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In six French satellite states, Holland, Westphalia, Berg, (Northern) Italy, Naples, and Spain, Napoleon placed his kinsmen on the throne to ensure the administrative, financial and social reforms necessary to supply men and money for the... more
In six French satellite states, Holland, Westphalia, Berg, (Northern) Italy, Naples, and Spain, Napoleon placed his kinsmen on the throne to ensure the administrative, financial and social reforms necessary to supply men and money for the imperial war effort. In most of the brother kingdoms, French bureaucrats played a major role in implementing this modernisation process as senior government officials. They were either asked for by the Napoleonids or sent over by Napoleon, each of them applying different ways of recruitment. For the Emperor specialist knowledge and previous achievements were usually the deciding factor, while his royal relatives preferred to look for suitable candidates primarily in their personal entourages. Most friends and acquaintances of the Napoleonids proved to be expert and experienced administrators, but there were a few notorious exceptions. In general, French senior government officials in the brother kingdoms enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in the performance of their duties, thus enabling several of them not merely to implement policy but to shape it. As both the Emperor and his crowned siblings were keen to select moderate liberals, it was this specific political creed that marked the way modernisations were introduced abroad.
By admitting pages into his household, King of Holland Louis Bonaparte (1806-1810) allowed upper class adolescents to be groomed for military careers in a prestigious environment. These traditional junior court positions, few in number... more
By admitting pages into his household, King of Holland Louis Bonaparte (1806-1810) allowed upper class adolescents to be groomed for military careers in a prestigious environment. These traditional junior court positions, few in number and eagerly coveted, constituted one of the King’s instruments to bolster the legitimacy of his newly-created throne. This article examines royal patronage through the appointments of pages, considering Louis Bonaparte’s policies as well as the response of the country’s leading families. A prosopographical analysis of the total of twenty-five pages reveals how he sought to integrate as many sections of the kingdom’s broadened and fragmented elite as possible. Although the King’s efforts were eventually thwarted by the brevity of his reign, the allegiance of both the pages and their families proved, in many cases, to have been easily transferred to the succeeding imperial regime.
‘Sint-Helena, klein eilandje’, noteerde Napoleon als jonge luitenant in zijn aardrijkskundeschrift, niet wetende dat hij op 5 mei 1821, op 51-jarige leeftijd, in dit onherbergzame oord in de Atlantische Oceaan zou overlijden als de... more
‘Sint-Helena, klein eilandje’, noteerde Napoleon als jonge luitenant in zijn aardrijkskundeschrift, niet wetende dat hij op 5 mei 1821, op 51-jarige leeftijd, in dit onherbergzame oord in de Atlantische Oceaan zou overlijden als de zwaarbewaakte ‘gevangene van Europa’. Jos Gabriëls legt uit hoe de Franse keizer in 1815, na zijn nederlaag bij Waterloo, verkeerd gokte door zich als asielzoeker over te leveren aan de Britten.
In 1806, at Napoleon's behest, Louis Bonaparte suddenly became the foreign king of a former republic. Confronted with the problem of finding competent and trustworthy senior court dignitaries in this alien environment, he initially... more
In 1806, at Napoleon's behest, Louis Bonaparte suddenly became the foreign king of a former republic. Confronted with the problem of finding competent and trustworthy senior court dignitaries in this alien environment, he initially resorted to appointing French friends and confidants. Louis' choice was far from unique: his crowned relatives elsewhere, by necessity , opted for the same solution. This article reconstructs the early household composed by Louis and compares it to the households in the other satellite states. The juxtaposition not only highlights Napoleon's constant interference in nominations, but also reveals some inconsistencies in the Emperor's attitude. In addition, it emphasizes the marked impact of local conditions. Contrary to the situation in the other Napoleonic kingdoms, no Frenchmen entered the government posts in Holland, yet they dominated in senior court office. The comparison also helps to explain the remarkably rapid disappearance of French court dignitaries from Holland, prompting the 'Dutchification' of the king's entourage familiar from earlier historiography.
Op 15 augustus 2019 is het 250 jaar geleden dat Napoleon werd geboren. Dat dit feit in Nederland niet veel aandacht krijgt, is begrijpelijk. Maar dat in Frankrijk slechts beperkt bij deze gebeurtenis zal worden stilgestaan, is ronduit... more
Op 15 augustus 2019 is het 250 jaar geleden dat Napoleon werd geboren. Dat dit feit in Nederland niet veel aandacht krijgt, is begrijpelijk. Maar dat in Frankrijk slechts beperkt bij deze gebeurtenis zal worden stilgestaan, is ronduit opmerkelijk. Wat is hiervan de reden?
