nuclear Nonproliferation

The protracted conflict between the US and the former USSR demonstrated that deterrence stability is improved by détente. South Asia‟s environment is characterized by mutual hostility; conventional military balance tilting in favor of India; and lack of a transparent and nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. The aforementioned factors are the missing components of détente. Both the provocative Indian expansion in its nuclear weapons programme, and Pakistani retaliatory notion of the short-range weapons option, is problematic not only in the South Asian context, but also contradictory to the decades-long experience acquired during the Cold War. Pakistan and India must move towards nuclear CBMs, doctrinal clarity, and risk-reduction measures in the light of new technological advancements, and changing US role in the region.

Is there a gap in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Regime related to nuclear material for the propulsion of submarines by Non-nuclear Weapons States? This question arises with the steady advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and within the AUKUS strategic partnership. This article argues that there is no such gap since the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) addresses this issue. What happens is that no Special Procedures models for this kind of nuclear material have yet been elaborated. The article proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it focuses on the discussion regarding the existence of such a gap. Then, it addresses the CSA signed by Australia and Brazil. The final remarks present the inferences regarding this kind of gap.

Keywords: Nonproliferation. Nuclear-Powered Submarines. Nuclear Safeguards.

Continuous of at sea deterrence was part of a discussion on defence and an independent Scotland held by the U K Defence Forum in 2013. Points made by the speaker and others are again relevant as the subject of Scottish independence returns to political prominence.

Barry Posen has, in his study on Inadvertent Escalation, raised a very pertinent question asking, 'Can Nuclear Powers fight conventional wars with each other and avoid the use of nuclear weapons?' This question should always be kept in mind by all nuclear powers especially those with mutually hostile relationships. It is evident that the phenomenon of 'Inadvertent Escalation' cannot be understood without an understanding of the process of Escalation. South Asia despite the nuclearization of the region in 1998, has been facing one crisis after another each more belligerent than the preceding one and with the potential to wittingly or unwittingly embroil the antagonists into an irreversible escalation cycle with potentially catastrophic consequences. This paper is aimed at sensitising the decision makers in both countries to the dangers inherent in recurring crises especially in the absence of any overarching restraint regime and to make them understand that they might have escaped devastating results in the previous crises merely due to sheer good luck and not any prudence on their part. A case study of February 2019 crisis between India and Pakistan has been employed to bring home the point.

This thesis examines development of energy sector and policy in Iran, which holds fourth largest oil reserve and second largest natural gas reserves of the world, from discovery of oil in the country in 1908 to the present. The study first provides a historical background of energy resources in the country. It mainly focuses on the discovery of reserves and use of oil, natural gas, nuclear and other resources. The thesis then analyzes Iran’s energy sector and its policy during the period of nuclear-related sanctions which were imposed mainly by UN, along with US and the European Union. Following the sanction period, it examines the nuclear deal of 2015 between Iran and the US, the UK, France, Russia and China, plus Germany (P5+1). Finally, the study discusses developments in the Iranian energy sector and impacts of the sanction relief as a result of the nuclear deal reached by the West and Iran. Contrary to the opinions of scholars who claim that Iran would regain power in energy wi...

The ongoing renaissance of artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping the world. Just like many other developing countries, India and Pakistan—the two nuclear-armed states of South Asia—are exploring the subsequent opportunities for economic and social change. Their political leaders seem to prioritize civilian applications of AI over the military, and public attention reflects the political priorities. National efforts to militarize AI do not receive the same public coverage as civilian AI development

The outer space and the Milky Way, where the Earth, mankind’s habitat, is located, are described in international agreements as a place that belongs to everyone and over which no country can claim sovereignty. The participation of the private sector as a non-state actor in space studies, a field where state actors have been dominant to date, under the leadership of the United States resulted
in the idea of commercial space gaining importance and marked the beginning
of a new era in space featuring multiple players and missions. That multipolar system with multiple players, which represents a reflection of the Earth’s
international system in space, entails certain additional threats and risks. It is
possible to argue that the national security of all relevant countries requires, on
top of their existing space missions, leadership in the field of commercial space,
establishing permanent bases and settling in planetary objects in deep space,
the privatization of their resources and building space colonies – which would
consolidate their leadership on the Earth. In addition to state actors, the stated
ideal of space entrepreneurs, who are part of the private sector, is to pioneer efforts to rebuild life on another planet within the Milky Way.

Iranian nuclear threat remains one of the most pressing issue throughout the history of US foreign policy.  Ever since the islamic revolution occured in Iran in 1979, Iran hostile activities in Middle East has been a major threat for US  security interest, in particular when Iran started to build its ambition to build its nuclear weapon. Having said that, this article aims to discuss US foreign policy toward the threat of Iranian nuclear program from Bill Clinton administration until Trump Administration.  By using thematic analysis from Braun and Clarke, this article would scrutinize the internal and external factors of US foreign policy toward Iran and then seeks to understand the change and continuity of US foreign policy from Bill Clinton until Trump administration. From the analysis, it was found that US foreign policy has been influenced a lot by its internal and external factors, resulting in different responses of US foreign policy in each administration. Moreover, US foreig...

