Peirce Pragmaticist Semiotics

On June 17, 2015, Dylann Roof opened fire at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. In sum, he massacred nine people, including the pastor and state senator Clementa C. Pickney. Several days later at Roof’s first court appearance, relatives of the slain victims had the opportunity to confront the gunman. As many news stories noted, the relatives of the victims offered Roof their forgiveness even while articulating the pain and suffering of their loss. At the hearing, Nadine Collier spoke the powerful words “I forgive you,” to Dylan Roof (Izadi 2015). Collier’s testimony hinted at a theological imperative that is fundamental to Christianity, namely the notion of forgiveness. Forgiveness from the perspective of African American Christianity is composed of both reconciliation and justice. The aim of this chapter is to blend the pragmatic principles of Charles Sanders Peirce and W.E.B. Du Bois to understand the meaning of forgiveness centered on the perspective of Christianity from African Americans.

Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) pode ser considerado o maior filósofo nascido nas Américas. Polímata, foi cientista por formação e profissão. Formou-se em química em Harvard, obtendo pela primeira vez a distinção summa cum laude, a mais alta da universidade. De 1859 a 1891, foi geofísico e astrônomo da United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, e, com suas pesquisas, inseriu definitivamente os EUA no cenário científico internacional. Foi demitido sem aposentadoria, o que lhe causou grandes dificuldades financeiras na velhice. No único período (1878-1883) em que trabalhou numa universidade, a então recém-criada Johns Hopkins, elaborou uma teoria da quantificação compatível com a lógica de primeira ordem, posteriormente expandindo-a de forma a torná-la compatível para lógicas de ordem superior. Isto, Peirce o fez com base no trabalho de matemática de seu pai, Benjamin Peirce, o cálculo da lógica de G. Boole, e a lógica das relações de A. De Morgan. Se posterior aos resultados Frege, seu trabalho não obstante foi realizado de maneira totalmente autônoma e sobre outras bases, com outras preocupações, influenciando E. Schroeder, e, por via deste, L. Löwenheim e Th. Skolem. Não à toa, Peirce sempre se considerou sobretudo um lógico. Mas sua obra é imensa e variada, indo da matemática e da lógica à história da filosofia e da ciência, passando pela enologia e pela fonética da língua inglesa do período elizabetano. Nela, desponta proeminente a sua semiótica, ou teoria geral dos signos, pela qual ficou mundialmente conhecido. Sua filosofia é sistemática, abrangente, na qual encontramos desde teses ontológicas sobre o acaso (tiquismo), a afirmação de um princípio amoroso de evolução do universo (agapismo), e a hipótese da continuidade psicofísica de todos os fenômenos (sinequismo), sem esquecer uma teoria das categorias cenopitagóricas (faneroscopia). Tais temas ontológico-metafísicos são por ele resumidos sob a denominação de idealismo objetivo, segundo influência de pensadores do Iluminismo e do romantismo alemães. No entanto, Peirce sempre se autodenominou um realista escolástico, mais radical até mesmo que Duns Scotus, pois defendia um realismo dos continua, e não de termos individuais. Mais tardiamente, também referia à própria filosofia como uma filosofia crítica do senso-comum, parecida com a da anterior escola escocesa, mas adequada aos problemas de um mundo transformado pela Revolução Científica. Tendo recebido de seu amigo William James o título de inventor do pragmatismo, Peirce o entendia primordialmente como um método lógico para a investigação científica, mas, depois, passou a considerá-lo também em chave kantiana, em específica remissão aos imperativos hipotéticos por Kant menosprezados. Tardiamente, e durante certo período, chegou mesmo a usar o rótulo pragmaticismo, um nome tão feio que ninguém desejará roubá-lo, nas suas próprias e jocosas palavras. Seu pensamento exerceu profícua influência sobre vários pensadores do século XX, como Umberto Eco, Roman Jakobson, Gilles Deleuze, Alfred Tarski, Karl Popper e Juergen Habermas, dentre outros.

A biographical summary plus a presentation of his basic philosophy focused on the application of phenomenology to the human sciences, especially Communicology and the political/sociological condition of the the ordinary citizen, the "forgotten man". Many summary Tables of key concepts.

