Athanassios Raftopoulos
University of Cyprus, Department of Psychology, Faculty Member
Research Interests:
— Any discussion concerning representations in cognitive psychology and science assumes that mental representational contents are carried by brain representational vehicles. Recently Sedivy attacked the view that mental contents are... more
— Any discussion concerning representations in cognitive psychology and science assumes that mental representational contents are carried by brain representational vehicles. Recently Sedivy attacked the view that mental contents are carried by vehicles. Sedivy relies on Dennett's work to argue that mental contents cannot be carried by vehicles because the former cannot be independently individuated whereas the latter are, by definition, independently individuated by means of their semantic properties. In this paper, I claim that mental contents are carried by neural vehicles and that Sedivy misunderstands Dennett's work on the relation between the mental and the neural by confounding the algorithmic and the computational level of description. I analyze connectionist representations that Dennett favors and which are the most amenable to Sedivy's concerning the context dependency of contents on which Sedivy builds her arguments, and argue that in connectionism, there is a clear cut distinction between contents and vehicles that carry these contents.
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Firestone & Scholl (F&S) examine, among other possible cognitive influences on perception, the effects of peripheral attention and conclude that these effects do not entail cognition directly affecting... more
Firestone & Scholl (F&S) examine, among other possible cognitive influences on perception, the effects of peripheral attention and conclude that these effects do not entail cognition directly affecting perception. Studies in neuroscience with other forms of attention, however, suggest that a stage of vision, namely late vision, is cognitively penetrated mainly through the effects of cognitively driven spatial and object-centered attention.
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Model-based reasoning refers to the sorts of inferences performed on the basis of a knowledge context that guides them. This context constitutes a model of a domain of reality, that is, an approximative and simplifying to various degrees... more
Model-based reasoning refers to the sorts of inferences performed on the basis of a knowledge context that guides them. This context constitutes a model of a domain of reality, that is, an approximative and simplifying to various degrees representation of the factors that underlie, and the interrelations that govern, the behavior of this domain.
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Developmental psychologists have been preoccupied with the shape or form of development since the early days of developmental psychology. One of their main concerns has been to specify the developmental function of the characteristics... more
Developmental psychologists have been preoccupied with the shape or form of development since the early days of developmental psychology. One of their main concerns has been to specify the developmental function of the characteristics (i.e., behaviors, traits, abilities, processes, etc.) that are of interest to them. This is equivalent to saying that they try to specify how a given characteristic varies with age (Wohlwill, 1973). Underlying this concern are some fundamental ontological assumptions about the nature of development and some methodological assumptions about the science of development. The main ontological assumption underlying developmental theories is that the direction of development is known. That is, it is assumed that development is teleologically driven to an ultimate end that is equated with an, ideally, error-free state of functioning of every possible characteristic that may be considered. For most characteristics, this state is thought to be attainable in early adulthood. Therefore, development, under this assumption, is a process of growth or expansion and successive states during its course are just increasingly closer approximations to this ideal. This assumptionunderliesalldevelopmental theories.Forexample, in languagedevelopment, it is taken for granted that, with age, people know more words and use longer and more complex sentences, in accordance with the rules of grammar and syntax. The ultimate aim of language development is error-free communication that would map an underlying universal linguistic competence (Bowerman, 1982; Chomsky, 1972). In cognitive development it is taken for granted that, with age, people can unJOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT, 5(1), 89–95 Copyright © 2004, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
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ABSTRACT Dartnall claims that visual short-term memory (VSTM) stores nonconceptual content (NCC), in the form of compressed images. In this paper I argue against the claim that NCC can be stored in VSTM. I offer four reasons why NCC... more
ABSTRACT Dartnall claims that visual short-term memory (VSTM) stores nonconceptual content (NCC), in the form of compressed images. In this paper I argue against the claim that NCC can be stored in VSTM. I offer four reasons why NCC cannot be stored in visual memory and why only conceptual information can: (1) NCC lasts for a very short time and does not reach either visual short-term memory or visual long-term memory; (2) the content of visual states is stored in memory only if and when object-centered attention modulates visual processing and this modulation signifies the onset of the conceptualization of that content; (3) only categorical high-level information that characterizes conceptual content and not metric and precise iconic information that characterizes NCC can be stored in visual memory for long periods; and (4) if NCC were stored in visual memory then this would allow recognitional judgments pertaining to NCC—one could recognize the precise shade of a color that one had seen before. However NCC does not allow such recognitional judgments.
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Hintikka (1997, 1998) argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the... more
Hintikka (1997, 1998) argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the phenomena it purports to explain; knowledge is not enhanced until the hypothesis undergoes a further inductive process that will test it against empirical evidence. Hintikka, therefore, introduces a wedge between the abductive process properly speaking and the inductive process of hypothesis testing. Similarly, Minnameier (2004) argues that abduction differs from the inference to the best explanation (IBE) since the former describes the process of generation of theories, while the latter describes the, inductive, process of their evaluation. As Hintikka so Minnameier traces this view back to Peirce’s work on abduction. Recent work on abduction (Gabbay and Wood 2005) goes as far as to draw a distinction between abducting an hypothesis that is considered worth conjecturing and the decision either to use further this hypothesis to do some inferential work in the given domain of enquiry, or to test it experimentally. The latter step, when it takes place, is an inductive mode of inference that should be distinguished from the abductive inference that led to the hypothesis. In this paper, I argue that in real scientific practise both the distinction between a properly speaking abductive phase and an inductive phase of hypothesis testing and evaluation, and the distinction between testing an hypothesis that has been discovered in a preceding abduction and releasing or activating the same hypothesis for further inferential work in the domain of enquiry in which the ignorance problem arose in the first place are blurred because all these processes form an inextricable whole of theory development and elaboration and this defies and any attempt to analyze this intricate process into discrete well defined steps. Thus, my arguments reinforce Magnani’s (2014) view on abduction and its function in scientific practise.
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ABSTRACT Toribio argues against my thesis that the cognitive penetrability (CP) of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for this content to be nonconceptual content (NCC)–the MET (mutually entailing thesis).... more
ABSTRACT Toribio argues against my thesis that the cognitive penetrability (CP) of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for this content to be nonconceptual content (NCC)–the MET (mutually entailing thesis). Her main point is that MET presupposes a non-standard, causal interpretation of NCC that either trivializes NCC or fails to engage with the contemporary literature on NCC, in which the property of being nonconceptual is not construed in empirical but in constitutive terms. I argue that Toribio's arguments presuppose views of NCC that clash with important themes in the nonconceptualist literature, and that constitutive considerations concerning NCC are inextricably linked with causal considerations since the latter are required to address the concerns that led philosophers to postulate NCC.
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Abstract Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is... more
Abstract Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is theory-laden. To defend realism ...
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Research Interests: Psychology, Cognitive Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Logic, Medicine, and 15 moreDown Syndrome, Problem Solving, Humans, Analogical Reasoning, Concept Formation, Female, Male, Developmental disabilities, Adult, Public health systems and services research, Short Term Memory, Reference Values, Neuropsychological Tests, Child preschool, and Growth pattern
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Abstract Macpherson (Nous 40(1):82117, 2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, construed as the theory which holds that the phenomenal character is explained by the nonconceptual content of... more
Abstract Macpherson (Nous 40(1):82117, 2006) argues that the square/regular diamond figure threatens representationalism, construed as the theory which holds that the phenomenal character is explained by the nonconceptual content of experi-ence. Her argument is the claim that ...
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ABSTRACT I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system.... more
ABSTRACT I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system. Then I argue that the existence of Glover's two types of representations is supported by studies on “object-centered” attention. Furthermore, it foreshadows a nondescriptive causal reference fixing process.
