Pragmaticism

Uma das mais importantes potencialidades da Web 2.0 é permitir a difusão de ideias em comum, unindo pessoas que defendam as mesmas causas, consilidando o ciberativismo nos últimos anos. No Brasil um dos maiores exemplos foram os movimentos de junho de 2013, que ainda ressoam pela Internet e faz com que grupos ativistas tentem novas formas de mobilização tão efeitvas quanto a do ano anterior. O objetivo desta pesquisa é analisar as publicações que possuam tons de humor (baseados no princípio do lulz, característico dos coletivos Anonymous mundialmente), realizadas no site de rede social Facebook próximo a jogos do Brasil na Copa do Mundo, a partir de quatro fan pages dos anons: AnonymousBrasil, Anonymous Brasil, AnonymousBr e Anonymous Rio.

"Michel Weber and Will Desmond, (eds.), Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought, Frankfurt / Lancaster, ontos verlag, Process Thought X1 & X2, 2008. (695 p. + 726 p. ; ISBN 978-3-938793-92-3 ; 398 €)
Gathering 115 entries written by 101 internationally renowned experts in their fields, the Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought aims at interpreting Whitehead secundum Whitehead, at canvassing the current state of knowledge in Whiteheadian scholarship and at identifying promising directions for future investigations through (internal) cross-elucidation and (external) interdisciplinary and crossdisciplinary development.
Table of Contents
Introduction
I. Aesthetics
II. Anthropology
III. Ecology
IV. Economy
V. Education
VI. Ethics
VII. Gender Studies
VIII. History
IX. Language
X. Mathematics and Logic
XI. Metaphysics
XII. Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind
XIII. Public Policy
XIV. Science
XV. Sociology of Science
XVI. Theology and Religion
XVII. Theory of Knowledge
XVIII. Urbanism & Architecture
XIX. Biographical entries
XX. Critical Apparatus

Authors : A Sister of St-John, Adam Scarfe , Albert C. Lewis, Alessandro Sardi, Alix Parmentier, Andrew Dawson, Annamaria Miranda, Arran Gare, Barbara Muraca, Berit Brogaard, Beth Lord, Brian G. Henning, Bruce Duncan MacQueen, Bruce G. Epperly, Carol F. Johnston, Carol P. Christ, Claude de Jonckheere, Claus Michael Ringel, Clifford Cobb, Craig Eisendrath, Daniel A. Dombrowski, David G. Butt, David Ray Griffin, Dominic J. Balestra, Donald Wayne Viney, Donna Bowman, Douglas R. Anderson, Elias L. Khalil, Elie During, Frédéric Fruteau de Laclos, Franck Robert, Gao Shan, Gary A. Cook, George Allan, Giangiacomo Gerla , Gottfried Heinemann, Graham Bird, Granville C. Henry, jr., Gudmund Smith, Guillaume Durand, Howard Woodhouse, Ivor Grattan-Guinness, Jaime Nubiola, James Connelly, James Williams, Jean-Pascal Alcantara, Johanna Seibt, John B. Cobb, Jr., John H. Buchanan, John Quiring , John W. Lango, Jonathan Delafield-Butt, Jorge Luis Nobo, Joseph A. Bracken, S.J., Joseph E. Earley, Sr., Joseph Grange, Juan Vicente Mayoral de Lucas, Judith Jones, Julie A. Nelson, Kipton Jensen, Leemon McHenry, Les Muray, Lieven Decock, Liliana Albertazzi, Luca Gaeta, Luca Vanzago, Manuel Bächtold, Marc Maesschalck, Maria Pachalska , Mark Modak-Truran, Mark R. Dibben, Mary Elizabeth Moore, Max Velmans, Michael Epperson, Michael Fortescue, Michel Weber, Murray Code, Mustafa Ruezgar, Norman Sieroka, Patrick J. Coppock, Paul Custodio Bube, Peter Hare, Peter Simons, Pierfrancesco Basile, Les Muray, Randall E. Auxier, Richard Feist, Robert Castiglione, Robert J.Valenza, Ronny Desmet , Ross L. Stein, Rudolf Windeln, Stephen T. Franklin, Sylviane R. Schwer, T. L. S. Sprigge, Thomas A. F. Kelly, Thomas E. Hosinski, C.S.C., Timothy E. Eastman, Vincent Shen, Volker Peckhaus, William Jay Garland, William T. Myers"

