International private law

The donation in p.i.l. is an old problem in particular for the characterization and the current situation in certain EU Member States. This article briefly analyzes the relationship between the donation with Rome I Regulation and the recent EU Regulation 650/2012. Finally the article focuses on the Italian legal system and describes the problem, elaborating on the different solutions that might be adopted.

We can conclude that non-state rules may include both lex mercatoria, i.e. the law of international merchants, which is not perceived in any uniform way, and currently perhaps also selected rules of EU law, provided that no legal relations are involved that have no connection to the European area. Lex mercatoria can be defined as including international trade usages (such as INCOTERMS, which have become rather popular), generally recognised legal principles (for instance, pacta sunt servanda), and collections of principles governing international agreements (e.g. UNIDROIT Principles).

Lex mercatoria can be applied both in arbitration and in litigation based on four theoretical approaches. The first applicable method is subsidiary application, i.e. lex mercatoria is applied within the limits of binding provisions of applicable law – this method does not raise any problems in practice. Another possibility is application equivalent to national legal systems, i.e. based on the conflict-of-laws method. This method is currently considered controversial and is suitable for arbitration, rather than litigation. The third possibility is the preferential application of lex mercatoria – this is, however, a very extreme approach, even within international commercial arbitration, and requires the due assessment of all relevant circumstances. This category may also include negative choice of law, which postulates that the parties opted for lex mercatoria, because they did not choose any applicable law. This is, again, controversial doctrine, which may only be applied if we first take into consideration all of the circumstances of the case, and primarily the will of the parties. The fourth and last possibility is the ex post choice of law.

As concerns practical possibilities of application, the most frequently employed method is the application of non-state rules in connection with arbitration, where the courts control the proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Academics agree that the recognition and enforcement of a foreign award cannot be refused, should the sole grounds for refusal be the fact that the award is based on lex mercatoria. Another possibility of applying non-state rules in courts is application based on domestic laws. The third possibility is the application of non-state rules based on the parties’ choice, i.e. the parties may opt for non-state law. Even if some of the parties disagree, it is possible to envisage the application of non-state rules in litigation, though rather as soft law, i.e. a tool or inspiration for the resolution of the given case. This would be similar to the application of foreign law or foreign case law.

We can also imagine, subject to certain conditions, the application of non-state rules in domestic disputes: (i) if the parties agree to do so, in which case, again, non-state rules would be applied within the limits of binding rules of the applicable law, or (ii) at the court’s discretion. In such case, the court should have regard for any and all circumstances, such as the parties’ experience with international trade, as well as the method of application. The application of non-state rules as soft law can be accepted without objections. Both arbitral tribunals and courts have become more open to non-state rules – for instance, the fact that a decision or award is based on lex mercatoria is not eo ipso contrary to public policy (ordre public).
The application of non-state legal standards is intertwined with the irreplaceable role of a first-rate pre- and post-graduate system of education, and with interactions between extensive practice, on the one hand, and education and training, on the other. This is the reason why schools and other educational institutions must be addressed, and such quality of lectures and courses must be emphasised that will guarantee a high level of theoretical training and high-quality and solid incentives and information from practice. The reason is that this very requirement attains qualified dimensions in the case of trade and legal usages (international, as well as national and regional). The potential of cooperation between educational institutions and international organisations mostly remains untapped – and not only those that create and apply contract templates, unify recommendations, or formulate trade and legal principles, etc.

В заключение можно сказать, что негосударственные правила могут включать в себя, во-первых, lex mercatoria, т. е. право участников международных коммерческих отношений, относительно понимания которого отсутствует единое мнение, во-вторых, в настоящее время, очевидно, и некоторые правовые нормы ЕС, при условии, что речь идет о правоотношениях, в которых отсутствует связь с европейским пространством. Составляющей lex mercatoria можно считать международные торговые обычаи (например, ИНКОТЕРМС, которые в значительной степени стали популярными), общепризнанные правовые принципы или основы (например, pacta sunt servanda) и свод принципов международных договоров (например, Принципы УНИДРУА).

