Brussels I Regulation

Παρατηρήσεις στις:

• ΠολΠρΘεσ 11792/2014
Διατάξεις: Άρθρα 5 σημ. 3, 6 § 1 Καν. 44/2001, 31, 32
Καν. 864/2007, 26 ΑΚ
Αγωγή αποζημίωσης λόγω αδικοπραξίας σε βάρος εναγομένων που δραστηριοποιούνται στη Ρουμανία. Διεθνής δικαιοδοσία ελληνικών δικαστηρίων, εξαιτίας
της κατοικίας ενός των εναγομένων, που συνδέονται
με το δεσμό της παθητικής ομοδικίας. Υφίσταται στενή συνάφεια για την από κοινού εναγωγή τους. Η διεθνής δικαιοδοσία των ελληνικών δικαστηρίων θεμελιώνεται και σε σιωπηρή συμφωνία παρέκτασης, λόγω ανεπιφύλακτης παράστασης των αλλοδαπών εναγομένων. Εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο. Δεν εφαρμόζεται ο Καν. 864/2007. Το επίδικο ζημιογόνο γεγονός έλαβε χώρα πριν από τη θέση του σε εφαρμογή. Εφαρμοστέο το άρθρο 26 ΑΚ. Αδίκημα πολλαπλής τοπικής σύνδεσης. Δικαίωμα επιλογής του εφαρμοστέου δικαίου από το ζημιωθέντα. Εφαρμοστέο το ελληνικό δίκαιο, ως το δίκαιο που επικαλούνται οι ενάγοντες.

• ΜονΠρΧαλκιδ 115/2016
Διατάξεις: Άρθρα 3 § 1, 40, 683 § 4, 725 ΚΠολΔ
Ασφαλιστικά μέτρα. Δικαστική μεσεγγύηση πλοίου που
βρίσκεται σε λιμένα ημεδαπής κατά εναγόμενου κατοίκου αλλοδαπής. Διεθνής δικαιοδοσία ελληνικών
δικαστηρίων. Ειδική δωσιδικία τόπου εκτέλεσης. Θεμελιώνεται διεθνής δικαιοδοσία των ελληνικών δικαστηρίων, ως πλησιέστερων στον τόπο που πρόκειται να εκτελεστεί το αιτούμενο ασφαλιστικό μέτρο.

The gradual introduction of a globalized marked, the mass tourism, the enactment of the four EU freedoms, and, above all, the general utilisation of e-commerce, have resulted in a rapidly growing number of cross-border contracts and thus also of cross-border disputes. In the second half of the 20th century, the protection of the consumers as weaker contractual parties has developed in national substantial and procedural rules, as well as in the field of private international law. On the EU level, special choice-of-law rules were adopted first in the Rome Convention of 1980, and then, with several modifications, in the Rome I Regulation currently in force. In Slovenia, the latter has replaced the previously applicable choice-of-law rules and applies in cases connected with other EU Member States or with third States.
The Rome I Regulation determines the scope of application of the protective rules through the definition of the notions of consumer, professional and the circumstances of the conclusion of the contract. In electronic contracts the most important condition is that the professional has directed their activity to the country of the consumer’s habitual residence. The “directing” of activity is a legal standard which has been further concretized also by the case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU, which watches over the harmonized interpretation of the consumer’s protection in the Rome I and the recast Brussels I regulations.
When the conditions for the protection in choice-of-law are met, the Rome I Regulation enacts the consumer’s habitual residence as the main connecting factor. The parties are allowed choose the applicable law, but the consumer cannot thereby be deprived of the mandatory protection from the law of the state of his habitual residence. As a result, the courts must sometimes combine the rules of the chosen law and the law of the consumer’s residence, which can prove to be a difficult task. Nevertheless, the doctrine deems that such solution is the best possible compromise between the legal and economic interests of both contractual parties.


KEYWORDS:
Consumer, consumer protection, Rome I Regulation, Rome Convention, Private International Law and Procedure Act, choice-of-law, conflict of laws, contract, electronic contract, private international law, party autonomy

The problems of application of the article 5.3 º/7.2º Brussels I Regulation/Recast have not been gathered by the proposals of the Commission´s Green Paper on the Review of the Brussels I Regulation, despite the number of prejudicial questions that have been presented before the ECJ. These questions reveal the relevance of this issue, particulary considering the increasing ues of the new technologies of the Information Society. The practical difficulties in the interpretation of this rule in the Information society context are not fully solved totally by the jurisprudence of the ECJ (doctrine Bier and Shevill, principally) where the strict territorial criterion " place of origin / place of result " can not be applied in automatically. Beyond the interpretive questions the doctrine established by the ECJ brought up other practical problems that they need to be solved.