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a central element of the global nuclear order, the primary goal of which is to prevent nuclear war. But this understanding is being threatened by a number of developments. Frustration about the lack of nuclear disarmament and concerns about humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons led to the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The new treaty has further exposed existing fault lines within the NPT and exacerbated unresolved conflicts over the proper approach to disarmament and the weighting of the NPT pillars. Currently, disagreements over the compatibility of the two treaties and the approach to the TPNW in particular divide the membership of the NPT. At the same time, real proliferation cases test the regime’s ability to act, as norm enforcement is regularly hampered by interference from the great powers. These developments—the absence of genuine disarmament, disputes among NPT members, competitio...

The ongoing renaissance of artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping the world. Just like many other developing countries, India and Pakistan—the two nuclear-armed states of South Asia—are exploring the subsequent opportunities for economic and social change. Their political leaders seem to prioritize civilian applications of AI over the military, and public attention reflects the political priorities. National efforts to militarize AI do not receive the same public coverage as civilian AI development

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a central element of the global nuclear order, the primary goal of which is to prevent nuclear war. But this understanding is being threatened by a number of developments. Frustration about the lack of nuclear disarmament and concerns about humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons led to the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The new treaty has further exposed existing fault lines within the NPT and exacerbated unresolved conflicts over the proper approach to disarmament and the weighting of the NPT pillars. Currently, disagreements over the compatibility of the two treaties and the approach to the TPNW in particular divide the membership of the NPT. At the same time, real proliferation cases test the regime’s ability to act, as norm enforcement is regularly hampered by interference from the great powers. These developments—the absence of genuine disarmament, disputes among NPT members, competitio...

The History of the Iran's Nuclear ProgramAccording to Morales Pedraza (2012), Iran interest in the use of nuclear energy for electricity production dates back more than 60 years ago. In 1955, the first discussion on developing a nuclear power program for Iran took place between the USA and the Iranian government. However, the first concrete step was taken in 1957 when the US government signed an agreement with the Iranian government for the development of a peaceful nuclear cooperation program. This was promoted as part of the US Atoms for Peace program that was supposed to provide technical assistance to a group of states that agree not to develop a nuclear weapon program in the future, and to put all of their nuclear activities under international control.In the same year, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) that consisting of Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Britain and the USA moved its Institute of Nuclear Science from Baghdad to Tehran after Iraq withdrew from CENTO. In t...

Germany and France are often viewed as the EU pillars in their common European foreign policy. After Brexit, their role has become even more significant. Consequently, the Euro-Atlantic relations have been affected by the ways these countries react to the US's foreign policies when they are against European values, including the tenets of the international rule of law. The US withdrawal from Iran's deal with 5+1 concerning Iran's nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and abbreviated as the JCPOA) is a case regarded as unlawful by the UN. It can be used to test how much these two countries show resistance to the US in case of disagreement. This article draws a comparison between Berlin's reaction to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA vise-à-vise Paris's response to the same event. The distinctions between these responses and the reasons behind them will be analyzed by drawing on the theory of neoclassical realism. Furthermore, it will be argued that while Germany's political structure and its historical developments speak volumes about its disposition to being more conservative and taking less restrictive measures towards countries like Iran, for France, tipping the balance of power is an important factor that accounts for the country's tendency to form an alliance with the hegemon in recent years.

Zusammenfassung:Das Memorandum über Sicherheitszusagen für die Ukraine, das im Dezember 1994 auf dem KSZE-Gipfeltreffen in Budapest unterzeichnet wurde, schuf eine Verbindung zwischen dem Nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsvertrag (NVV) von 1968 sowie der ukrainischen politischen Souveränität und territorialen Integrität. Kiew hatte sich erst dann bereit erklärt, sein damals in der Welt drittgrößtes Atomwaffenarsenal abzubauen, nachdem die Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritannien und Russland, als die Depositarstaaten des NVV, im Budapester Memorandum sowie Frankreich und China in separaten Regierungsdeklarationen der Ukraine ihren Respekt für ihre Unabhängigkeit und Grenzen versichert hatten. Dies ist einer der Gründe, weshalb mögliche Pläne der Trump-Administration für einen Neustart der Beziehungen zum Kreml weder eine explizite noch implizite Aufweichung der US-amerikanischen Position gegenüber der fortgesetzten russischen Bekämpfung des ukrainischen Staates einschließen sollte.