In the seminal essay " Pragmatism " , Peirce discusses the end of interpretation in terms of the ultimate logical interpretant, which is varyingly characterized as habit or habit-change. While it is broadly accepted that his conception of pragmatic meaning rests on habit, the precise role of habit-change in his account of conceptual purport has not been examined in detail. In this chapter, I address this issue, which turns out to be closely linked to the pivotal question of the purpose of Peircean pragmatism itself. My primary aim is to demonstrate that Peirce's pragmatic account of the interpretant surpasses that of mere explication of habitual meaning, something that can be teased out from an embryonic account of three logical interpretants, sketched in " Pragmatism " and supported by certain suggestive references to first, second, and third pragmatistic interpretation in other writings. This investigation not only exposes the hitherto overlooked fact that Peirce recognizes a stage of conceptual clarification beyond that of the ultimate logical interpretant; it also paves the way for a reassessment of the significance of the pragmatist approach within a broader developmental-normative framework aimed at the improvements of our habits.

CONTENIDO

ARNOLD OOSTRA. La matemática intuicionista y sus conexiones
con el pensamiento de Peirce

FERNANDO ZALAMEA. Faneroscopia, filosofía natural y literatura.
“La Esfinge” en Peirce, Emerson, Poe y Melville

EUGENIO ANDRADE. Las categorías ceno-pitagóricas y la controversia
sobre el origen de las innovaciones evolutivas

ROBERTO PERRY. Desde Peirce: invitación a ampliar
nuestro concepto de signo

CARLOS GARZÓN. ¿Es la verdad la meta de la investigación?
Una lectura pragmaticista para objeciones pragmatistas

DOUGLAS NIÑO. Algunas reflexiones sobre la duda y la creencia

EDISON TORRES Idealismo epistemológico y realismo metafísico
en Charles S. Peirce

La presente selección de textos ofrece una muestra significativa de algunos resultados de las investigaciones de largo alcance sobre el pragmaticismo del pensador y científico norteamericano Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), emprendida por expertos de reconocimiento internacional, quienes abordan los conceptos filosóficos claves que este lógico norteamericano usó, estudió, aclaró o discutió.

The mature Peirce worked towards a realism that confronts and wipes the doubts surrounding an absolute conception of reality. Such an absolute conception implies a single and ultimate way of explaining reality through inquiry. Peirce thought that this conception, explained below, was nomi- nalistic. He opposed his mature Scholastic Realism as his definite answer against nominalism of universals. This final endeavour to improve his rea- lism avoided the problems of his own previous realist accounts. Peirce’s early version of realism began by setting the conditions for self-controlled inquiry. The necessity to open the path of inquiry makes the inquirer go be- yond purely epistemological aspects of inquiry and accept different levels of realism; such was Peirce’s purpose when he avowed different manifestations of the Categories in The Guess at the Riddle.

This chapter investigates whether signs and their action, semiosis, are real. It critically surveys three arguments. The first argument consists in holding that semiosis must be real, because denying the reality of signs is self-defeating. This self-confirming status seems to imply that semiosis is the very means by which we partition the mind-independent and mind-dependent. One would then need to clarify this ontological neutrality or priority. The second argument consists in identifying an instance of sign-action that is mind-independent. Instead of searching for abiotic semiosis, a more parsimonious approach is to ask whether we want reality to be what exists apart from minds in general or apart from human minds specifically. If we adopt the latter view, and if the action of signs can be shown to take place in the non-human realm, this would show that semiosis does not depend on us. One would then need to explain how humans can interpret all this while putting themselves out of the equation, so to speak. The third argument consists in saying that, despite its initial plausibility, the mind-dependent and mind-independent division is not clear-cut. This is because some conventional patterns can be informationally compressed in ways that are practically indistinguishable from genuinely mind-independent patterns. One would then need to clarify how the mind-dependent/mind-independent divide can admit of such hybrid cases.

