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I wrote a review of Bryan Reece's great short book Aristotle on Happiness, Virtue, and Wisdom. It is published in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 77 no. 3, 2024, p. 552-555. Project MUSE, https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a922082. However,... more
I wrote a review of Bryan Reece's great short book Aristotle on Happiness, Virtue, and Wisdom. It is published in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 77 no. 3, 2024, p. 552-555. Project MUSE, https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a922082. However, I had a much longer version which I will make public here. Of course, the main points are in the published version as well, this perhaps adds some reasons to what I wrote there.
Research Interests:
The following article provides an interpretation of the structure of courage in Plato's Laches, Meno and Protagoras. I argue that these dialogues present courage (ἀνδρεία) in one's soul according to the same pattern: there is a... more
The following article provides an interpretation of the structure of courage in Plato's Laches, Meno and Protagoras. I argue that these dialogues present courage (ἀνδρεία) in one's soul according to the same pattern: there is a normatively neutral psychic state informed by knowledge of good and evil. The knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) informing this normatively neutral psychic state is called practical wisdom (for which Plato uses the terms φρόνησις or sometimes σοφία). This interpretation seems to contradict the claim that virtue is knowledge. I will show that it is not in contradiction and virtue is knowledge despite the complex moral psychology of courage. Finally, I will argue that the conception of courage in the Republic answers some of the problems present in the discussion of courage in the above mentioned dialogues.
The article shows a difference in Aristotle’s ethical theory between the Protrepticus and Eudemian Ethics on the one hand and the Nicomachean Ethics on the other. The difference is explicated by means of the interpretation of the concept... more
The article shows a difference in Aristotle’s ethical theory between the Protrepticus and Eudemian Ethics on the one hand and the Nicomachean Ethics on the other. The difference is explicated by means of the interpretation of the concept of ὅρος (standard) in these writings. The Protrepticus and Eudemian Ethics present ethical theory as an expertise which – together with other sciences – has a standard for decisions and actions taken from nature and the divine. The ethical theory presented in the Nicomachean Ethics does not entail such a strong concept of ὅρος and it treats ethics in contrast to other, more exact, sciences. Finally, the article presents a tentative suggestion as to why it seems that the Nicomachean Ethics VI,1 raises hopes that it will provide a detailed account of ὅρος when in fact there is no discussion of it.
The following article is a contribution to the rich debate concerning happiness or fulfilment (eudaimonia) in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. It argues that eudaimonia is theōria in accordance with what Aristotle repeatedly says in Book X... more
The following article is a contribution to the rich debate concerning happiness or fulfilment (eudaimonia) in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. It argues that eudaimonia is theōria in accordance with what Aristotle repeatedly says in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. However, happy life (eudaimōn bios) is a complex way of life which includes not only theoretical activity but also the exercising of other virtues including the so-called moral or social ones. The article shows that Aristotle differentiates between eudaimonia on the one hand and the happy or fulfilled life (eudaimōn bios) on the other, and shows how this distinction clarifies Aristotle's account of eudaimonia.
Research Interests:
Plato, Alcibiades, Socrates, Symposium, soul
Plato, Laws, god, reason, motion
In the following text I will argue that the dialogue shows the essential connection between (i) sophistry, (ii) right usage of language, particularly in the case of names and naming, and finally (iii) politics, and more precisely the... more
In the following text I will argue that the dialogue shows the essential connection between (i) sophistry, (ii) right usage of language, particularly in the case of names and naming, and finally (iii) politics, and more precisely the critique of radical democracy. By doing this, I want to show that Plato’s protreptic work is not without any other purpose or merely protreptic. I will show how the sophistic use of language correlates with the manners of politics which Plato associates with the sophists.
Plato, Statesman, dialectics, education
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I will argue that happiness (which is eudaimonia in Greek) is contemplation (which stands for theōria) in accordance with what Aristotle repeatedly says in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics. On the other hand, happy life (something which... more
I will argue that happiness (which is eudaimonia in Greek) is contemplation (which stands for theōria) in accordance with what Aristotle repeatedly says in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics. On the other hand, happy life (something which would be called eudaimōn bios) is a complex way of life which includes not only theoretical activity but also the exercising of other virtues including the so-called moral or social ones.
