Aurel Kolnai

Traduzione integrale del saggio di Aurel Kolnai Der Ekel, pubblicato sullo Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung nel 1929. Un saggio importante e a lungo dimenticato che influenzò Dalì, Bataille, Sartre.

Allego qui l'introduzione di Kolnai e il § 1 del terzo capitolo del suo libro, sui sensi e il disgusto.

I consider that my books are a part of Germany’s moral an intellectual armament for the next war […] I am a disciple of Nietzsche, and take the greatest delight in a struggle for power wherever it occurs and whoever wins.
(Ernst Jünger, Evening Chronicle, 29.11.1929)

This paper aims to offer a concise overview of certain key features of the accounts of emotion defended by the early phenomenologists. After briefly presenting the movement of early phenomenology and describing its historical context, I shall elaborate the main claims about the emotions defended by this group, articulating them through the following five topics: 1) the stratification of emotional life; 2) the qualitative and phenomenal aspect of emotional experience; 3) the foundation of the emotions in cognitive acts; 4) the intentionality of the emotions; and 5) their moral dimension. The paper finishes with some concluding remarks about the significance of the early phenomenological discussion of the emotions for the debate on this topic in contemporary analytical philosophy.

In the face of longstanding philosophical debates on the nature of hatred and an ever-growing interest in the underlying social-psychological function of group-directed or genocidal hatred, the peculiar affective intentionality of hatred is still very little understood. By drawing on resources from classical phenomenology, recent social-scientific research and analytic philosophy of emotions, I shall argue that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinctive in three interrelated ways: (1) it has an overgeneralizing, indeterminate affective focus, which typically leads to a form of collectivization of the target; (2) short of a determinate affective focus, haters derive the indeed extreme affective powers of the attitude not in reaction to any specific features or actions of the targets or from some phenomenological properties of the attitude but, rather, from the commitment to the attitude itself; (3) finally, in sharing this commitment to hate with others, hatred involves a certain negative social dialectics, robustly reinforces itself and becomes entrenched as a shared habitus.

This collection of essays on twentieth-century poetry and poetics is written from a wide-ranging perspective, working analytically and comparatively with literature, music, video, film, architecture and performance art.
Bringing together readings of Virgil Thomson, Gertrude Stein, Max Jacob, Louis Feuillade, Rosmarie Waldrop, Frank Zappa, Bill Viola and Pierre Alechinsky, this book attempts to delineate the possibility of a truly transversal poetics, one which creates a space for a reconsideration of contemporary poetics while navigating the complex interactions between the theory and practice.

This paper is a bridge between my interest in the notion of philosophical nonsense and my interest in problems concerning ethics and action.  Geach sees an analogy between philosophical error and moral error, more specifically between the problem of understanding the state of mind of someone who is duped by philosophical nonsense and that of someone who ‘sins’.  In neither case does being confused oneself help one understand the confusion of others.  I argue that Geach gives us no good reason to believe that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and that, even if there is, there will be no real analogy between the states of mind in question.  For one thing, there is no obvious reason why there could not be ‘clear-headed sin’.  For another, one who ‘sins’ and one who does not often have the same sorts of difficulty understanding each other, whereas, if there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense, it is hard to see how there could be any such symmetry between one who is taken in by it and one who is not.

When one deliberates one has reasons both for and against doing something.  Could the reasons for OBJECTIVELY outweigh the reasons against, in the sense that someone who thought otherwise would simply be wrong?  (This is not the same question as that of whether any of the competing reasons could be objectively valid in itself.)  Three seemingly relevant kinds of ethical theory are examined: virtue ethics, utilitarianism and moral absolutism.  It is suggested that the proponents of these have all so far failed to show that they can give compelling objective reasons for acting on certain reasons rather than others.  We so far lack any conception of what sort of second-order considerations could adjudicate between competing reasons.  This is not so much an ‘error theory’ in J. L. Mackie’s sense as an admission of ignorance.

