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Traditionally, discussions of governance beyond Earth have largely been held to the purview of debates about space law and global governance regimes. Yet, the priority of space exploration among ambitious, tech-industry associated... more
Traditionally, discussions of governance beyond Earth have largely been held to the purview of debates about space law and global governance regimes. Yet, the priority of space exploration among ambitious, tech-industry associated billionaires and its continued potential for militarization suggest that a more dynamic approach may be needed, given that state-sponsorship of extraterrestrial colonial projects may be more akin to partnerships between private and public actors rather than nation-states assuming traditional roles as sole sources of decision-making. Permanent settlements in space will require forms of localized government that may look distinct from contemporary models of political order. This article thus asks a provocative question associated with the empirical record of human colonization and settlement in prior eras: What sort of authoritarian governance is most likely to form in human space settlements during the medium term? Reviewing variations on political order in small-scale colonial settlements in light of recent conceptual work on authoritarian rule, the article identifies three theoretical models of governance that may emerge once beyond Earth settlements become permanent fixtures of human society.
Illiberalism is often associated with the concept of “authoritarianism,” but their relation can be underspecified, confused, contradictory, or overlapping. This is in no small part due to the tricky conceptualization of authoritarianism... more
Illiberalism is often associated with the concept of “authoritarianism,” but their relation can be underspecified, confused, contradictory, or overlapping. This is in no small part due to the tricky conceptualization of authoritarianism itself, which holds to surprisingly different definitions across several social-scientific disciplines and deals with the same common problems of usage imprecision. This chapter conceptualizes the relationship between illiberalism and the several understandings of authoritarianism current in the mainstream academic literature. In doing so, it shows how the concept of authoritarianism understood as a form of political regime is the most useful for most scholars working on the subject of illiberalism, although in some ways also the most difficult to adhere. In support of this conclusion, the chapter reviews several prominent and influential alternative definitions of authoritarianism, including psychological-dispositional, psychological-behavioral, policy-ideological, and practice-process conceptualizations. It notes that these other variants of authoritarianism suffer from diverse, internal problems with conceptual coherency, parsimony, bias, rigor, and empirical replicability. Furthermore, they are particularly susceptible to obscuring or even hindering the empirical and theoretical application of illiberalism in scholarly study, although important exceptions and further avenues of exploration are noted as well. Familiarity with definitional problems associated with non-regime conceptualizations of authoritarianism will ultimately facilitate a more precise and nuanced scholarly research approach on illiberalism.
The 2010s and 2020s have been readily identified as periods of considerable disjuncture and political disruption at the level of the global states system. Many point to observations of a relative rise in certain ideational conceptual... more
The 2010s and 2020s have been readily identified as periods of considerable disjuncture and political disruption at the level of the global states system. Many point to observations of a relative rise in certain ideational conceptual categories, such as “illiberalism” or “populism,” or regime concepts such as “authoritarianism” to explain these patterns of breakdown and system-level uncertainty. While this scholarly approach has much to recommend itself, in the end a great deal of academic usage suffers from a poor understanding of what these conceptual categories entail and consist of, their application across states, and their interaction with seemingly antithetical concepts such as “liberalism” or “democracy” itself. This article presents a critical schematic approach to the application of these conceptual tools in the scholarly analysis of the current international system and its discontents. In doing so, it argues that the concepts of “illiberalism” and “authoritarianism,” in particular, are vulnerable to conceptual misuse, and that this misuse leads to sometimes-unintended ontological assumptions about the global states system—such as “authoritarian internationals” and “illiberal waves”—that may be empirically and functionally untenable, or otherwise misleading, although context and close case analysis ultimately determines their relevance beyond description.
The modern Russian regime is one of the more prominent states espousing an explicitly illiberal ideological worldview domestically and abroad. Although regime illiberalism is many-sided, including authoritarian governance characteristics,... more
The modern Russian regime is one of the more prominent states espousing an explicitly illiberal ideological worldview domestically and abroad. Although regime illiberalism is many-sided, including authoritarian governance characteristics, international diffusion practices, and domestic political management, observers have often assumed that illiberalism is at its core an instrumental or cynical approach employed by the Russian leadership to bolster regime security and promote its foreign policy. This article suggests rather that observed illiberalism has additional roots in the dynamics of authoritarian domestic politics and society, rather than being characterized as simply a cynical top-down strategy of the Kremlin. Rather, regime illiberalism is congruent with many domestic drivers of political and societal influence. While decision-making elites certainly play up illiberalism instrumentally for purposes of regime maintenance and positional international influence, large institutional constituencies for substantive illiberalism also exist independent of regime goals. After suggesting two institutional formats-the Russian parliament and national broadcast media-in which observed illiberalism can best understood as an entrepreneurial behavior by lower-tier elite signaling loyalty and usefulness to the regime center, three further institutional sources are identified to be constituted by inherently illiberal organizational and symbolic forms that would promote illiberalism regardless of the regime's strategic preferences: the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian Armed Forces, and the symbolic center of the patronal presidency.