Les images tactiles sont des traductions et adaptations en relief de contenus de la culture visuelle tels que les schémas, les illustrations et les œuvres picturales. Elles sont en général utilisées dans les projets éducatifs et culturels d’inclusion et d’accessibilité des personnes non-voyantes. Mais comment traduire les images issues du monde visuel afin qu’elles soient perçues et interprétées du bout des doigts ? Comment les designers peuvent-ils rendre ces images plus accessibles aux non-voyants ? Afin de répondre à ces questions, nous avons évalué la production et la lecture de dessins par des jeunes non-voyants et malvoyants placés dans un environnement ludique. Pour ce faire, nous avons inventé et mis au point un jeu de dessin tactile, Tactilonary, permettant d’observer in situ et in vivo l’activité graphique et les stratégies de com- munication des sujets de l’expérience, tout en conservant un cadre réaliste au plus proche des activités de la vie ordinaire.
Cet article présente une étude ethnographique portant sur les atti- tudes, les comportements et les interactions entre les joueurs, ain- si que l’analyse sémiotique des composants figuratifs des représen- tations graphiques des objets selon le type de déficience visuelle. Les données recueillies montrent les conflits interprétatifs qui apparaissent lorsque les non-voyants sont confrontés aux normes de la représentation visuelle. Les résul- tats de cette recherche renforcent la nécessité de prise en compte des aspects per- ceptifs et sémiotiques de la cécité lors de la conception de dispositifs tactiles destinés à ce public spécifique.

Abstract :
Tactile images are the translation and adaptation in relief of the contents of visual culture such as diagrams, illustrations and paintings. They are generally used in educational and cultural projects dedicated to the inclusion and accessibility of blind people. But how does one translate the images from the seeing environment so they can be perceived and interpreted with the fingertips? How can designers make these images more accessible to blind people? To answer these questions, we have evaluated the production and interpretation of drawings by young blind and visually impaired people using the Tactilonary tactile game. To do this, we have invented and developed this game to create a fun environment allowing us to observe in situ and in vivo the graphic activity and communication strategies of participants, while maintaining a realistic environment closer to the activities of day-to-day life.
This paper presents an ethnographic study on the attitudes, behaviours and interac- tions between players as well as the semiotic analysis of the figurative components of the graphic representations of objects depending on the type of visual impairment. The data collected shows the interpretative conflicts that occur when blind people are faced with the norms of visual representation. The results of this research underline the need to take into account the perceptual and semiotic aspects of blindness in the design of haptic devices targeted at this specific audience.

On several occasions during his life, Peirce argued that Aristotle was the first to present  perfect form of induction, and also claimed that he followed Aristotle in this formulation. Despite this, Peirce criticizes Aristotle´s justifi cation of induction as an enumeration of all individuals and as a self-evident and immediate inference that depends upon intuition (nous). In this article, the author explores the readings and comments that Peirce makes of the two most important passages of Aristotle on induction (epagōgē), namely, Prior Analytics II, 23 and Posterior Analytics II, 19. The first is commented and partially translated by Peirce whereas the second is not mentioned directly, although it seems that Peirce refers to it when he discusses the problem of fi rst principles. In addition to presenting Peirce’s  comments about these two passages, the author evaluates critically their accuracy and finds that Peirce sometimes interprets them wrongly.

The pragmatic semiotic theory of Charles Sanders Peirce has a lot of practical benefits for enhancing visual communication in illustrations. His triadic theory of Semiosis focuses on the dynamic interrelationships between the concept to be communicated, how it is represented through a semiotic sign, and how this affects the success of how the concept is eventually interpreted. Peirce's pragmatic semiotic theory uses complex language, and although Peirce is embraced in some design disciplines, the language that defines Semiosis (or sign-action) is problematic beyond academia. This paper is an attempt to address this by providing illustrators with a basic introduction to how Semiosis can help to enhance the success of the visual communication in their illustrations. This is done by translating Peircean terminology into illustrator-centric language and providing an example of how the Semiosis is implemented in an illustration. Within the limits of a short paper, illustrators can begin to understand how the triadic nature of concept/representation/interpretation can benefit them during their ideation and sketching phase to author effective images. In doing this, this paper will mostly discuss iconic, indexical, and symbolic semiotic representation within pragmatic semiotic signs of the intended concept to be communicated in an illustration. This paper's aim is to enact a pragmatic turn in illustrators, in which Semiosis theory becomes more integrated within their practical work, by providing a more illustrator-centric dissemination of Peirce's semiotic theory.

Ces dernières années, dans le domaine de la participation citoyenne aux politiques de la ville, bon nombre de chercheurs en philosophie politique et en sciences sociales ont plaidé pour un décentrement du discours et de l’argumentation, pour une communication démocratique plus « inclusive », plus « sensible », davantage en prise sur les environnements, sur les dimensions expérientielle et matérielle des problèmes urbains. Le message semble avoir été reçu. Visites de groupes dans les quartiers, reportages vidéo ou photo, expositions de dessins, jeux de construction, fonds de cartes à recouvrir d’icônes et de gommettes autocollantes, ateliers visant à imaginer « la ville de ses rêves », activités de théâtre-action, jeux de rôle et jeux de plateau, etc., sont en effet devenus des incontournables de la « boîte à outils » des professionnels de la participation. Dans cet article, plutôt que de nous intéresser aux différents « outils » dans leurs spécificités, nous voudrions interroger plus généralement la prolifération des méthodes cadrant les contributions citoyennes dans le domaine de l’image ou de l’imagination, et repliant la parole ordinaire dans ses fonctions d’ostension et de figuration, c’est-à-dire dans ses fonctions « indexiques » et « iconiques » (Charles Sanders Peirce). L’hypothèse qui nous guide est celle-ci : en lieu et place d’un enrichissement des processus de communication, on assisterait plutôt à un véritable « tournant sémiotique » dans les pratiques de démocratie participative ; un tournant à travers lequel l’image profane en viendrait peu à peu à se substituer au discours citoyen et à éluder, avec lui, les prétentions d’articulation, de problématisation, de synthèse et de généralisation chez les « participants ordinaires ».

