- Universität Hildesheim
Institut für Philosophie
Universitätsplatz 1
D-31141 Hildesheim
Germany
Lars Leeten
University of Hildesheim, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Aesthetics and Ethics, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy, Ethics, and 18 moreAncient Greek ethics, History of Philosophy, Phenomenological Ethics, Phenomenology of Language, Phenomenology, Modernity and Morality, History Of Modern Philosophy, Post-Truth, Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, Knowledge and Power, Trust, Tragedy (Philosophy), Ethics of Belief, Epistemic Injustice, Epistemic Trust, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Social Epistemologyedit
- Lars Leeten (PD Dr.) was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Hildesheim, a visiting professor in Brazil, a vis... moreLars Leeten (PD Dr.) was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Hildesheim, a visiting professor in Brazil, a visiting researcher at the University of Oslo, and a fellow at the Research Institute for Philosophy in Hannover. In 2016, he received his Habilitation; since 2017, he has been teaching philosophy at the University of Hildesheim. His main research interests include ancient and modern ethics, the philosophy of ordinary language, theories of discursive practice, and epistemology from an ethical and political perspective.edit
Die philosophische Ethik der Antike war praktische Einübung in das gute Leben. Dieses Buch untersucht, wie dies die Formen der Rede prägt, die die antike Ethik ausbildete. Es zeigt sich, dass diskursive Praktiken für sie immer auch... more
Die philosophische Ethik der Antike war praktische Einübung in das gute Leben. Dieses Buch untersucht, wie dies die Formen der Rede prägt, die die antike Ethik ausbildete. Es zeigt sich, dass diskursive Praktiken für sie immer auch Lebenspraktiken waren, die in Orientierung an Vorstellungen vom Guten und Richtigen zu gestalten sind. Zur antiken Ethik gehört wesentlich eine ethische Kultur der Rede. Diese Studie zeichnet zentrale Motive dieser diskursiven Kultur nach – von der Sophistik über die sokratische Dialektik bis zur hellenistischen Philosophie.
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Die philosophische Ethik sieht die alltägliche Verständigung über moralische Fragen vorwiegend als Vorform der rationalen Argumentation. Dabei ist unterstellt, dass Verständigung nur insofern etwas für die ethische Orientierung und... more
Die philosophische Ethik sieht die alltägliche Verständigung über moralische Fragen vorwiegend als Vorform der rationalen Argumentation. Dabei ist unterstellt, dass Verständigung nur insofern etwas für die ethische Orientierung und Konfliktbewältigung austragen kann, als sie die Form eines Begründungsverfahrens aufweist. Die konkrete Praxis der moralischen Verständigung ist aber offensichtlich ein vieldimensionales Geschehen, in dem ganz unterschiedliche Aspekte - logische und rhetorische, begriffliche und sinnliche, sprachliche und nichtsprachliche - auf komplexe Weise zusammenwirken. Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheint moralische Verständigung nicht nur als Streit um das moralisch Richtige, sondern auch als Prozess der konkreten ethischen Orientierung, als Arbeit an der Wahrnehmung, als ästhetische Selbstverständigung, als Praxis der Artikulation und Erzählung oder als leibliches Sinngeschehen.
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Wo von 'Freiheit' gesprochen wird, geht es gewöhnlich um das Handeln. Legt man aber zugrunde, dass wir uns die Welt aktiv durch den Gebrauch von 'Zeichen' erschließen, so ist damit auch für das Erkennen und Verstehen Freiheit... more
Wo von 'Freiheit' gesprochen wird, geht es gewöhnlich um das Handeln. Legt man aber zugrunde, dass wir uns die Welt aktiv durch den Gebrauch von 'Zeichen' erschließen, so ist damit auch für das Erkennen und Verstehen Freiheit vorausgesetzt. Dieses Buch geht dem Sinn dieser Voraussetzung nach. Dabei zeigt sich: Das theoretische Weltverhältnis als frei zu begreifen, bedeutet vor allem, sich die Verantwortung zu vergegenwärtigen, mit der alles Denken und Verstehen von Anfang an verbunden ist.
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Wittgenstein’s later writings, particularly the Philosophical Investigations, reflect a practice of self-transformation, a ‘work on oneself’. This article interprets this philosophical practice in the light of Pierre Hadot’s conception of... more
Wittgenstein’s later writings, particularly the Philosophical Investigations, reflect a practice of self-transformation, a ‘work on oneself’. This article interprets this philosophical practice in the light of Pierre Hadot’s conception of ‘spiritual exercises’. The Investigations display an interior dialogue of the self that speaks in different voices, which in many respects resembles ancient exercises of conversing with oneself. In contrast to its ancient precursors, however, these attempts at self-transformation do not aim at ideals of virtue or wisdom. Instead, Wittgensteinian exercises are meant to enable the subject to take a critical stance towards modern self-conceptions. The Investigations develop a practice of philosophical reflection that does not rely on a unified rational self, but builds on a continuous process of exploring oneself through exercise.