When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their mobilization? Do the same media sources align with positive views of mass mobilizations among the public in their aftermath? And, what is the... more
When people join in moments of mass protest, what role do different media sources play in their mobilization? Do the
same media sources align with positive views of mass mobilizations among the public in their aftermath? And, what is the
relationship between media consumption patterns and believing disinformation about protest events? Addressing these
questions helps us to better understand not only what brings crowds onto the streets, but also what shapes perceptions
of, and disinformation about mass mobilization among the wider population. Employing original data from a nationally
representative panel survey in Ukraine (Hale, Colton, Onuch, & Kravets, 2014) conducted shortly after the 2013–2014
EuroMaidan mobilization, we examine patterns of media consumption among both participants and non-participants, as
well as protest supporters and non-supporters. We also explore variation in media consumption among those who believe
and reject disinformation about the EuroMaidan. We test hypotheses, prominent in current protest literature, related
to the influence of “new” (social media and online news) and “old” media (television) on protest behavior and attitudes.
Making use of the significance of 2014 Ukraine as a testing ground for Russian disinformation tactics, we also specifically test
for consumption of Russian-owned television. Our findings indicate that frequent consumption of “old” media, specifically
Russian-owned television, is significantly associated with both mobilization in and positive perceptions of protest and is a
better predictor of believing “fake news” than consuming “new” media sources.
In a constitutional rupture, when the fundamental rules of political life are uncertain, it is unlikely that constitutional courts could play a major role. Yet in some remarkable cases, such courts transform into highly interventionist... more
In a constitutional rupture, when the fundamental rules of political life are uncertain, it is unlikely that constitutional courts could play a major role. Yet in some remarkable cases, such courts transform into highly interventionist political actors, even achieving some success. This paper provides a series of short case studies highlighting Hungary, Russia, Turkey, and South Africa to illustrate common elements that are shared across interventionist courts in such times—namely institutional centrality, strong and personalized court leadership, and division among elected branches of the state. All of these factors then combine with a court-derived constitutional vision that undergirds a constitutional court's legitimacy in the extra-constitutional period. This dynamic is then applied in detail to the case of post-Mubarak Egypt in order to explore the ephemeral and self-limiting nature of the interventions.
Research Interests:
The recent coups in sub-Saharan Africa have ushered in a new era in civil-military relations in the Francophone states of the continent. While military intervention and insurgency have long been a feature of politics in the region since... more
The recent coups in sub-Saharan Africa have ushered in a new era in civil-military relations in the Francophone states of the continent. While military intervention and insurgency have long been a feature of politics in the region since decolonization, the quick succession of regime change and the seizure of power by a new generation of juntas against long standing personalist dictatorships suggests a break in previous political patterns. And this is especially true in light of assumptions that have informed thinking since the Third Wave of Democratization at the end of the Cold War.

Put simply, over the last three decades many states had gone the way of electoral authoritarianism or personalist rule, rather than continue the older and more precarious tradition of military regimes. This state of affairs seems to be changing. Previous studies on coup dynamics can helpfully inform our understanding of this moment, but the new, cascade-like contagion of military-led regime-changes requires an analytic approach that is sensitive to the specific conditions of the geopolitical environment and internal domestic transformations operating in the region today.

To that end, we can shed light on the contemporary phenomenon unfolding in parts of West and Central Africa today by emphasizing two relevant conceptual dimensions that interact with each other. First, the internal guardianship self-perception of institutionalized and semi-institutionalized armed forces in the relevant states. Second, the deep and abiding concentration of multigenerational resentment at foreign influence (in this case, specifically French post-colonial quasi-hegemony).
