Torkild Thellefsen

Hitherto, there has been no book that attempted to sum up the breadth of Umberto Eco’s work and it importance for the study of semiotics, communication and cognition. There have been anthologies and overviews of Eco’s work within Eco Studies; sometimes, works in semiotics have used aspects of Eco’s work. Yet, thus far, there has been no overview of the work of Eco in the breadth of semiotics. This volume is a contribution to both semiotics and Eco studies. The 40 scholars who participate in the volume come from a variety of disciplines but have all chosen to work with a favorite quotation from Eco that they find particularly illustrative of the issues that his work raises. Some of the scholars have worked exegetically placing the quotation within a tradition, others have determined the (epistemic) value of the quotation and offered a critique, while still others have seen the quotation as a starting point for conceptual developments within a field of application. However, each article within this volume points toward the relevance of Eco -- for contemporary studies concerning semiotics, communication and cognition.

Abstract Any great new theoretical framework has an epistemological and an ontological aspect to its philosophy as well as an axiological one, and one needs to understand all three aspects in order to grasp the deep aspiration and idea of the theoretical framework. Presently, there is a widespread effort to understand CS Peirce's (1837–1914) pragmaticistic semeiotic, and to develop it by integrating the results of modern science and evolutionary thinking; first, producing a biosemiotics and, second, by integrating it with the progress in ...

C. S. Peirce defined the metaphor as a sign of the type hypo-icon. The metaphor depends on a special kind of similarity, namely parallelism. But Peirce never gave an answer to the question “on which ontological level can the similarity of metaphor be identified?”. However, a tentative answer seems to be deducible from different text passages in Peirce’s grand oeuvre. Even though Peirce defined the metaphor as a hypoiconic sign, he was accentuating the metaphor’s most salient semeiotic mechanism, not describing the only one. Thus, the metaphor is e.g. also a symbolically mediated icon. In the following, we will try to focus on these two topics concerning the “Peircean metaphor.


C. S. Peirce define a metáfora como um signo hipoicônico. A metáfora depende de um tipo especial de similaridade, o paralelismo. Peirce não chegou a dar uma resposta à questão “em que nível ontológico pode-se identificar a similaridade da metáfora?”. No entanto, uma resposta inicial parece dedutível de diferentes passagens da sua obra. Quando Peirce define a metáfora como um hipoícone, ele está apenas destacando seu mecanismo semiótico mais proeminente, e não o único mecanismo. Assim, por exemplo, a metáfora é também um ícone simbolicamente mediado. Neste artigo, buscamos focar nestes dois tópicos concernentes à “metáfora peirceana”.

Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) was a practising physical scientist and for thirty-two years employed by the United states Coast and Geodetic Service – first and foremost surveying and conducting geodetic investigations, for example making measurements of the intensity concerning the gravitational field of the earth (cf. Fisch 1993). But Peirce was also a fine theorist of the logic and philosophy of science, and in a fragment (c. 1897) he accentuated that: ”…out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out, all my philosophy has always seemed to me to grow. . . .” (CP: 1.14). According to Peirce there is a real uncertainty in the world and in the inferences of the scientific inquirer; these are, of course, closely connected. Hence, the scientific inquiry can never stop. This does not mean, however, that Peirce was a scepticist (cf. Deely 1932: 124). Rather, Peirce`s interpretation of scientific knowledge was highly optimistic; according to him scientific theories are progressive, cumulative and – in the long run – convergent. Peirce had, as John Dewey (1859-1952) remarks in a review of ”The Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce”: ”…an intense faith in the possibility of finding out, of learning – if only we will inquire and observe” (Dewey 1932: 124). Peirce`s acknowledgement of fallibility seems to establish the cognitive task of the scientific inquirer and can be related to his scattered remarks concerning an ”ethics of inquiry”: how the inquirer ought to conduct his investigations in the light of fallibilism. In the following will try to take a look at the logical obligation of the scientist, to pursue truth for the sake of truth, which rests upon the ethical obligation, the identification of his interests of cognition with the interests of an indefinite community of inquiry. An important metaphysical concept seems to underpine this ”ethics of inquiry”, agapastic attraction or the living telos of reason. Only because the scientist can be attracted to reason by its intrinsic aesthetical goodness, is he able to fullfil his two obligations. The article will proceed like this; firstly, we will take a look at Peirce´s concepts of scientific knowledge and fallibilism. Then we will understand with Peirce that science is an ethical claim. And, finally, we will see how agapastic attraction can be a metaphysical underpining of the ”ethics of inquiry”.

In this article we suggest a possible relation between C. S. Peirce’s (1839-1914) concept of metaphor and abduction. To our knowledge Peirce never did analyze nor even mention the two concepts in the same context. But we understand the hypoiconic metaphor as rooted in the abductive mode of inference; the hypoiconic metaphor is part of an intricate relation between experience, body, inference, and guessing instinct as a semeiotic mechanism which can convey novel ideas.

