- Scientometrics, Bibliometry, Science evaluation, Philosophy of Science, Research Policy, Bibliometrics, Sociology of Science, Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge, and 14 moreHistory of Contemporary Philosophy, Sociology of Philosophy, Scientometrics, History of Science, Historical Epistemology, Ian Hacking, Michel Foucault, Thomas S. Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan, Logical Empiricism, History of Philosophy, History of Ideas, and Impact of Social Sciences and Humanitiesedit
- I am a post-doc researcher (Assegnista di Ricerca) at the Department of Political Economy and Statistics, University ... moreI am a post-doc researcher (Assegnista di Ricerca) at the Department of Political Economy and Statistics, University of Siena. My main areas of research are scientometrics and philosophy of science. Currently, I am working on a project called "How Bibliometric Indicators Shape Science", funded by INET (Institute for New Economic Thinking). The main output of the project has been a paper published in PLOS ONE. The results were covered by Science, Nature, and Physics Today, as well as several Italian newspapers (Il Sole 24 Ore, Corriere della Sera, Il Fatto Quotidiano)
I obtained my Ph.D. at the Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences, University of Milan. My Ph.D. dissertation, that was judged "Excellent" by the Examining Committee (Prof. Achille Varzi, Prof. K. Brad Wray, Prof. Elisa Paganini), applied different citation analysis techniques to the recent analytic philosophy. During my Ph.D., I published a couple of studies on Scientometrics, the leading journal in the quantitative study of science.
I obtained my Master Degree in Philosophy in 2014 (110/110 cum laude) discussing a thesis on Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science.edit
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Science maps are visual representations of the structure and dynamics of scholarly knowledge. They aim to show how fields, disciplines, journals, scientists, publications, and scientific terms relate to each other. Science mapping is the... more
Science maps are visual representations of the structure and dynamics of scholarly knowledge. They aim to show how fields, disciplines, journals, scientists, publications, and scientific terms relate to each other. Science mapping is the body of methods and techniques that have been developed for generating science maps. This entry is an introduction to science maps and science mapping. It focuses on the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological issues of science mapping, rather than on the mathematical formulation of science mapping techniques. After a brief history of science mapping, we describe the general procedure for building a science map, presenting the data sources and the methods to select, clean, and pre-process the data. Next, we examine in detail how the most common types of science maps, namely the citation-based and the term-based, are generated. Both are based on networks: the former on the network of publications connected by citations, the latter on the network of terms co-occurring in publications. We review the rationale behind these mapping approaches, as well as the techniques and methods to build the maps (from the extraction of the network to the visualization and enrichment of the map). We also present less-common types of science maps, including co-authorship networks, interlocking editorship networks, maps based on patents’ data, and geographic maps of science. Moreover, we consider how time can be represented in science maps to investigate the dynamics of science. We also discuss some epistemological and sociological topics that can help in the interpretation, contextualization, and assessment of science maps. Then, we present some possible applications of science maps in science policy. In the conclusion, we point out why science mapping may be interesting for all the branches of meta-science, from knowledge organization to epistemology.
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It is several years since national research evaluation systems around the globe started making use of quantitative indicators to measure the performance of researchers. Nevertheless, the effects on these systems on the behavior of the... more
It is several years since national research evaluation systems around the globe started making use of quantitative indicators to measure the performance of researchers. Nevertheless, the effects on these systems on the behavior of the evaluated researchers are still largely unknown. For investigating this topic, we propose a new inwardness indicator able to gauge the degree of scientific self-referentiality of a country. Inwardness is defined as the proportion of citations coming from the country over the total number of citations gathered by the country. A comparative analysis of the trends for the G10 countries in the years 2000-2016 reveals a net increase of the Italian inwardness. Italy became, both globally and for a large majority of the research fields, the country with the highest inwardness and the lowest rate of international collaborations. The change in the Italian trend occurs in the years following the introduction in 2011 of national regulations in which key passages of professional careers are governed by bibliometric indicators. A most likely explanation of the peculiar Italian trend is a generalized strategic use of citations in the Italian scientific community, both in the form of strategic author self-citations and of citation clubs. We argue that the Italian case offers crucial insights on the constitutive effects of evaluation systems. As such, it could become a paradigmatic case in the debate about the use of indicators in science-policy contexts.
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In this brief note, I discuss two citation analysis-based studies in history of analytic philosophy that I recently published, highlighting some of their methodological features. In the first section, I sum up the two studies, focusing on... more
In this brief note, I discuss two citation analysis-based studies in history of analytic philosophy that I recently published, highlighting some of their methodological features. In the first section, I sum up the two studies, focusing on the three methodologies that were used (citation counting, co-citation analysis, and citation context analysis). In the second section, I advance three remarks on these studies. Firstly, I argue that citation analysis methods produce a formal representation of their object, i.e. they shed light on the form rather than the content of the object. Secondly, I argue that these methods have an ontological counterpart: they frame the object under study at the documental level. I point out that this level should be distinguished both from the intellectual level that is studied by the internalist history of philosophy and from the social level that is studied by the externalist history of philosophy. Thirdly, I point out that citation analysis allows to reach a panoramic point of view on the object under study. Such perspective unveils patterns that are invisible at the micro-scale and that are difficult to study by traditional methodologies. I argue in particular that we need to develop new theories and concepts to better understand the objects and phenomena we observe from this distant point of view. In the third section, I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of citation analysis. The main strengths are epistemological, heuristic, and methodological, whereas the weaknesses relate to the losses caused by the translation of object at the documental level, the risk of being distracted by mathematical properties that lack a clear interpretation, and the problems involved in the validation of the results. I conclude by stressing the need for an interdisciplinary research programme that integrates citation analysis, history of philosophy, and the social studies of science.
