- Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata
Dipartimento di Storia, Patrimonio culturale, Formazione e Società (SPFS)
Via Columbia, 1
I-00133 Roma
Italia
Building B, Room 12 (II floor)
In this book, I claim that disgust is an emotion that marks aesthetic conflicts. An aesthetic conflict is a conflict that should neither be understood in moral terms nor in political ones. After analyzing the meaning of the word... more
In this book, I claim that disgust is an emotion that marks aesthetic conflicts. An aesthetic conflict is a conflict that should neither be understood in moral terms nor in political ones. After analyzing the meaning of the word "disgust", I try to answer the question what disgust is. I evaluate many theories (Rozin's, Angyal's, Kelly's, Miller's, Kolnai's, McGinn's, Schmitz's, etc.), I provide critics, finally, I claim that disgust has to do with what one actually feels to be. Put differently, disgust has to be with our aesthetic identity.
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In this book, I argue that Adolf Reinach was neither a realist in the sense he argued for the external existence of the world, nor in the sense he did not agree with Husserl's phenomenological Idealism. According to Reinach, the former is... more
In this book, I argue that Adolf Reinach was neither a realist in the sense he argued for the external existence of the world, nor in the sense he did not agree with Husserl's phenomenological Idealism. According to Reinach, the former is a naive attempt, while I will show that the latter does not suffice to characterize Reinach's "phenomenological" realism. What makes Reinach both realist and phenomenologist is his radically intuition-based theory of knowledge.
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For the past twenty years, the relationship between politics, morality and disgust has been resolved into a denunciation of the injustices perpetrated in the name of this emotion. However, no compelling reasons have been brought forward... more
For the past twenty years, the relationship between politics, morality and disgust has been resolved into a denunciation of the injustices perpetrated in the name of this emotion. However, no compelling reasons have been brought forward to release the suspicion that the condemnation is merely a corollary of the dominant liberal ideology. I will exemplify this weakness by analysing the theory of disgust proposed by Debra Lieberman and Carlton Patrick in 2018 (§§ 2-3). I will offer a different empirical basis for articulating an adequate answer to the question “what is disgust?” (§4). I will use some acquisitions from philology to exemplify the moral and political scope of disgust (§5). I will propose an “ontological” definition of disgust (§ 6), based on which I will distinguish between disgust and its ethical and political use to justify oppression and discrimination. This use must be replaced by explicating the reasons that justify such oppression and discrimination (§ 7). To discover of not being able to give reasons for such behaviours every time they occur opens up a breach in the direction of a more free and thus more just society.
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What is a "Monster"? In the first part of my paper (§ 1-3), I answer this question by delving into the historical changes that the concept of "monster" underwent in Western culture along with centuries. I claim that what we call "monster"... more
What is a "Monster"? In the first part of my paper (§ 1-3), I answer this question by delving into the historical changes that the concept of "monster" underwent in Western culture along with centuries. I claim that what we call "monster" had been the object of an "integral gaze" since its origin, while, during the 19 th Century, it has become the object of a "disintegrated gaze". What I mean with "integral gaze" is that we look at and understand something in one sole way: the monster exceeds the natural order. On the contrary, with "disintegrated gaze", I mean that we look at and understand something in different ways, so that looking at and understanding do not gather nor hold together: the monster as much is experienced as an unnormal living being as is thought as a normal living being. This condition is far more general. Though, I contend that the analysis of the transformations undergone by the concept of "monster" over the last two centuries make us aware of such historical condition. This condition is concerning in so far as it "disintegrates" our understanding of the world. In the second part of my paper (§ 4-6), I point out a way to surpass such condition, at least with regard to the concept of "monster". To this purpose, I will answer my starting question by describing the ontological structure of a "monster". This is the structure of a paradox. The monster is a paradox.
Research Interests: Ontology, Aesthetics, History and Philosophy of Biology, Teratology, Monster Theory, and 9 moreGilles Deleuze, Georges Canguilhem, Monsters and Monster Theory, Deformity & Birth-Defects, Paradox, Monsters and the Monstrous, History of Modern Science, Joachim Ritter, and Etienne Geoffroy Saint-hilaire
Adolf Bernard Philipp Reinach was born in Mainz on December 23, 1883. Reinach was a leading figure among Husserl’s early pupils who animated the circles of Munich and Göttingen and, together with Alexander Pfänder and Johannes Daubert,... more
Adolf Bernard Philipp Reinach was born in Mainz on December 23, 1883. Reinach was a leading figure among Husserl’s early pupils who animated the circles of Munich and Göttingen and, together with Alexander Pfänder and Johannes Daubert, was a leading figure of the so-called Phenomenological Realism (Salice 2016). Between 1909 and 1914 he taught in Göttingen alongside Husserl; then, at the outbreak of World War I, he left academia to volunteer for the army. Adolf Reinach was killed in action, outside Diksmuide in Flanders, on November 16, 1917. In his short intellectual life, he tackled logic and theory of knowledge, ontology, psychology, theory of law, physics and religious experience through phenomenology. His most important work is On The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law. In what follows, I will outline an intellectual and philosophical profile of this prominent figure, one of the protagonists of the emerging Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg 1982).
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In this paper, I consider the relationship that obtains between disgust and the idea of a just society. Contra Martha C. Nussbaum, who argues that disgust poses dangers to a just society, I contend that disgust can either damage or... more
In this paper, I consider the relationship that obtains between disgust and the idea of a just society. Contra Martha C. Nussbaum, who argues that disgust poses dangers to a just society, I contend that disgust can either damage or promote the construction of a just society. In fact, I largely agree with Nussbaum’s perspective on disgust, except for this point: disgust, I think, is not necessarily dangerous for a just society, but can also be useful and constitute an important element for its development. In order to justify my claim, first, I will comment on Nussbaum’s criticism of disgust. Second, I will analyse Paul Rozin and April E. Fallon’s seminal study on disgust, which Nussbaum’s own research fully presupposes. Third, I will outline a slightly different, indeed “holistic” view on disgust, and bring forward some arguments for the use of disgust in order to construct a just society.
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The relationship between the human being and their environment has been investigated in many ways during the 20th century. In the following chapter, I will address the topic by focusing on the way that has conceived of such relationship... more
The relationship between the human being and their environment has been investigated in many ways during the 20th century. In the following chapter, I will address the topic by focusing on the way that has conceived of such relationship in terms of atmosphere. I will claim that, in order to provide a proper clarification of the human-environment relationship, the concept of “atmosphere” has to refer to that of “taste”. First of all, I will wonder whether these two concepts are incompatible. Secondly, I will compare the two original theories of atmosphere. Thirdly, I will argue for their need for a concept of “taste”. Finally, I will discuss the first systematic though non-philosophical usage of the concept of “atmosphere”, strictly related to that of “taste”, in order to show the relevance of the latter for atmospherology.
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Husserl’s pupils mostly blamed him for being a subjectivist and an idealist. This has happened from the origin of the movement. Even in the early years of the last century, they challenged Husserl to this topic, particularly focusing on... more
Husserl’s pupils mostly blamed him for being a subjectivist and an idealist. This has happened from the origin of the movement. Even in the early years of the last century, they challenged Husserl to this topic, particularly focusing on his alleged idealist positions and their conviction that phenomenology was to conceive of as a form of realism. Such debate passed into history as the idealism-realism controversy. Still, its historical origin remains all but clear thus far. In my paper, I will try and clarify such origins. Starting from some archives documents, which have been neglected by the scholars, I will put forward some arguments for the hypothesis that such controversy arose in 1907 against the alternative hypothesis that it arose in 1905.
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Konstellationsforschung is a historic-philosophical method of inquiry, which has developed during the late 80’s of the last century. Though its important results concerning the origins of German romanticism and idealism, it has not been... more
Konstellationsforschung is a historic-philosophical method of inquiry, which has developed during the late 80’s of the last century. Though its important results concerning the origins of German romanticism and idealism, it has not been applied to new themes of research. The present paper aims at presenting a new theme for this methodology. I will try to show that controversy idealism-realism in phenomenology, which took place in the second half of the 20’s, represents a proper field of appli-cation for this method. Indeed, I suggest that such controversy make phenomenologists the thinkers they have been all along their following lives and that they influenced Husserl’s path to his transcendental phe-nomenology.
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The concept of disgust refers to an emotional reaction of revulsion and strong disapproval elicited by something perceived as repellent or offensive, which is to be distanced and avoided. Disgust arises in many domains of human existence... more
The concept of disgust refers to an emotional reaction of revulsion and strong disapproval elicited by something perceived as repellent or offensive, which is to be distanced and avoided. Disgust arises in many domains of human existence that can be traced back to two main spheres: the physical and the moral. As a matter of example, food, body products, corpses, intimate contact, etc., are to be counted among the physical objects that elicit disgust, whereas moral objects of disgust might be moral violations in human behaviour such as abuse, betrayal, hypocrisy, corruption, and the like. The function of disgust is to protect the subject who feels it from contamination. Disgust should not be confused either with distaste, as disgust is a deeper and stronger feeling of rejection, or with contempt since disgust does not refer immediately to the intrinsic value of the concerned object. Disgust is mostly addressed by Philosophy of emotions, Aesthetics, and Political philosophy.
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In 1929 Aurel Kolnai published Der Ekel (On disgust), the first phenomenological account entirely devoted to the topic. In this paper the author will try to identify and make explicit his theoretical roots, by arguing (1) that aesthetics... more
In 1929 Aurel Kolnai published Der Ekel (On disgust), the first phenomenological account entirely devoted to the topic. In this paper the author will try to identify and make explicit his theoretical roots, by arguing (1) that aesthetics and cognitive psychology do not provide the very starting point of Kolnai’s thought; (2) that Kolnai’s analysis presupposes the work of Sigmund Freud and Max Scheler; finally (3), that Kolnai aims both at providing a new theory of disgust and at definitely detaching from psychoanalysis by reshaping Max Scheler’s value-ethics in a way that the author will call «practical».
Nel 1929 Aurel Kolnai pubblica Der Ekel (Il disgusto), il primo contributo fenomenologico interamente riservato all’argomento. Nel presente articolo, l’autore proverà a ricostruire e rendere nuovamente esplicite le radici teoriche del saggio, sostenendo che (1) estetica e psicologia cognitiva non costituiscono l’autentico punto di partenza della teoria di Kolnai; (2) che l’analisi di Kolnai presuppone l’opera di Sigmund Freud e Max Scheler; (3) che Kolnai aspira al contempo a presentare una teoria innovativa del disgusto e a prendere definitivamente le distanze dalla psicanalisi riformulando la scheleriana etica dei valori in un senso che l’autore definisce «pratico».
Nel 1929 Aurel Kolnai pubblica Der Ekel (Il disgusto), il primo contributo fenomenologico interamente riservato all’argomento. Nel presente articolo, l’autore proverà a ricostruire e rendere nuovamente esplicite le radici teoriche del saggio, sostenendo che (1) estetica e psicologia cognitiva non costituiscono l’autentico punto di partenza della teoria di Kolnai; (2) che l’analisi di Kolnai presuppone l’opera di Sigmund Freud e Max Scheler; (3) che Kolnai aspira al contempo a presentare una teoria innovativa del disgusto e a prendere definitivamente le distanze dalla psicanalisi riformulando la scheleriana etica dei valori in un senso che l’autore definisce «pratico».
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Profilo biobibliografico tratto da Aurel Kolnai, Il Disgusto, a c. di M. Tedeschini, Marinotti, Milano 2017, pp. 113-129. Nella sezione "Translations" si può leggere un gustoso assaggio del libro di Kolnai.
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Allego qui la prima parte della mia introduzione alla traduzione di Kolnai, a cui seguono le prime due pagine del suo saggio.