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ABSTRACT This paper aims to provide an explication of the meaning of ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ in Descartes’ writings. In the first part I claim that Descartes’ method is entirely captured by the term ‘analysis’, and that it is a method... more
ABSTRACT This paper aims to provide an explication of the meaning of ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ in Descartes’ writings. In the first part I claim that Descartes’ method is entirely captured by the term ‘analysis’, and that it is a method of theory elaboration that fuses the modern methods of discovery and confirmation in one enterprise. I discuss Descartes’ methodological writings, assess their continuity and coherence, and I address the major shortcoming of previous interpretations of Cartesian methodology. I also discuss the Cartesian method in the context of other conceptions of scientific method of that era and argue that Descartes’ method significantly transforms these conceptions. In the second part I argue that mathematical and natural-philosophical writings exhibit this kind of analysis. To that effect I examine in Descartes’ writings on the method as used in mathematics, and Descartes’ account of the discovery of the nature of the rainbow in the Meteors. Finally, I briefly assess Descartes’ claim regarding the universality of his method.
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Research Interests: Psychology and Cognition
In this chapter, I elaborate my thesis that a stage of visual processing, namely, late vision, is Cognitively Penetrated (CP). The CP of late vision results in states with hybrid, that is visual/iconic and semantic/symbolic contents. The... more
In this chapter, I elaborate my thesis that a stage of visual processing, namely, late vision, is Cognitively Penetrated (CP). The CP of late vision results in states with hybrid, that is visual/iconic and semantic/symbolic contents. The conceptual modulation of late vision notwithstanding, I argue that late vision is a perceptual stage rather than a stage of discursive thought. My main claim is that instead of discursive inferences, late vision involves pattern matching processes, and I discuss the perception of ambiguous figures to sybstantiate my claim. I also argue that early vision, too, does not involve discursive inferences and that both late and early vision involve some sort of abductive reasoning.
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In earlier work (Raftopoulos 2009), I analyzed early vision, which I claimed is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual processing. In contradistinction, late vision is cognitively penetrated (CP) and involves the modulation of... more
In earlier work (Raftopoulos 2009), I analyzed early vision, which I claimed is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual processing. In contradistinction, late vision is cognitively penetrated (CP) and involves the modulation of processing by cognitively driven attention. Its stages have hybrid contents, partly conceptual contents, and partly iconic analogue contents. In this chapter, I examine the processes of late vision and discuss whether late vision should be construed as a perceptual stage or as a thought-like stage. Using Jackendoff ’s (1989) distinction between visual awareness and visual understanding, I argue that the contents of late vision belong to visual awareness. In late vision an abduction or “inference” to the best explanation allows the construction of a representation that best fits a scene. Given the sparse retinal image that underdetermines both the distal object and the percept, the visual system fills in the missing information to arrive at the best explanation, that is, the percept that best fits the retinal information. I argue that late vision does not consist in propositional structures formed in cognitive areas and participate in discursive reasoning and inferences, and does not implicate discursive abductive inferences from propositionally structured premises to recognitional beliefs.
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Attention has often been likened to spotlights and filters—devices that illuminate or screen out some inputs in favor of others. This largely passive conception of attention has been gradually replaced by a more dynamic and far-reaching... more
Attention has often been likened to spotlights and filters—devices that illuminate or screen out some inputs in favor of others. This largely passive conception of attention has been gradually replaced by a more dynamic and far-reaching process. We know that attentional processes augment neural processing at all levels, and in some cases, augmenting processing within the sense organs themselves. For example, cueing object features (e.g., instructing a subject to look at a screen for a red object) modulates prestimulus activity in the visual cortex. Far from being limited to space or basic features, such attention cueing can function in surprisingly flexible and complex ways: people can be cued to attend to various objects, properties, and semantic categories and such attention appears to directly involve perceptual mechanisms. Studies of spatial attention cues presented before stimulus presentation show early modulation of perceptual processing. This phenomenon refers to the enhancement of the baseline activity of neurons at all levels in the visual cortex that are tuned to the cued location, which is called attentional modulation of spontaneous activity. The spontaneous firing rates of neurons are increased when attention is shifted toward the location of an upcoming stimulus before its presentation. Evidence also suggests that through pre-cueing of object features, feature-based attention modulates prestimulus activity in the visual cortex. The effects of pre-stimulus feature attention act either as a preparatory activity to enhance the stimulus-evoked potentials within feature sensitive areas, or they act so as to modulate stimulus-locked transients. Both effects of pre-cueing reflect a change in background neural activity. They are called anticipatory effects established prior to the presentation of the stimulus. Thus, they do not modulate processing during stimulus viewing but bias the process before it starts via the increase in the base line firing rates; they rig-up perceptual processing without affecting it on-line. Moreover, recent work on perceptual processing emphasizes the role of brain as a predictive tool. To perceive is to use what you know to explain away the sensory signal across multiple spatial and temporal scales. Perception aims to enable perceivers to interact with their environment successfully. Success relies on inferring or predicting correctly (or nearly so) the nature of the source of the incoming signal from the signal itself, an inference that may well be Bayesian. Current research sheds light on the role of attention in inferring the identities of the distal objects. Attention within late vision contributes to testing hypotheses concerning the putative distal causes of the sensory data encoded in the lower neuronal assemblies in the visual processing hierarchy. This testing assumes the form of matching predictions, made on the basis of an hypothesis, about the sensory information that the lower levels should encode assuming that the hypothesis is correct, with the current, actual sensory information encoded at the lower levels. To this aim, attention enhances the activity of neurons in the cortical regions that encode the stimuli that most likely contain information relevant to the testing of the hypothesis. In this Research Topic we aim to answer two related questions: First, what are the differences between this sort of pre-cueing effects and top-down cognitive influences on perception, and, in general, how do such attentional cuing effects relate to the broader literature on top-down influences on perception? Second, given that attention appears to change perceptual processing and that a form of attention, namely, cognitively-driven (or endogenous, or sustained) attention is a cognitive process, does attentional modulation through pre-cueing constitute cognitive penetrability of perception? Addressing these two questions will shed light on the theoretical underpinnings of cognitive penetrability and the nature of perceptual processing
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ABSTRACT Most developmental theories consider development as a process in which an organism grows from an immature (biological, behavioral, sensory, and cognitive) state to a mature one, the latter being more perfect and ‘better’. In this... more
ABSTRACT Most developmental theories consider development as a process in which an organism grows from an immature (biological, behavioral, sensory, and cognitive) state to a mature one, the latter being more perfect and ‘better’. In this paper I will argue in favor of the view that the limited resources with which the organism starts its development show positive results, in that they make possible certain kinds of learning which otherwise would be highly problematical. I will start by discussing certain limitations regarding the cognitive structure of the organism. Then, I will discuss learning and its problems in connectionism. My argument will be that the knowledge we gain from our effort to overcome these problems sheds light on the beneficial role of limited resources. Finally, I will return to the types of limitations taken up in the first part, and assess their role in the cognitive development of the organism.Copyright © 1997 S. Karger AG, Basel
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ABSTRACT tudies on the syndrome called ‘unilateral visual or spatial neglect’ have been used by philosophers in discussions concerning perceptual phenomenology. Nanay (Philos Perspect 26:235–246, 2012), based on spatial neglects studies,... more
ABSTRACT tudies on the syndrome called ‘unilateral visual or spatial neglect’ have been used by philosophers in discussions concerning perceptual phenomenology. Nanay (Philos Perspect 26:235–246, 2012), based on spatial neglects studies, argued that the property of being suitable for action (an action-property) is part of the perceptual phenomenology of neglect patients. In this paper, I argue that the studies on visual neglect conducted thus far do not support Nanay’s thesis that when patients succeed in detecting the neglected object, it’s action properties are part of their perceptual phenomenology; instead, the support the view that the patients consciously see low-level properties such as color and shape. In the first section, I discuss unilateral neglect and extinction. In the second section, I analyze Nanay’s argument. In the third section, I explain why Nanay’s thesis does not follow from the studies on visual neglect. Nanay argues that when neglect patients are cued with an action-property of an object and succeed in perceiving the object in the con- tralesional side they are phenomenally aware of an action-property of it but they are not phenomenally aware of its low-level properties. Since the patients detect the object, they must be phenomenally aware of some of its properties. Failing to see the low-level properties, the patients should be phenomenally aware is the action- property. Against this, I argue that research on spatial neglect shows that the patients come to see the low-level properties. I also explain why my discussion also supports the more general claim that the studies on neglect and extinction conducted thus far do not establish that the action-properties are part of the patients’ phenomenology. Finally, in section four, I examine a possible objection against my account. My arguments do not entail that the action properties are not part of perceptual phe- nomenology; only that the neglect studies do not establish this.