Can science tell us what’s objectively true? Or is it merely a clever way to cure doubt – to give us something to believe in, whether it’s true or not? In this essay, I look at the pragmatist account of science expounded by Charles Sanders Peirce in his 1877 essay, ‘The Fixation of Belief’. Against Peirce, I argue that science does not come naturally to our species, nor does the doubting open-mindedness upon which its practice relies. To the extent that science is successful in ‘curing’ doubt, it’s because it tracks the real state of the world; and I argue that Peirce himself – his pragmatist narrative notwithstanding – is implicitly committed to this view as well.

¿Es posible pensar sin signos? Impulsado por esta pregunta, Charles S Pierce desarrolló una teoría sobre la lógica del conocimiento que lo llevaría a ser considerado padre de la semiótica y fundador del pragmatismo angloamericano. En esta lectura renovada de los Collected Papers, Jesús Octavio Elizondo indaga la evolución del pensamiento peirceano para ofrecernos una imagen clara de la semiosis: signos en acción, signos que se expresan en creencias y hábitos, signos tan dinámicos como la vida misma.

Approaching Christian education in light of Charles Sanders Peirce’s Classical Pragmatism can help catechists make Christian tradition more intelligible to present-day North Americans; it can provide them with a rich framework for pedagogical practices; and it can help them offer a compelling vision of deeper participation in the Trinitarian life of God. A Peircean pedagogy of religious education emphasizes attentiveness, discernment, creativity, artistry, and the key role of the Holy Spirit.

Umberto Eco (1975; 1985) has invariantly maintained that specular images have no semiosic status, basically because they stand in front rather than instead of an object. In his Kant and the Platypus (1997), Eco returns offering reasons to exclude specular images from signs, and definitely classifies mirrors as visual prosthetic devices. In this paper I argue that Eco is partly right and partly wrong. He is right inasmuch as he claims that seeing an object in a mirror must count as a case of seeing that object rather than as a case of seeing a sign of that object (or, a sign standing for a propositional content about that object). The only reason why we should agree with Eco on this point, however, is that otherwise we would be forced to admit that also when we see the object in normal visual perception, with no mirror involved, what we really see is a sign. But then Eco is wrong because he does not acknowledge that, although mirror phenomena do have no semiosic status per se, they may acquire it by taking advantage of independent sign-functions – thus coming to be part of what I call parasiticly semiosic phenomena. Specifically, since an object that is visually perceived in a mirror may appear to have some spatial or topological properties that the real object does not possess, it is sufficient for the mirror phenomenon to exploit an independent sign-function whose expressions admit spatial or topological properties among their distinctive traits in order for it to become fully (though parasiticly) semiosic.

Many scholars believe "On a New List of Categories" is a metaphysical or transcendental deduction. The present essay will argue that Peirce derives the categories by induction and validates their order by prescision. Then the article shall solicit aid from Peirce's early and later writings to explain how the new way to list the categories can serve as a genealogy of signifi cation: how the diff erent types of term, proposition, and argument emerge in the process of reasoning as the diff erent types of signs. Thus, the genealogy of signifi cation would then qualify as a phenomenology of logic as a science of semiotics. Such a science of semiotics will have three types of comparison corresponding to the sign-relation in illation: namely, uniparance, diaparance, and comparance. Then the three types of comparison will occasion three types of relative in diff erent types of propositions: namely, concurrents, disquiparants, and equiparants. Finally, the three types of relative will occasion the diff erent types of sign corresponding to the diff erent types of term: namely, icons, indices, and symbols. With this classifi cation, there is then an explanation of how the process of reasoning is a semiotic process with three forms of valid argument: namely, hypothesis, induction, and deduction.