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It is often assumed that the concept of alētheia, or ‘truth’, in Gorgias of Leontini belongs to the art of rhetoric. Along these lines, it is usually understood as an aesthetic concept or even a mere ‘adornment’ of speech. In this paper,... more
It is often assumed that the concept of alētheia, or ‘truth’, in Gorgias of Leontini belongs to the art of rhetoric. Along these lines, it is usually understood as an aesthetic concept or even a mere ‘adornment’ of speech. In this paper, it is argued, by contrast, that Gorgianic alētheia is a definable criterion of speech figuring in the practice of moral education. While the ‘truth’ of a logos indeed has to be assessed on aesthetic grounds, the underlying concept of alētheia is predominantly ethical. For Gorgias, speech is ‘true’ when it promotes virtue (aretē) by being expressive of virtue. The principle stated in the opening passage of the Encomium of Helen, that a speaker has ‘to praise what is praiseworthy and to blame what is blameworthy’, explains precisely this understanding of alētheia.
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In his late 'A Plea for Excuses', John L. Austin suggests labelling his philosophy 'linguistic phenomenology'. This article examines which idea of phenomenology Austin had in mind when he coined this term and what light this sheds on his... more
In his late 'A Plea for Excuses', John L. Austin suggests labelling his philosophy 'linguistic phenomenology'. This article examines which idea of phenomenology Austin had in mind when he coined this term and what light this sheds on his method. It is argued that the key to answering this question can be found in Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception', which Austin must have been familiar with. Merleau-Ponty presents phenomenology in a way Austin could embrace: it is a method, it aims at description and uses reduction, it is a non-idealistic study of essence and interprets intentionality as 'operative'. In this light, Austin's method can be appreciated more fully.
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Dieser Artikel fragt, was es heißen kann, einer irreduziblen Perspektivität in epistemischen Praktiken Rechnung zu tragen. Zugrunde gelegt wird, dass Perspektivität auch im Bereich des Epistemischen nicht einer logisch-begrifflichen,... more
Dieser Artikel fragt, was es heißen kann, einer irreduziblen Perspektivität in epistemischen Praktiken Rechnung zu tragen. Zugrunde gelegt wird, dass Perspektivität auch im Bereich des Epistemischen nicht einer logisch-begrifflichen, sondern primär einer sinnlich-ästhetischen Logik unterliegt. Entwickelt wird diese Logik im Ausgang von Merleau-Pontys Wahrnehmungsphänomenologie. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden vier Aspekte entwickelt, die eine unaufhebbare Perspektivität dem Erkennen abverlangt: unabschließbare Bewegung, notwendige Horizonterweiterungen, Ertragen von Spannungen und die Möglichkeit anderer Horizonte. Sobald sich die Erkenntnispraxis von der traditionellen Idee einer endgültigen Einsicht in die ‚Sache selbst' löst, wie sie in den Begrifflichkeiten der Erkenntnistheorie überdauert, muss sie sich als ein konkretes innerweltliches Unternehmen begreifen, das ständig mit der Möglichkeit umzugehen hat, dass sich die Welt vielleicht besser, neu oder ganz anders verstehen ließe.
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The article examines a close link between Socratic dialectic and the sophistic discourse practice known as ‚antilogic‘. First, traditional assumptions are rejected, in particular the prejudice that antilogic is a kind of eristic that is... more
The article examines a close link between Socratic dialectic and the sophistic discourse practice known as ‚antilogic‘. First, traditional assumptions are rejected, in particular the prejudice that antilogic is a kind of eristic that is indifferent to truth, solely aiming at blindsiding the opponent. In order to develop an alternative perspective, antilogic is contextualized within the discursive climate of its time. In this way, antilogic can be interpreted as an educational practice attempting to determine the ‘right logos’ by generating contradictions. In conclusion, continuities between antilogic and dialectic become visible that shed light on their differences too.
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This article argues that Kant's attack on the ars oratoria in §53 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment is directed against eighteenth-century school rhetoric, in particular against the "art of speech" (Redekunst) of Johann Christoph... more
This article argues that Kant's attack on the ars oratoria in §53 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment is directed against eighteenth-century school rhetoric, in particular against the "art of speech" (Redekunst) of Johann Christoph Gottsched. It is pointed out that Kant suggests a revision of Gottsched's conception of "true eloquence," which was the predominant rhetorical ideal at the time. On this basis, and in response to recent discussions on "Kantian rhetoric," Kant's own ideal of speech is addressed. It emerges that he favors a culture of speech embedded in moral cultivation, which excludes any disciplinary form of rhetoric.
