Coşkun Soysal

This article examines the contested relationship between Greece and Turkey from a historical materialist approach. It seeks to explain the very essence of this contestation rather than merely focusing on its surface forms. While doing this, we eschew intra-Marxist theoretical debates not to exceed the research scope. The article argues that the foreign policies of Greece and Turkey have indeed been subject to considerations of the dominant bourgeois classes in both countries that have been stimulated as well as bound by Euro-Atlantic imperialism. It considers the relative comparative advantages of Greece and Turkey’s relational and possessional capabilities. It puts forward that the historical materialist approach has better explanatory power and offers an alternative reading. It elaborates upon the tense relations between the two countries, showing the interwoven connections with imperialism at national and international levels. It underlines how the contestation between Greece and Turkey has been encouraged and delimited by Euro-Atlantic imperialism.

It has become commonplace among Western scholars to treat supposed processes of “democratization” in terms of “waves” since Samuel Huntington’s seminal book published in 1991—The Third Wave. The Western literature on “democratization in the Arab world” is no exception, and some Western scholars have labeled the Arab uprisings that began in late 2010 the “fourth wave of democratization”. The main research question of this article is whether this literature, which has been accumulating from the 1990s onwards, consists of genuine scholarly analyses of political change in the Arab world or whether it is instead reflective of political exigencies of the West. This article falls closer to the latter position, and asserts that there are indeed waves of the Western literature on “democratization in the Arab world” rather than the so-called “waves of democratization”. The article argues that there is at least some sort of correlation between the political exigencies of the U.S. leadership and this literature from the very beginning by discussing its relationship to the anti-Communist Modernization school of political development that emerged in the United States in the early Cold War years. The article also demonstrates that there is a striking continuity within that literature in terms of the themes it has covered despite its decades-long existence.

“Hakikat-sonrası” kavramı, 2016’daki çok tartışılan Brexit ve Trump’ın başkanlık kampanyası süreçlerinden bu yana siyasi tartışmaların ön saflarında yer alıyor. Bu bölüm, kavramın Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) disiplini açısından açtığı yeni ufuk ve içsel sınırlılıklarını tartışmayı hedefliyor. Bu yapılırken kavramı ilk kez kullanan yazarların eserleri incelenmekte, ardından kavramın ön plana çıkışı da ayrıntılı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Kavramın iki ana yaygınlaştırıcısı olarak hem Evanjelik Protestanların hem de liberal uluslararası düzenin seçkinlerinin kavramı eleştirel fakat benzer şekillerde kullandıkları tespit edilmiştir. Her ikisi de, kendi karşıtlarını hakikate aykırı düşenler olarak nitelendirerek, bu kavramla hakikatin esas temsilcileriymiş gibi ilişkiye girerler. Bölümün ana argümanı iki yönlüdür. Öncelikle kavram, kusurlu epistemolojik çağrışımları nedeniyle önemli kısıtlara sahipken, Uİ için sınırlı ufuklar açabilmektedir. İkinci olarak, kavram, özellikle 2007-2008 küresel finansal krizi sonrasında hegemonik kapasitesi azalan neoliberal küreselleşmenin hegemonik söyleminin bir parçası olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Turkish foreign policy makers have at times become tempted by aspirations of regional leadership. The political leadership of Turgut Özal, first as prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and later as president from 1989 until his death in 1993, is crucial in this sense, as the “neo-Ottomanist” foreign policy aspiration became a much-contested issue during the period of his rule. This thesis, therefore, seeks to examine how and in what circumstances this aspiration flourished under Özal. This thesis argues that the domestic neoliberal restructuring that took place throughout the 1980s is a key factor that formed the basis on which neo-Ottomanism could be proposed in a way that could be considered a subimperialist hegemonic project in the early 1990s. The transformation in the international order that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s is another key factor thought to have opened up space for aspirant regional powers. However, the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy aspiration of the Öz...