Through its theorization and elaboration in the path-breaking work of Michael Silverstein, indexicality has served as a foundational analytic category for linguistic anthropology, both in its ethnographic analyses as well as in its theoretical interventions into key issues in the philosophy of language, linguistics, and sociocultural anthropology. The working out of indexicality's implications for the study of semiosis—and more particularly, language in culture—has and continues to produce a vital and dynamic theoretical field of scholarly activity. This vitality, I argue, emerges from a foundational ambivalence within the category of indexicality: between, on the one hand, immediacy and presence and, on the other hand, mediation and representation. Productively unresolved, this ambivalence is less a problem than an opportunity and invitation for further ethnographic and analytic refinement of our accounts of (meta)semiosis and social life. A reflexive and deconstructive turn to indexicality's ambivalent ground, then, is implied and necessitated by the category itself, though this in no way obviates its utility for semiotic and ethnographic theory and analysis; indeed, as I argue, such a turn is critical to indexicality's ongoing utility to both.

Álvaro Cepeda Samudio publicó Todos estábamos a la espera, su primer libro de cuentos, en 1954. Allí queda patente el giro por la nostalgia del futuro, que inspiró su opción vanguardista. Cepeda Samudio es un reto para el estudio literario, porque ocupa el lugar precursor de una nueva narrativa colombiana. La obra de Cepeda Samudio gira en torno al encanto del mundo roto por el desprecio de la razón poética, que se pierde como medida de todas las cosas; por lo cual se cancela el proyecto de la humanidad encarnada en la sociedad. Esta es la nostalgia del Ser perdido para siempre. Entonces, la primera sugerencia de su obra sería que la experiencia humana no debe someterse a las doctrinas religiosas o políticas; ni a la aparente verificación por la opinión mayoritaria, porque la condición indispensable para la vida, en la plenitud de su significado, es la libertad. Cepeda Samudio aceptó la vanguardia, sin avanzar decididamente en el existencialismo. A este hecho habría que buscarle una explicación: acaso habitaba una "atmósfera densa, lenta, silenciosa y solitaria", que le obligó a ser fiel a la cultura caribe, como profeta en su tierra. En todo caso, aquí vanguardia equivale a nostalgia del futuro; que podría definirse como la adivinación de una catástrofe emocional y filosófica. Así, anuncia el mutismo de la conciencia anclada en el esfuerzo por establecer su identidad, ante la inminente ruptura del equilibrio social que permitía dirigir la mirada hacia sí mismo sin la culpa que surgiría de la lucha de clases que estaba por desatarse en Colombia en la década de 1960.

È estatico ogni discorso che, costruendosi nel linguaggio e col linguaggio, rappresenta nondimeno una fuoriuscita da esso, un bloccarsi della semiosi, un venir meno delle distinzioni che fondano il senso. Trattasi dunque di un’impostura? Dell’evocazione impossibile, fra le maglie dell’immanenza, di una dimensione trascendente nella quale e verso la quale la prima si sfaldi, perdendo la consistenza di strutture e opposizioni? Rispondere affermativamente sarebbe forse semplicistico, sarebbe considerare l’estasi come puro effetto ottico, come sorta di trompe-l’oeil mistico. In realtà, come ogni trompe-l’oeil, anche l’estasi rinvia a qualcosa di più della propria semplice rappresentazione. Essa rimanda ai pregiudizi inconfessati di un’ideologia semiotica, alla trama nascosta, al negativo segreto che regge tutta la concezione moderna del senso e del linguaggio. Il discorso mistico, che corre parallelo e invisibile, spesso represso, a volte perseguitato, lungo tutta la storia delle religioni, esprime allora questo dubbio: e se il senso non fosse distinzione, separatezza, dualità? Se l’immanenza articolatoria che lo viviseziona non fosse che illusoria? A questo punta ogni racconto dell’estasi: al sospetto che i fondamenti della modernità, anti-mistici per definizione, non siano altro che una delle possibilità dell’umano, e che una storia non detta, in filigrana, si dipani accanto e sotto al moderno come traccia sbiadita di un altro percorso, di un altro modo d’intendere e di dire.

Signatim è termine raro. Compare in un passo attribuito all’autore Caio, all’interno dei cosiddetti Gromatici veteres, una raccolta di testi di agrimensura compilata nel V secolo d.C. “Gromatico” è infatti tutto ciò che si riferisce alla misurazione, divisione, e rappresentazione di terreni. Il termine deriva da “groma”, uno strumento che gli Etruschi prima, e poi i Romani, utilizzarono per tracciare sul territorio allineamenti ortogonali, necessari per la delimitazione di nuove città, quartieri, e strade, ma anche per suddividere il terreno in quadrati o rettangoli, e renderne così calcolabile la superficie.
Nel passo di Caio si descrive una tecnica gromatica. Al fine di poter identificare anche in futuro i paletti interrati che delimitano il terreno, è necessario contraddistinguerli con un segno a forma di stella, la cosidetta “stella junior”. In questo contesto, “signatim” è dunque avverbio che designa la scrittura e la lettura di segni nella delineazione di frontiere. Quale parola più appropriata per evocare il lavoro della semiotica della cultura, la quale pure si occupa dei segni, delle tracce, delle marche che gli individui e le società producono nell’istituire la diversità? Per cartografare non colture ma culture, non gromatiche ma grammatiche, riconducendone le forme esuberanti all’ortogonalità di strutture soggiacenti?

