrorist threats, nuclear energy remained out of site for wider publics and most nuclear specialists alike. The distinctive episodes reveal the changing working experiences of technical workers in late-twentieth and early twenty-first century environments.