Sven Steinmo

Some economists argue that institutions are the most important factor affecting variation in economic growth. There is a need, however, to better understand how and why institutions emerge and change. Informed by evolutionary theory and complexity science , this chapter develops a conceptual framework that follows models of cultural evolution in viewing institutions as part of a nongenetic system of inheritance. This framework is used to examine how broad historical factors (not just economic factors) infl uence present-day institutional arrangements and economic outcomes, as well as how noninstitutional aspects of culture (e.g., values, beliefs) interact with institutions to shape behavior in particular contexts. Overall, this framework emphasizes the processes by which institutions evolve, and how they can coevolve with other institutions and culture. This approach is illustrated using four examples to demonstrate how evolution theory and complexity science can be used to study institutional emergence and change. Explicit models of the processes of institutional evolution need to be developed and then tested and assessed with data. This framework holds promise to bring together and synthesize the fi ndings and insights from a range of different disciplines.

This paper addresses the following question: Can the weakening of the Social Democratic political project in Europe be explained by the fact the Social Democratic model of society no longer performs? In other words, can the recent electoral crisis in Social Democratic parties be seen as a rational response from an electorate saying good-bye to a socio-economic model? If one wants to compare Social Democratic policies with some kind of utopian political programme, you will certainly be disappointed. As pointed out in the introductory chapter to this volume, Social Democracy was never a utopian political project and its earlier success can therefore not be seen as a result of fulfilling a nirvana type of society. In contrast to the utopian models historically launched by communists and anarchists, Social Democracy has traditionally been firmly anchored in a concrete, down to earth pragmatism based on a realist vision that politics must be based on what is "possible". Our arg...

As shown by the recent crisis, tax evasion poses a significant problem for countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy. While these societies certainly possess weaker fiscal institutions as compared to other EU members, might broader cultural differences between northern and southern Europe also help to explain citizens' (un)willingness to pay their taxes? To address this question, we conduct laboratory experiments in the UK and Italy, two countries which straddle this North-South divide. Our design allows us to examine citizens' willingness to contribute to public goods via taxes while holding institutions constant. We report a surprising result: when faced with identical tax institutions, redistribution rules and audit probabilities, Italian participants are significantly more likely to comply than Britons. Overall, our findings cast doubt upon " culturalist " arguments that would attribute crosscountry differences in tax compliance to the lack of morality amongst southern European taxpayers.

This article suggests that institutionalists can and should take the “micro-foundations” of human behavior more seriously if we want to understand both why humans build and maintain institutions and how they work.  The paper surveys a large body of scholarship from psychology and the cognitive sciences and shows how many of the insights drawn from this literature can help us better understand the relationship between actors and institutions.  We specifically focus on the question: Why to people follow rules?  We examine our basic motivations for rule following behavior as well as the cognitive mechanisms most likely at work when we do so.  We conclude with some observations on the implications of these insights for understanding the relationship between “ideas” and “institutional change.”

▪ Abstract This article provides an overview of recent developments in historical institutionalism. First, it reviews some distinctions that are commonly drawn between the “historical” and the “rational choice” variants of institutionalism and shows that there are ...

RESTRUCTURING THE WElMJtE STATE © Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo, 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or ...

... US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington: US Department of ... 13 Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching of America, 1776–1990 (New Brunswick ... 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 Year All Europe Catholics Protestants ...

In this essay, we explore the epistemological and ontological assumptions that have been made to make political science “scientific.” We show how political science has generally adopted an ontologically reductionist philosophy of science derived from Newtonian physics and mechanics. This mechanical framework has encountered problems and constraints on its explanatory power, because an emphasis on equilibrium analysis is ill-suited for the study of political change. We outline the primary differences between an evolutionary ontology of social science and the physics-based philosophy commonly employed. Finally, we show how evolutionary thinking adds insight into the study of political phenomena and research questions that are of central importance to the field, such as preference formation.

Published with assistance from the Mary Cady Tew Memorial Fund. Copyright © 1993 by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the ...

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND TAX POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES, SWEDEN, AND BRITAIN By SVEN STEINMO* THIS essay addresses one of the broadest and most complex issues faced by students of comparative politics: Why do different democ-racies pursue different public ...

Countries as different as the United States and Sweden, Indonesia and Canada, and Jamaica and Japan have recently undergone (or are currently undergoing) major reforms of their national tax systems. Individual nations exhibit very important differences in their specific tax ...

RESTRUCTURING THE WElMJtE STATE © Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo, 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or ...

We have never lost sight of our goal, which points beyond a bourgeois society and toward a socialist order. -Hjalmar Branting, Swedish Social Democratic Party leader, Parliamentary debate, December 17, 1918 ... The party program talks about replacing capitalism with ...

The following paper explores the relationship between trust and trustworthy institutions. I build on insights from social psychology, behavioral economics, and institutional theory and
argue that people are inclined to follow rules and behave in ways that are consistent with those rules if the rules themselves are implemented in consistent and transparent ways. I begin with an examination of why people follow rules in the first place. I argue rule following behavior is explained by three basic human motivations: a) “self-interest” b) the
desire to belong and c) the need for logical consistency. The paper then examines why political institutions that implement tax rules and laws in fairly and consistently engender higher levels of compliance than institutions that seek to cater to special interests and/or
particular constituencies.
Self-interest has long been seen as a (or perhaps, the) basic motivation for behavior. I acknowledge this motivation but suggest that traditional economic theory’s focus on individual self-interest pushed policy makers towards understanding tax compliance as a
bargain between otherwise unwilling taxpayers and public authorities. This starting assumption leads to a “Predatory” model of tax compliance which is less efficient than a more cooperative model that acknowledges citizen’s desire to be part of a community and to behave according to the community’s values and norms. I argue that successful tax
compliance strategies account for all three of these basic human motivations rather than simply assume a cost/benefit transaction model. In so doing they build trust between citizens
and their states.
High quality institutions act impartially and thereby help build and maintain the social norm of compliance. They build on people’s desire to be part of a community and to contribute to that community. Tax Morale, then, is enhanced by strong institutions that encourage people’s better moral character, not by intimidating taxpayers into compliance.

The Leap of Faith asks: Why are some countries more successful than others?  Examining the foundations of the relationship between taxpayers and their governments in Sweden, Britain, Italy, Romania and the United States, the book offers a thoughtful and fascinating analysis of why some countries have been able to build a positive relationship and others have been so much less successful.  The book concludes with a  policy oriented chapter designed to help fiscal authorities and policy makers in developing countries understand what has worked well and what tends to undermine the fiscal legitimacy of modern governments.