The aim of my paper is already indicated in its subtitle. What I try to explain is what Peirce himself said: not only that all his philosophy has always seemed to him to grow “out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a faith in the reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out”, but also that two doctrines –critical common sensism  and the scholastic doctrine of realism (“usually defined as the opinion that there are real objects that are general. (...) the belief in this can hardly being accompanied by the acknowledgment that there are, besides, real vagues, and especially real possibilities”, CP 5.453)– were developed before his formulation of pragmaticism (first enounced in the form of a maxim in 1878).

Despite there being deep lines of convergence between the philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead, C. S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and other classical American philosophers, it remains an open question whether Whitehead is a pragmatist, and conversation between pragmatists and Whitehead scholars have been limited. Indeed, it is difficult to find an anthology of classical American philosophy that includes Whitehead’s writings. These camps began separately, and so they remain. This volume questions the wisdom of that separation, exploring their connections, both historical and in application. The essays in this volume embody original and creative work by leading scholars that not only furthers the understanding of American philosophy, but seeks to advance it by working at the intersection of experience and reality to incite novel and creative thought. This exploration is long overdue. Specific questions that are addressed are: Is Whitehead a pragmatist? What contrasts and affinities exist between American pragmatism and Whitehead’s thought? What new questions, strategies, and critiques emerge by juxtaposing their distinct perspectives?

C. S. Peirce is often credited as a forerunner of the verificationist theory of meaning. In his early pragmatist papers, Peirce did say that if we want to make our ideas clear(er), then we should look downstream to their actual and future effects. For many who work in philosophy of mind, this is enough to endorse functionalism and dismiss the whole topic of qualia. It complexifies matters, however, to consider that the term qualia was introduced by the founder of pragmatism himself. Peirce was adamant that only triadic relations can support language and cognition. Even so, he insisted on purely logical grounds that, when we analyze triadic signs all the way, we are left with a qualitative residue he called Firstness. Such an isolated relatum could never be studied experimentally. Yet, given that this primitive state can be confirmed by means of a formal or prescissive distinction, I believe the Peircean account can do justice to many of the intuitions that generate the so-called hard problem of consciousness. My goal, then, is to show that Peirce's semiotic commitment to qualia is compatible with his foundational statements about pragmatism.

The focus of this article is on how to make realistic representations of knowledge organizations. We define the knowledge profile as a tool developed within C. S. Peirce’s pragmaticistic maxime. The article points out that in order to make realistic representations of knowledge organizations, we need a basic understanding of how relations emerge, develop and become related terms. In order to strengthen the theoretical points and to show the usability of the knowledge profile, we unfold it upon the knowledge domain MARKK.

Keywords: Pragmatism, Knowledge profiling, displacement of meaning, semiotics, MARKK

In order to gain the highest grade of clarity of his concepts, the polyhistor Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) put forth a pragmatic maxim. We get a glimpse of a maxim which is to serve the self-controlled scientific drive for growth in the concrete reasonableness. It follows that the maxim is endowed with a special normative function; the maxim renders the meaning of clearly understood concepts as general normative rules of action, i.e. the meaning of a concept is directly assessed in the light of its contribution with which reactions it causes provides for the realization of the highest purpose of reasoning. These conditions always involve certain goals for action - goals which are founded on the general way in which actions contribute to the universal process of rationalization. Mankind can and should try to contribute to the aforesaid growth, and this e.g. by using the pragmatic maxim. But this requires that mankind relentlessly tries to cultivate not only his thinking and acting habits but also his habits of feeling in accordance with the highest purpose; these efforts of cultivation fall precisely within the three normative sciences: esthetics, ethics and logic.

Key words: CSP, pragmaticism, the pragmatic maxim, summum bonum, the growth in the concrete reasonableness and the three normative sciences esthetics, ethics and logic.