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This article discusses Seyla Benhabib's transformation of Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics. It focusses on her interpretation of communicative moral reason by reference to actual 'moral conversations'. While she does not draw on... more
This article discusses Seyla Benhabib's transformation of Jürgen Habermas's discourse ethics. It focusses on her interpretation of communicative moral reason by reference to actual 'moral conversations'. While she does not draw on universal pragmatics, Benhabib still claims that her ethical theory represents a form of universalism. This study argues that this claim is misleading: Benhabib's discourse ethics points to a culture of moral judgment that is essentially open to different kinds of moral thinking. Such a culture, however, needs moral humility and cannot appropriately be called 'universalism'.
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If we regard discursive practice as constitutive for the way we relate to the world, ourselves and others, then it is vitally important to ask how this practice can be formed or cultivated. For this reason, rhetoric has always been... more
If we regard discursive practice as constitutive for the way we relate to the world, ourselves and others, then it is vitally important to ask how this practice can be formed or cultivated. For this reason, rhetoric has always been closely connected to ethics. This article attempts to explicate this relationship. It revolves around ancient conceptions of rhetoric that do not aim at establishing a system or a theory of speech, but at cultivating speech as a practice of good life. This "rhetorical ethics" of antiquity remains instructive for contemporary thinking, since it points to a way of reflecting discourse that accounts not only for the content of speech but also for how it shapes human life. In particular, it is instructive for modern ethics, since it reveals that moral discourse can be regarded as a rhetorical practice too: it is not ethically neutral but has to be reflected upon as a practice of life.
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Der Beitrag fragt, welches Verständnis der universitären Lehre durch die an deutschen Universitäten geltenden Richtlinien nahegelegt ist. Bezugspunkt ist der ‚Qualifikationsrahmen für Deutsche Hochschulabschlüsse‘. Gezeigt wird,... more
Der Beitrag fragt, welches Verständnis der universitären Lehre durch die an deutschen Universitäten geltenden Richtlinien nahegelegt ist. Bezugspunkt ist der ‚Qualifikationsrahmen für Deutsche Hochschulabschlüsse‘. Gezeigt wird, inwiefern der administrativ leitende Begriff der 'Kompetenz' nicht in der Bildungsforschung, sondern in der Ökonomie und zwar genauer im 'Human Resource Management' beheimatet ist, und welches 'Bildungsideal' damit verbunden ist.
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This survey article describes the current state of research on the Greek sophists. It draws on recent work on the beginnings of rhetoric, overviews of sophistic thought and case studies on Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon and Prodicus. It is... more
This survey article describes the current state of research on the Greek sophists. It draws on recent work on the beginnings of rhetoric, overviews of sophistic thought and case studies on Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon and Prodicus. It is shown that the traditional notion of a sophistic antithesis to philosophy has lost further ground: While earlier "rehabilitations" of sophistic thought still use the dichotomous distinction of philosophy und sophistic, now any generic talk of "the sophist" should better be regarded as misleading.
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In Plato's Gorgias, Socrates makes pronounced use of 'rhetorical' means. While this has often been pointed out, it has rarely been asked which constitutive features are shared by Socrates' and Gorgias' discursive practices. This article... more
In Plato's Gorgias, Socrates makes pronounced use of 'rhetorical' means. While this has often been pointed out, it has rarely been asked which constitutive features are shared by Socrates' and Gorgias' discursive practices. This article tackles this question based on the notion of logos that emerges in Gorgias' Encomium of Helen. It is claimed that Gorgias' was not concerned with a rhetorical technique but in fact with a practice of ethical formation. In this practice, or culture of speech, speakers bring virtue to bear by displaying virtuous ways of speaking. Socratic dialectic, as presented in the Gorgias, can be interpreted as bringing this discursive practice to perfection.
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This contribution examines the ethical dimension in the thinking of Jean-François Lyotard. It is shown that receptivity (passibilité) is crucial to its understanding. On these grounds, ethical responsibility can be... more
This contribution examines the ethical dimension in the thinking of Jean-François Lyotard. It is shown that receptivity (passibilité) is crucial to its understanding. On these grounds, ethical responsibility can be conceived as fundamentally different from the standard conceptions of
autonomy: ethical obligation has its sources in affection and is founded by a capacity of responsivity. This position is further developed by drawing on Lyotard’s thoughts on language in "Le Différend": the idea of a “sentence event” can be conceptualized within the framework of an ethics of dialogue, which leaves room for asymmetry, alterity, and transformation. The philosophy of the irreconcilable conflict
(différend) turns out to be a form of ethics in this sense.
autonomy: ethical obligation has its sources in affection and is founded by a capacity of responsivity. This position is further developed by drawing on Lyotard’s thoughts on language in "Le Différend": the idea of a “sentence event” can be conceptualized within the framework of an ethics of dialogue, which leaves room for asymmetry, alterity, and transformation. The philosophy of the irreconcilable conflict
(différend) turns out to be a form of ethics in this sense.