Nella sezione "Traslations" si può leggere anche un estratto dal III capitolo del saggio di Kolnai.
Nella sezione "Traslations" si può leggere anche un estratto dal III capitolo del saggio di Kolnai.
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Disgust and fear are very similar. Both seem to be a reaction of defense. The very sense of fear is nonetheless clear enough, that of disgust is not. Fear defends a person from something dangerous; disgust defends a person too, but the... more
Disgust and fear are very similar. Both seem to be a reaction of defense. The very sense of fear is nonetheless clear enough, that of disgust is not. Fear defends a person from something dangerous; disgust defends a person too, but the danger (if there is) that elicits it is absolutely obscure. In this paper, I will try to clarify in what consists the function of disgust and provide a criterion to identify its object. Basing my analysis on those carried out by Aurel Kolnai and Jean-Paul Sartre, I will claim that fear concerns the very existence of a person, while disgust its very value.
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In this paper I claim that disgust has a logic. This logic does not let us differentiate aesthetic and ethical value judgements, and shows that there are cases in which they overlap. In order to show this, I will consider Aurel Kolnai’s... more
In this paper I claim that disgust has a logic. This logic does not let us differentiate aesthetic and ethical value judgements, and shows that there are cases in which they overlap. In order to show this, I will consider Aurel Kolnai’s phenomenological analysis of disgust.
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In this paper I will discuss Barry Smith’s and Kevin Mulligan’s revision of Husserl’s phenomenology, starting from the fact that many Italian scholars seem to follow them in a sense, by dealing with phenomenology as a sort of a priori... more
In this paper I will discuss Barry Smith’s and Kevin Mulligan’s revision of Husserl’s phenomenology,
starting from the fact that many Italian scholars seem to follow them in a sense, by dealing
with phenomenology as a sort of a priori ontology. Therefore, I will first reconstruct Smith’s
and Mulligan’s attempt and its objectives, then I will show how it is rooted in the school of
Brentano and, in particular, in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, I will provide some arguments
against this attempt : first of all that it does not attain a better description of the world, secondly
that phenomenology does the job of formal ontology better than the latter.
starting from the fact that many Italian scholars seem to follow them in a sense, by dealing
with phenomenology as a sort of a priori ontology. Therefore, I will first reconstruct Smith’s
and Mulligan’s attempt and its objectives, then I will show how it is rooted in the school of
Brentano and, in particular, in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, I will provide some arguments
against this attempt : first of all that it does not attain a better description of the world, secondly
that phenomenology does the job of formal ontology better than the latter.
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In this paper, I try and tackle the Gettier Problem from a Husserlian point of view. I will argue that Husserl provides the theoretical framework and instruments to make Gettier's impasse productive in a sense.
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Starting from two contradictory claims regarding whether realist phenomenologists accepted Husserl’s transcendental reduction, I will try to show that these ones are about two different points of view on Husserl’s idealism. The first one,... more
Starting from two contradictory claims regarding whether realist phenomenologists accepted Husserl’s transcendental reduction, I will try to show that these ones are about two different points of view on Husserl’s idealism. The first one, which I call the epistemological one, refuses transcendental reduction because it limits the phenomenological inquiry; the second one, which I call the ontological one, accepts the reduction for the very opposite reason, but rejects the theory of the pure Ego since it is non-phenomenological. I will show that these two point of view arose in two different period of Husserl’s thought evolution and that they can live together, even though they are irreducible. In doing that I provide a brief history of the idealism-realism controversy, through which I aim at clarifying some crucial points of this history.
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Starting from a debate which took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century between Jean Clair and Arthur C. Danto, we will focus on the link between art and disgust, because we wish to show what art is now ‘doing’ with disgust.... more
Starting from a debate which took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century between Jean Clair and Arthur C. Danto, we will focus on the link between art and disgust, because we wish to show what art is now ‘doing’ with disgust. Our hypothesis is that art is part of the general process of self-reshaping that is underway in today’s capitalist societies. Therefore, by commenting Aurel Kolnai’s phenomenological analysis of disgust, we will gain the tools to try to show how disgust could be a crucial factor in the above process. Finally, we will recall the work of artists such as Pasolini, Nebreda, and McCarthy, in order to suggest how art could use disgust and have an actual political effect by orienting that process. All this is possible, because disgust has to do with the good life.