In his novel book Natural Propositions (2014), Frederik Stjernfelt reconstructed and completed C.S. Peirce’s 1903 doctrine of dicisigns. Stjernfelt’s most convincing arguments concern the presentation and explication of dicisign as a generalized conception of proposition at the logical level and the notion of the independence of logic on special sciences and especially on psychology. It is more questionable what the range of applicability of dicisign is. Stjernfelt argues that dicisigns can be found not only in cognitive processes of higher animals but also of insects (photuris) and even bacteria (E.coli). Especially the application to bacterial chemotaxis is problematic because there does not seem to be any distinction between sign-mediated cognition and direct (“perceptive”) cognition. From the point of view of bacteria, the signs that they respond to do not have objects, though in the ontology accessible for us, the transmembrane receptors of bacteria indeed interact with nutrient molecules. The case of fireflies seems less problematic, but even then we may ask whether apparent dicisigns are really functioning as dicisigns for the fireflies and not just as simple (indexical) signals. The problematic is related to general question concerning the role and nature of self-control in Peirce’s conception of sign. Stjernfelt’s approach rests on the argument that self-control occurs in many degrees. I would like to argue that though actual self-control cannot be demanded, the sign-interpreting agent must have at least some kind of capability of choosing non-habitual interpretation if it seems needed. If this argument is valid, the range of applicability of Peirce’s concept of sign/dicisign is far narrower than that is usually assumed in ‘Peircean’ biosemiotics.

The Existence in the work of C. S. Peirce: Firstness, Secondeness, and Thirdness as an Approximation of Existence (article) – The article focuses on the three crucial categories of the phenomenology of the American philosopher C. S. Peirce. The article briefly outlines the Peirce’s philosophical attitudes in general, and depicts the categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness as possible ways how to approximate the existence. Peirce uses the three categories as an analytical method for his phenomenology. The article is an attempt of outlining of the Peirce understanding to the categories whereby it tries to point out how he thinks about being, existence, and reality.

El capítulo examina algunos postulados filosóficos de Charles Sanders Peirce, en especial, el concepto de creencia en el pragmaticismo, para establecer algunos elementos teóricos y conceptuales que puedan proyectarse a la comunicación publicitaria, en particular, a la planeación estratégica (Planning)

El modo en que se genera el conocimiento bajo la perspectiva pragmaticista, debe contar con algunos elementos centrales como lo son la comunidad de investigadores, el sentido común crítico y el falibilismo, dado el anhelo de convergencia última del conocimiento propuesto por Peirce. He centrado mi interés en este último ya que plantear este óptimo (convergencia última del conocimiento) es un tanto problemático en el contexto no sólo de la filosofía actual, sino también en el contexto de la investigación científica y de la construcción de una posición epistemológica. Plantear una convergencia última del conocimiento es deseable, pero cabe preguntarse si es realizable. Sin embargo, este anhelo teóricamente tiene una salvaguardia, la de guiar a un objetivo por remoto que este sea a la investigación científica. Este óptimo que sería la convergencia última del conocimiento es analogable a lo que ocurre en ciencias físicas como sociales o en matemáticas, con óptimos como el sistema de elecciones democráticas perfectas que Arrow desechó con su teorema de limitación o el ideal de un sistema de aritmética que sea tanto completo como consistente, como axiomatizable que después del teorema de incompletud de Gödel sabemos que no es posible alcanzar (cfr. Mosterín 1999). Sin embargo pese a todas estas restricciones teóricas cabe rescatar la función que en un inicio cumplieron o que cumplen estos óptimos imposibles en el proceso de generación de conocimiento. Cómo a partir de ellos fue posible desarrollar más y mejor conocimiento y cómo también si no se hubiesen puesto en cuestión no podríamos concebir el conocimiento como está estructurado en la actualidad. La noción de trabajo comunitario en ciencia es un pilar fundamental de la arquitectura filosófica pragmaticista, pues es ésta la que a partir de un criticismo universal, inicia la creación de conocimiento y búsqueda de la verdad como convergencia de este mismo conocimiento. El lugar que ocupa la comunidad de investigadores es primordial, esta es la que finalmente desvelará los fenómenos que estudia la ciencia. Esta noción también ha sido entendida simplemente como comunidad, no de investigadores, sino que de individuos dentro de una sociedad. Sin embargo, esta interpretación aunque no es contraria en todos los aspectos a la propuesta de Peirce vuelve la noción muy problemática, ya que extiende lo que él redujo a un grupo acotado de individuos que manejan conocimientos específicos a un grupo mucho más extenso, con lo cual también se amplían las posibilidades de crear hábitos basados en creencias que obligarían a los investigadores a concretar un camino muy poco eficiente hacia la verdad requerida. Una creencia se puede fijar de varios modos no beneficiosos para la verdad y el conocimiento válido y de los cuatro modos de fijar la creencia propuestos por Peirce, sólo el que se refiere al método de la ciencia es el menos propenso a establecer hábitos que posteriormente no apelarán a la verdad.