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In this chapter, I defend the thesis that early vision is Cognitively Impenetrable (CI) against very recent criticisms, some of them aimed specifically at my arguments, which state that neurophysiological evidence shows that early vision... more
In this chapter, I defend the thesis that early vision is Cognitively Impenetrable (CI) against very recent criticisms, some of them aimed specifically at my arguments, which state that neurophysiological evidence shows that early vision is affected in a top-down manner by cognitive states. This criticism comes from (a) studies on fast object recognition; (b) pre-cueing studies; and (c) imaging studies that examine the recurrent processes in the brain during visual perception. I argue that upon closer examination, all this evidence supports rather than defeats the thesis that early vision is CI, because it shows that (a) the information used in early vision to recognize objects very fast is not cognitive information; (b) the processes of early vision do not use the cognitive information that issues cognitive demands guiding attention or expectation in pre-cueing studies; and (c) the recurrent processes in early vision are purely stimulus-driven and do not involve any cognitive signals.
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Hintikka (1997, 1998) argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the... more
Hintikka (1997, 1998) argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the phenomena it purports to explain; knowledge is not enhanced until the hypothesis undergoes a further inductive process that will test it against empirical evidence. Hintikka, therefore, introduces a wedge between the abductive process properly speaking and the inductive process of hypothesis testing. Similarly, Minnameier (2004) argues that abduction differs from the inference to the best explanation (IBE) since the former describes the process of generation of theories, while the latter describes the, inductive, process of their evaluation. As Hintikka so Minnameier traces this view back to Peirce’s work on abduction. Recent work on abduction (Gabbay and Wood 2005) goes as far as to draw a distinction between abducting an hypothesis that is considered worth conjecturing and the decision either to use further this hypothesis to do some inferential work in the given domain of enquiry, or to test it experimentally. The latter step, when it takes place, is an inductive mode of inference that should be distinguished from the abductive inference that led to the hypothesis. In this paper, I argue that in real scientific practise both the distinction between a properly speaking abductive phase and an inductive phase of hypothesis testing and evaluation, and the distinction between testing an hypothesis that has been discovered in a preceding abduction and releasing or activating the same hypothesis for further inferential work in the domain of enquiry in which the ignorance problem arose in the first place are blurred because all these processes form an inextricable whole of theory development and elaboration and this defies and any attempt to analyze this intricate process into discrete well defined steps. Thus, my arguments reinforce Magnani’s (2014) view on abduction and its function in scientific practise.
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Attention has often been likened to spotlights and filters—devices that illuminate or screen out some inputs in favor of others. This largely passive conception of attention has been gradually replaced by a more dynamic and far-reaching... more
Attention has often been likened to spotlights and filters—devices that illuminate or screen out some inputs in favor of others. This largely passive conception of attention has been gradually replaced by a more dynamic and far-reaching process. We know that attentional processes augment neural processing at all levels, and in some cases, augmenting processing within the sense organs themselves. For example, cueing object features (e.g., instructing a subject to look at a screen for a red object) modulates prestimulus activity in the visual cortex. Far from being limited to space or basic features, such attention cueing can function in surprisingly flexible and complex ways: people can be cued to attend to various objects, properties, and semantic categories and such attention appears to directly involve perceptual mechanisms. Studies of spatial attention cues presented before stimulus presentation show early modulation of perceptual processing. This phenomenon refers to the enhancement of the baseline activity of neurons at all levels in the visual cortex that are tuned to the cued location, which is called attentional modulation of spontaneous activity. The spontaneous firing rates of neurons are increased when attention is shifted toward the location of an upcoming stimulus before its presentation. Evidence also suggests that through pre-cueing of object features, feature-based attention modulates prestimulus activity in the visual cortex. The effects of pre-stimulus feature attention act either as a preparatory activity to enhance the stimulus-evoked potentials within feature sensitive areas, or they act so as to modulate stimulus-locked transients. Both effects of pre-cueing reflect a change in background neural activity. They are called anticipatory effects established prior to the presentation of the stimulus. Thus, they do not modulate processing during stimulus viewing but bias the process before it starts via the increase in the base line firing rates; they rig-up perceptual processing without affecting it on-line. Moreover, recent work on perceptual processing emphasizes the role of brain as a predictive tool. To perceive is to use what you know to explain away the sensory signal across multiple spatial and temporal scales. Perception aims to enable perceivers to interact with their environment successfully. Success relies on inferring or predicting correctly (or nearly so) the nature of the source of the incoming signal from the signal itself, an inference that may well be Bayesian. Current research sheds light on the role of attention in inferring the identities of the distal objects. Attention within late vision contributes to testing hypotheses concerning the putative distal causes of the sensory data encoded in the lower neuronal assemblies in the visual processing hierarchy. This testing assumes the form of matching predictions, made on the basis of an hypothesis, about the sensory information that the lower levels should encode assuming that the hypothesis is correct, with the current, actual sensory information encoded at the lower levels. To this aim, attention enhances the activity of neurons in the cortical regions that encode the stimuli that most likely contain information relevant to the testing of the hypothesis. In this Research Topic we aim to answer two related questions: First, what are the differences between this sort of pre-cueing effects and top-down cognitive influences on perception, and, in general, how do such attentional cuing effects relate to the broader literature on top-down influences on perception? Second, given that attention appears to change perceptual processing and that a form of attention, namely, cognitively-driven (or endogenous, or sustained) attention is a cognitive process, does attentional modulation through pre-cueing constitute cognitive penetrability of perception? Addressing these two questions will shed light on the theoretical underpinnings of cognitive penetrability and the nature of perceptual processing
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I argue that emotive states affect perceptual processing either directly or indirectly with latencies that fall within late vision and not early vision. These effects differ from the effects of, and are subserved by different neuronal... more
I argue that emotive states affect perceptual processing either directly or indirectly with latencies that fall within late vision and not early vision. These effects differ from the effects of, and are subserved by different neuronal mechanisms than those that subserve, attentional effects on perception, although the two sorts of effects may interact. It follows that the emotive effects found in perception do not entail either the cognitive penetrability of early vision or its emotional penetrability.