It has become commonplace among Western scholars to treat supposed processes of “democratization” in terms of “waves” since Samuel Huntington’s seminal book published in 1991—The Third Wave. The Western literature on “democratization in the Arab world” is no exception, and some Western scholars have labeled the Arab uprisings that began in late 2010 the “fourth wave of democratization”. The main research question of this article is whether this literature consists of genuine scholarly analyses of political change in the Arab world or whether it is instead reflective of political exigencies of the West. This article defends the latter position, and asserts that there are indeed waves of the Western literature on “democratization in the Arab world” rather than the so-called “waves of democratization”. The article argues that this literature has been reflective of the political exigencies of the U.S. leadership from its very beginning by discussing its relationship to the anti-Communist Modernization school of political development that emerged in the United States in the early Cold War years. The article also demonstrates that there is a striking continuity within that literature in terms of the themes it has covered despite its decades-long existence.

This study aims to reflect critically upon the apparent incongruence
between the discipline of International Relations (IR) and
its teaching, as the former is supposed to be totally unfixed in
spatial terms, at least with respect to its subject matter, whereas
the latter seems to have been captive in classrooms to a large
extent. Although the IR discipline could still be considered in
development, with post-positivist currents having brought forth
such notions as self-reflexivity, it has yet to posit that “self” as
the very person with a mobility as an active learner. The debate
over self-reflexivity has revolved rather around the dichotomy
between scientific objectivity and relativity within these post-positivist
currents in the field of IR, leaving aside any enquiries into
mobility as a possible novel form of learning. Thus, both the discipline
itself and the current state of its teaching have remained
rather in an unexpectedly odd position, especially in the face of
the still-accumulating literature on “walking research” as a new interdisciplinary
trend and despite the highly interdisciplinary and
“international” nature of the discipline of IR. Accordingly, this
study also aims to address the very need to develop a novel, mobile
teaching model in IR education. In this vein, it also opens
a discussion on the possible merits of walking, especially in capital
cities, as an effective way of teaching and learning with respect
to subjects such as as political history and international
politics.

Uluslararası İlişkiler (Uİ) disiplininde “birincil birimler” olarak devletler arası rekabetten söz edilmesi, vaka-yı âdîye’den sayılır. Farklı yaklaşımlar, bu rekabetin kaynağının, ya anarşik konumlanmaların bulunduğu bir “uluslararası yapı” ve bundan neşet eden bir “uluslararası sistem” ya da hiyerarşik konumlanmaların bulunduğu bir “uluslararası düzen” olduğunu öne sürerler. Disiplin içi tartışma elbette bu iki seçenekten ibaret değildir, fakat devletler arası rekabet genellikle bu iki ana damar tarafından ele alınmaktadır. “Büyük güçler arası rekabet” ya da “hegemonik rekabet” kavramsallaştırmaları da devletler arası rekabete dair bu iki ana damarın kullanmayı tercih ettiği kavramsallaştırmalardır. Açıkça belirtilecek olursa, ilki, disiplindeki gerçekçi ya da daha bilindik adlandırmayla “realist” okulun ve bu okuldan türemiş diğer yaklaşımların tercihini yansıtırken, ikincisi ise realizmin kimi modifikasyonlarının yanı sıra, kabaca liberal olarak adlandırılabilecek yaklaşımların ve içerik bakımından hayli farklı biçimde kullanılmasına rağmen aynı zamanda eleştirel yaklaşımların tercihini yansıtmaktadır. Her iki kavramsallaştırmanın birbirlerinin yerine geçecek biçimde kullanıldığına tanıklık etmek işten bile değildir, fakat belirtildiği üzere aslında aralarında esaslı farklılıklar mevcuttur.
Bu çalışmada, “büyük güç rekabeti” ve “hegemonik rekabet” kavramsallaştırmaları, kuramsal kaynakları ortaya konularak ele alınacak ve bu yolla aralarındaki temel farklılıklar gösterilecektir. Bu yapıldıktan sonra, her iki rekabet biçimine tarihten örnekler sunulacak ve böylelikle bu iki kavramsallaştırmanın daha iyi anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunulmaya çalışılacaktır. İzleyen kısımda ilk olarak “büyük güç rekabeti” kavramsallaştırması incelenecektir.

This study aims to contribute to current and future debates over Russia’s war on Ukraine that would place it within the evolving historical pace of the international order. To that aim, the study first discusses the historical development and characteristics of the contemporary international order. Then the study outlines the process that paved the way for the current level of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Successive sections also discuss the positions of Russia, the West, China and Turkey vis-à-vis the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as well as the wider conflict between Russia and the West. The study ends with a concluding section within which prospects and implications for the international level are elaborated.