在法学理论研究日趋多样化与精致化的今天，“海峡两岸法理学讨论会”的召开乃是一种宣称，她表明: 汉语世界的法理学研究者们热切期待着直面同台交流; 同时，就法理学基本问题、研究范式与可能结论上存在的分歧，他们已有心理和智识上的准备，如无根本抵牾，当秉持开放心态相互切磋。因而“海峡两岸法理学讨论会”又是一种独特的论说方式: 在相互独立的论说主体之间有可能凸显出若干条主线，从而相互交织、勾连为某种独具特色的“中国法理学”或者“汉语法理学”。正是怀着上述期许，此次讨论会的主题被设定为“当代法理学的基本问题”———它既可以容纳不同的提问立场，又期待着基本问题( 或问题域) 的呈现。
当然，上述超出理论工作本身的憧憬能否最终实现，则要落实到理论研究者本己的智识努力之中。换言之，宣称，应当符合标准证立; 论说，应当做到充分、融贯。每一位与会者都将承担标准证立与充分论说的任务，宣称的正当性最终系于论说的质量。这也对本文的写作提出了同样严苛的要求。慧心的读者将会发现: 笔者给予了各份文本不尽相同的篇幅，并有意调整了文本的先后顺序; 此外，在概述完某个文本( 或某个会议单元) 之后，笔者都基于自己的理解进行了简要评论，甚至提出了商榷意见。作为学界后进，笔者无意对各位前辈大家的精思巧构横加指摘，只是在笔者看来，“理论综述”本身也具有理论的属性，势必也要聆听来自文本的宣称，参与到文本的论说之中，发掘其中卓越的创见，并从互相关联的文本中抽取出连贯的问题脉络。因而对于一篇理论综述而言，适当的论辩甚至商榷就在所难免，与此相反，貌似客观、忠实的文本摘要只会贻误读者，使他们对原著留下生涩呆板的印象，从而最终危害了原作者的名誉。在延伸意义上，法律人的日常工作同样是在各种论说的开放结构中探求事物的本质。

This paper examines the connections between triadism and processuality in Peirce’s semiotics by comparing two reducibility theses. Peirce’s thesis regarding the irreducibility of triads and its corollary in semiotics, the irreducibility of signs, is compared with the process metaphysical thesis regarding the irreducibility of processes. The comparison indicates that (1) there is a connection between the irreducibility of signs and the irreducibility of processes; (2) that the triadic condition of the sign entails process metaphysical commitments; and this in turn (3) urges us to consider the ontology of the sign from a process metaphysical perspective.

The uniquely pragmatic aspect of Charles Peirce's philosophy is a sentiment that competing theories ought  to be referred to a single norm of inquiry and that such a norm will be located only in the contributions these theories make to repairing errant practices in the communities they serve.  This pragmatic sentiment informs Peirce's efforts to integrate the two competing tendencies in his own theoretical work: an historicist tendency, exemplified in his critique of Cartesianism,  and a foundationalist tendency, exemplified in his transcendentalism.  Unmediated by a pragmatic sentiment, these two tendencies divide contemporary pragmatic scholarship into opposing schools of deconstructive historicists and semiotic foundationalists. A suggested remedy is to reread Peirce's later pragmaticism, pragmatically, as a dialoque between two complementary modes of philosophic inquiry: hermeneutics and logic.

In this thesis we will be exploring the full extent of Peirce’s Pragmaticism. Differentiating from his former Pragmatism, which contemporary scholars uttered for a more psychological view rather than one combined with a logical perspective of phenomena, we will be confronted whether such methodology is sufficient in today’s standards of psychosomatic epistemological limits. After which, will decree what type of framework we could visualize chance or probability, as a main characteristic of the whole, in matter and human degree of belief. Finally, if successful in introducing the full implication of the principles of Peirce’s Pragmaticism, we could eventually start to re-vision any type of human-framed knowledge, to the point of achieving greater expansion in our range of propositions. In this way, human inquiry is condemned by its own generating force towards creation, in any of its forms.
Keywords: Pragmaticism, Pragmatism, Chance, Tychism, Fortuitist Distribution of Chance, Continuity, Synechism, Probability, Set Theory, Degrees of Beliefs, Ramsey Sentences, Pyrrhonism, Apoliticism.