Lex mercatoria может применяться как арбитражами, так и судами общей юрисдикции на основе четырех теоретических подходов. Первым является субсидиарное применение, когда lex mercatoria применяется в рамках когентных положений применяемого права – на практике данный способ применения не встречается с какими-либо проблемами. Вторым вариантом является применение, равноценное национальным правовым системам, т. е. на основании коллизионного метода. В настоящее время данный способ является спорным и применяется скорее арбитражными судами, чем судами общей юрисдикции. Третий вариант – это преимущественное применение lex mercatoria, которое, однако, является крайним случаем даже в контексте международного торгового арбитража, требующего рассмотрения всех существенных обстоятельств. Сюда также можно включить отрицательный выбор права (negative choice), когда предполагается, что стороны, не выбрав применимое право, выбрали именно lex mercatoria. И в данном случае речь снова идет о спорной доктрине, перед применением которой необходимо взвесить все обстоятельства дела и, прежде всего, учесть волеизъявление сторон. Четвертым и последним вариантом является дополнительный выбор права.

С точки зрения практического применения на первом месте (с учетом частоты применения) находится применение негосударственных правил в связи с арбитражным разбирательством, когда суды осуществляют контрольную функцию в ходе разбирательства о признании и приведении в исполнение иностранных арбитражных решений. В этом случае доктрина признает, что нельзя отказать в признании и приведении в исполнение решения иностранного суда только по той причине, что оно основано на lex mercatoria.  Следующим возможным применением негосударственных правил в судах общей юрисдикции является применение на основании национальных правовых норм. Третьим вариантом является применение негосударственных правил на основании выбора сторон, когда стороны могут выбрать негосударственное право. Даже если не все стороны согласны, можно рассматривать возможность применения негосударственных норм судами общей юрисдикции, однако, скорее как т. н. soft law, т. е. в качестве пособия или источника инспирации при рассмотрении и разрешении спора. Аналогично применяется иностранное право или иностранные документы судебной практики.

При определенных условиях также возможно применение негосударственных правил во внутригосударственных спорах. Это, прежде всего, споры, в которых стороны согласуют применение негосударственных правил в рамках когентных положений применяемого права, или по усмотрению суда. В данном случае суд должен рассмотреть все обстоятельства, например, опыт сторон с международной торговлей, а также способ применения. Против применения негосударственных правил как soft law нельзя возражать. В контексте наблюдается растущий интерес арбитражных судов, а также судов [общей юрисдикции/государственных] к негосударственным правилам, который проявляется, например, в том, что основание решения на lex mercatoria еще не означает противоречие публичному порядку.
В связи с применением негосударственных правовых норм важную роль играет качественная вузовская и послевузовская образовательная система и взаимодействие широкой практики с воспитанием и обучением. Поэтому необходимо обращать особое внимание на воспитательные и образовательные учреждения, а также на качество содержания обучения, гарантирующее как высокий уровень теоретической подготовки, так и качественные и обоснованные стимулы и сведения из практики. Именно это требование в торговых и правовых обычаях (международных, а также национальных и региональных) приобретает важность с точки зрения квалификации. В основном остается нереализованным потенциал в области сотрудничества между образовательными учреждениями и международными организациями, причем не только теми, которые занимаются созданием и применением образцов договоров, объединяющих рекомендаций, формулировок торговых и правовых принципов и т. п.

International treaties therefore have priority over provisions of domestic origin (domestic lex arbitri). This mainly concerns two conventions, namely the New York Convention (1958) and the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961). In the field of international arbitration, specifically the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, these two conventions were historically preceded by two international treaty acts. If it is possible to apply both the provisions of bilateral interstate treaties (as mentioned above, primarily the legal assistance treaties) and the provisions of multilateral conventions, then the bilateral treaties are usually prioritized as a quasi lex specialis. Mainly the reflection the bilateral treaties (legal assistance treaties), but often also the reflection of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961) will often be omitted.