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In this paper we address the issue of grounding for experien-tial concepts. Given that perceptual demonstratives are a basic form of such concepts, we examine ways of fixing the refer-ents of such demonstratives. To avoid... more
In this paper we address the issue of grounding for experien-tial concepts. Given that perceptual demonstratives are a basic form of such concepts, we examine ways of fixing the refer-ents of such demonstratives. To avoid 'encodingism', that is, relating representations to representations, we postulate that the process of reference fixing must be bottom-up and non-conceptual, so that it can break the circle of conceptual content and touch the world. For that purpose, an appropriate causal relation between representations and the world is needed. We claim that this relation is provided by spatial and object-centered attention that leads to the formation of object-files through the function of deictic acts. This entire causal process takes place at a pre-conceptual level, meeting the requirement for a solution to the grounding problem. Finally we claim that our account captures fundamental insights in Put-nam's and Kripke's work on "new" reference.
Hintikka (1997, 1998) argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the... more
Hintikka (1997, 1998) argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the phenomena it purports to explain; knowledge is not enhanced until the hypothesis undergoes a further inductive process that will test it against empirical evidence. Hintikka, therefore, introduces a wedge between the abductive process properly speaking and the inductive process of hypothesis testing. Similarly, Minnameier (2004) argues that abduction differs from the inference to the best explanation (IBE) since the former describes the process of generation of theories, while the latter describes the, inductive, process of their evaluation. As Hintikka so Minnameier traces this view back to Peirce’s work on abduction. Recent work on abduction (Gabbay and Wood 2005) goes as far as to draw a distinction between abducting an hypothesis that is conside...
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Research Interests: Psychology and De Gruyter
— Any discussion concerning representations in cognitive psychology and science assumes that mental representational contents are carried by brain representational vehicles. Recently Sedivy attacked the view that mental contents are... more
— Any discussion concerning representations in cognitive psychology and science assumes that mental representational contents are carried by brain representational vehicles. Recently Sedivy attacked the view that mental contents are carried by vehicles. Sedivy relies on Dennett's work to argue that mental contents cannot be carried by vehicles because the former cannot be independently individuated whereas the latter are, by definition, independently individuated by means of their semantic properties. In this paper, I claim that mental contents are carried by neural vehicles and that Sedivy misunderstands Dennett's work on the relation between the mental and the neural by confounding the algorithmic and the computational level of description. I analyze connectionist representations that Dennett favors and which are the most amenable to Sedivy's concerning the context dependency of contents on which Sedivy builds her arguments, and argue that in connectionism, there is a clear cut distinction between contents and vehicles that carry these contents.
Abstract The Macpherson (Philos Phenomenol Res 84(1):24–62, 2012) argued that the perceptual experience of colors is cognitively penetrable (CP). Macpherson also thinks that perception has nonconceptual content (NCC) because this would... more
Abstract The Macpherson (Philos Phenomenol Res 84(1):24–62, 2012) argued that the perceptual experience of colors is cognitively penetrable (CP). Macpherson also thinks that perception has nonconceptual content (NCC) because this would provide a good explanation for several phenomena concerning perceptual experience. To have both, Macpherson must defend the thesis that the CP of perception is compatible with perception having NCC. Since the classical notion of CP of perception does not allow perception to have NCC, Macpherson (Cognitive effects on perception: new philosophical perspectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) proposes CP-lite. CP-lite makes room for an experience to have content determined by concepts because the perceptual processes that produce the experience are affected by concepts rendering the experience, CP, while the same type of experience could have been had without any conceptual influences, in which case it would be CI. Macpherson then proceeds to show that CP-lite is compatible with some of the definitions of NCC. To do so, she argues that even when an experience is CP owing to the fact that it is produced by means of the mechanism posited by CP-lite, that is, through the interaction between bottom–up pure perception and top–down perceptual imagery, its content is NCC because it has the basic properties that characterize NCC. Based on this, Macpherson proceeds to criticize and undermine the definitions of NCC that are incompatible with CP-lite. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of CP-lite rests on the erroneous assumption that a state with conceptual content and a state with NCC can have the same phenomenology or content, and that the compatibility of CP-lite with NCC presupposes a view of NCC that does not conform to the usual construal of NCC.
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ABSTRACT This paper aims to provide an explication of the meaning of ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ in Descartes’ writings. In the first part I claim that Descartes’ method is entirely captured by the term ‘analysis’, and that it is a method... more
ABSTRACT This paper aims to provide an explication of the meaning of ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ in Descartes’ writings. In the first part I claim that Descartes’ method is entirely captured by the term ‘analysis’, and that it is a method of theory elaboration that fuses the modern methods of discovery and confirmation in one enterprise. I discuss Descartes’ methodological writings, assess their continuity and coherence, and I address the major shortcoming of previous interpretations of Cartesian methodology. I also discuss the Cartesian method in the context of other conceptions of scientific method of that era and argue that Descartes’ method significantly transforms these conceptions. In the second part I argue that mathematical and natural-philosophical writings exhibit this kind of analysis. To that effect I examine in Descartes’ writings on the method as used in mathematics, and Descartes’ account of the discovery of the nature of the rainbow in the Meteors. Finally, I briefly assess Descartes’ claim regarding the universality of his method.
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In earlier work (Raftopoulos 2009), I analyzed early vision, which I claimed is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual processing. In contradistinction, late vision is cognitively penetrated (CP) and involves the modulation of... more
In earlier work (Raftopoulos 2009), I analyzed early vision, which I claimed is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual processing. In contradistinction, late vision is cognitively penetrated (CP) and involves the modulation of processing by cognitively driven attention. Its stages have hybrid contents, partly conceptual contents, and partly iconic analogue contents. In this chapter, I examine the processes of late vision and discuss whether late vision should be construed as a perceptual stage or as a thought-like stage. Using Jackendoff ’s (1989) distinction between visual awareness and visual understanding, I argue that the contents of late vision belong to visual awareness. In late vision an abduction or “inference” to the best explanation allows the construction of a representation that best fits a scene. Given the sparse retinal image that underdetermines both the distal object and the percept, the visual system fills in the missing information to arrive at the best explanation, that is, the percept that best fits the retinal information. I argue that late vision does not consist in propositional structures formed in cognitive areas and participate in discursive reasoning and inferences, and does not implicate discursive abductive inferences from propositionally structured premises to recognitional beliefs.
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Erkenntnis
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In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is... more
In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observation, which I will call perception, is bottom-up and theory neutral. As such, perception could play the role of common ground on which a naturalized epistemology can be built and relativism avoided.
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ABSTRACT In this paper, I elaborate on the notion of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) and cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision, and I draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing to link the problem of the CI or CP of... more
ABSTRACT In this paper, I elaborate on the notion of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) and cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision, and I draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing to link the problem of the CI or CP of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that is, NCC. This content cannot involve any concepts and is, as I call it, purely NCC, in contradistinction to the contents of the states of late vision that can contain both conceptual content and NCC. The aforementioned conditional holds on the assumption, for which I argue, that concepts cannot figure inherently in early vision. Then, I discuss NCC and argue that the nature of NCC leads to the view that it is retrieved in a stage of visual processing that is CI. Thus, if some content is purely NCC, it is CI. It follows that the CI of a state and content is a sufficient (given the abovementioned assumption) and a necessary condition for the state and its content to be purely NCC—the CI≡NCC thesis. The brunt of my argument is that if one could establish on independent scientific grounds that early vision is CI, which I have done elsewhere (Raftopoulos 2009), and if one could mount an argument, as I attempt to do here, that CI entails and is entailed by conceptual encapsulation, then CI≡NCC. Since only early vision is CI, the purely NCC of perception is early vision content. Finally, I examine and reject some objections against my thesis.