La «Enciclopedia Virtual del Pensamiento Fenomenológico» es un proyecto orientado a generar investigación científica básica en torno a la fenomenología. Este proyecto tiene por sede la Universidad La Salle-México. El propósito de la «Enciclopedia» es facilitar el acceso a investigadores, profesores, alumnos e interesados en general en el pensamiento fenomenológico, tanto a nivel científico como a nivel histórico. Dado que es «Virtual» permitirá la actualización permanente de las discusiones, bibliografía, conceptos, corrientes y autores que pertenecen a la cultura fenomenológica; de esa manera pretende servir como una herramienta de acceso rápido a los interesados en iniciarse y/o profundizar en esta tradición filosófica. Es por lo anterior que la «Enciclopedia» será una base de datos selectiva cuyo propósito es ayudar a conocer el estado del arte de la disciplina fenomenológica a nivel nacional, iberoamericano e internacional. Todos los contenidos publicados en la «Enciclopedia Virtual del Pensamiento Fenomenológico» deberán ser originales y serán sometidos a un proceso de revisión por pares expertos, nacionales e internacionales, en el área y en los autores sobre los que cada uno de ellos versa. Introducción: Objetivo: Ofrecer una Enciclopedia especializada en fenomenología donde se expongan los conceptos fundamentales, la vida, la obra, la biografía, influencias, obras publicadas y póstumas, publicaciones generales, análisis de las obras del autor y algunas traducciones inéditas relacionadas con el movimiento Cómo participar: La «Enciclopedia» recibirá constantemente las aportaciones enviadas por los aspirantes siempre que se ajusten a las normas de publicación que en esta convocatoria se publican: • El participante debe considerar los siguientes rubros como temas a abordar en la «Enciclopedia»:

In 1929 Aurel Kolnai published Der Ekel (On disgust), the first phenomenological account entirely devoted to the topic. In this paper the author will try to identify and make explicit his theoretical roots, by arguing (1) that aesthetics and cognitive psychology do not provide the very starting point of Kolnai’s thought; (2) that Kolnai’s analysis presupposes the work of Sigmund Freud and Max Scheler; finally (3), that Kolnai aims both at providing a new theory of disgust and at definitely detaching from psychoanalysis by reshaping Max Scheler’s value-ethics in a way that the author will call «practical».

Nel 1929 Aurel Kolnai pubblica Der Ekel (Il disgusto), il primo contributo fenomenologico interamente riservato all’argomento. Nel presente articolo, l’autore proverà a ricostruire e rendere nuovamente esplicite le radici teoriche del saggio, sostenendo che (1) estetica e psicologia cognitiva non costituiscono l’autentico punto di partenza della teoria di Kolnai; (2) che l’analisi di Kolnai presuppone l’opera di Sigmund Freud e Max Scheler; (3) che Kolnai aspira al contempo a presentare una teoria innovativa del disgusto e a prendere definitivamente le distanze dalla psicanalisi riformulando la scheleriana etica dei valori in un senso che l’autore definisce «pratico».

Disgust and fear are very similar. Both seem to be a reaction of defense. The very sense of fear is nonetheless clear enough, that of disgust is not. Fear defends a person from something dangerous; disgust defends a person too, but the danger (if there is) that elicits it is absolutely obscure. In this paper, I will try to clarify in what consists the function of disgust and provide a criterion to identify its object. Basing my analysis on those carried out by Aurel Kolnai and Jean-Paul Sartre, I will claim that fear concerns the very existence of a person, while disgust its very value.

There is stock argument against libertarianism: that the indeterminism it postulates makes human choice a matter of chance and this is no better as a basis for practical rationality and moral responsibility than the most rigid determinism.  I suggest that a similar problem arises on deterministic assumptions: although human choice is no longer a matter of mere chance, it remains arbitrary since whatever explains a person’s choice to act on the reasons for an action rather than those against, it is not a matter of reasons that were reasons FOR THAT PERSON.  The explanatory gap is closed in the wrong way for the impression of sheer arbitrariness to be cancelled.  I discuss (via a digression on F. H. Bradley) whether Davidson’s ‘anomalous monism’ would, if correct, necessitate any modification to this conclusion.  I also ask how the problem addressed in this paper relates to Galen Strawson’s rejection of the possibility of complete autonomy or self-determination.

Gilbert 19:8 (July-August 2016): 16. Reprinted in Chesterton Review XLIII: 1-2 (Spring/Summer 2017): 235-238. This "Miscellany of Men" column is a biographical sketch of the Hungarian-Jewish born journalist, political philosopher, and Catholic convert who left Germany and lived and worked in England, Switzerland, Canada, and the US.