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In this letter, I reply to two insightful remarks made by Wray on a study I recently published on Scientometrics. First, I clarify the method I used to assess the transition of Analytic Philosophy to a normal science phase, explaining in... more
In this letter, I reply to two insightful remarks made by Wray on a study I recently published on Scientometrics. First, I clarify the method I used to assess the transition of Analytic Philosophy to a normal science phase, explaining in more details the epistemological role that different types of citations play. Second, I address the topic of the relationship between the normal science and the aging of the literature. I argue that more research is needed to understand the epistemological meaning of aging.
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This study analyzes how the accumulation of knowledge takes place in para-scientific areas, focusing on the case of Analytic Philosophy. The theoretical framework chosen for the analysis is Kuhn's theory of normal science. The methodology... more
This study analyzes how the accumulation of knowledge takes place in para-scientific areas, focusing on the case of Analytic Philosophy. The theoretical framework chosen for the analysis is Kuhn's theory of normal science. The methodology employed is qualitative citation context analysis. A sample of 60 papers published in leading Analytic Philosophy journals between 1950 and 2009 is analyzed, and a specific classificatory scheme is developed to classify citations according to their epistemological function. Compared to previous studies of citation context, this is the first paper that includes the temporal dimension into the analysis of citation context, in order to gain insights into the process of knowledge accumulation. Interestingly, the results show that Analytic Philosophy started accumulating after Second World War, but in a peculiar way. The accumulation was not matched by a corresponding rising consensus. This can be explained by the hypothesis that AP underwent a process of fragmentation in sub-fields during the second half of the century.
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Our aim in this paper is to present a quantitative approach to history of late analytic philosophy. In the first section, we focus on methodological issues. We discuss the relation between history of philosophy and metaphilosophy,... more
Our aim in this paper is to present a quantitative approach to history of late analytic philosophy. In the first section, we focus on methodological issues. We discuss the relation between history of philosophy and metaphilosophy, distinguish between qualitative and quantitative history of philosophy, and present the theoretical framework we choose for a quantitative study of late analytic philosophy, namely scientometrics and citation analysis. In the second section, we discuss the results of our method. We present a list of high-impact authors in late analytic philosophy, and we analyze the evolution of the field in the light of citational networks (science maps) generated by VOSviewer. Finally, we propose several lines for further research.
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In this chapter, I analyze how the three main paradigms of the classic philosophy of science (Neo-positivism, Kuhn, and Popper) differently frame the relationship between history and philosophy of science. Then, taking inspiration from... more
In this chapter, I analyze how the three main paradigms of the classic philosophy of science (Neo-positivism, Kuhn, and Popper) differently frame the relationship between history and philosophy of science. Then, taking inspiration from Popper’s thinking, I advance a new kind of integration between the two fields, and I show how such a normative historically oriented IHPS can fruitfully dialogue with contemporary science policy issues.
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In this chapter, I discuss the normative value of historical epistemology, focusing in particular on the notion of “epistemic norm” advanced by Daston and Galison in their book Objectivity. Drawing from arguments taken by Reichenbach,... more
In this chapter, I discuss the normative value of historical epistemology, focusing in particular on the notion of “epistemic norm” advanced by Daston and Galison in their book Objectivity. Drawing from arguments taken by Reichenbach, Kant, and Hume, I argue that historical description cannot have prescriptive force. Thus, historical epistemology cannot have a normative value. Nonetheless, I argue that it provides a useful critique of science, reminding scientists of the historical, contingent nature of scientific objects.
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Research infrastructures (RIs) are a vast and diversified group of organizations that provide scientific and technological support to research. They include experimental facilities and observational platforms, technological equipment, ICT... more
Research infrastructures (RIs) are a vast and diversified group of organizations that provide scientific and technological support to research. They include experimental facilities and observational platforms, technological equipment, ICT resources and services, and providers of access to data and other digital resources. Research Infrastructures for social sciences and humanities (SSH RIs) are mainly of the last kind, i.e., distributed e-infrastructures producing and preserving data for social scientific and humanistic research.