Research Interests:
The number of universities, students and lecturers is higher than ever. Yet, feelings at the university are often cheerless to the point of scepticism about its own mission. Moreover, the wider society seems to be losing trust in these... more
The number of universities, students and lecturers is higher than ever. Yet, feelings at the university are often cheerless to the point of scepticism about its own mission. Moreover, the wider society seems to be losing trust in these institutions of higher education, and the authority of university professionals, the experts, is being questioned more than ever.
This collection brings together several perspectives on key issues facing universities and university education today. First, we focus on the general problem of the relationship between universities and the liberal democratic order. We then turn to several specific issues in the contemporary functioning of universities. The core of the book then consists of papers on the autopoietic functioning of the university system, and the book concludes with several important case studies that illustrate our general points made earlier.
This book will serve anyone who would like to know more about the contemporary functioning of universities, their problems and their position in contemporary society. The book is aimed not only at specialists, but all the contributions are written so that they can be read by anyone interested in the subject.
Proceedings of the ninth Symposium Platonicum Pragense.
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Collection of essays on contemporary university and history of liberal education.
Research Interests:
The article distinguishes two possible answers presented by the Alcibiades I regarding the question “Who am I?”. The first answer is carried out in terms of our practical identity, as it is discussed in the first part of the dialogue; the... more
The article distinguishes two possible answers presented by the Alcibiades
I regarding the question “Who am I?”. The first answer is carried out
in terms of our practical identity, as it is discussed in the first part of the
dialogue; the second answer concerns our deeper, constitutive self, uncovered
in the second part of the dialogue. Whereas other interpretations
look for different senses of the “self” in the second part of the dialogue,
my interpretation shows that distinct concepts of the “self” are to be
found across the entire dialogue. In conclusion I address the relation
between these two concepts of the self in order to show in what sense
the constitutive “self” serves as a normative ground for our practical
identity.
Abstrakt: Tématem příspěvku je výklad možnosti přesvědčit zákony, která podle dialogu Kritón občanům umožňuje neuposlechnout zákon či jeho nařízení, aniž by takové jednání bylo nespravedlivé. Nejprve shrnu autoritářskou pozici zákonů a... more
Abstrakt: Tématem příspěvku je výklad možnosti přesvědčit zákony, která podle dialogu Kritón občanům umožňuje neuposlechnout zákon či jeho nařízení, aniž by takové jednání bylo nespravedlivé. Nejprve shrnu autoritářskou pozici zákonů a představím dosavad-ní interpretace přesvědčování zákonů. Poté předvedu, proč se domnívám, že žádná z dosavadních interpretací není uspokojující. Následně představím svoji vlastní in-terpretaci přesvědčování zákonů, která navazuje na Sókratovo pravidlo následování rozumu a nejsilnějšího dostupného argumentu. Domnívám se, že přemlouvání záko-nů odpovídá dialektické výměně argumentů se samotnými zákony, resp. úspěšnému odporování jejich argumentům, které Sókratés předvádí např. v dialogu Kritón. Moje interpretace tak řeší výše uvedené problémy (vztah k Sókratovu vlastnímu jednání, zdánlivá nekonzistence s dialogem Obrana Sókrata) a zároveň smysluplně vysvětluje, proč Sókratés přijímá nespravedlivý trest smrti a zůstává ve vězení.
Research Interests:
Etika ctností je jednou z normativních oblastí současné etiky, tj. měla by poskytovat podklady pro morální hodnocení (ponechme zatím otevřené, čeho se hodnocení týká). Jinými slovy, normativní etika předkládá morální důvody pro naše... more
Etika ctností je jednou z normativních oblastí současné etiky, tj. měla by poskytovat podklady pro morální hodnocení (ponechme zatím otevřené, čeho se hodnocení týká). Jinými slovy, normativní etika předkládá morální důvody pro naše jednání, případně naopak proti nemorálnímu jednání. Podle etiky ctností bychom měli jednat tak, jak by v dané situaci jednal ctnostný člověk. Ctnost je tedy taková vlastnost, která určuje jednání člověka, o kterém správně hovoříme jako o ctnostném. Etika ctností tedy na jedné straně už od Aristotela pracuje s obecně sdíleným přesvědčením o ctnosti, na straně druhé se snaží o hlubší výklad ctnosti, na které se toto sdílené přesvědčení zakládá, má-li být pravdivé. Zároveň tato vlastnost formuje naše vnímání, porozumění situaci, ve které jednáme. A v neposlední řadě ctnost určuje naše praktické rozhodování, jak bychom měli jednat. Díky ctnosti jsou také naše jednání doprovázena těmi náležitými pocity (ctnostný člověk se nemusí přemáhat, aby jednal ctnostně).