This paper builds on work relating to pattern languages for social change, such as in the papers titled Fourth generation pattern languages-patterns as epistemic threads for systemic orientation, and Pattern Literacy in support of Systems Literacy presented to the Systems Science and Pattern Language communities between 2015 and 2017. It is part of an endeavor to bring pattern thinking and systems thinking, or pattern science and systems science, closer to each other, in order to further introduce pattern thinking and pattern language in the design, assessment and orientation of our socio-technological and socio-environmental systems, large or small, to better address the societal issues of our time. It complements several initiatives to put pattern languages at the service of sustainability and societal change, and to introduce pattern thinking and pattern language into systems thinking and systemic design. My broader aim is to enhance the innate patterning capability of human beings and thus an overall pattern literacy in support of systems literacy. Pattern literacy manifests our ability to grasp, learn, assemble, represent and mobilize patterns to make-sense of, converse about and shape our world(s). Systems literacy manifests our ability to interrogate and attempt to understand the relationships among systems wholes and parts, and the mechanisms that affect and shape our world(s), in part or as a whole. In this paper, I explore how a systemic approach to patterns and pattern language could support systemic inquiry and systemic design, and more generally the advancement of pattern language. In particular, I discuss the extension of the act of design to encompass the systemic inquiry that motivates a design and the ongoing monitoring of the fitness of a design to its intended purpose. I examine the multiple facets and understandings of the concept of pattern and show how they can be reconciled to include both the inquiry or observational/informational aspects and the design aspects of patterns in a larger systems framework. In this light, I reexamine the appropriateness of the pattern expressed in problem-solution form in the context of complex systems, and the notion of generativity, and I propose ways forward for extended definitions and pattern forms.

It is widely held nowadays that Saussurean semiology and the Peircean theory of signs are two major semiotic schools that, although they have certain theoretical and historical background in common, are incommensurable.

However, it appears that numerous — and evidently strong — points of incongruence between Saussurean (and post-Saussurean) semiology and Peirce's semiotics do not prevent the possibility of some important theoretical intuitions common to both traditions. In particular, this claim finds support in light of Russian formalism — essentially a Saussurean-type semiotic school that gained wide acclaim in mid-twentieth century Europe alongside French structuralism. Without challenging the truth of the obvious differences between the two schools, this paper undertakes to reinterpret some of the late formalist concepts on the problem of continuity in terms of Peirce's semiotics. The brief account this paper presents has a double objective: (1) to give a particular example of how some basic formalist analytical categories may be placed in the wider context of Peirce's semiotics, thus making the purely structural aspect of meaning a particular case of Peirce's theory of signs, and (2) to show the possibility of building a case in which Peirce's semiotic ideas might actually be applied as efficient tools in the examination of different traditional discourses. This objective is accomplished by way of a sample analysis of Vladimir Propp's “Oedipus in Light of Folklore” in terms of Peirce's “On a New List of Categories.”

Keywords:: continuity; history; formalism; semiotics; narrative function; interpretant

In his monograph on Educational Semiotics, Francois Tochon (along with a number of research colleagues) has produced a work that is truly groundbreaking on a number of fronts.  First of all, in his concise but brilliant introductory comments, Tochon clearly debunks the potential notion that semiotics might provide yet another methodological tool in the toolkit of educational researchers.  Drawing skillfully on the work of Peirce, Deely, Sebeok, Merrell, and others, Tochon shows us just how fundamentally different semiotic research can be when compared to the modes and techniques that have dominated educational research for many decades.  That is, he points out how semiotic methods can provide the capability for both students and researchers to look at this basic and fundamental human process in inescapably transformational ways, by acknowledging and accepting that the path to knowledge is, in his words “through the fixation of belief.”
    But he does not stop there – instead, in four brilliantly conceived studies, he shows us how semiotic concepts in general, and semiotic mapping in particular, can allow both student teachers and researchers alike insights in these students’ development of insights and concepts into the very heart of the teaching and learning process.  By tackling both theoretical and practical research considerations, Tochon has provided the rest of us the beginnings of a blueprint that, if adopted, can push educational research out of (in the words of Deely) its entrenchment in the Age of Ideas into the new and exciting frontiers of the Age of Signs.
- Gary Shank, Duquesne University