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232 Young Children's Construction of Operational Definitions in Magnetism: the role of cognitive readiness and scaffolding the learning environment Constantinos P. Constantinou (cp constantinou@ ucy. ac. cy), Athanassios Raftopoulos... more
232 Young Children's Construction of Operational Definitions in Magnetism: the role of cognitive readiness and scaffolding the learning environment Constantinos P. Constantinou (cp constantinou@ ucy. ac. cy), Athanassios Raftopoulos (raftop@ ucy. ac. cy), George ...
UC Merced Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society Title Does the Emotional Modulation of Visual Experience Entail the Cognitive Penetrability or Emotional Penetrability of Early Vision? Publication Date Does the Emotional Modulation of Visual Experience Entail the Cogni...more
I argue that emotive states affect perceptual processing either directly or indirectly with latencies that fall within late vision and not early vision. These effects differ from the effects of, and are subserved by different neuronal... more
I argue that emotive states affect perceptual processing either directly or indirectly with latencies that fall within late vision and not early vision. These effects differ from the effects of, and are subserved by different neuronal mechanisms than those that subserve, attentional effects on perception, although the two sorts of effects may interact. It follows that the emotive effects found in perception do not entail either the cognitive penetrability of early vision or its emotional penetrability.
In this paper we argue for a new role for experiment in science teaching and learning. Our proposition is based on the conception of experiment as an active ingredient of theory construction and not as a mere tool for theory testing. This... more
In this paper we argue for a new role for experiment in science teaching and learning. Our proposition is based on the conception of experiment as an active ingredient of theory construction and not as a mere tool for theory testing. This latter view is based on the classical conception of the mind-world interaction, according to which human action purports to test the validity of a tentative solution to a problem and follows after mental processing. We present the new framework that views the interactions with the environment as active ingredients of the mind's problem solving activity. We also adduce evidence for this new role of experiment from the history of science. Finally, we discuss the repercussions of this view of cognition, as the activity of a mind-environment inseparable whole for the role of experiment in knowledge construction.
In this paper, I examine first the way knowledge-statements and belief-statements are questioned in ordinary language. The former are questioned by "how do you know?" questions, while the latter are questioned by "why do... more
In this paper, I examine first the way knowledge-statements and belief-statements are questioned in ordinary language. The former are questioned by "how do you know?" questions, while the latter are questioned by "why do you believe?" questions. The answers to these questions are different. In the former case, one replies by providing the reasons that justify their being in position to know, whereas in the latter case, one replies by adducing the evidence for their statement. Then, I explore the epistemological repercussions of the difference in ordinary usage between the verbs 'to know' and 'to believe' and, drawing on these, I discuss the implication for science teaching. Keywords Why-questions, knowledge-statements, belief-statements, epistemic status of scientific theories résumé Dans cet article, j'examine d'abord comment les types connaissance-déclarations et croyance-déclarations sont remises en question dans le langage courant. Les...
Does the Emotional Modulation of Visual Experience Entail the Cognitive Penetrability or Emotional Penetrability of Early Vision? Athanassios Raftopoulos (raftop@ucy.ac.cy) Department of Psychology University of Cyprus P.O. Box 20537... more
Does the Emotional Modulation of Visual Experience Entail the Cognitive Penetrability or Emotional Penetrability of Early Vision? Athanassios Raftopoulos (raftop@ucy.ac.cy) Department of Psychology University of Cyprus P.O. Box 20537 Nicosia 1678, Cyprus Abstract I argue that emotive states affect perceptual processing either directly or indirectly with latencies that fall within late vision and not early vision. These effects differ from the effects of, and are subserved by different neuronal mechanisms than those that subserve, attentional effects on perception, although the two sorts of effects may interact. It follows that the emotive effects found in perception do not entail either the cognitive penetrability of early vision or its emotional penetrability. Introduction Discussions on the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of perception almost exclusively concern attentional modulation of perceptual processing. Pylyshyn (1999) argues that attention does not modulate a stage of visua...
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Model-based reasoning refers to the sorts of inferences performed on the basis of a knowledge context that guides them. This context constitutes a model of a domain of reality, that is, an approximative and simplifying to various degrees... more
Model-based reasoning refers to the sorts of inferences performed on the basis of a knowledge context that guides them. This context constitutes a model of a domain of reality, that is, an approximative and simplifying to various degrees representation of the factors that underlie, and the interrelations that govern, the behavior of this domain.
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In this chapter, I elaborate my thesis that a stage of visual processing, namely, late vision, is Cognitively Penetrated (CP). The CP of late vision results in states with hybrid, that is visual/iconic and semantic/symbolic contents. The... more
In this chapter, I elaborate my thesis that a stage of visual processing, namely, late vision, is Cognitively Penetrated (CP). The CP of late vision results in states with hybrid, that is visual/iconic and semantic/symbolic contents. The conceptual modulation of late vision notwithstanding, I argue that late vision is a perceptual stage rather than a stage of discursive thought. My main claim is that instead of discursive inferences, late vision involves pattern matching processes, and I discuss the perception of ambiguous figures to sybstantiate my claim. I also argue that early vision, too, does not involve discursive inferences and that both late and early vision involve some sort of abductive reasoning.
In this paper we argue for a new role for experiment in science teaching and learning. Our proposition is based on the conception of experiment as an active ingredient of theory construction and not as a mere tool for theory testing. This... more
In this paper we argue for a new role for experiment in science teaching and learning. Our proposition is based on the conception of experiment as an active ingredient of theory construction and not as a mere tool for theory testing. This latter view is based on the classical conception of the mind-world interaction, according to which human action purports to test the validity of a tentative solution to a problem and follows after mental processing. We present the new framework that views the interactions with the environment as active ingredients of the mind’s problem solving activity. We also adduce evidence for this new role of experiment from the history of science. Finally, we discuss the repercussions of this view of cognition, as the activity of a mind-environment inseparable whole for the role of experiment in knowledge
... typically attributed to it. (This issue cannot be pursued further here; see Smolensky, 1990; Clark, 1991; and Ramsey, Stich, Garon, 1991, for Page 18. ... ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Debbie-Brown Kazazis for her... more
... typically attributed to it. (This issue cannot be pursued further here; see Smolensky, 1990; Clark, 1991; and Ramsey, Stich, Garon, 1991, for Page 18. ... ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Debbie-Brown Kazazis for her assistance and comments, and Prof. ...
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In this paper, I examine first the way knowledge-statements and belief-statements are questioned in ordinary language. The former are questioned by “how do you know?” questions, while the latter are questioned by “why do you believe?”... more
In this paper, I examine first the way knowledge-statements and belief-statements are questioned in ordinary language. The former are questioned by “how do you know?” questions, while the latter are questioned by “why do you believe?” questions. The answers to these questions are different. In the former case, one replies by providing the reasons that justify their being in position to know, whereas in the latter case, one replies by adducing the evidence for their statement. Then, I explore the epistemological repercussions of the difference in ordinary usage between the verbs ‘to know’ and ‘to believe’ and, drawing on these, I discuss the implication for science teaching.
Newen and Vetter (2016) argue that cognitive penetration (CP) of perceptual experience is the most possible account of the evidence. They target both the weak impenetrability thesis that only some early visual processes are cognitively... more
Newen and Vetter (2016) argue that cognitive penetration (CP) of perceptual experience is the most possible account of the evidence. They target both the weak impenetrability thesis that only some early visual processes are cognitively impenetrable (CI), and the strong impenetrability thesis that all perceptual processes are CI. Since I agree that perceptual processing as a whole is CP, I will concentrate on their arguments against the weak CI thesis. In attacking weak CI, the authors take aim at Raftopoulos’ arguments supporting the CI of early vision. Their main argument comes from studies that, Newen and Vetter think, show that early vision is CP by demonstrating the existence of cognitive effects on early vision. I examine the same empirical evidence that Newen and Vatter discuss and argue this same evidence strongly supports the view that early vision is CI.