This paper examines the connections between triadism and processuality in Peirce’s semiotics by comparing two reducibility theses. Peirce’s thesis regarding the irreducibility of triads and its corollary in semiotics, the irreducibility of signs, is compared with the process metaphysical thesis regarding the irreducibility of processes. The comparison indicates that (1) there is a connection between the irreducibility of signs and the irreducibility of processes; (2) that the triadic condition of the sign entails process metaphysical commitments; and this in turn (3) urges us to consider the ontology of the sign from a process metaphysical perspective.

Western Philosophy’s modern period has been very much shaped by a representationalism according to which “concepts” (earlier: “ideas”) assembled into “propositions” constitute the fundamental unit of meaning, thought, belief— and even, in the hands of 20th century philosophers such as G.E.M. Anscombe and Jaegwon Kim— action, conceived as performed under a description. What exactly a proposition consists in ontologically is not easy to explain in a manner consonant with prevailing scientific naturalism.  But it is clearly a disembodied entity, some kind of abstract object. But in human behaviour, much depends on not just what is done but how it is done (and this ‘how’ will possess a beginning, middle, and end denied to abstract objects).  The ‘how’ may be understood as gesture, and Maddalena’s book takes a first pass across how a philosophy that takes this, rather than disembodied meanings, as its foundation might organise itself.  The result is a fascinating wealth of germinal ideas, not all of which I have space to discuss here.

In this paper, I aim to retrieve insights from the philosophy of the polymath Charles Sanders Peirce, which he referred to as pragmaticism. What Peirce is perhaps best known as is the father of pragmatism. In order to differentiate his project from those of other thinkers such as William James and John Dewey, who likewise referred to their projects as pragmatism, he renamed his pragmatism to pragmaticism. Peirce’s pragmaticism has much to offer theologians, especially concerning the field of theological method. I demonstrate this claim by showing the usefulness of two of Peirce’s pragmaticist concepts. The first section of this paper briefly explicates the foundational concepts of pragmaticism, which are the pragmatic(ist) maxim, the semiotic nature of all understanding, and fallibilism. The second section of this paper provides a sketch of the benefits these three concepts have for theological method.

What is the proper extension of Peirce’s triadic concept of normative sign can be investigated through Peirce’s own methodeutic principles, pragmaticism and the ethics of terminology, and in accordance with his hierarchical classification of sciences.
If we look upon Peirce’s two derivations (i.e. constructions) of the concept of sign as an irreducibly triadic relation of representamen, object, and interpretant, we can observe that the concept is a representational one and that the quest for truth (about the object of sign) is built in into the triadic structure of sign. This limits the application of Peirce’s concept of sign — its principal intended (though not necessarily sole) application is in the logic of rational inquiry. Moreover, it follows that not all thought is in signs, only self-controlled thought, a thought that controls itself.
Besides thoughts, we control also our conduct by thought. Peirce’s pre-logical normative science of Practics, seems to employ another, more general kind of thought-sign that need not be a representational one. Conduct is controlled when it is controlled by thought, but this controlling thought does not have to be in itself controlled (i.e. self-controlled). Such construable concept of non-representational sign does not need to have an object because it can seek also practical ends (external to it), and not necessarily just truth. Peircean representational sign would thus be a special case of such more general concept of sign like Peircean logic/semeiotic is a special case of Practics.

The paper attempts to develop a non-reductionistic and transdisciplinary view on human knowing in the light of the growing development of transdisciplinary practices and sciences. Medicine is one of the oldest; ecology and information science are some of the newer examples of ...

The paper attempts to develop a non-reductionistic and transdisciplinary view on human knowing in the light of the growing development of transdisciplinary practices and sciences. Medicine is one of the oldest; ecology and information science are some of the newer examples of ...