This Article explores the coexistence and dissimilarities of the external and internal functions of domicile of natural persons from both a comparative and Louisiana law perspective. The historical foundations of these connections are examined first (Part I). Next, the discussion focuses on the common-law concept of domicile, particularly its English foundations and American development (Part II), and on the civil law concepts of domicile (Part III) and habitual residence (Part IV). Finally, the main discussion turns to Louisiana’s law of domicile (Part V).  This comparison of civil and common law systems reveals that the Louisiana understanding of domicile resembles more closely the American common law model. This comparison also shows that the modern Louisiana private-law rules regulate domicile very effectively. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said with respect to Louisiana’s public-law rules, especially the rules concerning residential qualifications of candidates for public office.

‣ ΜονΠρΘεσ 3530/2018, Εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο ως
προς τις ζημιές που υφίστανται τρίτοι

‣ ΜονΠρΘεσ 15129/2017, Εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο επί
υποκατάστασης

‣ ΜονΠρΘεσ 12352/2018, Αυτοκινητικό ατύχημα.
Εφαρμοστέο το ελληνικό δίκαιο

‣ ΜονΠρΘεσ 5503/2018, Εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο. Στενότερος σύνδεσμος λόγω προϋφιστάμενης συμβατικής σχέσης

‣ ΜονΠρΘεσ 15253/2018, Εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο αυτό
της κοινής διαμονής των διαδίκων κατά τον χρόνο
επέλευσης της ζημίας

Prawo szwajcarskie nie wywiera bezpośredniego wpływu na system wspólnotowy. Nie chodzi ani o prawo państwa członkowskiego UE, ani o prawo członka Europejskiego Obszara Gospodarczego. Prawo szwajcarskie, dzięki swojemu mieszanemu podejściu do rozwiązywania tradycyjnych materialnoprawnych, kolizyjnych a również niektórych procesowych zagadnień, nie pełni już dzisiaj w tak dużym stopniu funkcji prawa neutralnego, jaką pełniło jeszcze trzydzieści lat temu. W pierwszej połowie minionego stulecia, prawo szwajcarskie wraz z prawem francuskim były podstawowymi wyznacznikami w praktyce umownej krajów europejskich, a zarazem jeżeli chodzi o prawo Szwajcarii to było ono prawdopodobnie najczęściej wybieranym neutralnym prawem właściwym. Aktualnie Szwajcaria zachowała znaczenie bardziej jako miejsce rozstrzygania sporów, zwłaszcza zaś jako miejsce, w którym odbywają się postępowania arbitrażowe. Z tych powodów znaczenie szwajcarskiego prawa materialnego jak również  kolizyjnego nie jest już tak duże jak w przeszłości, a nawet często w zakresie europejskiej wymiany handlowej i stosunków prawnych  uważa się, że jest ono raczej bardzo ograniczone. Do pewnego stopnia zachowuje ono jednak swoje znaczenie jako stosunkowo często wybierane prawo właściwe w ramach stosunków w handlu światowym. W tym przypadku jednak nie zawsze istotną rolę odgrywa rzeczywiście dane prawo, ale na przykład czynniki językowe, gdyż w niektórych krajach nadal, wbrew rosnącemu znaczeniu języka angielskiego, komunikacja w języku francuskim jest istotna a wielojęzyczność środowiska (a zarazem fakt, że język francuski jest językiem wielu systemów prawa krajowego) jest przez niektóre z nich uważana za atut. W każdym przypadku Szwajcarii i jej prawo krajowe odgrywa istotną rolę w europejskim środowisku prawnym. Również kultura prawa prywatnego międzynarodowego jest właśnie w Szwajcarii na bardzo wysokim poziomie. Podczas gdy odwołanie się do standardów szwajcarskiego prawa materialnego jest w praktyce umownej rzadkie, to szwajcarska ustawa o prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym [IPRG] nadal pozostaje znaczącym i interesującym wzorcem, który jest nieodzowną częścią europejskiej, chociaż nie wspólnotowej kultury prawnej.