Perceptual Learning Meets Philosophy: Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and its Philosophical Implications Athanassios Raftopoulos (raftop@ucy.ac.cy) Department of Educational Sciences University of Cyprus P.O. Box 20537 Nicosia 1678,... more
Perceptual Learning Meets Philosophy: Cognitive Penetrability of Perception and its Philosophical Implications Athanassios Raftopoulos (raftop@ucy.ac.cy) Department of Educational Sciences University of Cyprus P.O. Box 20537 Nicosia 1678, Cyprus Abstract The undermining of the cognitive impenetrability of perception has led to the abolition of the distinction between seeing and seeing as, clearing the way for the relativistic theories of science and meaning, since perception becomes theory—laden. Hence the existence of a theory-neutral basis, on which a rational choice among alternative theories could be based, is rejected and scientific theories become incommensurable. One of the arguments against the cognitive impenetrability of perception is based on evidence from neuroscientific studies that suggest the plasticity of the visual cortex, in the sense that there can be some local rewiring of the neural circuitry of the early visual system, as a result of experience. This is taken to ...
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Young Children’s Construction of Operational Definitions in Magnetism: the role of cognitive readiness and scaffolding the learning environment Constantinos P. Constantinou (c.p.constantinou@ucy.ac.cy), Athanassios Raftopoulos... more
Young Children’s Construction of Operational Definitions in Magnetism: the role of cognitive readiness and scaffolding the learning environment Constantinos P. Constantinou (c.p.constantinou@ucy.ac.cy), Athanassios Raftopoulos (raftop@ucy.ac.cy), George Spanoudis (spanoud@ucy.ac.cy) Department of Educational Sciences, University of Cyprus P.O. Box 20537, 1678 Nicosia, Cyprus. Abstract In this paper, we examine the importance of scaffolding the environment and the role of cognitive readiness in young childrens’ construction of operational definitions in magnetism. We discuss various resource constraints and the conceptual background of preschoolers. Then we present an experimental study of 165 children aged 4-6 who took part in an extended structured intervention in which they were guided to construct two operational definitions of a magnet. The two definitions differed with regard to the cognitive demands imposed upon the children attempting to construct them. The construction of the...
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In this chapter, I examine the repercussions of the cognitive impenetrability of early vision and cognitive penetrability of late vision for the epistemic role of visual perception and for the constructivist claim that our access to the... more
In this chapter, I examine the repercussions of the cognitive impenetrability of early vision and cognitive penetrability of late vision for the epistemic role of visual perception and for the constructivist claim that our access to the world is mediated through our concepts.
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This book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neither is it affected directly by cognition, nor does cognition affect its epistemic role. It also argues that late vision, even though it is... more
This book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neither is it affected directly by cognition, nor does cognition affect its epistemic role. It also argues that late vision, even though it is cognitively penetrated and, thus, affected by concepts, is still a perceptual state that does not involve any discursive inferences and does not belong to the space of reasons. Finally, an account is given as to how cognitive states with symbolic content could affect perceptual states with iconic, analog content, during late vision. This book is, thus, about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs. It examines the impact of the epistemic role of perception in defining cognitive penetrability and the relation between the epistemic role of perceptual stages and the kinds (direct or indirect) of cognitive effects on perceptual processing. Table of contents : Preface......Page 7 Series Editors’ Preface......Page 11 Acknowledgements......Page 12 Contents......Page 14 Abbreviations......Page 18 1 Introduction......Page 19 2 Cognitive Effects on Perception and the Epistemic Problems They Pose for Perception......Page 32 3 Siegel’s Inferentialism......Page 44 3.1 Ways in Which Cognition Affects Perception......Page 55 3.2 Illicit Perception and Illicit Inferences......Page 64 3.3 Inferences in Perception......Page 71 4 Externalism: Perceptual Justification vs. Perceptual Grounding......Page 74 References......Page 96 1 Introduction......Page 102 2.1 Pylyshyn......Page 110 2.2 Macpherson......Page 116 2.3 Stokes......Page 119 2.4 Siegel......Page 124 2.5 Wu......Page 132 3 A New Definition of CP......Page 134 4 The Epistemic Role of Early and Late Vision......Page 141 5 How Do Cognition and Perception Interact?......Page 143 5.1 The Argument......Page 146 5.2 How Do Cognitive States Modulate Perceptual Processing in Late Vision?......Page 149 5.3 IEV and EEV: Direct and Indirect Cognitive Effects on Perception......Page 169 References......Page 171 1 Introduction......Page 176 2.1 Operational Constraints......Page 179 2.2 Perceptual Learning......Page 186 3 Early Vision: Why Early Vision Is Not Affected Directly by Cognition Part 2......Page 190 3.1 The MT/V5 to V1, V2 Interaction in Early Vision (First Pass)......Page 194 3.2 Assessing the Evidence Thus Far......Page 198 3.3 What About Modules?......Page 199 3.4 Is the Content of Early Vision Philosophically Speaking Significant?......Page 201 4 Recurrent Processes of Early Vision Do Not Involve Cognitive Information: Why Early Vision Is Not Affected Directly by Cognition Part 3......Page 202 4.1 Recurrent Processing Between MT/V5 and V1, V2 (Second Pass)......Page 203 4.2 Other Types of Early Recurrent Interactions in Early Vision and the Role of FEF......Page 208 4.3 Does Early Object Recognition Entail the CP of Early Vision (Again)?......Page 215 5 Pre-cueing Effects in Perception: Why Early Vision Is Not Affected Directly by Cognition Part 4......Page 216 References......Page 229 1 Introduction......Page 239 2 Indirect Cognitive Effects on Early Vision and Their Epistemic Impact......Page 241 3 The CP of Late Vision Does Not Justify Constructivism......Page 247 4 Concluding Discussion......Page 260 References......Page 265 1 Introduction......Page 267 2 Early Vision......Page 272 3 Late Vision......Page 277 4.1 The Problem......Page 290 4.2 Beliefs......Page 292 4.3 Inference......Page 294 4.4 Late Vision, Hypothesis Testing, and Inference......Page 296 4.4.1 Perceptual Beliefs and Pattern Matching in Dynamic Neural Networks......Page 303 4.4.2 Ambiguous Figures: An Exemplification of the Matching Process......Page 313 5.1 Late Vision Is More Than Object Recognition......Page 324 5.2 Late Vision as a Synergy of Bottom-Up and Top-Down Information Processing......Page 325 6 Beliefs: Take Two......Page 335 7 Late Vision, Amodal Completion, and Inference......Page 339 8 Concluding Discussion......Page 344 References......Page 348 References......Page 355 Index......Page 381
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I have argued (Raftopoulos, 2009, 2014) that early vision is not directly affected by cognition since its processes do not draw on cognition as an informational resource; early vision processes do not operate over cognitive contents,... more
I have argued (Raftopoulos, 2009, 2014) that early vision is not directly affected by cognition since its processes do not draw on cognition as an informational resource; early vision processes do not operate over cognitive contents, which is the essence of the claim that perception is cognitively penetrated; early vision is cognitively impenetrable. Recently it has been argued that there are cognitive effects that affect early vision, such as the various pre-cueing effects guided by cognitively driven attention, which suggests that early vision is cognitively penetrated. In addition, since the signatures of these effects are found in early vision it seems that early vision is directly affected by cognition since its processes seem to use cognitive information. I defend the cognitive impenetrability of early vision in three steps. First, I discuss the problems the cognitively penetrability of perception causes for the epistemic role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs. Sec...