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Representations of research fields are devices that are used to grasp the inner structure of disciplines. They play a crucial role in the disciplinary life since they ease the fulfillment of many epistemic and social tasks (from... more
Representations of research fields are devices that are used to grasp the inner structure of disciplines. They play a crucial role in the disciplinary life since they ease the fulfillment of many epistemic and social tasks (from systematizing the intellectual content to organizing the cognitive labor of researchers, to manage appointments in the university). In the first part of the paper, I will distinguish between two types of field representations: top-down and bottom-up. The former are based on the assessment of the structure of research fields by experts, whereas the latter are based on computer algorithms. In the second part of the paper, I will focus on these ones and, by taking as an example co-citation maps, I will argue that they capture the latent forces that shape the intellectual action of the researchers contributing to a scientific discipline. These forces have both a negative and positive function (i.e., they are structuration forces). The negative function is to constraint the possible intellectual actions of the researchers, the positive is to enable the organized accumulation of knowledge by channeling information and reducing noise.
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In my intervention today I would like to tell you about the research I am working on for my PhD in Milan. First, I will provide you with the path that brought me to deal with the “quantitative approach” I mention in the title. Then, I... more
In my intervention today I would like to tell you about the research I am working on for my PhD in Milan. First, I will provide you with the path that brought me to deal with the “quantitative approach” I mention in the title. Then, I will show you some of the results I obtained during my visiting period at the Center for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS) in Leiden. I point out that some of these findings are still unpublished. It is the first time I present them to an audience. My research is currently in progress, so any feedback you will like to share with me, would be very helpful.
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This is the introductionary talk to the Workshop "Comparative History of Philosophy", held at the University of Milano on June 9, 2017. I present Giulio Preti's view about historiography of philosophy, with a focus on two major themes:... more
This is the introductionary talk to the Workshop "Comparative History of Philosophy", held at the University of Milano on June 9, 2017. I present Giulio Preti's view about historiography of philosophy, with a focus on two major themes: continuity versus discontinuity in history of philosophy and autonomy versus eteronomy of philosophy.
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Che cosa distingue la scienza dalla pseudo-scienza? Questa domanda è nota in filosofia della scienza come “problema della demarcazione” e sarà l’oggetto principale del mio intervento. Il mio interesse non sarà spiegare perché le persone... more
Che cosa distingue la scienza dalla pseudo-scienza? Questa domanda è nota in filosofia della scienza come “problema della demarcazione” e sarà l’oggetto principale del mio intervento. Il mio interesse non sarà spiegare perché le persone credono alle pseudo-scienze (problema psicologico) ma capire che cosa sono le pseudoscienze (problema epistemologico).
Distinguerò prima di tutto fra le semplici bufale (enunciati falsi) e le vere e proprie teorie pseudoscientifiche (es.: medicine alternative e teorie del complotto) e mi concentrerò sulle seconde. Quindi, introdurrò una definizione minimale di teoria (definita come complesso di proposizioni, concatenate secondo nessi logici, il cui scopo è spiegare i fenomeni), e affronterò una prima risposta al problema della demarcazione: la tesi secondo cui la scientificità di una teoria coincide con il suo essere vero, laddove una teoria pseudo-scientifica è tale perché è falsa.
Cercherò di mostrare come questa prima risposta, per quanto attraente nella sua semplicità, non sia sufficiente, dal momento che le possono essere mosse quattro obiezioni (problema dei termini teorici, theory-ladness delle osservazioni, olismo teorico e statuto della storia della scienza).
Introdurrò quindi la risposta di Karl Popper al problema della demarcazione: secondo Popper la marca di scientificità di una teoria è insita nella struttura logica della teoria stessa. Una teoria scientifica ha una struttura logica tale da essere potenzialmente falsificata dall’esperienza, mentre una teoria pseudo-scientifica è strutturalmente immune al verdetto dell’esperienza. Paradossalmente, quindi, una teoria pseudo-scientifica è sempre vera, perché non può essere falsa, mentre una teoria scientifica è tale, perché, potenzialmente, potrebbe essere resa falsa dall’esperienza (ovviamente questo non vuol dire che sia falsa).
Dal criterio di falsificabilità popperiano deriva un’immagine socratica dello scienziato: lo scienziato è una figura intermedia tra lo scettico (che pensa di non poter sapere nulla) e lo pseudo-scienziato dogmatico (che crede invece di sapere tutto). Lo scienziato, al contrario, è come Socrate: “sa di non sapere”, nel senso che è cosciente del fatto che il suo sapere, prima o poi, potrebbe essere falsificato dall’esperienza.
Distinguerò prima di tutto fra le semplici bufale (enunciati falsi) e le vere e proprie teorie pseudoscientifiche (es.: medicine alternative e teorie del complotto) e mi concentrerò sulle seconde. Quindi, introdurrò una definizione minimale di teoria (definita come complesso di proposizioni, concatenate secondo nessi logici, il cui scopo è spiegare i fenomeni), e affronterò una prima risposta al problema della demarcazione: la tesi secondo cui la scientificità di una teoria coincide con il suo essere vero, laddove una teoria pseudo-scientifica è tale perché è falsa.
Cercherò di mostrare come questa prima risposta, per quanto attraente nella sua semplicità, non sia sufficiente, dal momento che le possono essere mosse quattro obiezioni (problema dei termini teorici, theory-ladness delle osservazioni, olismo teorico e statuto della storia della scienza).
Introdurrò quindi la risposta di Karl Popper al problema della demarcazione: secondo Popper la marca di scientificità di una teoria è insita nella struttura logica della teoria stessa. Una teoria scientifica ha una struttura logica tale da essere potenzialmente falsificata dall’esperienza, mentre una teoria pseudo-scientifica è strutturalmente immune al verdetto dell’esperienza. Paradossalmente, quindi, una teoria pseudo-scientifica è sempre vera, perché non può essere falsa, mentre una teoria scientifica è tale, perché, potenzialmente, potrebbe essere resa falsa dall’esperienza (ovviamente questo non vuol dire che sia falsa).
Dal criterio di falsificabilità popperiano deriva un’immagine socratica dello scienziato: lo scienziato è una figura intermedia tra lo scettico (che pensa di non poter sapere nulla) e lo pseudo-scienziato dogmatico (che crede invece di sapere tutto). Lo scienziato, al contrario, è come Socrate: “sa di non sapere”, nel senso che è cosciente del fatto che il suo sapere, prima o poi, potrebbe essere falsificato dall’esperienza.
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Everyone who is interested in IHPS should tackle a number of methodological problems. Probably, the most urgent one is: which is the exact relationship between history of science and philosophy of science? This paper aims at... more
Everyone who is interested in IHPS should tackle a number of methodological problems. Probably, the most urgent one is: which is the exact relationship between history of science and philosophy of science?
This paper aims at reconstructing a seminal debate over this issue in IHPS and, in the light of some concepts extracted from it, proposing a research programme in science policy as a new, promising avenue for IHPS.
In the first part, I will reconstruct a phase in the genesis of IHPS where the methodological issue was at the very focus of research, namely the Sixties and Seventies discussions around the “historical turn” in Anglophone philosophy of science. In particular, I want to focus on the distinction between a descriptive and a normative philosophy of science.
In the second part, I will try to show how this apparently outdated dichotomy can gain theoretical room for a historically conscious philosophy of science that can have also a normative dimension. Indeed, there is an important aspect of the scientific enterprise that involves problems that need an integrated historical-philosophical approach: science policy. Science policy crosses fundamental historical-philosophical issues, like: what counts as science? How can we foster scientific progress? Which kinds of scientific research exist (applied, basic, high impact research, etc.)? Answering these questions requires a normative account of science and, at the same time, a detailed historical reconstruction of exemplary case studies. Since IHPS can provide both, I think that science policy could be a very interesting object for future IHPS research.
This paper aims at reconstructing a seminal debate over this issue in IHPS and, in the light of some concepts extracted from it, proposing a research programme in science policy as a new, promising avenue for IHPS.
In the first part, I will reconstruct a phase in the genesis of IHPS where the methodological issue was at the very focus of research, namely the Sixties and Seventies discussions around the “historical turn” in Anglophone philosophy of science. In particular, I want to focus on the distinction between a descriptive and a normative philosophy of science.
In the second part, I will try to show how this apparently outdated dichotomy can gain theoretical room for a historically conscious philosophy of science that can have also a normative dimension. Indeed, there is an important aspect of the scientific enterprise that involves problems that need an integrated historical-philosophical approach: science policy. Science policy crosses fundamental historical-philosophical issues, like: what counts as science? How can we foster scientific progress? Which kinds of scientific research exist (applied, basic, high impact research, etc.)? Answering these questions requires a normative account of science and, at the same time, a detailed historical reconstruction of exemplary case studies. Since IHPS can provide both, I think that science policy could be a very interesting object for future IHPS research.
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Talk given at the Annual Evaluation Day of the Doctoral School in Philosophy and Human Sciences at the University of Milan.
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In the last seventy years, the philosophical community, i.e the people professionally engaged in philosophy, has faced an immense growth, due to huge public investments in universities and research after the Second World War in Western... more
In the last seventy years, the philosophical community, i.e the people professionally engaged in philosophy, has faced an immense growth, due to huge public investments in universities and research after the Second World War in Western countries [Rescher 2005, Marconi 2014]. We can say that in no other period of the history of philosophy there were so many professional philosophers as in the last fifty years, as there were not so many scientists [Price 1963]. This quantitative increase questions the historian of contemporary philosophy in multiple ways. In the present paper I would like to address the methodological issues in historiography of philosophy related to this increase. Therefore I will ask which are the concepts and methods that we should use in order to understand properly the new situation of contemporary philosophical research. In particular, I will argue that traditional concepts and assumption used in writing the history of philosophy are today just partially fit to describe the contemporary evolution of philosophy. The historical object they aim to describe is transforming in such a way that they are more an obstacle than a help to its comprehension. In order to reach this conclusion, my contribution is structured in the following way. In the first part I will provide some quantitative data about the growth of philosophical enterprise in the second half of twentieth century; secondly, I will sketch an analysis of the key notions used in the traditional everyday work of the historian of philosophy. I will focus on the very workaday " toolkit " , which comprehend notions such as " author " , " text " , " tradition " , " philosophical school " and so on. In the third part, I will present some tensions to which these very commonplace notions are subject due to the quantitative growth of philosophy. In particular, I will attempt to show how the traditional notion of " author " as the central unit of history of philosophy is partially inadequate to describe contemporary philosophy. Hence, I will suggest that quantitative methods used in contemporary studies of science, such as scientometrics and science-mapping, can in part supply this inadequacy, opening at the same time new perspectives on the development of contemporary philosophy. Finally, in the light of the previous considerations, I will reflect upon the role of this non-standard history of philosophy in contemporary philosophical research, situating my view in the debate started with the collection of essays about historiography of philosophy edited by Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner in 1984 [Rorty-Schneewind-Skinner 1984].