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In this article it is argued that the doctrine of Gorgias of Leontinoi, as expressed in his „Encomion of Helen“, is not a rhetorical technique but a practice of moral education. The medium of this „ethical speech practice“ is perceptual... more
In this article it is argued that the doctrine of Gorgias of Leontinoi, as expressed in his „Encomion of Helen“, is not a rhetorical technique but a practice of moral education. The medium of this „ethical speech practice“ is perceptual forms, its basic mode being the practice of showing or epideictic speech. The crucial standard of this practice is „epideictic rightness“, which is identical to Gorgias’ conception of „truth“ (ἀλήθεια). According to this conception, speech is true if it exemplifies morally right conduct and moral beauty. True speech in this sense must also be effective speech, since it will promote right behaviour in the future.
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It is sometimes suggested that scientific research is done by „mankind”, by the „scientific community” or some other sort of formal subject. Yet, more precisely, academic knowledge is generated within particular social groups. Using the... more
It is sometimes suggested that scientific research is done by „mankind”, by the „scientific community” or some other sort of formal subject. Yet, more precisely, academic knowledge is generated within particular social groups. Using the language of network analysis, one might say that academic knowledge emerges out of complex structures of „nodes and ties”. – This contribution suggests a critical use of network analysis in research and in the evaluation of science. It is argued that this can be achieved by incorporating social critique of knowledge into the ethics of science: As science is based on social practice, scientific knowledge claims cannot stand on epistemic grounds alone. Against this background the contribution sketches a scientific „culture of subtle distinctions“ and thereby accounts for the social constitution of knowledge.
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Es gilt als lobenswert, gut zuhören zu können, und man tadelt es, wenn jemand nicht gut zuhören kann. Daran zeigt sich, dass Zuhören keine Selbstverständlichkeit ist. Es geschieht nicht automatisch; es will offenbar gelernt sein. Dieser... more
Es gilt als lobenswert, gut zuhören zu können, und man tadelt es, wenn jemand nicht gut zuhören kann. Daran zeigt sich, dass Zuhören keine Selbstverständlichkeit ist. Es geschieht nicht automatisch; es will offenbar gelernt sein. Dieser Vortrag fragt nach der Fähigkeit des Zuhörens und ihrem Ort in Streitgesprächen. Wo Kontroversen – z.B. politische Debatten – die Form eines rohen rhetorischen Kampfes annehmen, geht das oft damit einher, dass man sich nicht mehr gut zuhört. Die Sachlichkeit der Auseinandersetzung scheint auch damit zu tun zu haben, dass die Beteiligten bereit sind, „sich etwas sagen zu lassen“. Dennoch spielt die Fähigkeit des Zuhörens in der Philosophie oder Argumentationstheorie kaum eine Rolle. Thematisiert werden fast ausschließlich Sprecher, die Gründe geben und Argumente entwickeln können; dass diese Sprecher auch hören und zuhören müssen, wird in der Regel ausgeblendet. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist zu fragen: Was bedeutet es, zuhören zu können? Kann man das Zuhören als argumentative Fähigkeit verstehen? Wie lernt man zuhören? Diskutiert werden diese Fragen in Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte der Philosophie, etwa mit Ansätzen der Antike und der Phänomenologie.
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It has been put into doubt that Protagoras represented an extreme relativism oder 'subjectivism', but the question what kind of endeavour it was, is still largely open for debate. This contribution attempts to interpret the Protagorean... more
It has been put into doubt that Protagoras represented an extreme relativism oder 'subjectivism', but the question what kind of endeavour it was, is still largely open for debate. This contribution attempts to interpret the Protagorean doctrine as an endeavour of cultivation, as opposed to an epistemological stance. For this purpose, traces of Protagoras' thinking in the extant fragments, in Hippocratic medicine, particularly in De vetere medicina, and in in Plato's Protagoras (320c-328d) are examined. It results that Protagoras aimed at a Culture of aretē and that the famous 'human-measure'-idea can be read against this background too.
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Vortrag im Philosophischen Kolloquium der Universität Hildesheim, Thema "Widerstand", April 2011
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Vortrag auf der Tagung „Fußball bewegt. Kontakt und Kultur im globalen Spiel“, Institut für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien, Universität Osnabrück, Mai 2010