Research Interests:
The main aim of the article is to present the interpretation of the prooimion on the Artemidorusí papyrus. Further, I compare it to the first chapter of pseudo-Aristotleís treatise On the cosmos (De mundo). I argue that both text (though... more
The main aim of the article is to present the interpretation of the prooimion on the Artemidorusí papyrus. Further, I compare it to the first chapter of pseudo-Aristotleís treatise On the cosmos (De mundo). I argue that both text (though not the entire treatise On the cosmos) share a common intellectual heritage of Platonism. I trace several motives back to Platoís dialogues and illustrate how both texts entail a Platonic conception of morally relevant forming of the soul in accordance with object of its study.
Příspěvek pokračuje v debatě o lékařem asistované sebevraždě, kterou zahájili Marek Vácha a Tomáš Hříbek. V textu kritizuji Hříbkův konsekvencialismus a vnitřně rozpornou argumentaci ohledně autonomie pacienta. V závěrečné části... more
Příspěvek pokračuje v debatě o lékařem asistované sebevraždě, kterou zahájili Marek Vácha a Tomáš Hříbek. V textu kritizuji Hříbkův konsekvencialismus a vnitřně rozpornou argumentaci ohledně autonomie pacienta. V závěrečné části představuji argumenty proti užitečnosti konceptu asistované sebevraždy a proti její případné legalizaci.
Review of Barbara J. Falk, The Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe (in Czech)
Hippias větší, Platón, zákon, spravedlnost
The article (in Czech) offers a new interpretation of the city-soul analogy in Plato’s Republic. It argues that a correct understanding of the analogy ought to be based upon Plato’s theory of human nature and of the natural tasks (erga)... more
The article (in Czech) offers a new interpretation of the city-soul analogy in Plato’s Republic. It argues that a correct understanding of the analogy ought to be based upon Plato’s theory of human nature and of the natural tasks (erga) assigned to everyone and each according to their own nature (physis).
Research Interests:
Much of the recent debate over the moral permissibility of abortion focuses on the question of whether the foetus is or is not a person, i.e. the only entity endowed with moral rights including the right to life. The article traces this... more
Much of the recent debate over the moral permissibility of abortion focuses on the question of whether the foetus is or is not a person, i.e. the only entity endowed with moral rights including the right to life. The article traces this line of thought in several key figures in the debate (Thomson, Tooley, Warren and Brody). However, I consider this way of argumentation as both inappropriate and misleading; in the second half of the article I offer arguments against using the concept of person in this debate.
Research Interests:
The current surge of political populism across the Western world may be interpreted not only as a sign of the collapse of the post-Cold War (neo-)liberal consensus but also as a symptom of a deeper crisis of representative democracy... more
The current surge of political populism across the Western world may be interpreted not only as a sign of the collapse of the post-Cold War (neo-)liberal consensus but also as a symptom of a deeper crisis of representative democracy itself. This development invites us as political theorists and historians of political thought alike to reflect upon the intellectual foundations of liberal democracy as well as various alternative conceptualizations of free and self-governing political regime including the important, albeit for a long time somewhat neglected, tradition of republican political thought. The conference is open to researchers from the fields of political philosophy, political theory, intellectual history and other related disciplines. We invite proposals of individual papers as well as panels (comprising of 3-4 papers) on the following broadly defined topics: • Historical roots and development of the republican tradition • The impact of the republican tradition on modern democracies • Variety of forms of current (neo-)republican political theory • Republicanism as an alternative to the prevailing liberal account of democracy • Constitutionalism, citizenship and political participation • Republican ideas and European integration How to Apply Paper abstracts and panel proposals should be submitted electronically by June 10 th , 2017. For more details and to submit a proposal, please visit our website: http://ideasinpolitics.fsv.cuni.cz/
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Abstrakt: Tématem příspěvku je výklad možnosti přesvědčit zákony, která podle dialogu Kritón občanům umožňuje neuposlechnout zákon či jeho nařízení, aniž by takové jednání bylo nespravedlivé. Nejprve shrnu autoritářskou pozici zákonů a... more
Abstrakt: Tématem příspěvku je výklad možnosti přesvědčit zákony, která podle dialogu Kritón občanům umožňuje neuposlechnout zákon či jeho nařízení, aniž by takové jednání bylo nespravedlivé. Nejprve shrnu autoritářskou pozici zákonů a představím dosavad-ní interpretace přesvědčování zákonů. Poté předvedu, proč se domnívám, že žádná z dosavadních interpretací není uspokojující. Následně představím svoji vlastní in-terpretaci přesvědčování zákonů, která navazuje na Sókratovo pravidlo následování rozumu a nejsilnějšího dostupného argumentu. Domnívám se, že přemlouvání záko-nů odpovídá dialektické výměně argumentů se samotnými zákony, resp. úspěšnému odporování jejich argumentům, které Sókratés předvádí např. v dialogu Kritón. Moje interpretace tak řeší výše uvedené problémy (vztah k Sókratovu vlastnímu jednání, zdánlivá nekonzistence s dialogem Obrana Sókrata) a zároveň smysluplně vysvětluje, proč Sókratés přijímá nespravedlivý trest smrti a zůstává ve vězení.