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Nel presente contributo rifletto sulla categoria di autore nella storiografia della filosofia contemporanea, domandandomi se, alla luce dell'incremento quantitativo della comunità filosofica successivo alla II Guerra Mondiale, questa... more
Nel presente contributo rifletto sulla categoria di autore nella storiografia della filosofia contemporanea, domandandomi se, alla luce dell'incremento quantitativo della comunità filosofica successivo alla II Guerra Mondiale, questa nozione possa ancora essere efficace per scrivere la storia della filosofia contemporanea.
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The focus of the talk is the status and, consequently, the tasks of historical epistemology. In particular, the question at stake is the following: can the history of an epistemic norm bear a normative value in turn? This question raises... more
The focus of the talk is the status and, consequently, the tasks of historical epistemology. In particular, the question at stake is the following: can the history of an epistemic norm bear a normative value in turn? This question raises quite naturally when we consider inquiries in historical epistemology that deal with normative objects, such as the so-called epistemic norms. Indeed, I will use [Daston and Galison 2007] as a starting point for reaching the theoretical problem I want to discuss. I will try to distinguish three key meanings of normativity and then I will focus my attention on two historical moments where the notion of normativity was at the very heart of philosophy of science: I mean the times of logical empiricists, Hans Reichenbach in particular, and the Sixties Neo-positivistic reaction to Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions". I will show how these philosophical arguments, based on the notion of normativity, can be used as theoretical tools in order to provide an answer to my starting question. A line of reasoning borrowed from Kant's Critique of Practical Reason will be another useful theoretical source that I will use. Finally, by the means of these concepts I will provide an answer and, in the conclusion, I will reflect on what I think is the proper task of historical epistemology – a task that I will call “critique” in opposition to normativity.
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In the present paper I will focus on the notion of author as one of the more basic notion used in the historiography of philosophy. My purpose is to show how this notion, in spite of its widespread use in traditional historiography of... more
In the present paper I will focus on the notion of author as one of the more basic notion used in the historiography of philosophy. My purpose is to show how this notion, in spite of its widespread use in traditional historiography of philosophy, could engender a misleading account of the history of philosophy especially when applied to the contemporary historical situation of philosophical research, because of the quasi-exponential growth of the philosophical enterprise after Second World War . Thus I will argue that, in order to reach a more adequate and richer historical comprehension of the present of philosophy, we need to elaborate an alternative theoretical framework where the notion of author does not play anymore a central role.
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The topic of my presentation will be the application of scientometrics (in particular co-citation analysis) to the reconstruction of the recent history of philosophy. In particular, I will focus on how scientometrics can contribute to... more
The topic of my presentation will be the application of scientometrics (in particular co-citation analysis) to the reconstruction of the recent history of philosophy. In particular, I will focus on how scientometrics can contribute to reconstructing late analytic philosophy (i.e. analytic philosophy of the last 30 years).
My presentation will be divided in three parts. Firstly, I will deal with the difference between traditional historiography of philosophy, grounded on a qualitative methodology (close reading of texts), and the quantitative approach made possible by scientometrics. Secondly, I will discuss what is quantifiable of contemporary analytic philosophy, and, in particular, the sort of meaning we can attach to citation counting in history of analytic philosophy. Thirdly, I will present some results obtained with the science mapping software VOSviewer, using a co-citation analysis and a clustering algorithm. I will focus on the historiographical insights that can be gained by such data.
My presentation will be divided in three parts. Firstly, I will deal with the difference between traditional historiography of philosophy, grounded on a qualitative methodology (close reading of texts), and the quantitative approach made possible by scientometrics. Secondly, I will discuss what is quantifiable of contemporary analytic philosophy, and, in particular, the sort of meaning we can attach to citation counting in history of analytic philosophy. Thirdly, I will present some results obtained with the science mapping software VOSviewer, using a co-citation analysis and a clustering algorithm. I will focus on the historiographical insights that can be gained by such data.
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Le point de départ de mon présentation sera la croissance exponentielle de la connaissance scientifique dans le dernier siècle : aujourd’hui 2 millions de nouveaux articles sont publiée chaque année dans les revues scientifiques... more
Le point de départ de mon présentation sera la croissance exponentielle de la connaissance scientifique dans le dernier siècle : aujourd’hui 2 millions de nouveaux articles sont publiée chaque année dans les revues scientifiques (Pacchioni 2017). Cette situation pose des problèmes sérieux aux scientifiques, qui risquent de ne pas être en mesure de rester au courant des développements qui arrivent au-delà du leur propre micro-spécialisation. A ce propos, la scientométrie peut être d’aide aux scientifiques. Notamment, je vais me concentrer sur les « tool » de « science-mapping », qui, par des techniques de « citation analysis » (analyse citationelle), peuvent visualiser la structure d’un corpus de littérature scientifique, en révélant son structure. Grâce aux cartes de la science est donc plus facile pour les chercheurs découvrir quels sont les articles principaux dans un champ scientifique, aussi que les mots clés et les autours les plus importants.
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One of the most recent and promising branches of scientometrics is science-mapping, i.e. the graphical visualization, via network-maps, of the citational structure of scientific fields [Small 1999]. The so-called science-maps that result... more
One of the most recent and promising branches of scientometrics is science-mapping, i.e. the graphical visualization, via network-maps, of the citational structure of scientific fields [Small 1999]. The so-called science-maps that result from science-mapping software (such as VOSviewer) have different applications. For example, they can be used to individuate the paradigms of a field or to determine the hottest topics in a discipline for science-policy purposes [Morris & Van Der Veer Martens 2008]. Moreover, science-mapping has been showed to be an useful tool for historical reconstruction, since it offers a big-data view on the overall dynamics of a scientific discipline [Chen 2003]. In particular, it can be very useful to reconstruct the very recent history of science. However, until now science-mapping has been applied mainly to the history of hard sciences and bio-medical areas.
Therefore, in the present talk, we want to assess its application to the field of Humanities, selecting in particular two case studies: contemporary analytic philosophy and human geography. In the first section of the talk, we will present a preliminary mapping of these two fields, considering at the same time strengths and shortcomings of science-mapping as an historical tool for the Humanities (e.g. limited scope of the databases, selection-bias in the initial dataset, role of monographs in humanities). We will use both case studies as a driver for approaching a broader methodological reflection on the contemporary structure of humanistic research, focusing in particular on analytic philosophy and human geography.
Concerning contemporary analytic philosophy, we will present a general mapping of the content of the top journals in analytic philosophy, using data retrieved from Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science (WoS) and the science-mapping software VOSviewer. From the methodological point of view, we want to reflect on the historical notions that mapping involve, understanding how they are related to traditional historiographical categories, such as “author”. We will ask if it is plausible to speak of a transition from little philosophy to big philosophy after Second World War, in analogy with the famous study by Derek De Solla Price Little Science, Big Science [Price 1963]
Concerning human geography, we want to reconstruct historically the disciplinary path up to the current fragmented scenario of research. Moreover, we shall evaluate the influence of mainstream Anglo-American scientific literature on the Italian geographical research topics. Eventually, the reconstruction of the research landscape will help us drawing a first map of the discipline based on the recurrence of some keywords.
Finally, in the last part of the paper, we will suggest mapping interdisciplinarity in the Humanities as a promising direction for further research. Philosophy of mind could be an interesting case study to grasp the interactions between a humanistic area and scientific disciplines [Laydersdoff & Goldstone 2013].
We believe that the case studies taken in consideration in this talk are a good starting point for everyone who is interested in understanding contemporary knowledge dynamics in the Humanities, as well as the overall epistemic flow between Humanities and Sciences in the actual intellectual landscape.
Therefore, in the present talk, we want to assess its application to the field of Humanities, selecting in particular two case studies: contemporary analytic philosophy and human geography. In the first section of the talk, we will present a preliminary mapping of these two fields, considering at the same time strengths and shortcomings of science-mapping as an historical tool for the Humanities (e.g. limited scope of the databases, selection-bias in the initial dataset, role of monographs in humanities). We will use both case studies as a driver for approaching a broader methodological reflection on the contemporary structure of humanistic research, focusing in particular on analytic philosophy and human geography.
Concerning contemporary analytic philosophy, we will present a general mapping of the content of the top journals in analytic philosophy, using data retrieved from Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science (WoS) and the science-mapping software VOSviewer. From the methodological point of view, we want to reflect on the historical notions that mapping involve, understanding how they are related to traditional historiographical categories, such as “author”. We will ask if it is plausible to speak of a transition from little philosophy to big philosophy after Second World War, in analogy with the famous study by Derek De Solla Price Little Science, Big Science [Price 1963]
Concerning human geography, we want to reconstruct historically the disciplinary path up to the current fragmented scenario of research. Moreover, we shall evaluate the influence of mainstream Anglo-American scientific literature on the Italian geographical research topics. Eventually, the reconstruction of the research landscape will help us drawing a first map of the discipline based on the recurrence of some keywords.
Finally, in the last part of the paper, we will suggest mapping interdisciplinarity in the Humanities as a promising direction for further research. Philosophy of mind could be an interesting case study to grasp the interactions between a humanistic area and scientific disciplines [Laydersdoff & Goldstone 2013].
We believe that the case studies taken in consideration in this talk are a good starting point for everyone who is interested in understanding contemporary knowledge dynamics in the Humanities, as well as the overall epistemic flow between Humanities and Sciences in the actual intellectual landscape.