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Firestone & Scholl (F&S) examine, among other possible cognitive influences on perception, the effects of peripheral attention and conclude that these effects do not entail cognition directly affecting perception. Studies in neuroscience... more
Firestone & Scholl (F&S) examine, among other possible cognitive influences on perception, the effects of peripheral attention and conclude that these effects do not entail cognition directly affecting perception. Studies in neuroscience with other forms of attention, however, suggest that a stage of vision, namely late vision, is cognitively penetrated mainly through the effects of cognitively driven spatial and object-centered attention.
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Research Interests: Optics, Philosophy, Property, Causality, Generalization, and 15 morePositivism, Reasoning, Method, Colour, Light, Mechanism, Proof, Argument, Hypothesis, Refraction, Erkenntnis, Phenomena, PRISM, Generalisation, and Elimination
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In this chapter we offer a dynamical account of types of conceptual change both at the cognitive and the mathematical level. Our aim is to show that some classes of neural models can implement the types of change that we have proposed... more
In this chapter we offer a dynamical account of types of conceptual change both at the cognitive and the mathematical level. Our aim is to show that some classes of neural models can implement the types of change that we have proposed elsewhere. First, we introduce certain types of change that purport to account for the kinds of conceptual change observed in human development. These types are first described at the cognitive level. In the second part of the chapter, we discuss the mathematical/representational level realizations of the cognitive level representations and we claim that the latter can be depicted as points in the system’s activational landscape. The concepts of attractors and basins of attraction are introduced and their role is discussed. Our guide in developing our account is the dynamical connectionist theory. In the third part of the chapter we offer a dynamical account of the types of change and we claim that, at this level, conceptual change can be modeled as a ...
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ABSTRACT
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ABSTRACT The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the... more
ABSTRACT The paper argues that the reference of perceptual demonstratives is fixed in a causal nondescriptive way through the nonconceptual content of perception. That content consists first in spatiotemporal information establishing the existence of a separate persistent object retrieved from a visual scene by the perceptual object segmentation processes that open an object-file for that object. Nonconceptual content also consists in other transducable information, that is, information that is retrieved directly in a bottom-up way from the scene (motion, shape, etc). The nonconceptual content of the mental states induced when one uses a perceptual demonstrative constitutes the mode of presentation of the perceptual demonstrative that individuates but does not identify the object of perceptual awareness and allows reference to it. On that account, perceptual demonstratives put us in a de re relationship with objects in the world through the non-conceptual information retrieved directly from the objects in the environment.
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1. Reference, perception, and realism Athanassios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer, 2. Towards an (improved) interdisciplinary investigation of demonstrative reference Amanda Brovold and Rick Grush, 3. Visual demonstratives Mohan Matthen,... more
1. Reference, perception, and realism Athanassios Raftopoulos and Peter Machamer, 2. Towards an (improved) interdisciplinary investigation of demonstrative reference Amanda Brovold and Rick Grush, 3. Visual demonstratives Mohan Matthen, 4. Losing grip on the world: from ...
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I argue that emotive states affect perceptual processing either directly or indirectly with latencies that fall within late vision and not early vision. These effects differ from the effects of, and are subserved by different neuronal... more
I argue that emotive states affect perceptual processing either directly or indirectly with latencies that fall within late vision and not early vision. These effects differ from the effects of, and are subserved by different neuronal mechanisms than those that subserve, attentional effects on perception, although the two sorts of effects may interact. It follows that the emotive effects found in perception do not entail either the cognitive penetrability of early vision or its emotional penetrability.
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Hintikka (1997, 1998) argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the... more
Hintikka (1997, 1998) argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the phenomena it purports to explain; knowledge is not enhanced until the hypothesis undergoes a further inductive process that will test it against empirical evidence. Hintikka, therefore, introduces a wedge between the abductive process properly speaking and the inductive process of hypothesis testing. Similarly, Minnameier (2004) argues that abduction differs from the inference to the best explanation (IBE) since the former describes the process of generation of theories, while the latter describes the, inductive, process of their evaluation. As Hintikka so Minnameier traces this view back to Peirce's work on abduction. Recent work on abduction (Gabbay and Wood 2005) goes as far as to draw a distinction between abducting an hypothesis that is considered worth conjecturing and the decision either to use further this hypothesis to do some inferential work in the given domain of enquiry, or to test it experimentally. The latter step, when it takes place, is an inductive mode of inference that should be distinguished from the abductive inference that led to the hypothesis. In this paper, I argue that in real scientific practise both the distinction between a properly speaking abductive phase and an inductive phase of hypothesis testing and evaluation, and the distinction between testing an hypothesis that has been discovered in a preceding abduction and releasing or activating the same hypothesis for further inferential work in the domain of enquiry in which the ignorance problem arose in the first place are blurred because all these processes form an inextricable whole of theory development and elaboration and this defies and any attempt to analyze this intricate process into discrete well defined steps. Thus, my arguments reinforce Magnani's (2014) view on abduction and its function in scientific practise.
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The Macpherson (Philos Phenomenol Res 84(1):24–62, 2012) argued that the perceptual experience of colors is cognitively penetrable (CP). Macpherson also thinks that perception has nonconceptual content (NCC) because this would provide a... more
The Macpherson (Philos Phenomenol Res 84(1):24–62, 2012) argued that the perceptual experience of colors is cognitively penetrable (CP). Macpherson also thinks that perception has nonconceptual content (NCC) because this would provide a good explanation for several phenomena concerning perceptual experience. To have both, Macpherson must defend the thesis that the CP of perception is compatible with perception having NCC. Since the classical notion of CP of perception does not allow perception to have NCC, Macpherson (Cognitive effects on perception: new philosophical perspectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) proposes CP-lite. CP-lite makes room for an experience to have content determined by concepts because the perceptual processes that produce the experience are affected by concepts rendering the experience, CP, while the same type of experience could have been had without any conceptual influences, in which case it would be CI. Macpherson then proceeds to show that CP-lite is compatible with some of the definitions of NCC. To do so, she argues that even when an experience is CP owing to the fact that it is produced by means of the mechanism posited by CP-lite, that is, through the interaction between bottom–up pure perception and top– down perceptual imagery, its content is NCC because it has the basic properties that characterize NCC. Based on this, Macpherson proceeds to criticize and undermine the definitions of NCC that are incompatible with CP-lite. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of CP-lite rests on the erroneous assumption that a state with conceptual content and a state with NCC can have the same phenomenology or content, and that the compatibility of CP-lite with NCC presupposes a view of NCC that does not conform to the usual construal of NCC.
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— Any discussion concerning representations in cognitive psychology and science assumes that mental representational contents are carried by brain representational vehicles. Recently Sedivy attacked the view that mental contents are... more
— Any discussion concerning representations in cognitive psychology and science assumes that mental representational contents are carried by brain representational vehicles. Recently Sedivy attacked the view that mental contents are carried by vehicles. Sedivy relies on Dennett's work to argue that mental contents cannot be carried by vehicles because the former cannot be independently individuated whereas the latter are, by definition, independently individuated by means of their semantic properties. In this paper, I claim that mental contents are carried by neural vehicles and that Sedivy misunderstands Dennett's work on the relation between the mental and the neural by confounding the algorithmic and the computational level of description. I analyze connectionist representations that Dennett favors and which are the most amenable to Sedivy's concerning the context dependency of contents on which Sedivy builds her arguments, and argue that in connectionism, there is a clear cut distinction between contents and vehicles that carry these contents.