The aim of this paper is to compare the approaches of Ernst Cassirer and Aurel Kolnai on the idea of the nation state in its most radical form, which consists of identifying national sovereignty with an unrestricted right of the nation to political, external, and internal self-determination. What the comparison attempted here focuses on, is the criticism on the conditions for the possibility of specific German nationalism, presented by Cassirer in his Myth of the State and by Kolnai in his War Against the West. According to the main thesis of this paper, insofar as both Cassirer and Kolnai recognized the role played in politics by emotions and considered political
phenomena as being constituted by not only rational or at least calculable mechanisms, but also affective factors, like beliefs, religion, and myth, they tended to consider nationalism in terms of the politics of “regression,” understood, psychoanalytically, as a reversion of mental life, in some respects, to a former, or less developed, psychological state, characteristic of not only individual mental disorders, but also social psychosis. It will be argued, that Cassirer and Kolnai, not unlike the representatives of the Frankfurt School, considered the contemporary preponderance of mythical thought in political philosophy to be an expression of the dialectic, which consisted in “relapsing” of the Enlightenment into mythology. As a main motive for the comparison of their political philosophies, an assumption will be presented in the paper, that, while taking into account the contemporary tendency to oppose national sovereignty to the sovereignty of international law, the approach to the idea of nation state, as presented by Cassirer and Kolnai, seems to be by no means out of date.

It has been maintained that disgust is a special form of fear (fear of contamination). In this paper I focus on Kolnai's claim that fear and disgust are two different emotions. My specific concern is the difference between fear and disgust with respect to the conditions of temporal and spatial proximity. In the two emotions the condition of proximity  has a different meaning, as I show also by reference to Aristotle's analysis of fear in the Rhetoric.

In this paper I claim that disgust has a logic. This logic does not let us differentiate aesthetic and ethical value judgements, and shows that there are cases in which they overlap. In order to show this, I will consider Aurel Kolnai’s phenomenological analysis of disgust.

This paper is a bridge between my interest in the notion of philosophical nonsense and my interest in problems concerning ethics and action.  Geach sees an analogy between philosophical error and moral error, more specifically between the problem of understanding the state of mind of someone who is duped by philosophical nonsense and that of someone who ‘sins’.  In neither case does being confused oneself help one understand the confusion of others.  I argue that Geach gives us no good reason to believe that there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense and that, even if there is, there will be no real analogy between the states of mind in question.  For one thing, there is no obvious reason why there could not be ‘clear-headed sin’.  For another, one who ‘sins’ and one who does not often have the same sorts of difficulty understanding each other, whereas, if there is such a thing as philosophical nonsense, it is hard to see how there could be any such symmetry between one who is taken in by it and one who is not.

Paper given on September 23rd 2021, 48th Annual IAPS Conference, Split/Croatia. Keynote 1: “Sport and the (Asian) Martial Arts Ethos”.
http://iaps.net/conference/48th-annual-iaps-conference/

In a good competition you bring out the best in each other. You want to beat your opponent when she is at her strongest; this is one aspect of sportsmanship. In popular games (e.g. football) we have been observing for more than a century that the ‘winning attitude’ (winning at all cost) has gained greater acceptance, to the detriment of the notion of sportsmanship. Players frequently fall down in the penalty area (simulation); they argue with the referee (disputing decisions), attempt to intimidate the referee (by squaring up to them), or they commit strategic fouls. All of this subverts the ‘good contest’.

Davidson and Kolnai in different ways emphasise that practical syllogistic reasoning can only tell one that one has a reason to do or not to do something.  It cannot adjudicate between conflicting reasons.  It can tell one the means to certain ends but not which ends to pursue.  This paper considers possible responses to this predicament.  What if anything can be done to put deliberation - the 'weighing' of competing reasons - on  a rational basis?

Most contemporary research on disgust can be divided into “disgust advocates” and “disgust skeptics.” The so-called advocates argue that disgust can have a positive influence on our moral judgment; skeptics warn that it can mislead us toward prejudice and discrimination. This article compares this disagreement to a structurally similar debate in the field of genocide studies concerning the phenomenon of “perpetrator abhorrence.” While some soldiers report having felt strong disgust in the moment of committing or witnessing atrocity, scholars disagree on whether such disgust is moral in nature. These empirical cases provide us with reasons to reconsider the normative features of disgust. Inspired by the conceptualization of disgust in Immanuel Kant and Aurel Kolnai, and as an alternative to both the disgust advocates and the skeptics, this article argues that the analogy of a stop sign can better help us define disgust responses.