Reconocimiento y ejecución de resoluciones extranjeras.—
Reglamento 44/2001.—Ámbito de aplicación temporal en relación con nuevos Estados miembros.—Sentencia dictada con anterioridad a la entrada en vigor para EM de ejecución.—Aplicación del Reglamento 44/2001: no.

This article presents a study of the so-called ‘unilateral’ (‘optional’, ‘hybrid’) jurisdiction clauses combining arbitration and choice of court options, which business tends to favour as such clauses seek to designate a method of dispute resolution that provides a more favourable position for one of the parties to an agreement and ensure better enforcement against a debtor’s assets. However, there are a growing number of jurisdictions where courts have issued decisions that declare such clauses either invalid or as having a significant defect. This study makes a review of both common law and continental jurisdictions and focuses particularly on a number of decisions issued recently in continental jurisdictions making an assessment of the arguments that are typically employed by courts in order to find that a unilateral clause is invalid. Finally, this study proposes a method of interpretation of unilateral jurisdiction clauses which favours their validity or, where there is a significant defect, proposes partial invalidity and severance instead of invalidity of the entire clause.

Resumen Una sociedad alemana demanda en España al distribuidor italiano de unas llantas para automóvil. Se pretende que se declare que la comercialización de tales llantas supone una infracción de varios modelos industriales comunitarios de los que es titular la empresa alemana. La competencia de los tribunales españoles se fundamenta en el foro por conexidad del art. 6.1 del Reglamento 44/2001. La empresa italiana es codemandada en España junto con la sociedad española titular de un taller de automoción que instalaba las llantas objeto del litigio. El Tribunal Supremo interpreta que no existe competencia de los tribunales españo-les, pues el foro por conexidad había sido utilizado para atraer a la empresa italiana a un foro diferente del de su domicilio confiando en que los tribunales españoles favore-cerían en mayor medida las pretensiones de la empresa alemana que los italianos. El Tribunal Supremo rechaza esta utilización del forum shopping.

Νομικές Διατάξεις: άρθρα 6 § 1 ΕΣΔΑ, 8 § 1, 20 Συντ., 43 § 3 καν. 44/2001, 215 § 1, 585 § 1 ΚΠολΔ

Κήρυξη εκτελεστότητας κατά τον καν. 44/2001· δικαστική απόφαση και δικαστικές διαταγές Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου στις οποίες περιλαμβάνονται κρίσεις που παρεμποδίζουν την πρόοδο των δικών που ανοίχτηκαν στην Ελλάδα, υποχρεώνουν σε αποζημιώσεις και προειδοποιούν για την υποχρέωση καταβολής αποζημιώσεων τα πρόσωπα εκείνα τα οποία επιδιώκουν την ικανοποίηση αξιώσεών τους με διαδικασίες ενώπιον της Ελληνικής Δικαιοσύνης· τα ανωτέρω κείμενα περιέχουν «οιονεί» αντιαγωγικές διαταγές διά των οποίων τίθενται εμπόδια στην προσφυγή ενώπιον της Ελληνικής Δικαιοσύνης, κατά παράβαση των προβλέψεων των άρθρων 6 § 1 της ΕΣΔΑ, 8 § 1 και 20 Συντ., τα οποία εντάσσονται στον πυρήνα της έννοιας της δημοσίας τάξεως.

The Recast of the Brussels I Regulation (1215/2012/EC) reforms EU law on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters and includes long-awaited changes designed to prevent the use of the abusive tactic known as the Italian Torpedo to frustrate choice-of-court agreements. The new rules give priority in determining jurisdiction to a court designated by a prima facie valid agreement, even if litigation underway elsewhere was first in time. While this development has been broadly welcomed, it is unclear if the Recast’s solution applies to related actions underway in other states as well as identical actions. Using a recent case from the Irish Supreme Court, in this article, we highlight that this possible omission could create significant problems, and calls into question the comprehensiveness of the Recast’s solution to the problem of the Italian Torpedo.