While a general ideological shift toward illiberalism has been noted in Russia for over a decade, recent developments suggest an increasingly deep, pervasive, and comprehensive use of illiberal rhetoric and framings by Russian elites.... more
While a general ideological shift toward illiberalism has been noted in Russia for over a decade, recent developments suggest an increasingly deep, pervasive, and comprehensive use of illiberal rhetoric and framings by Russian elites. Policy discussions, which could once be held in a neutral or technocratic register, are increasingly suffused with illiberal legitimating and justifying language, which suggests the further integration of illiberal ideology into the worldviews of a broader cohort of Russian public figures, intellectuals, and loyalist professionals. The case of a recent public debate surrounding nuclear use policy gives rise to useful observations that underline this development.
The Russian political leadership badly misjudged the domestic political environment in Ukraine in February 2022. In contradistinction to its apt and aggressive reading of the ground-level Ukrainian political ecosystem in 2014, Russian... more
The Russian political leadership badly misjudged the domestic political environment in Ukraine in February 2022. In contradistinction to its apt and aggressive reading of the ground-level Ukrainian political ecosystem in 2014, Russian intelligence failures in 2022 turned an attempted regime-change operation into a grinding regional war of attrition, with its political objectives forcibly downgraded and its military and economy both substantially degraded by the conflict.[1] Expectations that a sizeable portion of the country’s population were in favor of political decapitation in Kyiv; that a large number of state, military, and security officers were ready to defect or aid in Russian efforts; and that local politicians would be waiting in the wings with sufficient clout, legitimacy, and personal skill to lead post-occupation efforts proved to be wrong on all counts.
Explaining the decision to invade Ukraine has been an ongoing debate in academic and policy making circles since the day Russia declared its ‘Special Military Operation.’ Why exactly did Russia go to war — and why in 2022?
The scholarly term ‘illiberalism’ can be conceptualized in brief as modern, ideological reaction against the experience of political, economic, and societal liberalism, whose expressions vary significantly across country-cases and... more
The scholarly term ‘illiberalism’ can be conceptualized in brief as modern, ideological reaction against the experience of political, economic, and societal liberalism, whose expressions vary significantly across country-cases and political contexts. Some political actors and intellectuals, especially in Eastern Europe, have taken the term on themselves and even describe their political projects as forthrightly ‘illiberal.’ Yet they are as likely, if not more so, to call themselves simply ‘conservative,’ ‘national-conservative,’ or even ‘Christian-Democratic.’ Coherent illiberal programs are newer in the contemporary Anglophone West and only now moving from intellectual discussions and criticism to nascent ideological projects. Yet illiberal thinkers in the English-speaking world often prefer altogether different descriptors, such as ‘postliberalism’ or ‘the dissident Right’ – in doing so, they often explicitly reject the very same labels of ‘conservatism’ or ‘center-right’ in favor of a distinct ideological vocabulary – and one that much more openly emphasizes the reactionary and radical nature of their position vis-à-vis the prevailing political forces in power.
Will President Vladimir Putin’s regime implode? Unfortunately, the media’s fixation with this question — understandable as it might be — has prevented us from gaining a more holistic understanding of how Russian politics are working right... more
Will President Vladimir Putin’s regime implode? Unfortunately, the media’s fixation with this question — understandable as it might be — has prevented us from gaining a more holistic understanding of how Russian politics are working right now.

While fully in the grips of a new form of bellicose, authoritarian rule, Russia has not fallen down the totalitarian path and rather exhibits signs of a skewed but dynamic authoritarian public politics. Putin’s regime is a personalist dictatorship in a partial state of exception, and one with a great deal of elite quiescence at the top. Yet the political dynamics playing out in the public eye are hardly uniform and reflect real claims to power and influence that can help Western observers understand Russia’s transforming political system.
The lure of typology is irresistible for social scientists, yet commonly used schemas classifying authoritarian politics still miss key variation. Our frameworks often rely on organisational assumptions set one level of abstraction too... more
The lure of typology is irresistible for social scientists, yet commonly used schemas classifying authoritarian politics still miss key variation. Our frameworks often rely on organisational assumptions set one level of abstraction too high. Julian G. Waller demonstrates how a closer look at constitutional structure can confront this problem
No longer confined to the realm of heterodox online letters, the diverse and disparate expressions of the illiberal Right in America have found their footing and are moving towards substantive projects.