Wreszcie prawo Szwajcarii jest jednym z praw krajowych, które implementowało do swojej regulacji normatywnej zasadę świadczenia charakterystycznego jako łącznik, dzięki czemu art. 117 IPRG stanowi pewnego rodzaju nowoczesną próbę połączenia czynników obiektywnych i subiektywnych przy określeniu kolizyjnego (łącznika). Szwejcaria i jej prawo ze względu na położenie geograficzne, miejsce rozstrzygania sporów, stosunki finansowe i świadczenie usług bankowych jest dodatkowo jednym z najbardziej znaczących państw (praw krajowych)  na kontynencie europejskim, które nie są nawet członkami EOG. Nie jest także bez znaczenia rola Szwajcarii w handlu i stosunkach prawnych z państwami spoza Wspólnoty, przede wszystkim zaś w pozaeuropejskich stosunkach handlowych i finansowych. Nie chodzi wprawdzie o prawo, które byłoby na poziomie wspólnotowym formalnie uwzględniane, to jednak pro futuro ma ono doniosłe znaczenie dla środowiska wspólnotowego. Co więcej, szwajcarskie prawo prywatne międzynarodowe naturalnie nadal zachowuje charakter kompleksowej i uniwersalnej kodyfikacji kolizyjnej oraz kodeksu międzynarodowego postępowania  cywilnego, gdyż ich zakres nie jest dotknięty żadnymi normami wspólnotowymi i na ich stosowanie nie ma wpływu żadna uniwersalna regulacja międzynarodowa z zakresu prawa kolizyjnego.  Szwejcaria nie była bowiem i nawet nie może być umawiającym się państwem konwencji rzymskei. Kolizyjny system europejskiego prawa prywatnego międzynarodowego, w odróżnieniu od dziedziny procesowej w postaci konwencji lugańskie, w chwili obecnej nie oferuje żadnego odpowiednika dla krajów nieczłonkowskich. Niewątpliwie szwajcarskie prawo prywatne międzynarodowe może więc w przyszłości odegrać interesującą rolę, co najmniej jako tło prawnoporównawcze dla autonomicznego wspólnotowego systemu prawnego. Struktura krajowego prawa kolizyjnego naruszona wskutek wpływów europejskiego (wspólnotowego) prawa prywatnego międzynarodowego, takiej roli z oczywistych względów pełnić już nie może. Szwajcarskie prawo prywatne międzynarodowe może więc w przyszłości - z punktu widzenia praktycznego (stosowanie kolizyjnej legis fori w przypadku sporów rozwiązywanych w Szwajcarii), podobnie jak na płaszczyźnie prawa porównawczego i nauki prawa - odegrać może nie zasadniczą, ale i tak stosunkowo istotną rolę.

Résumé en anglais en en français de la version intégrale de ma thèse :

L’influence libérale en droit de la famille et l’essor de l’idéologie individualiste ont provoqué un pluralisme des formes de conjugalité et ont considérablement accru la diversité des règles et des méthodes applicables aux couples en droit international privé contemporain.L’analyse des couples en droit international privé nous a alors conduit à repenser le droit international privé du couple. La déconstruction de la matière met en lumière l’inadaptation actuelle de la méthode conflictuelle classique et l’insuffisance de la méthode de la reconnaissance. En effet, l’actuel droit international privé du couple ne permet pas de garantir la continuité internationale du lien conjugal, pas plus qu’elle ne permet d’assurer un traitement juridique cohérent des problèmes auxquels sont confrontés les couples internationaux. Une réflexion quant à une possible évolution méthodologique de la matière était donc nécessaire. Cette étude vise à démontrer qu’une adaptation de la méthode conflictuelle classique à l’aune des objectifs de la méthode de la reconnaissance et fondée sur un raisonnement en termes de conflit d’autorités est possible. Elle apporterait aux règles de droit international privé du couple une meilleure cohérence tout en assurant aux rapports conjugaux internationaux une réelle stabilité.

The liberal influence in Family Law and the rise of individualist ideology have led to a multiplication of conjugal life forms and considerably increased the diversity of laws and methods applicable to couples in International Private Law. To analyse couples under International Private Law leads us to rethink the International Private Law of the Couple. Deconstructing this subject brings to light the current non-adaptation of the classic conflict of laws method and the insufficiency of the recognition approach. In fact, current International Private Law as it pertains to couples neither guarantees the international recognition of theconjugal bond nor ensures a coherent legal treatment of legal problems faced by international couples. It is therefore necessary to examine a possible methodological evolution of thesubject. This study aims to demonstrate that it is possible to adapt the classic conflict of lawsmethod by taking into account the objectives of the recognition approach whilst founding iton the lex auctoritas rule. This would not only bring better coherence to International Private Law of the Couple but it would also assure a real legal stability for international conjugal relationships.

The seat of arbitration has essential practical importance in arbitration, and it directly determines a number of issues: arbitrability, determination of governing law, whether substantive, or (mainly) procedural, and annulment of the arbitral award or its recognition and enforcement etc. Pursuant to author´s opinion the seat of arbitration is the main factor determining arbitration, while denationalization of arbitration seems to be a myth widely remote from international reality. The seat of arbitration need not be the place in which the individual procedural acts are conducted. From the seat of arbitration has to be distinguished also the place, where the arbitral award has been rendered and/or signed. Consequently, the place where the arbitral award is made usually determines whether the award is a domestic or a foreign award. The seat of arbitration can exceptionally be changed in course of arbitration, but not after an arbitral award has been rendered. International arbitration is usually subject to a two-tier control exercised by courts. The first control is exercised by the state of the seat of arbitration, and the second control is exercised by the state in which the parties seek recognition and enforcement. Consequently, if the parties internationalize their dispute (both parties from the same country agree on a seat of arbitration in a different country) and the arbitral award is rendered abroad (foreign arbitral award vis-à-vis the country of parties’ origin/domicile), the award has no effects in the country of parties´ origin/domicile until its recognition.

Στο παρόν αφιέρωμα φιλοξενούνται τέσσερις αποφάσεις, οι οποίες προέρχονται από υποθέσεις που είτε είναι αμιγώς, είτε δευτερευόντως κληρονομικής φύσης.
Συγκεκριμένα, η πρώτη απόφαση κινείται στο πολυσύχναστο πεδίο των αγωγών αποζημίωσης από αυτοκινητικό ατύχημα, όπου τέθηκε ζήτημα εφαρμοστέου δικαίου ως προς τους- κληρονόμους του ζημιώσαντος·
η δεύτερη αφορούσε αγωγή ακύρωσης πλασματικής αποδοχής κληρονομίας·
η  τρίτη αγωγή μεριδούχου νόμιμης μοίρας· τέλος, η τέταρτη προέρχεται από το δίκαιο του κτηματολογίου, όπου τέθηκε ζ
ήτημα εφαρμοστέου δικαίου σε αγωγή διόρθωσης ανακριβούς κτηματολογικής εγγραφής.