Θέματα Διεθνής Θαλάσσια Μεταφορά: Διεθνής Σύμβαση των Βρυξελλών της 25.08.1924 «για την ενοποίηση ορισμένων κανόνων σχετικά με τις φορτωτικές», όπως τροποποιήθηκε με τα Πρωτόκολλα της 23.02.1968 και 23.12.1979 (Κανόνες Χάγης-Βίσμπυ), κυρωθείσα με τον ν. 2107/1992· νόθος αντικειμενική ευθύνη του θαλάσ-σιου μεταφορέα· έναρξη της ευθύνης με τη φόρτωση (και όχι με την παραλαβή του φορτίου προς μεταφορά) και λήξη με την εκφόρτωση (και όχι με την παράδοση του φορτίου στον παραλήπτη)· δυνατότητα του θαλάσσιου μεταφορέα να απαλλαγεί από την ευθύνη του κατά τα ακραία στάδια της μεταφοράς πριν τη φόρτωση και μετά την εκφόρτωση με ρήτρα στη φορτωτική.

Διεθνής Χερσαία Μεταφορά: Διεθνής Σύμβαση της Γενεύης για τις διεθνείς οδικές μεταφορές εμπορευμάτων (CMR) της 19.05.1956, κυρωθείσα με τον ν. 559/1977· έναρξη της ευθύνης του χερσαίου μεταφορέα με την παραλαβή του φορτίου προς μεταφορά και λήξη αυτής με την παράδοσή του στον παραλήπτη· δυνατό-τητα απαλλαγής από την ευθύνη· συρροή συμβατικής και εξωσυμβατικής ευθύνης· αποκλεισμός της δυνατότητας του χερσαίου μεταφορέα να επωφεληθεί των διατάξεων της Σύμβασης που αποκλείουν ή περιορίζουν την ευθύνη του, αν η ζημία είναι αποτέλεσμα ηθελημένης κακής διαχείρισης (willfull misconduct).

Παραγγελιοδόχος μεταφοράς: εγγυητική και εις ολόκληρον με τον μεταφορέα ευθύνη για την καλή εκτέλεση της μεταφοράς, στο μέτρο που θεμελιώνεται ευθύνη του μεταφορέα.

Παρέκταση αρμοδιότητας: αν η σχετική (δικονομική) συμφωνία περιέχεται σε έγγραφο θαλάσσιας φορτωτικής, αυτό πρέπει να φέρει τις υπογραφές του πλοιάρχου (ή, κατά περίπτωση, του εξουσιοδοτημένου πράκτορα) και του φορτωτή ή παραλήπτη.

This article seeks to examine the fundamental juridical nature, classification and enforcement of choice of law agreements in international commercial contracts. At the outset, it will be observed that the predominance of jurisdictional disputes in international civil and commercial litigation has displaced choice of law issues to the periphery. The inherent dialectic between the substantive law paradigm and the internationalist paradigm of party autonomy will be harnessed to provide us with the necessary analytical framework to examine the various conceptions of such agreements and aid us in determining the most appropriate classification of a choice of law agreement. A more integrated and sophisticated understanding of the emerging transnationalist paradigm of party autonomy will guide us towards a conception of choice of law agreements as contracts, albeit contracts that do not give rise to promises inter partes. This coherent understanding of both the law of contract and choice of law has significant ramifications for the enforcement of choice of law agreements.

Περίληψη: Η μελέτη επιχειρεί μια πρώτη προσέγγιση στο νέο καθεστώς, σύμφωνα με το οποίο τα κωλύματα αναγνώρισης και εκτέλεσης αλλοδαπών αποφάσεων εξετάζονται κατά τη διαδικασία των άρθρων 45 επ. καν. 1215/2012 για τη διεθνή δικαιοδοσία, την αναγνώριση και την εκτέλεση αποφάσεων σε αστικές και εμπορικές υποθέσεις. Μετά από κάποιες γενικές εισαγωγικές παρατηρήσεις σχετικά με την κατάργηση της διαδικασίας κήρυξης εκτελεστότητας (Ι), η μελέτη εστιάζει στο νέο ένδικο βοήθημα, το οποίο ρυθμίζεται στα άρθρα 46 επ. καν. 1215/2012, δηλαδή στην αίτηση άρνησης (ΙΙ). Στο πλαίσιο αυτό αναλύονται σημαντικοί παράγοντες σχετικά με τις μελλοντικές προοπτικές αυτού του βοηθήματος (ΙΙΙ), όπως, η διάρκεια της διαδικασίας, τα επιτρεπτά ένδικα μέσα κατά της πρωτοβάθμιας απόφασης, οι δικονομικές ιδιαιτερότητες της αίτησης άρνησης εκτέλεσης που χρήζουν αποσαφήνισης από τον εθνικό νομοθέτη, και μια πρώτη αποτίμηση του νεοεισαχθέντος συστήματος (ΙV). Τα παρατηρούμενα κενά επιτάσσουν την εκπόνηση της κατάλληλης εσωτερικής νομοθεσίας, προς αποφυγή δυσλειτουργιών στην ελεύθερη κυκλοφορία των δικαστικών αποφάσεων στον κοινό ευρωπαϊκό χώρο (V)