Interest in the classical legal tradition and the classical philosophies on political regime and political order from which it emerged have grown signi cantly, as this very publication outlet can attest. This revival is particularly... more
Interest in the classical legal tradition and the classical philosophies on political regime and political order from which it emerged have grown signi cantly, as this very publication outlet can attest. This revival is particularly interesting because until recently the categories and frames of reference central to the classical tradition have been largely outside the mainstream of scholarly work across an array of academic genres, from legal theory to political science and beyond. Given this, I wanted to invite the readers of I&I's attention to a recent attempt at melding older understandings of political regime with modern scholarship-thus far still a rare occasion. This summary is an encouragement for those interested in classical political concepts and their relevance to the classical legal tradition to engage with both the promise and pitfalls of this approach to the scholarly study of political order and political regime. Most scholarship today does not consciously rely on classical frameworks for these topics. It is therefore important to understand the di culty of translating old and new ways of typifying regime, and to take interest whenever such a mixing, or an attempt at application, is undertaken.
Das moderne Russland ist lange mit der Person und der Figur Wladimir Putin assoziiert worden, wodurch die politische Diskussion im Westen wie auch in Russland personifiziert wurde: Sie rankt sich um den Präsidenten als dem zentralen, wenn... more
Das moderne Russland ist lange mit der Person und der Figur Wladimir Putin assoziiert worden, wodurch die politische Diskussion im Westen wie auch in Russland personifiziert wurde: Sie rankt sich um den Präsidenten als dem zentralen, wenn nicht gar alleinigen Entscheidungsträger. Russlandexperten wenden sich zwar oft gegen eine solche Charakterisierung, doch lässt sich nicht leugnen, dass in den vergangenen fünf Jahren eine zunehmende Personalisierung und Zentralisierung der Politik in Russland erfolgt ist. Was bedeutet das für die anderen politischen Institutionen in Russland, wo nun das zweite Jahrzehnt von Putins Herrschaft zu Ende geht?
Alexei Navalny, the main opposition candidate running in the Moscow mayoral election, paradoxically received support from his Kremlin-backed opponent several times throughout the campaign. The goals and ambitions of acting mayor and... more
Alexei Navalny, the main opposition candidate running in the Moscow mayoral election, paradoxically received support from his Kremlin-backed opponent several times throughout the campaign. The goals and
ambitions of acting mayor and candidate Sergei Sobyanin best explain this uncharacteristic promotion of an opposition politician by the authorities. The logic of Sobyanin’s hesitant, yet persistent, support for Navalny’s candidacy seeks to tap into legitimacy as the new basis for political agency and self-promotion. Only Navalny could deliver that legitimacy, without which Sobyanin would remain in his more subordinate role as Moscow city’s apparatchik-in-chief. This reality became clear as the campaign progressed, and strongly changed the nature of its dynamic over the course of the summer. In the aftermath of the election, it remains unclear if this policy was a success.
Book review for Bo Petersson's "The Putin Predicament. Problems of Legitimacy and Succession in Russia."
The recent Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism provides a thorough review of many theoretical and empirical elements that are constitutive of and related to the new social science concept of illiberalism. In doing so, the volume attempts... more
The recent Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism provides a thorough review of many theoretical and empirical elements that are constitutive of and related to the new social science concept of illiberalism. In doing so, the volume attempts to make coherent an inherently difficult and multifaceted conceptual space. The Handbook’s considerable merits are clear, given that it makes up one of the very first efforts to comprehensively approach what a growing body of scholarship means by ‘illiberalism’ from a definitional perspective, how it interacts with other conceptual terms of art from social science, political theory, and the political humanities, and how it fits with the empirical record of individual country-cases of interest. The Handbook is thus a very welcome addition to a burgeoning sub-genre of academic research on ideology, political movements, and regime conceptualization, as well as area and country-level studies.
The recent Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism provides a thorough review of many theoretical and empirical elements that are constitutive of and related to the new social science concept of illiberalism. In doing so, the volume attempts... more
The recent Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism provides a thorough review of many theoretical and empirical elements that are constitutive of and related to the new social science concept of illiberalism. In doing so, the volume attempts to make coherent an inherently difficult and multifaceted conceptual space. The Handbook’s considerable merits are clear, given that it makes up one of the very first efforts to comprehensively approach what a growing body of scholarship means by ‘illiberalism’ from a definitional perspective, how it interacts with other conceptual terms of art from social science, political theory, and the political humanities, and how it fits with the empirical record of individual country-cases of interest. The Handbook is thus a very welcome addition to a burgeoning sub-genre of academic research on ideology, political movements, and regime conceptualization, as well as area and country-level studies.
A review of David Stasavage's "The Decline and Rise of Democracy: A Global History from Antiquity to Today."