In this paper we argue for a new role for experiment in science teaching and learning. Our proposition is based on the conception of experiment as an active ingredient of theory construction and not as a mere tool for theory testing. This... more
In this paper we argue for a new role for experiment in science teaching and learning. Our proposition is based on the conception of experiment as an active ingredient of theory construction and not as a mere tool for theory testing. This latter view is based on the classical conception of the mind-world interaction, according to which human action purports to test the validity of a tentative solution to a problem and follows after mental processing. We present the new framework that views the interactions with the environment as active ingredients of the mind's problem solving activity. We also adduce evidence for this new role of experiment from the history of science. Finally, we discuss the repercussions of this view of cognition, as the activity of a mind-environment inseparable whole for the role of experiment in knowledge construction.
I argue that emotive states affect perceptual processing either directly or indirectly with latencies that fall within late vision and not early vision. These effects differ from the effects of, and are subserved by different neuronal... more
I argue that emotive states affect perceptual processing either directly or indirectly with latencies that fall within late vision and not early vision. These effects differ from the effects of, and are subserved by different neuronal mechanisms than those that subserve, attentional effects on perception, although the two sorts of effects may interact. It follows that the emotive effects found in perception do not entail either the cognitive penetrability of early vision or its emotional penetrability.
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ABSTRACT In this paper, I claim that since (a) there is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and (b) cognitive penetrability (CP) and theory-ladenness are coextensive, the CI of early vision... more
ABSTRACT In this paper, I claim that since (a) there is a cognitively impenetrable (CI) stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and (b) cognitive penetrability (CP) and theory-ladenness are coextensive, the CI of early vision entails that early vision content is theory neutral. This theory-neutral part undermines relativism. In this paper, I consider two objections against the thesis. The one adduces evidence from cases of rapid perceptual learning to undermine my thesis that early vision is CI. The other emphasizes that the early perceptual system, in order to solve various underdetermination problems, relies on certain principles, which may be taken to constitute a sort of a theory about the world that affect early vision, rendering it theory-laden. Both objections purport to show that early vision is CP and theory-laden. Against this thesis, I argue that the evidence on which the two objections are based does not show that early vision is CP and is fully compatible with the view that early vision is CI.
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The undermining of the cognitive impenetrability of perception has led to the abolition of the distinction between seeing and seeing as, clearing the way for the relativistic theories of science and meaning, since perception becomes... more
The undermining of the cognitive impenetrability of perception has led to the abolition of the distinction between seeing and seeing as, clearing the way for the relativistic theories of science and meaning, since perception becomes theory-laden. Hence the existence of a theory-neutral basis, on which a rational choice among alternative theories could be based, is rejected and scientific theories become incommensurable. One of the arguments against the cognitive impenetrability of perception is based on evidence from neuroscientific studies that suggest the plasticity of the visual cortex, in the sense that there can be some local rewiring of the neural circuitry of the early visual system, as a result of experience. This is taken to constitute evidence that the early vision is cognitively penetrable. In this paper I argue that the evidence concerning perceptual learning does not entail the cognitive penetrability of perception. To that end I discuss the issue of perceptual learning...
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The present study investigates the ability of Down Syndrome (DS) adults to reason: (a) deductively with transitivity (linear and reverse relations) and categorical syllogisms (all-some relations); (b) inductively with classical verbal... more
The present study investigates the ability of Down Syndrome (DS) adults to reason: (a) deductively with transitivity (linear and reverse relations) and categorical syllogisms (all-some relations); (b) inductively with classical verbal analogies and non-verbal analogical reasoning (Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices); and (c) to retain information in short-term memory. The results have shown that: (i) The Down Syndrome adults did not differ from typically developing children, matched on expressive and verbal ability, in transitivity and non-verbal analogical thinking; (ii) they differed in categorical reasoning, classical verbal analogies and short-term memory. Application of a structural model demonstrated that, despite differences in slope means in the three measures, the structure of functioning within-and-across all domains of cognition tests and its growth pattern, equally reliable and coherent, goes in parallel for the Down Syndrome adults and the typically developing children. The results are discussed within the context of the two-group developmental and difference approach.
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ABSTRACT I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system.... more
ABSTRACT I comment on two problems in Glover's account. First, semantic representations are not always available to awareness. Second, some functional properties, the affordances of objects, should be encoded in the dorsal system. Then I argue that the existence of Glover's two types of representations is supported by studies on “object-centered” attention. Furthermore, it foreshadows a nondescriptive causal reference fixing process.
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This article presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of the mind. Thus, the architecture of the mind as specified by the theory is described... more
This article presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of the mind. Thus, the architecture of the mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypercognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. This article then specifies the types of changes that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive
development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the article and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience are discussed throughout.
development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the article and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience are discussed throughout.
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In this paper I discuss Newton's first optical paper. My aim is to examine the type of argument which Newton uses in order to convince his readers of the truth of his theory of colors. My claim is that this argument is an induction by... more
In this paper I discuss Newton's first optical paper. My aim is to examine the type of argument which Newton uses in order to convince his readers of the truth of his theory of colors. My claim is that this argument is an induction by elimination, and that the Newtonian method of justification is a kind of “generative justification”, a term due to T. Nickles. To achieve my aim I analyze in some detail the arguments in Newton's first optical paper, relating the paper with Newton's other writings in optics, and especially his early correspondence in defence of his theory of colors.
Research Interests: Philosophy and Erkenntnis
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Fodor has argued that observation is theory neutral, since the perceptual systems are modular, that is, they are domain-specific, encapsulated, mandatory, fast, hard-wired in the organism, and have a fixed neural architecture. Churchland... more
Fodor has argued that observation is theory neutral, since the perceptual systems are modular, that is, they are domain-specific, encapsulated, mandatory, fast, hard-wired in the organism, and have a fixed neural architecture. Churchland attacks the theoretical neutrality of observation on the grounds that (a) the abundant top-down pathways in the brain suggest the cognitive penetration of perception and (b) perceptual learning can change in the wiring of the perceptual systems. In this paper I introduce a distinction between sensation, perception, and observation and I argue that although Churchland is right that observation involves top-down processes, there is also a substantial amount of information in perception which is theory-neutral. I argue that perceptual learning does not threaten the cognitive impenetrability of perception, and that the neuropsychological research does not provide evidence in favor of the top-down character of perception. Finally, I discuss the possibility of an off-line cognitive penetrability of perception.
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This rejoinder attempts to show that Bickhard's criticism is irrelevant to our theory and epistemologically one-sided. It is irrelevant because our theory is pragmaticist and interactivist at a number of levels ignored by Bickhard. It is... more
This rejoinder attempts to show that Bickhard's criticism is irrelevant to our theory and epistemologically one-sided. It is irrelevant because our theory is pragmaticist and interactivist at a number of levels ignored by Bickhard. It is epistemologically one-sided because it assumes that interactivism is the only proper model of mind. Thus, we try to show that different approaches can be used to model different levels or phrases in the organization and development of the mind. The discussion focuses on how interactivism, connectionism, computationalism and experientialism may complement each other as tools for modeling cognitive architecture and change. We also try to respond to various other, less central, criticisms that Bickhard leveled against our theory.
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This article presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of the mind. Thus, the architecture of the mind as specified by the theory is described... more
This article presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of the mind. Thus, the architecture of the mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypercognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. This article then specifies the types of changes that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the article and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience are discussed throughout.