Contribution to a work on Aurel Kolnai's The War Against the West edited by Wolfgang Bialas. Also published in German as Der Krieg gegen den Westen und Kolnais moralische und politische Theorie nach dem Krieg. I discuss the connections between the moral-theoretical and moral psychological themes of WATW and the papers he published in later years as a member of the philosophy departments of Laval University and Bedford College, London.

By making use of Aurel Kolnai's ethical writings I want to offer a more adequate understanding of moral conflicts and moral dilemmas. Insisting on Kolnai's phenomenological method, in particular, focussing on the agent's moral awareness (or conscience) and his deliberation, results in an understanding of moral conflicts as moments of moral choice rather than anomalies of moral theory. In this way, I argue that one can account for Bernard Williams's phenomenological description of moral conflicts without having to accept his anti-realist conclusions. Moreover, this approach indicates the adequacy of ordinary moral reasoning for decision-making and action guidance. Lastly and importantly, the essay illustrates the relevance of Kolnai's writings to contemporary moral philosophy.(Online publication September 22 2011)

Abstract:
The paper demonstrates how Kolnai's philosophy can contribute to the current discussion surrounding supererogatory acts. Kolnai's philosophy is at odds with much contemporary moral philosophy, resisting ideas of equality and homogeneity. Ridge and Archers' recent discussion of supererogation provides the critical backdrop for elucidating Kolnai's view and the paper shows how he engages with pluralism as part of his overall personalist view, whilst still retaining universal principles.

Aurel Kolnai, born in Hungary and mainly influenced by realist phenomenology, completed his dissertation in Vienna in 1926. After fleeing throughout Europe and living in the States and Canada for some years, he eventually left for the United Kingdom. While Kolnai’s early philosophical work (and his dissertation) mainly concentrated on ethics, he dedicated most of his time and work during the 30s and 40s to political-philosophical writings. But once in England, Kolnai became interested in the British moralists of the 19th-20th century and, in general, in ethics again. His exile-existence meant that Kolnai would remain relatively unknown, although he developed a somewhat eclectic moral philosophy and held political-philosophical views which certainly made him into a distinguished philosopher. This paper offers a short introduction to Kolnai’s main ethical views and shows the relevance of Kolnai’s views to certain contemporary controversies in ethics.

The two problems are:

a) Does one ever have sufficient reason for what one does; and if not, should this be a cause for concern? If, when reasons for action conflict, reaching a decision is always a non sequitur, then it looks as though in such situations the answer is: No.  But would it even be desirable to act according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason?  It can be argued that, unless one can give sufficient reason for one’s actions, one can never really justify them; nor will rational persuasion be possible.  On the other hand, the idea that there is only one rational thing to do in any given situation seems oppressive, almost totalitarian.

b) Is deliberation an inherently self-deceptive operation? Is the deliberator compelled to treat an irrational procedure with no right outcome as though it were the intelligent engagement with a problem that has a correct answer? And if so, what will become of deliberation once this is fully realised?  Less nihilistically, what would a maximally rational decision be like?

Linda Ben-Zvi relacionó recientemente la obra de Samuel Beckett con alguno de los aspectos mencionados por Aurel Kolnai cuando elabora su teoría del asco. El trabajo de Ben-Zvi ha enfatizado la preeminencia que el cuerpo ocupa en la obra del autor irlandés, infiriendo que éste tiene una relevancia aún mayor que la de la mente, que para gran parte de los críticos es la que define el sujeto del conocimiento beckettiano. El presente trabajo se propone indagar en el modo en que las representaciones del asco integran la dinámica melancólica en la obra de Beckett y tienen un papel obligado en el repliegue solitario y ensimismado de los personajes. Las imágenes exteriores, en sus primeros poemas y prosas, refieren una experiencia traumática de desolación, padecimiento y abandono ante las cuales los sujetos no responden en forma activa ni evalúan la posibilidad de constituirse en agentes de cambio, sino que se hallan ceñidos a un papel que cada vez más los obliga a la inacción y a la cavilación.