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Qu'est-ce que l'« épistémologie historique » ? À cette question ce volume répond en esquissant le portrait d’un Janus bifrons, dont l’une des faces est tournée vers le « style français » traditionnel en histoire des sciences et l’autre... more
Qu'est-ce que l'« épistémologie historique » ? À cette question ce volume répond en esquissant le portrait d’un Janus bifrons, dont l’une des faces est tournée vers le « style français » traditionnel en histoire des sciences et l’autre vers les avancées épistémologiques anglo-saxonnes les plus contemporaines. Quels sont les échanges, les continuités et décalages, les convergences et divergences entre des philosophes ou historiens des sciences aussi divers que Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault, Ian Hacking, Hans- Jörg Rheinberger, Peter Galison ou Lorraine Daston ? De même que l’on peut distinguer différentes époques et versions de l’épistémologie historique et de l’historical epistemology, de même les « méthodes » mobilisées dans des contextes scientifiques particuliers sont très diverses. Ce volume vise à réfléchir plus avant, à partir de l’étude de cas précis, sur les modalités selon lesquelles des objets et des concepts émergent historiquement à l’intérieur des diverses sciences. Les objets mathématiques ont-ils une histoire ? Comment des sujets humains sont-ils devenus les objets d’une science de l’observation ? Le traitement statistique des données est-il la seule issue possible pour les sciences médicales ? En donnant ces exemples, parmi d’autres, des possibilités d’interactions entre sciences, philosophie et histoire, ce volume veut montrer que l’épistémologie historique n’est pas un « livre de recettes » méthodologiques, mais bien plutôt un champ de questionnement ouvert : la flexibilité de l’épistémologie historique lui permet de répondre à bon nombre des défis posés par la philosophie des sciences contemporaine.
Research Interests: Philosophy of Science, History of Science, Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault, and 15 moreHistorical Epistemology, Ian Hacking, Histoire Des Sciences, History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Philosophie, Epistémologie et Histoire Des Sciences, Philosophy and history of science, Philosophie Des Sciences, Histoire Des Sciences Humaines, Histoire des sciences de l'homme, Histoire & Philosophie Des Sciences, Philosophie & Histoire des sciences, Epistémologie Historique, History and Philosophy of Science, Integrated HPS, and Histoire des sciences et des techniques
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"How do we best design social institutions for the advancement of learning? The philosophers have ignored the social structure of science. The point, however, is to change it". Through this Marxian-flavoured plea, 27 years ago the... more
"How do we best design social institutions for the advancement of learning? The philosophers have ignored the social structure of science. The point, however, is to change it". Through this Marxian-flavoured plea, 27 years ago the philosopher Philip Kitcher invited philosophers to care about the social structure of science. Kitcher’s invitation had both a descriptive and a normative purpose, by aiming not only to understand how science works, but also how to modify and ameliorate its functioning.
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L’Italia ha tradizionalmente investito poco nella ricerca. Ma ora che la crisi sembra abbia allentato la propria morsa, e con l’economia del Paese che sta registrando i primi segnali di crescita, è il momento giusto per invertire la... more
L’Italia ha tradizionalmente investito poco nella ricerca. Ma ora che la crisi sembra abbia allentato la propria morsa, e con l’economia del Paese che sta registrando i primi segnali di crescita, è il momento giusto per invertire la rotta. Proponiamo di partire dal gradino più “basso”, eppure spesso più creativo e cruciale, del sistema della ricerca: il Dottorato di Ricerca.
La nostra proposta è che il Dottorato di Ricerca sia valorizzato sotto due aspetti: il suo ruolo nella società e la remunerazione che ne deriva. Questo è un investimento dovuto nel diritto allo studio ed è essenziale per arginare il trasferimento tecnologico verso l’estero derivante dalla “fuga dei cervelli”, dando dignità al Dottorato dentro e fuori dell’Accademia.
Alla luce di queste e altre considerazioni uno degli autori del presente articolo, rappresentante dei dottorandi alla Statale di Milano nel Senato Accademico che lo scorso anno ha varato un importante aumento, ha promosso una petizione per chiedere alla Ministra Fedeli di aumentare l’importo minimo delle borse di dottorato in tutta Italia.
La nostra proposta è che il Dottorato di Ricerca sia valorizzato sotto due aspetti: il suo ruolo nella società e la remunerazione che ne deriva. Questo è un investimento dovuto nel diritto allo studio ed è essenziale per arginare il trasferimento tecnologico verso l’estero derivante dalla “fuga dei cervelli”, dando dignità al Dottorato dentro e fuori dell’Accademia.
Alla luce di queste e altre considerazioni uno degli autori del presente articolo, rappresentante dei dottorandi alla Statale di Milano nel Senato Accademico che lo scorso anno ha varato un importante aumento, ha promosso una petizione per chiedere alla Ministra Fedeli di aumentare l’importo minimo delle borse di dottorato in tutta Italia.
Research Interests:
Queste sono le slide che ho utilizzato durante una lezione alla Laurea Magistrale in Biodiversità ed evoluzione biologica durante il corso di Storia e Filosofia delle Scienze (Prof. Guzzardi), all'Università di Milano. I principali temi... more
Queste sono le slide che ho utilizzato durante una lezione alla Laurea Magistrale in Biodiversità ed evoluzione biologica durante il corso di Storia e Filosofia delle Scienze (Prof. Guzzardi), all'Università di Milano.