The following article provides an interpretation of the structure of courage in Plato’s Laches, Meno and Protagoras. I argue that these dialogues present courage (ἀνδρεία) in the soul according to the same scheme: that there is a... more
The following article provides an interpretation of the structure of courage in Plato’s Laches, Meno and Protagoras. I argue that these dialogues present courage (ἀνδρεία) in the soul according to the same scheme: that there is a normatively neutral psychic state which is informed by the knowledge of good and evil. The knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) which informs this normatively neutral psychic state is called practical wisdom (which Plato refers to as φρόνησις or sometimes σοφία). This interpretation seems to negate the claim that virtue is knowledge. I will show, however, that this is not a contradiction and that virtue is in fact knowledge, despite the complex moral psychology of courage. Finally, I will argue that the conception of courage in the Republic addresses some of the problems posed by the discussion of courage in the above-mentioned dialogues.
Much of the recent debate over the moral permissibility of abortion focuses on the question of whether the foetus is or is not a person, i.e. the only entity endowed with moral rights including the right to life. The article traces this... more
Much of the recent debate over the moral permissibility of abortion focuses on the question of whether the foetus is or is not a person, i.e. the only entity endowed with moral rights including the right to life. The article traces this line of thought in several key figures in the debate (Thomson, Tooley, Warren and Brody). However, I consider this way of argumentation as both inappropriate and misleading; in the second half of the article I offer arguments against using the concept of person in this debate.
Plato’s Euthydemus was described as strange, the oddest, the most bantering, frivolous and farcical or even uninteresting dialogue.1 The sophistic brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus from Chios claim the ability to teach virtue, and... more
Plato’s Euthydemus was described as strange, the oddest, the most bantering, frivolous and farcical or even uninteresting dialogue.1 The sophistic brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus from Chios claim the ability to teach virtue, and Socrates asks them to convince Clinias that he should love wisdom and virtue. The brothers fail and Socrates fi nishes the task himself. The most radical exchanges take place between the brothers on the one hand and Socrates with his friends on the other, when the brothers fully expose their eristic skills in order to astound and bewitch the audience. On the contrary, Socrates’ conversations with Clinias are clear cases of protreptic speeches. Therefore, several interpreters think that the dialogue is simply a protreptic work designed to provoke philosophical interest.2 In the following text I will argue that the dialogue shows the essential connection between (i) sophistry, (ii) right usage of language, particularly in the case of names and naming, and...
:The following article is a contribution to the rich debate concerning happiness or fulfilment (
I wrote a review of Bryan Reece's great short book Aristotle on Happiness, Virtue, and Wisdom. It was published in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 77 no. 3, 2024, p. 552-555. Project MUSE, https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a922082.... more
I wrote a review of Bryan Reece's great short book Aristotle on Happiness, Virtue, and Wisdom. It was published in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 77 no. 3, 2024, p. 552-555. Project MUSE, https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2024.a922082. However, I have a much longer version, the main points are of course the same. This longer version perhaps explains some additional reasons for what I have in the published, shorter version.
Research Interests: