Ditte Marie Munch-Jurisic

Most psychological and philosophical theories assume that we know what we feel. This general view is often accompanied by a range of more specific claims, such as the idea that we experience one emotion at a time, and that it is possible to distinguish between emotions based on their cognition, judgment, behaviour, or physiology. One common approach is to discriminate emotions based on their motivations or ultimate goals. Some argue that empathic distress, for instance, has the potential to motivate empathic concerns; personal distress, on the other hand, is self-oriented and motivates egoistic concerns. In this paper, I argue against this and similarly teleological views of emotions and affect. Through a close study of the emotional breakdown of an American drone operator, I make the case that understanding our emotions entails much more ambiguity than dominant theories assume. In our emotional lives, disorientation and confusion are often the norm.

Chapter 3 presents a destructive view on perpetrator disgust as an alternative to both moral and non-moral views of the phenomenon. To account for the full range of documented cases, which include instances of aesthetic disgust as well as distress that is accompanied by explicit expressions of guilt and recognition of wrongdoing, it is necessary to divorce questions on the nature of perpetrator disgust from consequential questions of its motivational force. When perpetrators feel disgust in situations of mass atrocity, even if they experience moral conflict, they are not inspired to moral action. On the contrary, because of their social, moral, and political context, they tend to understand their distress as an emotional obstacle to be overcome. Rather than an impediment to murder, the management of perpetrator disgust becomes a crucial element in shaping a genocidal mentality.

In Negative Dialektik, Theodor W. Adorno claimed that after the Second World War a new categorical imperative was imposed on mankind: namely, to prevent Auschwitz – or something similar – from happening again. Today – 60 years after the United Nations Genocide Convention came into effect – it is difficult to remain optimistic about the preventive character of Adorno’s “Never Again!” imperative. In spite of its existence, the second half of the 20th Century was filled with ethnic violence andgenocide. This article undertakes a philosophical analysis of the “Never Again!” refrain and questions whether this new imperative is as preventive as we assume. The analysis looks at how Serbian nationalism used (and misused) history and expressions as “Never again!”. This example shows us that the impulse of moral abhorrence in “Never again!” does not necessarily lead to preventing atrocity, but can be an incitement to initiate new ones.

In genocide studies, as well as in literary and cinematic representations of mass atrocity, scholars and artists have been concerned with soldiers who experience a physiological and emotional breakdown while committing atrocities. These reactions often resemble disgust responses: perpetrators feel nausea; they convulse and sometimes vomit. This is book chapter is published in the anthology Emotions and Mass Atrocity: Philosophical and Theoretical Explorations, editors Thomas Brudholm and Johannes Lang, Cambridge University Press, March 2018

... I forlængelse heraf skriver Stefan Gaarsmand Jacobsen om Europas Kinesi-ske Oplysning. ... del af, hvad der skete på den intellektuelle scene før og efter Europa ”tog førertrøjen” i ... ningstidens helte, og i særdeleshed de tidlige økonomer, var optagede af Det Kinesiske Rige, hvis ...

Semikolon; har som semikolon i skriftsproget funktion af at være et både-og tegn; både afhængigt af historien, der gik forud, men samtidigt (og vigtigst) peger det frem og vil noget mere. Et; indstiller således opmærksomheden på det, der kommer efter. Og følgeligt giver tegnet ikke ...

We typically think of emotional states as highly individualised and subjective. But visceral gut feelings like discomfort can be better understood as collective and public, when they reflect implicit biases that an individual has internalised. Most of us evade discomfort in favour of comfort, often unconsciously. This inclination, innocent in most cases, also has social and political consequences. Research has established that it is easier to interact with people who resemble us and that such in-group favouritism contributes to subtle forms of discrimination. If we want a more equal and unbiased society, we have a duty to expose ourselves to more discomfort. Living up to this duty requires an enhanced emotional vocabulary that captures the political dimensions of physiological affect. I argue that a better understanding of what I call interaction discomfort can mitigate subtle forms of discrimination.

