OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION

Our aim is to test if the leverage and the debt maturity of Chilean firms quoted in the stock market are related with their growth opportunities, their ownership structure and the environment in which they operate. We perform an empirical analysis over an unbalanced panel of 169 Chilean firms for the period 1990-2001. Chilean firms growth opportunities are financed with long term debt. However, when firms need external funds they finance their growth opportunities with short term debt. The high ownership concentration, characteristic of Chilean firms, along with the presence of growth opportunities favours debt financing. The largest firms and the more needed of external financing prefer longer maturities for their debt. Finally, our results indicate that the presence of internal capital markets within a group influences firms financing decisions, particularly in those firms within the group with financing deficit. Pecking order theory offers partial explanations of Chilean firms fi...

n view of the exponential growth, now is the time to help the hotel industry transform itself and embrace project management as a strategic competence. Hotel Owners Manual  is for those who manage hotel opening projects, including hotel project developers, hotel management company Head, hotel owners and asset managers, hotel vendors…all the way to hotel educational institutions. It explains that the traditional approaches to opening new hotels do not work efficiently, cause delay after delay, and cannot be scaled, thus new, more effective strategies are required.

Book reveals the enormous opportunity available to hotel owners, operators, and their professional advisors by adopting the formal project management practices

The Indian hotel industry is experiencing unprecedented growth. Over the next Ten years, without a project and operations management approach, this will not be possible. In this book, author Gajanan Shirke-MIH considers the plans for future hotel operation in India, illustrate the scale of the problem, analyzes why traditional approaches will not be able to facilitate, and why project management methodologies are the best way forward.

Hotel Owners Manual will help you build a foundation for success in meeting deadlines for the hospitality industry, development.

The global beer industry has transformed dramatically in recent decades. Two key trends include 1) consolidation resulting from mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures, and 2) the largest firms expanding into new regions. While beer was previously a very local product, these trends have combined to result in approximately half of global sales being controlled by just four firms: AB InBev, SABMiller, Heineken, and Carlsberg. Notably, these top four com-panies are all headquartered in Western Europe. The primary products of the largest firms are pale lagers, with ales and numerous other potential beer varieties produced only in much smaller quantities, if at all. Why are these chang-es occurring now? Many other industries, including soft drinks, have seen a small number of companies achieve global dominance earlier than the beer industry. Recent policy and technological changes, however, have eroded many barriers to consolidation and geographic expansion for beer firms. They have enabled the largest firms to exert more political and economic power, and to move closer to the endgame of a global monopoly. These trends are not inevitable, however, and are countered by 1) the rise of specialty brewers and their much more diverse selection of beer varieties, and 2) cultural barriers to the global branding and marketing of beer.

The Brazilian equity market is characterized by relatively low liquidity, high cost of capital (low firm valuation), and limited new capital raising. Ownership concentration of corporations is high, with large wedges between control and cash flow rights, leading to large differences in pricing of non-voting and voting shares, reflecting the risks of expropriation by insiders. In recent years, much of

Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper aims at exploring the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the context of a small European capital market. Further developing existing literature, we acknowledge the multi-dimensionality of ownership by including both the fraction of shares owned by the five largest shareholders and the fraction of shares owned by management.Research Findings/Results: Using panel data for the period 2000–2003 with respect to the Italian market, we find that the ownership concentration of the five largest shareholders is beneficial to firm valuation. On the contrary, managerial ownership is beneficial only in non-concentrated firms, suggesting that the controlling owner may use his/her position in the firm to extract private benefits at the expense of the other shareholders by appointing managers that represent its own interest.Theoretical Implications: This study provides empirical support for the agency theory and the managerial entrenchment argument. As such, it suggests new avenues of research for the ownership structure literature willing to reflect the diverging interests of different types of shareholders and to explore both endogeneity and non-linearity issues.Practical Implications: This study contributes to the recent debate on the effects of government regulations inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance in the small European countries. In questioning the alleged competitive superiority of the widely held company, our paper also suggests that the existence of good corporate law is not a sufficient condition for the development of a corporate economy resembling the US model.

Using a unique dataset, we describe the degree of ownership concentration in Russian economy and its role in shaping economic and political institutions in Russia. In particular, we find that Russian ‘oligarchs’ do control a substantial part of the economy. While the relative weight of their firms in Russian economy is huge, they do not seem to be excessively large by the standards of the global economy where most of them are operating. The oligarchs seem to run their firms more efficiently than other Russian owners controlling for industry, region and size.

The study seeks to examine the effect of equity ownership structure on firm financial performance in South Korea. I focus on the role of two main dimensions of the ownership structure- Ownership concentration (i.e., the distribution of shares owned by majority shareholders) and identity of owners (especially, foreign investors and institutional investors). Using panel data for South Korea in 2000--2006, I find that firm performance measured by the accounting rate of return on assets generally improves as ownership concentration increases, but the effects of foreign ownership and institutional ownership are insignificant. I also find that there exists a hump-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, in which firm performance peaks at intermediate levels of ownership concentration. The study provides some empirical support for the hypothesis that as ownership concentration increases, the positive monitoring effect of concentrated ownership first dominat...

ABSTRACTManuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This paper focuses on the relationship between one of the main corporate governance dimensions – ownership structure – and income smoothing. The paper investigates whether family‐controlled companies differ from non‐family‐controlled companies with respect to income smoothing. Due to different incentives of management and owner investment horizons, we hypothesize that income smoothing is less likely among family‐controlled

This paper proposes a conceptual framework to investigate the role of family ownership for mitigating earnings management (accrual & real). Family ownership is among the corporate governance primary mechanisms that have been a focus of many researchers and scholars. The present study argues that firms with family ownership are less likely to allow earnings management because they have typically invested a lot of their private fortune in the firm and families are more concerned about the survival of the firm and its reputation; thus, they have a strong motivation to monitor management very well. Despite that, there is a lack of prior studies that examine these relationships in developing countries. So, the main objective of this study was to bridge this gap and try to enrich the existing literature.