In Parijs kwam in de laatste decennia van de achttiende eeuw een nieuw fenomeen op: de restaurants. Deze onderscheidden zich van de herbergen door een persoonlijke dienstverlening: er waren ruime openingstijden, de klanten aten aan aparte... more
In Parijs kwam in de laatste decennia van de achttiende eeuw een nieuw fenomeen op: de restaurants. Deze onderscheidden zich van de herbergen door een persoonlijke dienstverlening: er waren ruime openingstijden, de klanten aten aan aparte tafels en zij konden à la carte kiezen uit een breed aanbod aan gerechten. Toen na de angstige revolutiejaren de bourgeoisie met haar vele nieuwe rijken zich ongebreideld overgaf aan plezier en vertier, boden de Parijse restaurants daartoe volop gelegenheid. Dit culinaire genieten beleefde een bloeitijd onder het Consulaat en Keizerrijk. Onder Napoleon werd koken een ware kunstvorm. De term ‘gastronomie’ werd gemunt, en de figuur van de fijnproever, de ‘gourmand’, trad toen in de openbaarheid. In deze jaren deed de culinaire journalistiek zijn intrede, en er verscheen een voorloper van de Michelingids. Het ambacht van kok werd verheven tot een kunstzinnig beroep, uitgedrukt in de toen geïntroduceerde witte koksmuts. Opmerkelijk is dat Napoleon zelf deze culinaire ontwikkeling weliswaar stimuleerde, maar er niet aan deelnam. Eten was voor de Keizer corvee, een noodzakelijke kwaad dat hem van belangrijker zaken afhield.
For Napoleon’s military campaigns, accurate geographic information on potential theatres of war was paramount. The indispensable maps, topographic memoirs and land-survey reports were gathered, organized and synthesized by the Dépôt... more
For Napoleon’s military campaigns, accurate geographic information on potential theatres of war was paramount. The indispensable maps, topographic memoirs and land-survey reports were gathered, organized and synthesized by the Dépôt général de la Guerre to be communicated to the Emperor’s personal topographical bureau and, in times of war, to the army commanders in the field. As a bureau within the pre-eminent Ministry of War in Paris, the Dépôt general was part of a modern, Weberian-type bureaucracy. But this in itself does not reveal whether this agency actually succeeded in carrying out its assigned tasks adequately. To assess this, the workings of the Dépôt général were analysed from the perspective of information management, being an essential feature of modernity. The years of the Emperor’s uninterrupted military victories yielded a rich harvest of geographic materials, seized from vanquished enemies in anticipation of future campaigns. The near-continuous warfare also created an immense demand which, however, proved much harder to meet. Although chronically understaffed, the Dépôt général was nonetheless able to fulfil its tasks effectively and efficiently. Only in the last years of Napoleon’s Empire, when the tables turned, did the workload grow out of proportion and the information-management process become irremediably disrupted.
At the end of 1813, the Dutch statesman Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, took ownership of the initiative with daring and determination. He deliberately turned the ant-French uprising in the Northern Netherlands into an ‘Orange’... more
At the end of 1813, the Dutch statesman Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp, took ownership of the initiative with daring and determination. He deliberately turned the ant-French uprising in the Northern Netherlands into an ‘Orange’ insurrection. Even so, the return of Prince William Frederic, the son of the Stadtholder who had been expelled in 1795, was not instantly and certainly not for everybody self-evident. The pro-French elites, however, were overwhelmed by the events, far from unanimous in their political views, and much discredited by their collaboration with the unpopular Napoleonic regime. Therefore, unable to present an alternative to the Orange prince immediately, such an alternative was well and truly available. For from exile, Louis Napoleon, Holland’s former king, made several attempts to regain the throne he had lost three years before. In other words, could things have gone differently in 1813?
For many generations British historians have decried the conduct of the Dutch troops at the battle of Waterloo as cowardly, an accusation which Dutch and Belgian historians, in their turn, have tried time and again to refute. This... more
For many generations British historians have decried the conduct of the Dutch troops at the battle of Waterloo as cowardly, an accusation which Dutch and Belgian historians, in their turn, have tried time and again to refute. This accusation of cowardice results from the exclusive and uncritical use a chauvinistic British historiography made of compatriotic eyewitness accounts. The slighting assessments of the Dutch military they contain, in most cases, derive from misinterpretation: the smoke and noise, the chaos and danger of battle precluded an objective appraisal of each other’s combat performance. Miscommunication further enhanced this negative opinion. Since the occasional allies of Waterloo were not allowed time to get to know and appreciate one another, they were unfamiliar with each other’s language, uniforms, and command structure. Nonetheless, the British were certainly acquainted with fighting side by side with foreign troops, and they were more than willing, if applicable, to appraise their professionalism. As this common battle experience was lacking at Waterloo, historical prejudices could easily prevail.
Although the Congress of Vienna was not a main topic for political caricature, it was anything but ignored. During the first five months of 1815, while monarchs and diplomats were deliberating on Europe’s future, caricaturists in Great... more
Although the Congress of Vienna was not a main topic for political caricature, it was anything but ignored. During the first five months of 1815, while monarchs and diplomats were deliberating on Europe’s future, caricaturists in Great Britain, France and the German-speaking states depicted the Congress as a major or minor subject in 20 satirical prints. Together these caricatures provide a multi-perspectival view of the way contemporaries assessed the diplomatic deliberations taking place in Vienna. To obtain an insight into this important part of contemporary public opinion on the Congress, the corpus of graphic satire was submitted to close scrutiny in two ways. Firstly, a context analysis ascertained the artists who produced them; how the prints were published and brought to public attention; and for what audiences they were intended. Secondly, a content analysis explored the political messages that the caricatures on the Vienna Congress tried to convey and the persuasive techniques that were applied to visualise these points of view. Notwithstanding different national origins and opposite political views, the message is a negative one: the satires denounce the territorial greed of the Great Powers and their disregard for the demands and aspirations of the peoples they seek to incorporate.