La restituzione dei reperti archeologici trafugati continua ad essere un problema dati i numerosi limiti interni ed i casi di inapplicabilità delle convenzioni internazionali in materia (si pensi alla Convenzione UNESCO del 1970 ed alla Convenzione dell’Unidroit del 1995), per tale ragione nella risoluzione di simili controversie i giudici dovranno ricorrere ai comuni criteri di collegamento internazionalprivatistici.
Il traffico internazionale di reperti archeologici si configura quale commercio di beni mobili, conseguentemente laddove un giudice venga chiamato a dirimere una causa che li abbia per oggetto, egli, al fine di individuare la disciplina applicabile, dovrà far ricorso al comune criterio di collegamento della lex rei sitae, principio riconosciuto sia dai sistemi di civil law che da quelli di common law. In forza di tale criterio la proprietà, il possesso e gli altri diritti reali sul bene mobile sono disciplinati dalla legge del luogo di situazione del bene stesso.
I beni illecitamente fuoriusciti da uno Stato e venduti all’estero sono dunque soggetti a discipline nazionali che possono differire di molto dalla lex originis, la legge dello Stato d’origine. In primo luogo, il possesso può godere di una tutela più o meno stringente a seconda dell’ordinamento preso in considerazione. In merito possono di- stinguersi i Paesi di common law, i quali consentono al proprietario spossessato di rivendicare i bene anche presso il possessore di buona fede, dai paesi di civil law ove vige il principio “possesso vale titolo”. Un caso eclatante a tal riguardo è la causa “Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd.”, nella quale il giudice britannico applicando la disciplina codicistica italiana, in quanto legge del luogo di situazione delle opere rubate al momento della compravendita, giudicò a favore del convenuto decretando che in forza della lex rei sitae egli acquistò validamente la proprietà degli oggetti in buona fede.
In secondo luogo, gli Stati manifestano approcci deci- samente diversificati rispetto alla questione della tutela del patrimonio culturale, ve ne sono alcuni liberali ed altri più protezionisti, come l’Italia. Nella maggior parte dei casi le norme di tutela hanno natura di diritto pubblico, in conseguenza di ciò assai di rado, in assenza di un strumento pattizio internazionale, esse saranno prese in considerazione dalle autorità dello Stato di destinazione del reperto trafugato. Conseguentemente la loro applicazione dipenderà dal gioco dei comuni criteri di collega- mento e, quindi, dalla lex rei sitae. Esemplari a tal riguardo sono la causa “Repubblica dell’Ecuador - Casa della cultura ecuadoriana c. Danusso Matta e altri” e la vertenza “Ministero francese dei beni culturali c. Ministero dei beni culturali e ambientali e De Contessini” le cui pronunce sono diametralmente opposte.
In ambito statunitense si evidenziano alcuni tentativi d’accogliere il diritto pubblico straniero, ci si riferisce in particolare alla cd. “McClain doctrine”, anche se pur sempre attraverso il filtro di norme interne, quali l’NSPA. La problematica della lex rei sitae si pone anche in relazione al patrimonio culturale subacqueo. In Italia una corrente giurisprudenziale risalente al caso del Melqart di Sciacca, ha ribadito che i reperti archeologici “pescati” in acque internazionali appartengono allo Stato italiano qualora la nave batta bandiera italiana, in quanto il
bastimento è per fictio iuris, territorio italiano.
Per queste ragioni gli esiti di azioni giudiziarie volte alla restituzione di reperti archeologici trafugati sono
tutt’altro che scontati.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. — 2. I contenuti dei provvedimenti dei giudici di merito sull’annotazione della rinuncia all’azione di restituzione. — 3. Le teorie sulla rinuncia « diretta » ed « indiretta » all’azione di restituzione in generale e sulla rinuncia all’azione di restituzione « contro gli aventi causa dai donatari soggetti a riduzione »: elenco delle teorie e relativi presupposti. — 4. Segue: analisi critica delle tesi sulla rinuncia, « diretta » ed « indiretta », all’azione di restituzione, sia nei confronti del beneficiario della disposizione lesiva, sia « contro gli aventi causa dai donatari soggetti a riduzione ». — 5. Segue: analisi critica delle teorie sulla sola rinuncia all’azione ex art. 563 c.c. Conclusioni. — 6. Sui rapporti tra la rinuncia all’azione di restituzione ex art. 563 c.c. e le liberalità non donative.

A judgment of the Greek Supreme Court  tackled a highly interesting issue which appears rarely in practice.  The cardinal question was whether it is allowed to apply foreign (English) law for procedural acts taking place in
Greece, affecting directly the limitation of the action. In particular, the issue in question concerns the consequences resulting from the lawsuit waiver of the claimant/appellant  before a Greek court, and the repercussions of its examination pursuant to either Greek or English law.