In the seminal essay " Pragmatism " , Peirce discusses the end of interpretation in terms of the ultimate logical interpretant, which is varyingly characterized as habit or habit-change. While it is broadly accepted that his conception of pragmatic meaning rests on habit, the precise role of habit-change in his account of conceptual purport has not been examined in detail. In this chapter, I address this issue, which turns out to be closely linked to the pivotal question of the purpose of Peircean pragmatism itself. My primary aim is to demonstrate that Peirce's pragmatic account of the interpretant surpasses that of mere explication of habitual meaning, something that can be teased out from an embryonic account of three logical interpretants, sketched in " Pragmatism " and supported by certain suggestive references to first, second, and third pragmatistic interpretation in other writings. This investigation not only exposes the hitherto overlooked fact that Peirce recognizes a stage of conceptual clarification beyond that of the ultimate logical interpretant; it also paves the way for a reassessment of the significance of the pragmatist approach within a broader developmental-normative framework aimed at the improvements of our habits.

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. 

The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound.

Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward.

Di tutte le annunciazioni che popolano la storia umana e le sue svariate tradizioni, al semiologo non interessa la fonte in sé, il numinoso che all’umano si rivolge per significargli di volta in volta la propria presenza, intenzione, sensibilità; interessa, piuttosto, il modo in cui a seconda delle epoche storiche, dei contesti culturali, delle vicende sociali, ma anche delle sensibilità individuali, uomini e donne hanno utilizzato i materiali del mondo, quelli dell’immanenza, per forgiare i significanti del divino. Ovvero, specularmente, il modo in cui hanno immaginato, e creduto con fermezza, che tali materiali divenissero d’un tratto appannaggio di una divina intenzione di comunicare, stoffa della rivelazione, parole annuncianti. Al teologo, non al semiologo, spetta immaginare la ricostruzione della totalità a fronte della quale si dipana il messaggio divino nella sua vicenda immanente. Al semiologo tocca invece un compito che è insieme più modesto e più costrittivo; innanzitutto raccogliere e inventariare queste tracce: in quali circostanze gli uomini e le donne hanno raccontato e raccontano di un loro incontro con il divino? Utilizzando quali segni? Piegandoli a quali necessità comunicative? Il compito successivo, più arduo, è analizzare questi segni, con gli strumenti di cui dispone la metodologia semiotica, per capire se si possano in qualche modo catalogare, suddividere in tipologie, distribuire in atlanti che, anche al di là e a dispetto delle differenze d’origine storica e confessionale, manifestino nondimeno dinamiche comuni nella costruzione e nell’elaborazione del linguaggio.

The view argued in this article is that If we want to define a universal concept of information covering subjective experiential and meaningful cognition - as well as intersubjective meaningful communication in nature, technology, society and life worlds - then the main problem is to decide, which epistemological, ontological and philosophy of science framework the concept of information should be based on and integrated in. All the ontological attempts to create objective concepts of information result in concepts that cannot encompass meaning and experience of embodied living and social systems. There is no conclusive evidence that the core of reality across nature, culture, life and mind is purely either mathematical, logical or of a computational nature. Therefore the core of the information concept should not only be based only on pure logical or mathematical rationality. We need to include interpretation, signification and meaning construction in our transdisciplinary framework for information as a basic aspect of reality alongside the physical, chemical and molecular biological. It is difficult to produce a pure quantitative statement independently of a qualitative analysis based on some sort of relation to the human condition as a semiotic animal.
To follow the transdisciplinary ambition in much information science and philosophy leading to cognitive science we need to include a phenomenological and hermeneutical ground in order to encompass a theory of interpretative meaning and signification to achieve a transdisciplinary theory of knowing and communication. This is also true if we start in cybernetics and system theory that also have transdisciplinary aspirations for instance in Batesons ecological concept of information as a difference that makes a difference and in Luhmann’s triple autopoietic communication based system theory. Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmaticist semiotics integrates logic and information in interpretative semiotics. I therefore suggest alternatively building information theories based on semiotics from the basic relations of embodied living systems meaningful cognition and communication. I agree with Peircean biosemiotics that all information must be part of real relational sign-processes manifesting as tokens.
But although Peirce’s information theory is built on meaningful signs and he connects information to the growth of symbols, his information theory is empirically based in a realistic worldview, which in the development to modern biosemiotics include all living systems.
To follow the transdisciplinary ambition in much information science and philosophy leading to cognitive science we need to include a phenomenological and hermeneutical ground in order to encompass a theory of interpretative meaning and signification to achieve a transdisciplinary theory of knowing and communication. This is also true if we start in cybernetics and system theory that also have transdisciplinary aspirations for instance in Batesons ecological concept of information as a difference that makes a difference and in Luhmann’s triple autopoietic communication based system theory. Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmaticist semiotics integrates logic and information in interpretative semiotics. But although Peirce’s information theory is built on meaningful signs and he connects information to the growth of symbols, his information theory is empirically based in a realistic worldview, which in the development to modern biosemiotics include all living systems.