The Consulate is the last of the many regimes of the First French Republic. During these four crucial years the de facto head of state, Napoleon Bonaparte, gradually accumulated so much power that in the end he seemed to occupy an almost... more
The Consulate is the last of the many regimes of the First French Republic. During these four crucial years the de facto head of state, Napoleon Bonaparte, gradually accumulated so much power that in the end he seemed to occupy an almost royal position, foreshadowing his imperial dignity. Although Bonaparte tried to keep up a façade of revolutionary symbols and republican customs, it became more and more difficult to find excuses for the monarchical way in which his power was represented. Especially his magnificent entourage of palaces, service personnel, ceremonial pomp and the delicate rules of etiquette had all but by name the appearance of a genuine royal court. Many a staunch republican uttered his anger or annoyance at this apparent return to the detested practices of the ancien régime. But because Bonaparte acted with utmost prudence, patience and dissimulation there was never a general outcry or a serious attempt at obstruction. Thus, when in May 1804 the First Consul was proclaimed Emperor the foundations for his imperial court were already in place.
After the French had evacuated the Northern Netherlands, the new Dutch sovereign, William Frederick, Prince of Orange, began to raise a national army for which he had to commission general officers. In selecting them, during the eighteen... more
After the French had evacuated the Northern Netherlands, the new Dutch sovereign, William Frederick, Prince of Orange, began to raise a national army for which he had to commission general officers. In selecting them, during the eighteen months before the battle of Waterloo, three stages can be distinguished. During the first one, the Sovereign Prince could only employ former officers who had remained faithful to his House, but, for that reason, had not worn a uniform for two decades, and “Batavian-French” general officers who had rallied to the Prince, but were already retired or were mostly military administrators. During the second stage, the military organisation was established, first in the Northern Netherlands and subsequently in the Southern Netherlands. By allotting the sedentary posts to the aforesaid Orangist and “Batavian-French” generals the Sovereign Prince once again opted for security. Admittedly, the experienced and skilled commanding officers who had left French service to return home were given the appropriate ranks in the Dutch army, but were not entrusted with any vital commands. When during the third stage, after Napoleon’s return to power, King William I was forced to commission general officers on a large scale, he no longer hesitated to give preference to skills and experience previously acquired in French service, without, otherwise, relinquishing long-standing Orangist loyalties. Accordingly, in view of the forthcoming campaign, the King commended the sedentary posts to the most trustworthy generals, but conferred all field commands to the most experienced and competent generals. Professionalism, thus, prevailed over ideology.
The Emperor’s servants: on the influence, loyalty and talents of Napoleon’s closest collaborators In this article some recent French biographies of ministers and councillors of Napoleon I are being discussed. By way of introduction, an... more
The Emperor’s servants: on the influence, loyalty and talents of Napoleon’s  closest collaborators

In this article some recent French biographies of ministers and councillors of Napoleon I are being discussed. By way of introduction, an outline is given of the institutional framework within which they had to perform their duties as mere servants of the head of state. For the successive constitutions of the Consulate and the Empire made it clear that all executive power rested in the hands of Napoleon alone. The ministers and members of the Council of State had only an auxiliary task in carrying out his orders. In the first part of this article, the individual achievements and reputations of five of Napoleon’s closest collaborators are taken into account. In the second part, the ministers and councillors are considered as a group, with special interest for their political and social backgrounds, the relative influence they could exert, the role of temporary favourites and the continuous enmities and rivalries among them. The author of this article concludes that biographies as the ones reviewed here offer important material for a comprehensive study of the Napoleonic governmental machine, a study that still has to be written.
De veldheer zit te paard. Vanuit het zadel overziet hij het slagveld en geeft hij zijn bevelen. Ruiter en rijdier zijn één. In de beeldvorming die de Napoleontische legende heeft voortgebracht, zit ook de Franse keizer te paard. Dat paard... more
De veldheer zit te paard. Vanuit het zadel overziet hij het slagveld en geeft hij zijn bevelen. Ruiter en rijdier zijn één. In de beeldvorming die de Napoleontische legende heeft voortgebracht, zit ook de Franse keizer te paard. Dat paard is een schimmel: een kleine grijswitte Arabier. Maar wat was dat voor een paard? Hoe heette het en waar kwam het vandaan? En wat was de relatie tussen Napoleon en zijn rijdier? In het biografische onderzoek zijn dit veronachtzaamde, maar daarom nog geen onbelangrijke vragen.