I principali temi trattati sono i seguenti:
- La scienza come sistema autonomo all’interno della società: il ciclo della peer review.
- Evoluzione dei rapporti tra scienza e società: la sempre maggior richiesta di accountability.
- Le metriche e il ciclo integrato peer review-citation analysis: come gli indicatori scientometrici stanno cambiando la scienza.
- Alcuni problemi aperti
I principali temi trattati sono i seguenti:
- La scienza come sistema autonomo all’interno della società: il ciclo della peer review.
- Evoluzione dei rapporti tra scienza e società: la sempre maggior richiesta di accountability.
- Le metriche e il ciclo integrato peer review-citation analysis: come gli indicatori scientometrici stanno cambiando la scienza.
- Alcuni problemi aperti
Research Interests:
This is the abstract of the 20 hour course for Philosophy students at the Science and Technology Museum of Milan, that will take place between October and December 2017.
Research Interests:
Nel corso degli ultimi anni le digital humanities hanno visto uno sviluppo notevole, con la creazione di centri di ricerca e di numerose equipe multidisciplinari, all’interno delle quali informatici e specialisti in scienze umane e... more
Nel corso degli ultimi anni le digital humanities hanno visto uno sviluppo notevole, con la creazione di centri di ricerca e di numerose equipe multidisciplinari, all’interno delle quali informatici e specialisti in scienze umane e sociali (storici, archeologi, linguisti, storici dell’arte, ecc.) lavorano fianco a fianco a progetti ambiziosi. Grazie al costante sviluppo delle tecnologie digitali, i digital humanists dispongono di software sempre più sofisticati e performanti, che contribuiscono alla creazione di archivi fondamentali per la ricerca.
Tuttavia, parallelamente a questo sviluppo tecnico senza precedenti, si rende sempre più necessario interpretare gli “output” degli algoritmi. Per far ciò, c’è bisogno di una teoria “computazionale” che descriva il funzionamento dei software, ma anche di una teoria interpretativa che permetta di spiegare i resultati, collocandoli all’interno di quadri teorici più ampi. Quando si produce una “network analysis” con il software Gephi non si tratta semplicemente di spiegare come funzioni l’algoritmo, ma anche d’interpretare la mappa (si tratta di una rappresentazione della mentalità di un’epoca o della struttura socio-epistemica di una comunità?) e di domandarsi quale sia il suo contributo alla teoria generale della cultura (fa essa riferimento a delle dinamiche inaccessibili ai metodi tradizionali o ci conferisce invece un’immagine più classica della filosofia?).
L’obiettivo di questa giornata di studio è di proseguire questa riflessione teorica, mettendo in dialogo le digital humanities con la teoria e la metodologia proposte da Michel Foucault ne L’archeologia del sapere (1969). In questo testo Foucault sviluppa gli strumenti concettuali necessari per un’analisi del discorso che rigetta le categorie d’autore e di opera, le periodizzazioni tradizionali nonché le partizioni prestabilite tra i differenti campi scientifici. I concetti foucaultiani di enunciato, archivio, episteme e formazione discorsiva, possono contribuire allo sviluppo teorico delle digital humanities. Discutere la possibile riformulazione della storiografia delle scienze umane e della filosofia a partire da queste nozioni ci permetterà, tra l’altro, di attualizzare e rendere sempre più operativa la riflessione foucaultiana.
Tuttavia, parallelamente a questo sviluppo tecnico senza precedenti, si rende sempre più necessario interpretare gli “output” degli algoritmi. Per far ciò, c’è bisogno di una teoria “computazionale” che descriva il funzionamento dei software, ma anche di una teoria interpretativa che permetta di spiegare i resultati, collocandoli all’interno di quadri teorici più ampi. Quando si produce una “network analysis” con il software Gephi non si tratta semplicemente di spiegare come funzioni l’algoritmo, ma anche d’interpretare la mappa (si tratta di una rappresentazione della mentalità di un’epoca o della struttura socio-epistemica di una comunità?) e di domandarsi quale sia il suo contributo alla teoria generale della cultura (fa essa riferimento a delle dinamiche inaccessibili ai metodi tradizionali o ci conferisce invece un’immagine più classica della filosofia?).
L’obiettivo di questa giornata di studio è di proseguire questa riflessione teorica, mettendo in dialogo le digital humanities con la teoria e la metodologia proposte da Michel Foucault ne L’archeologia del sapere (1969). In questo testo Foucault sviluppa gli strumenti concettuali necessari per un’analisi del discorso che rigetta le categorie d’autore e di opera, le periodizzazioni tradizionali nonché le partizioni prestabilite tra i differenti campi scientifici. I concetti foucaultiani di enunciato, archivio, episteme e formazione discorsiva, possono contribuire allo sviluppo teorico delle digital humanities. Discutere la possibile riformulazione della storiografia delle scienze umane e della filosofia a partire da queste nozioni ci permetterà, tra l’altro, di attualizzare e rendere sempre più operativa la riflessione foucaultiana.