Since Peirce defined the first operators for three-valued logic, it is usually assumed that he rejected the principle of bivalence. However, I argue that, because bivalence is a principle, the strategy used by Peirce to defend logical principles can be used to defend bivalence. Construing logic as the study of substitutions of equivalent representations, Peirce showed that some patterns of substitution get realized in the very act of questioning them. While I recognize that we can devise non-classical notations, I argue that, when we make claims about those notations, we inevitably get saddled with bivalent commitments. I present several simple inferences to show this. The argument that results from those examples is 'pragmatic', because the inevitability of the principle is revealed in use (not mention); and it is 'semiotic', because this revelation happens in the use of signs.

Semiotics (sometimes spelled “semeiotic”) is the name first given by John Locke, and later reprised by Charles S. Peirce, for the “doctrine of signs,” or the study of how some things can stand for other things to still other things. This deliberate inquiry can be contrasted with “folk semiotic” accounts, which assume that there is some intrinsic feature about, say, the human voice or a painted board that makes them capable of signifying. Such a naive assumption does not withstand serious scrutiny. From a philosophical standpoint, what makes something a sign is an involvement in a specific sort of triadic relation. This relation is found in human/nonhuman and deliberate/nondeliberate signs alike. Semiosis, the action of signs, is what permits communication, but it is wider than communication. For example, if while in an adjacent room I smell that the turkey in the oven is ready, my pet dog can smell it too, and the turkey is not trying to “tell” us anything. But if the cook in the kitchen tells me it is ready, I receive that message, while my dog hears the sounds but is none the wiser (in contemporary semiotic parlance, my dog and I couple our Umwelten via indices, but the symbols at hand generate interpretants only in my anthroposemiosis). In spite of the fact that it has a long and distinguished history (especially during the medieval period), general inquiry into signs became an organized research program only in the mid-20th century. Today, in addition to philosophers, semiotics attracts a wide range of scholars, such as ethologists, cognitive scientists, linguists, art historians, logicians, media theorists, literary critics, computer programmers, biologists, sociologists, and so on. From a methodological standpoint, then, parochialism is not an option. The scholarly literature can nevertheless be fruitfully divided into theoretical and applied strands. Not surprisingly, most philosophers drawn to semiotic questions work in the former strand. Semiotics is not to be confused with “semiology,” a (now largely defunct) project that originated in the lectures of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and which was active in the 1960s, mainly in France. Semiotics, by contrast, is a vibrant tradition that continues to flourish worldwide. Although some persist in employing the term “semiotics” when discussing narrow studies that focus exclusively on cultural codes, such terminological misuse masks the fact that a study of signs is broader than a study of language. A sustained philosophy of signs, then, promises (as Locke initially surmised) to yield truly novel insights.

In this paper I aim to show that the creation and manipulation of written vehicles is part of our cognitive processing and, therefore, that writing transforms our cognitive abilities. I do this from the perspective of cognitive integration: completing a complex cognitive, or mental, task is enabled by a co-ordinated interaction between neural processes, bodily processes and manipulating written sentences. In section one I introduce Harris’ criticisms of ways in which writing has been said to restructure thought (Goody 1968; McLuhan 1962, 1964; Ong 1982). This will give us a preliminary idea about possible pitfalls for a cognitive integrationist account. The second section outlines, firstly, how integrated cognitive systems function. Secondly, the model is applied to a hybrid mental act where writing allows us to complete complex cognitive tasks. The final section outlines the sense in which, following Harris, there is “a more realistic picture of how writing restructures thought” [Harris, R., 1989. How does writing restructure thought? Language and Communication 9 (2/3) 99–106] that is concealed by the ‘romantic fantasies’ of theorists such as the above. This picture is one of writing providing an autoglottic space in which a new form of theoretical thinking becomes prevalent. The cognitive integrationist understands this in terms of the nature of the written vehicles and how we manipulate them

CONTENIDO

ARNOLD OOSTRA. La matemática intuicionista y sus conexiones
con el pensamiento de Peirce

FERNANDO ZALAMEA. Faneroscopia, filosofía natural y literatura.
“La Esfinge” en Peirce, Emerson, Poe y Melville

EUGENIO ANDRADE. Las categorías ceno-pitagóricas y la controversia
sobre el origen de las innovaciones evolutivas

ROBERTO PERRY. Desde Peirce: invitación a ampliar
nuestro concepto de signo

CARLOS GARZÓN. ¿Es la verdad la meta de la investigación?
Una lectura pragmaticista para objeciones pragmatistas

DOUGLAS NIÑO. Algunas reflexiones sobre la duda y la creencia

EDISON TORRES Idealismo epistemológico y realismo metafísico
en Charles S. Peirce

Simandan D (2005) "Pragmatic Scepticism and the Possibilities of Knowledge" Timisoara, Editura Universitatii de Vest/West University Press, 256 pp.