Danmark er et krigsførende land. Det er dog forholdsvist let at overse. Her er hverken rationeringsmærker, mørklægningsgardiner eller grandiøse støtteerklæringer til rigets forsvar. Alligevel bliver det i disse år langsomt tydeligere, at krigens virkelighed presser sig på. Fra dokumentarfilmen Armadillo over diskussioner om veteranpolitik, tortur og ikke mindst med Danmarks militære indsatser i verdens brændpunkter, bliver krigen med små skridt præsent. SLAGMARK har derfor sat sig for at undersøge krigen. I tre skridt gør dette nummers artikler os klogere på problemstillingen. Først trænes vores blik i at spore krigen i vores dagligdag. Dette sker gennem et opmærksomt essayistisk blik på krigen i den danske hverdag og en antropologisk analyse af vores nyligt indførte hjemkomstparader. Derefter undersøger vi idéhistorisk, hvordan en ung Hugo Grotius argumenterede for, at et handelskompagni kunne føre retfærdig krig og dermed skrev det private firma ind som en legitim aktør, der også ...

Danmark er et krigsførende land. Det er dog forholdsvist let at overse. Her er hverken rationeringsmærker, mørklægningsgardiner eller grandiøse støtteerklæringer til rigets forsvar. Alligevel bliver det i disse år langsomt tydeligere, at krigens virkelighed presser sig på. Fra dokumentarfilmen Armadillo over diskussioner om veteranpolitik, tortur og ikke mindst med Danmarks militære indsatser i verdens brændpunkter, bliver krigen med små skridt præsent. SLAGMARK har derfor sat sig for at undersøge krigen. I tre skridt gør dette nummers artikler os klogere på problemstillingen. Først trænes vores blik i at spore krigen i vores dagligdag. Dette sker gennem et opmærksomt essayistisk blik på krigen i den danske hverdag og en antropologisk analyse af vores nyligt indførte hjemkomstparader. Derefter undersøger vi idéhistorisk, hvordan en ung Hugo Grotius argumenterede for, at et handelskompagni kunne føre retfærdig krig og dermed skrev det private firma ind som en legitim aktør, der også ...

We typically think of emotional states as highly individualized, personal, and subjective. But visceral gut-feelings like discomfort can be better understood as collective, public, and political when they are a reflection of implicit biases that an individual has internalized. Most of us evade discomfort in favor of comfort, often unconsciously. This inclination, innocent in most cases, also has social and political consequences. Research has established that it is easier to interact with people who resemble us and that such in-group favoritism contributes to subtle forms of discrimination. If we want a more equal and unbiased society, we have a duty to expose ourselves to more discomfort. Living up to this duty requires an enhanced emotional vocabulary that captures the political dimensions of physiological affect. I argue that a better understanding of what I call "interaction discomfort" can mitigate subtle forms of discrimination (142 words).

In Negative Dialektik, Theodor W. Adorno claimed that after the Second World War a new categorical imperative was imposed on mankind: namely, to prevent Auschwitz – or something similar – from happening again. Today – 60 years after the United Nations Genocide Convention came into effect – it is difficult to remain optimistic about the preventive character of Adorno’s “Never Again!” imperative. In spite of its existence, the second half of the 20th Century was filled with ethnic violence and
genocide. This article undertakes a philosophical analysis of the “Never Again!” refrain and questions whether this new imperative is as preventive as we assume. The analysis looks at how Serbian nationalism used (and misused) history and expressions as “Never again!”. This example shows us that the impulse of moral abhorrence in “Never again!” does not necessarily lead to preventing atrocity, but can be an incitement to initiate new ones (paper in Danish).

An increasingly popular view in scholarly literature and public debate on implicit biases holds that there is progressive moral potential in the discomfort that liberals and egalitarians feel when they realize they harbor implicit biases. The strong voices among such discomfort advocates believe we have a moral and political duty to confront people with their biases even though we risk making them uncomfortable. Only a few voices have called attention to the aversive effects of discomfort. Such discomfort skeptics warn that, because people often react negatively to feeling blamed or called-out, the result of confrontational approaches is often counterproductive. To deepen this critique, I distinguish between awareness discomfort and interaction discomfort, developing a contextual approach that draws on recent research on negative affect and emotions to chart a more complete picture of the moral limits of discomfort. I argue that discomfort advocates risk overrating the moral potential of discomfort if they underestimate the extent to which context shapes the interpretation of affect and simple, raw feelings.