Policymakers must now assume that Iran has the enriched uranium it needs to build a nuclear weapon. Containment is a failure as Iran’s breakout time is now essentially at zero. [Additional background for non-scientists is appended]. According to estimates prepared from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  reports and Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS),  Iran now has sufficient stores of highly enriched uranium (e.g., HEU or 60 percent enriched uranium ) to fashion a crude nuclear weapon. [1] As I predicted in March, Iran now has sufficient HEU, the required centrifuges, and the skill to rapidly increase enrichment of weapon-grade uranium (e.g., WGU or 90 percent enriched uranium) within a few weeks. [2] … (download to read more)

Though Iran claims that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, yet it may decide to pursue nuclear weapons while taking into consideration the complex geostrategic matrix of the region-a situation that may result in further horizontal proliferation. The permanent five UN Security Council members and Germany (P5+1) signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2015 with the objective to curtail its nuclear ambitions. Since then, it has become a challenge for the European powers-France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (E3 + 1) to maintain trust and keep the deal going. Coercive measures like sanctions on the part of the US against Iran have created a huge trust deficit and resultantly have put the new administration of Joe Biden in a situation of few choices to revive the deal to tackle the Iranian nuclear issue. Sanctions also bittered American European allies especially France, whose companies have big business interests in Iran. This article aims at addressing the issues of the Iranian nuclear program, its nature, purpose, and interests. It also deliberates the European and the US concerns before and after the deal.

This chapter aims to analyze United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), endorsing the comprehensive solution to the Iranian nuclear issue reached in Vienna on 14 July 2015, between China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (‘E3/EU+3’) on the one side and Iran on the other side, from the perspective of international law. Taking into account the interim Joint Plan of Action concluded by these sides on 24 November 2013, this Chapter applies the method of a legal commentary in order to explain and dissect the complex and unprecedented structure of this arrangement. The ambition is to analyze the arrangement in the multilateral context of the 1968 Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The author argues that the implementation of this comprehensive solution is decisive for a strengthening, or weakenin...

Early warning systems (EWS) are a critical part of the global nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) enterprise. As nations begin to modernise these systems, discussion of further integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) approaches into various aspects of NC3 systems has publicly (and presumably privately) emerged via international expert communities. AI and ML are concepts that have become ‘buzz words’ but are often discussed without reference to the exact meaning and context in which they could be applied. This paper seeks to explore the areas in which EWS could be subject to the integration of novel machine learning (ML) techniques, particularly deep learning (DL) — an integration which is presumably already occurring in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) spheres of the nuclear realm. In doing so, the authors hope to both raise awareness of

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to affect ever more aspects of military and civilian life as part of the fourth industrial revolution. Countries are racing for global AI dominance, and whoever ‘wins’ shall reap the economic and geopolitical power expected to result. However, AI-enhanced technologies could pose new security risks that have not been encountered before.

This paper discusses some military and defence implications of AI development and assesses potential threats to Euro-Atlantic security. China has been identified as potentially threatening because of its high AI capability rankings, use of AI for military applications and poise to become the global 5G leader.

Ultimately, this paper argues that the UK and the EU should approach outsourcing critical communications infrastructure with caution and take recent security concerns involving China more seriously.

https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/202011_poni_papers_2020_web.pdf

March 2020 marked 50 years since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is considered the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and one of the key elements of the international security system. For five decades, the NPT has played an invaluable role in preserving peace on the planet and using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but currently this most important multilateral legal instrument faces a number of risks and challenges that can significantly damage prospects of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. To successfully contain the spread of nuclear weapons and further advance along the path of nuclear disarmament, the parties to the NPT, which include almost all states of the world, must continue compliance with the provisions of the treaty and active work to reduce the threat of a nuclear war.

The current US administration regards the political and economic confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran as an imperative to national security. However, the discursive strategies applied to legitimize such a stance have not yet been subjected to examination. This paper aims to explore linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms used by President Trump and his top officials to construct the enemy image of Iran. To fulfill these purposes, the data set of publications making up the US political discourse on the matter was collected. The research is designed drawing upon the paradigm of critical discourse analysis.

Thirty-six years ago this week, the 444-day Iranian hostage crisis came to an end just minutes after Ronald Reagan’s inauguration. To be sure, the timing of the release, which followed months of negotiations with the outgoing U.S. administration, likely stemmed from Tehran’s wish to humiliate Jimmy Carter rather than fear of his successor. Nevertheless, the confluence of events has come to symbolize the disparity between the two presidents’ broader foreign policy legacies: Whereas Carter projected weakness and equivocation in the face of aggression, Reagan championed moral clarity and a robust commitment to peace through strength.

Given the hype surrounding artificial intelligence (AI), it is easy to overstate the opportunities and challenges posed by its adoption in the military sphere. While AI could enable major improvements in many areas of warfare, including the nuclear domain, for the foreseeable future, developments will be far more prosaic than the common representation of AI in popular culture. Super-intelligent AI applications that can learn and teach themselves to resist human control – or Terminator-like dystopian scenarios – are not the type of technology policymakers and the general public should be most concerned about. In fact, highly speculative scenarios like these overshadow more urgent and plausible issues for international security.