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By reading Scheler's unaccomplished essay Über Scham und Schamgefühl, I will argue that the meaning and function of the "shame" consists in pointing out I am not satisfying those expectations and conditions that make me a human being: I... more
By reading Scheler's unaccomplished essay Über Scham und Schamgefühl, I will argue that the meaning and function of the "shame" consists in pointing out I am not satisfying those expectations and conditions that make me a human being: I feel myself less than human.
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Some notes on the problem of truth.
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This paper deals with what Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi call “the social cognition” from the chapter How we know others in their book The Phenomenological Mind (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008), and what Adolf Reinach calls the “extraneous... more
This paper deals with what Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi call “the social cognition” from the chapter How we know others in their book The Phenomenological Mind (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008), and what Adolf Reinach calls the “extraneous perception” in his university course Einleitung in die Philosophie (Reinach 1913) – that is, the possibility of intersubjectivity, according to these authors. My objective is to show how Gallagher and Zahavi’s analyses could profit from that of Reinach. I find that Reinach’s study could provide a particular heuristic value to Gallagher and Zahavi’s work, by furnishing it with a useful tool to clear up some issues which, in my opinion, remain rather vague. The first part of this article is devoted to outlining Gallagher and Zahavi’s thesis about how we know others, clarifying which points of their analyses could be cleared up by Reinach’s study; the second part presents Reinach’s arguments concerning the perception of the other subject; and finally, I will explain how Reinach’s analysis contributes to that of Gallagher and Zahavi’s work and remark on what accessing to others’ mental state from the second-person perspective by combining the two positions means.
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Dopo il Novecento, in particolare dopo Heidegger e Severino, porre ancora la questione dell'es-sere può sembrare un gesto tardivo e ingenuo. Il volume discute criticamente l'itinerario che ha condotto Vittorio Possenti a considerare... more
Dopo il Novecento, in particolare dopo Heidegger e Severino, porre ancora la questione dell'es-sere può sembrare un gesto tardivo e ingenuo. Il volume discute criticamente l'itinerario che ha condotto Vittorio Possenti a considerare questo gesto, invece, necessario e a dichiarare concluso il ciclo speculativo della modernità, avviato da Cartesio e perfezionato da Kant e Hegel. Recuperando con strumenti teorici rinnovati la tradizione realista della filosofia dell'essere, Possenti sostiene che «l’ente è» e che da qui deve ripartire qualsiasi discorso che intenda riprendere alla base la questione della metafisica. L’essere dopo la metafisica moderna raccoglie i contributi di studiosi che non si allineano e non si oppongo acriticamente agli argomenti proposti da Possenti, ma dialogano con le sue posizioni in modo franco e senza compromessi, restituendo ancora una volta il suo spessore alla parola «filosofia».
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Introduzione al volume
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You find attached my introduction to these proceedings.
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Traduzione integrale del saggio di Aurel Kolnai Der Ekel, pubblicato sullo Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung nel 1929. Un saggio importante e a lungo dimenticato che influenzò Dalì, Bataille, Sartre. Allego qui... more
Traduzione integrale del saggio di Aurel Kolnai Der Ekel, pubblicato sullo Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung nel 1929. Un saggio importante e a lungo dimenticato che influenzò Dalì, Bataille, Sartre.
Allego qui l'introduzione di Kolnai e il § 1 del terzo capitolo del suo libro, sui sensi e il disgusto.
Allego qui l'introduzione di Kolnai e il § 1 del terzo capitolo del suo libro, sui sensi e il disgusto.
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A short critical review of Joachim Feldes' book "Das Phänomenologenheim: Der Bergzaberner Kreis im Kontext der frühen phänomenologischen Bewegung" (2015).