In genocide studies, as well as in literary and cinematic representations of mass atrocity, scholars and artists have been concerned with soldiers who experience a physiological and emotional breakdown while committing atrocities. These reactions often resemble disgust responses: perpetrators feel nausea; they convulse and sometimes vomit.

This is book chapter is published in the anthology Emotions and Mass Atrocity: Philosophical and Theoretical Explorations, editors Thomas Brudholm and Johannes Lang, Cambridge University Press, March 2018

Ph.D-Thesis, Defended February 8, 2016
Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen

Evaluation commitee:
Professor Heidi L. Maibom, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati.
Professor Arne Johan Vetlesen, Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo.
Professor Dan Zahavi (chair), Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen.

Academic advisor: Thomas Brudholm, Minority Studies, University of Copenhagen
Co-Advisor: Søren Gosvig Olesen, Philosophy, University of Copenhagen

Abstract: Some soldiers experience strong emotional outbursts and bodily discomfort – such as disgust, dizziness, fainting, nausea, vomiting and crying – in the moment of committing or witnessing atrocities. This dissertation delivers a systematic examination of this complex phenomenon that I call “perpetrator disgust”. The central point of dispute is the moral significance of perpetrator disgust. Does the perpetrator’s bodily response indicate a subliminal awareness of the moral wrong of the act? I argue that perpetrator disgust can in some cases reflect a moral conflict, but warn against conflating it with a committed moral judgment.

Most contemporary research on disgust can be divided into “disgust advocates” and “disgust skeptics.” The so-called advocates argue that disgust can have a positive influence on our moral judgment; skeptics warn that it can mislead us toward prejudice and discrimination. This article compares this disagreement to a structurally similar debate in the field of genocide studies concerning the phenomenon of “perpetrator abhorrence.” While some soldiers report having felt strong disgust in the moment of committing or witnessing atrocity, scholars disagree on whether such disgust is moral in nature. These empirical cases provide us with reasons to reconsider the normative features of disgust. Inspired by the conceptualization of disgust in Immanuel Kant and Aurel Kolnai, and as an alternative to both the disgust advocates and the skeptics, this article argues that the analogy of a stop sign can better help us define disgust responses.

What is the significance of our gut feelings? Can they disclose our deep selves or point to a shared human nature? The phenomenon of perpetrator disgust provides a uniquely insightful perspective by which to consider such questions. Across time and cultures, some individuals exhibit signs of distress while committing atrocities. They experience nausea, convulse, and vomit. Do such bodily responses reflect a moral judgment, a deep-seated injunction against atrocity? What conclusions can we draw about the relationship of our gut feelings to human nature and moral frameworks?
Drawing on a broad range of historical examples as well as the latest scholarship from the philosophical and scientific study of emotions, this book explores the relationship of cognition and emotion through the lens of perpetrator disgust. Considering a range of interpretations of this phenomenon, it becomes evident that gut feelings do not carry a straightforward and transparent intentionality in themselves, nor do they motivate any core, specific response; they are templates that can embody a broad range of values and morals. Using this core insight, the book proposes a contextual understanding of emotions, by which an agent’s environment shapes their available hermeneutic equipment—concepts, categories, names—that individuals rely on to make sense of their emotions and navigate the world.

Introduction attached

One of the most insidious consequences of continuous exposure to gaslighting is that agents develop an expectation of further emotional manipulation. Repeated exposure to demeaning and humiliating behavior can make agents prone to interpret any epistemic challenge as a potential instance of gaslighting. Embedded in physiological and affective habits, this expectation become an integral way of interpreting social interactions and other people's intentions. The concept of gaslighting was originally coined to alleviate a form of hermeneutic injustice, but some applications