Abstract: This article intends to offer a first glimpse into the new regime, according to which grounds of refusal for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are examined pursuant to Article 45 et seq. Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels I bis) on the jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters. After some introductory remarks on the abolition of exequatur proceedings (I), the article focuses on the new legal remedy enshrined under Art. 46 et seq. Brussels I bis Regulation, i.e. the so called application for refusal (II). In this framework, some important factors for the future perspectives of this remedy are analyzed (IΙΙ), such as the duration of the proceedings, the admissible remedies against the decision on the application for refusal, certain peculiarities of the application for refusal, which need to be clarified, and a primer evaluation of the newly established system (ΙV). The lacunae appearing in the new provisions make necessary the elaboration of appropriate national legislation, in order to avoid discrepancies in the free movement of judgments within the European common space (V).

This paper analyses two late sixteenth-century armorials with the coats of arms of the 235 participants of a tournament organized in May 1439 on the central market square, the Grote Markt, of Brussels. The armorials, trustworthy copies of a now lost original, record the performance of an exclusive social category in public space, and express in a distinctive visual way the internal hierarchy of the tourneying society: team leaders, leaders of large companies, leaders of of small companies, and 'ordinary' participants. The heraldic elements that were essential to this hierarchic arrangement - banners, pennons, shields – were actually used during the tournament, as well as the depicted helmets and crests.
It goes without saying that these occasional rolls were important for the nobility of the Low Countries, both at the time of the tournament and at the time of their creation in the last decades of the sixteenth century. Inclusion of their coats of arms in the armorials ensured the participants of a place in the collective memory. The compilers of the armorials played an essential role in defining the nobility as a social category since participating in a tournament meant that you lived nobly and that your peers considered you as a nobleman. The two copies of the original armorial in the last decades of the sixteenth century reproduced the social classification within the nobility in the second quarter of the fifteenth century. It shows that the same mechanisms of social distinction still played a role at that time.

ΕφΘεσ 1292/2017
(Άρθρα 2 § 1, 23 Καν. 44/2001, 6, 31 Σ. Βιέννης)

ΕφΘεσ 1900/2017
(Άρθρο 624 § 2 ΚΠολΔ)

ΕφΘεσ 537/2018
(Άρθρα 14, 16, 18 ΑΚ, 3 § 1α’, 8 § 1 Καν. 2201/2003, 3 περ. α’ Καν. 4/2009)

ΕφΘεσ 1360/2018
(Άρθρα 3 § 1, 25 § 2 ΚΠολΔ, 3 § 1, 4 § 2 Συμβ. Ρώμης 1980, 321 ΑΚ)

ΕφΘεσ 1367/2018
(Άρθρα 14, 21 § 1, 22, 24 Καν. 1346/2000)

RESUMEN: Este artículo realiza una aproximación al nuevo régimen bajo el cual se examinan los
motivos de denegación del reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias extranjeras según el Reglamento
1215/2012 (RB I bis) relativo a la competencia judicial y la ejecución de resoluciones judiciales en
materia civil y mercantil. Tras unas consideraciones introductorias sobre la supresión del execuátur (I y
II), el trabajo se centra en el estudio del nuevo remedio establecido en los art. 46 ss RB I bis, es decir, la
llamada solicitud de denegación (III). En este marco, se analizan unos factores muy importantes para las
futuras perspectivas de dicho remedio, como la duración del proceso (IV), los recursos admisibles contra
la resolución sobre la solicitud de denegación (V), ciertas particularidades de la solicitud de denegación
que deben ser aclaradas (VI), y una primera evaluación del nuevo sistema (VII). Como consecuencia de
las lagunas que presenta la nueva regulación comunitaria, adquieren especial relevancia los ordenamientos
internos al fin de evitar discrepancias en la libre circulación de las resoluciones judiciales en el espacio
común europeo (VIII).

Frågan om vad som utgör samma sak är central i både civilprocessrätt och straffprocessrätt. Frågan har länge varit närmast en nationell angelägenhet. Sedan Amsterdam-fördraget 1999 har den nationella processrätten i allt större grad påverkats av de gemensamma europeiska reglerna. Som en följd av detta påverkas också kärnbegreppen i processrätten. Dan Frände har aktivt bidragit till utvecklingen av en europeisk straffrätt och straffprocessrätt. Därför ska jag följa i Dans fotspår ut till Europa (och till tysk doktrin).1 Temat är dock civilprocess och vad som är samma sak med tanke på litispendens i gränsöverskridande mål. Litispendens betyder att när ett mål blivit anhängigt vid en domstol, måste andra domstolar avvisa samma sak mellan samma parter. Det första målet spärrar alltså för senare mål. När målet har blivit rättskraftigt avgjort, övergår litispendens-spärren i rättskraft (res judicata). Den centrala frågan är vad som är samma mål, alltså hur man bestämmer att två mål är identiska. Det finns regler om detta i både nationell och europeisk rätt, särskilt i Bryssel I-förordningen2. I gränsöverskridande mål kan en part försöka utnyttja olikheter i olika länders rättsordning och domstolsförfarande på ett otillbörligt sätt. På grund av doktrinen om ömsesidig tillit är de nationella domstolarna tvungna att strikt tillämpa de europeiska reglerna och blint lita på andra länders domstolar. Detta gäller även om den ena parten försöker missbruka reglerna. Jag inleder artikeln med en närmare diskussion om problemet med italienska torpeder, litispendens och ömsesidig tillit. Därefter följer en närmare granskning av Bryssel I-förordningens regler om vad som är samma sak. I det fjärde avsnittet analyserar jag problemet ur parternas och den nationella domstolens synvinkel. I det femte avsnittet diskuterar jag italienska torpeder och reglerna om litispendens i ett större perspektiv med tanke på både den nationella och den europeiska civilprocessrätten. 2. Gränsöverskridande mål, italienska torpeder och ömsesidig tillit Med gränsöverskridande mål menar man mål som har anknytning till två eller flera EU-länder. Till exempel kan en person bosatt i Finland vålla en skada i Tyskland på en bil som tillhör en i Sverige bosatt person. Ofta kan käranden i gränsöverskridande mål välja i vilket lands domstolar målet ska behandlas. Valet av var talan ska väckas är av stor betydelse eftersom processen utformas efter domstollandets regler, lex fori. I något land kan till exempel bevisreglerna vara fördelaktiga för en part, rättegångskostnaderna lägre och rättegången ta kortare tid. Det är allmänt känt att domstolar är benägna att använda sitt eget 1 1 Jag har skrivit stora delar av artikeln under min vistelse på Max Planck Institutet i Luxemburg (Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law), i april 2015. 2 Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EU) nr 1215/2012 av den 12 december 2012 om domstols behörighet och om erkännande och verkställighet av domar på privaträttens område. Förordningen ersätter rådets förordning (EG) nr 44/2001 av den 22 december 2000 (Bryssel I-förordningen, tidigare version). Denna ersatte i sin tur Brysselkonventionen av den 27 september 1968.

This is the Croatian Report written for the Project “Remedies concerning Enforcement of Foreign Judgements according to Brussels I Recast - B IA RE”, supported by the European Commission under the Programme Civil Justice. This Report presents issues in national enforcement procedure in Croatia and in the cross-border context under the rules of the Brussels I bis Regulation.

Muovendo dalla premessa che il diritto alimentare, sancendo il diritto a un’informazione adeguata e leale sugli alimenti, si pone a presidio degli interessi individuali e collettivi dei consumatori, la cui lesione deve pertanto trovare efficace ed effettiva tutela anche privatistica, il breve saggio sottolinea l’importanza a tal fine dei meccanismi di tutela processuale collettiva, inquadrabili nei due distinti modelli dell’azione di classe e dell’azione inibitoria a tutela degli interessi collettivi.
L’efficacia di questo secondo modello, parzialmente armonizzato a livello europeo dall’attuale direttiva 2009/22/CE, nel caso di pratiche sleali a dimensione transnazionale è quindi testata esaminando le pertinenti norme di diritto internazionale privato e processuale poste dai regolamenti (CE) n. 44/2001 (Bruxelles I) e n. 864/2007 (Roma II). Dall’analisi svolta emerge che i suddetti regolamenti rispondono in maniera soddisfacente alle esigenze dell’azione inibitoria collettiva, poiché consentono di fatto a un’associazione dei consumatori di agire davanti ai propri giudici in base alla propria legge. Si sostiene inoltre che misure coercitive strumentali, volte a sanzionare il mancato ottemperamento spontaneo ai provvedimenti inibitori (previste, in Italia, dall’art. 140 comma 7 del codice del consumo), possano circolare, e quindi essere eseguite, negli altri Stati membri.

This essay deals with the enforcement of the prohibition of unfair trading practices in the business-to-consumer food supply chain by means of private law actions. This is a quite new issue, at least in Europe, which poses a number of problems, particularly in a cross-border context.
The starting point in the analysis is that, by virtue of clear obligations EU food law provisions create for businesses, corresponding subjective rights arise upon consumers which must be protected by national courts. In this regard, since Member States generally do not provide for specific remedies, consumers have to rely on general doctrines on contract or tort. However, EU substantive law provisions themselves appear to be likely to grant appropriate protection to consumers. In particular, on the one hand, the final seller may be held liable in contract under the Consumer Sales Directive; on the other hand, consumers may directly rely on EU food information provisions in order to seek compensation for loss suffered as a result of infringement thereof.
The private international law aspects of cross-border disputes arising out of unfair commercial practices are then thoroughly examined, with regard to both the jurisdictional and applicable law issues now dealt with, respectively, by EU Regulations Brussels I and Rome I and II, keeping in mind that uniform as well as adequate solutions to those issues can actually contribute to the smooth functioning of the European internal market.
As regards the preliminary problem of characterisation, it is submitted that, faced with the wide variety of claims which may flow from unfair practices, in some circumstances – particularly for jurisdictional purposes – it may prove to be a complex issue, owing notably to the difficulties in drawing a straightforward demarcation line between contractual and tortious matters.
It is argued that the EU private international law system is well-suited for individual consumers’ disputes, be they grounded on contractual or tortious liability. On the one hand, the jurisdictional criteria laid down in Brussels I enable the consumers to seize courts which not only are the closest to their interests, but also sit in the Member State whose market has been affected by the unfair commercial practice, thus ensuring fair competitive relations between traders therein. On the other hand, the pertinent connecting factors in Rome I and II lead to similar results as to the applicable law and, hence, allow a reasonable balance to be struck between the interests at stake. Moreover, effective enforcement of EU substantive provisions is ensured within the internal market, as these rules autonomously determine their own spatial scope of application in accordance with the goal served by them.
By contrast, some concerns arise as to whether EU private international law facilitate aggregate litigation against multistate unfair practices which, by ensuring a more efficient level of compensation and deterrence, could however strengthen private consumer enforcement. Indeed, various procedural devices – to more or less degree modelled on the US-style class action – have been recently developed in several Member States or only drafted in other States. Brussels I appears to be ill-equipped to deal with multi-party litigation, essentially because it rests upon a conception of dispute resolution as individual. Consequently, a EU-wide class action may in practice be brought only in the courts of the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled. The sole alternative but less attractive option is actually to split up the EU-wide class comprising all the consumers who have been harmed by the same multistate unfair practice and to bring concurrent statewide sub-class actions in the courts of the different Member States concerned.
Moreover, even if a multistate class action were brought at the place of the defendant’s domicile, the conflict rules in Rome I and II could cause a serious threat to aggregate litigation in that they lead to a multiplicity of substantive law being applicable on a distributive basis. However, it is questionable whether this is an absolute impediment to the admission of the group action. It is in particular suggested that, when the individual claims derive from EU substantive provisions, the commonality of legal issues requirement is satisfied, so that their aggregate treatment has to be allowed.

The relationship between the European jurisdiction regime and arbitration is one of the areas generating confusion and disputes. The Brussels I Regulation clearly excludes arbitration from its scope to avoid conflicts with the New York Convention, but arbitration-related issues, such as the validity of arbitration agreements, either as an independent claim or an incidental question, frequently arise in courts. The scope of the Brussels I Regulation in terms of arbitration has been addressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in a number of decisions, such as Marc Rich v Societa Italiano Impianti, Van Uden, and Front Comor. None of them have provided a satisfactory answer. In order to provide clarification and to reconcile the European jurisdiction Regulation and the New York Convention, the Brussels I Recast has inserted a new recital specifically addressing the relationship between court jurisdiction and arbitration. This article aims to assess the effect of the new recital and whether it has appropriately resolved the difficult questions on the relationship between jurisdiction and arbitration in the European Union.

One of the main purposes of private international law is the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction in civil matters. In the European Union (EU), this goal is pursued by an articulate body of Regulations, forming part of what is usually labelled as ‘European procedural law’ or ‘European civil procedure’. In criminal law, by contrast, no such system exists: although Eurojust aims at resolving conflicts of jurisdiction by facilitating the identification of the jurisdiction that should prosecute cross-border crimes,  no hard-law instrument regulates this matter in a binding fashion.
Having noted this legislative gap, in January 2013 the European Law Institute accepted a project proposal dealing with the prevention and settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal law. One of the tasks of the Working Group focusing on this project was a comparison between private international law and criminal matters, so as to assess whether and to what extent the solutions adopted in the former field could be successfully transposed to the latter. This Chapter presents some reflections of the topic, triggered by the Working Group’s meetings and discussions.
The Chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part preliminarily highlights some fundamental differences between civil and criminal justice, which must be taken into account. As the Chapter will show, the differences at hand constrain, to a certain extent, the feasibility of a cross-sectoral comparative exercise, but they by no means make it impossible. The second part looks at private international law in general and argues that some of its basic principles should be adopted in the field of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal law too. Finally, the third part draws some specific lessons from European civil procedure in particular.

RESUMEN: La salida del RU de la UE tendrá implicaciones para el DIPr. Los ciudadanos británicos dejarán de beneficiarse del régimen de extranjería que prevé el Derecho europeo para los nacionales de los Estados miembros y sus familiares. En los Estados miembros de la UE no existirá la obligación de reconocer a las sociedades constituidas en el Reino Unido y los decisiones adoptadas por los tribunales británicos no se beneficiarán de los instrumentos europeos para su eficacia en el territorio de los Estados miembros de la UE. El RU tampoco podrá participar en la patente europea con efecto unitario, lo que podría afectar al conjunto del proyecto. Las negociaciones entre el RU y la UE que prevé el art. 50 del TUE podrían modificar esta situación, pero la diversidad de intereses presentes hace difícil que tales negociaciones puedan concluir en un acuerdo. PALABRAS CLAVE: Unión Europea. DIPr. Artículo 50 TUE. Derecho de extranjería. Derecho de sociedades. Espacio Europeo de Libertad, Seguridad y Justicia. Patente Europea ABSTRACT: The UK withdraw from the EU will involve some consequences for PIL. British citizens will no longer benefit of the specific regulation about the right to move and reside, that UE law confers to EU citizens and their families. Member States of the EU will not be compelled to recognize companies incorporated in the UK and decisions adopted by the UK courts will no longer be recognized within the EU through the European instruments about judicial cooperation. UK will not be allowed to participate in the European Patent with unitary effect and this could affect the project itself. Negotiations between the UK and the EU, as established by art. 50 TEU, could modify this situation, but de diversity of interests at the stake implies that it is difficult to reach an agreement. KEY WORDS: European Union. PIL. Art. 50 TEU. Migrations law. Company law. European Space of Freedom, Security and Justice. I. Introducción 1. Tras los primeros días en los que tanto la sociedad británica como el conjunto de los europeos nos hemos visto sacudidos por el resultado del referéndum en relación a la permanencia del Reino Unido en la Unión Europea se hace necesario comenzar a examinar con algo más de detalle algunas consecuencias de la futura salida de este país de la UE. A continuación intentaré explorar algunas de las consecuencias de esta salida desde la perspectiva del DIPr, pero con carácter previo han de realizarse algunas precisiones que tienen que ver con el proceso general de salida de la Unión que regula el art. 50 del TUE. 2. En primer lugar, el referéndum del pasado día 23 no supone el inicio del proceso de separación que conducirá a que el Reino Unido deje de ser un Estado miembro de la UE. Este proceso solamente comenzará cuando las autoridades británicas comuniquen formalmente a la UE su voluntad de dejar la Unión. En estos días ya hemos tenido ocasión de asistir a tiras y aflojas en relación a este tema, ya que parece que los