Keywords: C. S. Peirce; metaphor; hypoicon; inference; abduction; experience; guessing instinct

We investigate how C. S. Peirce's theory of metaphor can provide us with an insight into concept formation. Peirce did not write much about the metaphor; still his suggestion that the basic mechanism of metaphor is that of parallelism is very interesting. This seems to suggest that metaphor is important to him not as an poetical adornment but as a special kind of abduction and as a basic esthetic element that pushes science forward towards the esthetic ideal: growth in concrete reasonableness.

Keywords: metaphor; C. S. Peirce; esthetics; concept formation

We present our semeiotic-inspired concept of information as one of three important elements in meaning creation, the two other concepts being emotion and cognition. We have the inner world (emotion); we have the outer world (information); and cognition mediates between the two. We analyze the three elements in relation to communication and the discuss the semeiotics-inspired communication model, the Dynacom; then, we discuss our semeiotic perspective on the meaning-creation process and communication with regard to a few, but central, elements in library and information, namely, the systems-oriented perspective, the user-oriented perspective, and a domain-oriented perspective.

This article is structured so that it offers the reader some of the basic concepts from CS Peirce's pragmatic semiotics and G. Lakoff's cognitive semantics in order to provide linguistic tools to describe and elucidate the complexity of indexing, and hopefully to clarify and improve the foundation of indexing. The article is also a further development and application of Brier's (1996) cybersemiotic approach to library and information science (LIS). It is our hypothesis that Peirce's semiotics offers concepts and methods that make it possible to ...

In the program article “The Architectures of Theories” (1893), C. S. Peirce presented his trichotomies within psychology, biology, physics and philosophy, and in terms of these trichotomies, it could easily be predicted, according to Peirce, what kind of metaphysics it would be appropriate to construct, a cosmogonic philosophy. But, other than presenting his very brief sketch of a evolutionary cosmogony, Peirce, unfortunately, did not give this important topic further treatment in the article. The question which arises then is in what way these trichotomies can be said to be connected? Consequently, will an attempt to analyze a possible connection between the trichotomies shed light upon the evolutionary thinking of Peirce? In the following article we will give a tentative answer to this question.

Keywords: C.S. Peirce, evolutionary cosmogony, metaphysics, pragmaticism

The seven short comments presented here investigate branding from a pragmatic semeiotic point of view. Comment 1 touches upon the brand in an extreme scholastic realistic point of view. Comment 2 focuses on how the brand becomes represented through its replica. Comment 3 investigates if a threshold of attraction exists, a level beyond which someone becomes attracted to a given brand. Comment 4 touches upon the relation between the object and its representation. Comment 5 investigates the concept “quality branding,” which is the process whereby something becomes endowed with certain qualities. Comment 6 defines the concept quasi-empathy as the basis for self-identification and attraction to a given brand. Comment 7 defines the fundamental sign as the sense of community.

Keywords:: pragmatic semeiotic ; brands ; branding ; sense of community

C. S. Peirce wanted philosophy to develop into a public discipline based on objective principles that can be made subject to falsification by a scientific community; a community which takes advantage of coenoscopic experience and the method of reasoning. Peirce often emphasized that the process of philosophical inquiry is creative. For example, it requires imagination to put forth hypotheses that might explain phenomena which have surprised the philosopher and caused him to wonder. And it requires imagination to create the neologisms and changes in meaning for already-known words and sentences that can expand the limits of the linguistic resources and the formation of concepts that the philosopher has inherited from his peers and predecessors. Peirce sometimes suggested that metaphor is among one of the most important ways of excercising imagination, and that there is a pervasiness of metaphors also in philosophical language. So, according to Peirce, metaphor has a cognitive content, it can play a role in the generation of sense and new knowledge - but is metaphor therefore suited to serious, scientific, philosophical thought and discourse? In the following we will try to see if the metaphor in a Peircean perspective is likely to play a role regarding this matter.

The aim of the article is to further define the significance-effect in relation to the American philosopher Charles S. Peirce concept of interpretants. An interpretant is an effect of meaning that occurs whenever a mind becomes exposed to a sign. However, the significance-effect only occurs when the interpreter truly understands the information communicated. In order for the successful communication to take place several conditions must be fulfilled. The article investigates these conditions and as examples of the significance-effect the concept of brands and branding becomes analyzed.

In the article Problems concerning the Process of Subject Analysis and the Practice of Indexing (Thellefsen, Brier, Thellefsen, 2003), the significance-effect was introduced. The concept is further developed in the article Semiotic Knowledge Organization (Thellefsen, 2002 2 ); and, as ...