This book distiled my own way of understanding the relation between epistemology, ontology, and politics, and the best name I found for labelling that way is pragmatic scepticism. Throughout the book, I stay away from the temptation to give a dictionary-like definition of this philosophy. I do not even like to think of it as a philosophy. Instead, I see pragmatic scepticism as a way of being and as a way of relating. A way of being human, i.e. enmeshed in language and limited by our senses; and a way of relating, i.e. crafted by the happy and sad encounters with theories, things, and lifeís happenings. The book is structured in three parts, which together give a sense of the potentials of pragmatic scepticism: as a way of thinking about the world, as a way of approaching theoretical dilemmas, as a way of mapping one's inner contradictions. The first part of the book introduces pragmatic scepticism in relation to the general questions underwriting the philosophy of knowledge and the study of science. The second part is more specific in that it deploys the pragmatic sceptical attitude to the central metatheoretical questions of the discipline of geography. The last part of the book groups under the heading "philosophies of struggle" two more applied essays on the political economy and the political epistemology of conflicts over knowledge in the globalised landscape of higher education in general and geography in particular.

La presente selección de textos ofrece una muestra significativa de algunos resultados de las investigaciones de largo alcance sobre el pragmaticismo del pensador y científico norteamericano Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), emprendida por expertos de reconocimiento internacional, quienes abordan los conceptos filosóficos claves que este lógico norteamericano usó, estudió, aclaró o discutió.

Conta-capa: ‘João Queiroz oferece um tratado sobre os signos e seus tipos, suas inter-relações, suas modelizações, e sua acessibilidade à pesquisa empírica com uma sofisticação que dificilmente vamos encontrar em qualquer língua, de qualquer tradição acadêmica. [...] Ele desenvolve uma lógica heterogênea seguindo as notações e o pensamento de C.S. Peirce, com um toque profundo de originalidade como ninguém. E como se isto não fosse suficiente, tudo fica demarcado dentro de uma meditação sobre uma neurobiologia da semiose, e a base da comunicação entre primatas não-humanas. [...] Eu, de fato, estou maravilhado com a abordagem rigorosamente argumentada deste volume. Deve ser leitura indispensável para o pesquisador da filosofia de Peirce, do pragmatismo, das ciências cognitivas, e da semiótica em seu sentido mais amplo.

Floyd Merrell (Purdue University)

* * *

Trechos extraídos do Prefácio: ‘Este livro de João Queiroz é, sobretudo, um livro necessário. Dependendo da identidade do leitor, poderá ainda ser didático ou herético, e para outros será apenas lógico. Nem mesmo para os diletos colaboradores de João haverá leitura sem surpresas, pois o caminho percorrido é tão único quanto o próprio autor. [...] Tomados em conjunto, os capítulos deste livro percorrem a distância que vai do pergaminho à idéia nova, desmistificando e atualizando Peirce com vistas a uma grande síntese neurosemiótica. Evidentemente as direções apontadas neste livro estão ainda por serem exploradas, e é nisso mesmo que reside sua força: mais do que prover respostas, este trabalho abre portas para novas perguntas.’

Sidarta Ribeiro (IINN, Natal; Duke University)

CONTENIDO

FERNANDO ZALAMEA. Continuidad y plasticidad en los
gráficos existenciales

ARNOLD OOSTRA. Los gráficos Alfa de Peirce aplicados a la lógica intuicionista

ALEJANDRO MARTÍN. La esfera de las relaciones. Un ensayo de interpretación

DOUGLAS NIÑO. Signo y propósito. Presentación y crítica de la propuesta de Thomas Short del modelo de signo de Charles S. Peirce

CARLOS GARZÓN. Normatividad y contextos de aserción

ROBERTO PERRY. La arbitrariedad en el lenguaje, la cognición y algunos otros ámbitos

LORENA HAM. Eidos, quidditas, arché: tres estadios en la construcción de identidad

This article builds on C. S. Peirce’s suggestive blueprint for an inclusive outlook that grants reality to his three categories. Moving away from the usual focus on (contentious) cosmological forces, I use a modal principle to partition various ontological layers: regular sign-action (like coded language) subsumes actual sign-action (like here-and-now events) which in turn subsumes possible sign-action (like qualities related to whatever would be similar to them). Once we realize that the triadic sign’s components are each answerable to this asymmetric subsumption, we obtain the means to track at which level of complexity semiosis finds itself, in a given case. Since the bulk of such a “trinitarian” metaphysics would be devoted to countenancing un-interpreted phenomena, I argue that current misgivings about sign-based ontologies are largely misplaced.