ΠΑΡΑΤΗΡΗΣΕΙΣ ΣΤΙΣ:

‣ ΜονΠρΘεσ 7006/2019, Παραγγελία διεξαγωγής αποδείξεων στη Γερμανία κατά τον Καν. 1206/2001
- Taking of Evidence Regulation -

‣ ΜονΠρΘεσ 3348/2017, Διεθνής δικαιοδοσία επί ασφαλιστικών μέτρων σε κληρονομικές διαφορές (Καν. 650/2012)
- provisional measures under the Succession Regulation -

‣ ΜονΠρΕδεσ 38/2019, Αναγνώριση δεδικασμένου γερμανικού δικαστικού συμβιβασμού αναγνώρισης πατρότητας δεν αντίκειται στη δημόσια τάξη.
- Recognition of a German judgment on paternity in Greece -

‣ ΜονΠρΘεσ 7964/2018, Εφαρμοστέο δίκαιο στην ικανότητα παράστασης αλλοδαπού ανηλίκου και την αξίωση αποζημίωσης λόγω θανάτωσης προσώπου
- Applicable law for the capacity of a foreign minor to sue for damages -

The paper thoroughly examines the rules on jurisdiction of the Property Regimes Regulations, analysing both the expected benefits as well as the existing and potential problems in the application of the new rules. The main accomplishment of the Property Regimes Regulations in the field of jurisdiction is that they established more coherence in the cross-border family law adjudication. Namely, they align the international jurisdiction regarding the couple’s property to that of the situation at the origin of the need to adjudicate on such property, i.e. separation of the couple or else the death of one of the spouses or partners. Such joinder of proceedings is the general rule in the Property Regimes Regulations and even mandatory when succession proceedings are pending. Questions
concerning property relations between spouses or registered partners must, however, sometimes be resolved without an underlying separation or succession proceedings and Property Regime Regulations also provide for the international jurisdiction of courts in such “independent” cases. The main connecting factor is then the common habitual residence of the spouses or registered partners, in line with the general tendency in EU Private International Law of enhancing the importance of the habitual residence, rather than of the nationality.

The EU Law is especially interested in the consumers contracts linked to third countries, although its response is improvable. Particularly the case “EU professional–consumer from third country” is characterized by the lack of protection of the so called “passive” consumer under the rules of the “BrusselsI.a” Regulation. Moreover, certain contradictions are observed by the different definitions of “consumer” provided by “Rome I” Regulation and by Directive 2011/83.

On the other hand, the case “professional from third country–EU consumer” is very influenced by the new rules of “Brussels I.a” Regulation, under which the consumer is entitled to claim in his proper domicile. However, the eventual decision will be considered unable to be recognized by many conventions on recognition and enforcement concluded by Spain and third countries. Meanwhile the protection of the EU Law is not guaranteed by “Rome I” Regulation in relation to consumers attracted in a Member State other than the Member State of his residence. This lack of protection is corrected by the EU overriding mandatory provisions.

The breach of public policy is the sole reason in terms of the Regulation that justifies the exceptional refusal of an EU Member State to recognize the main insolvency proceedings and grant their effects. However, the application of ordre public in this connection is more than questionable. It is doubtful whether the EU Member States may in an individual case deny effects to a European regulation as a significant and directly applicable source of European law, which is simultaneously a source of its own law, and whether such approach would not rather be an attempt to evade the regulation, which would be prohibited according to the principles of EU law. Moreover, Article 26 of the Regulation only provides for the procedural ordre public, not the substantive ordre public. The latter could apply in connection with the determination and, especially, the effects of the applicable substantive law of national origin as the lex fori concursus; the ordre public exception could in such case at least theoretically be possible from the substantive-law perspective. However, the substantive-law aspects of the situation are already reflected in Article 5 of the Regulation, which provides for the conflict-of-laws exceptions to Article 4 of the Regulation (and, indeed, in substantially all immunity and special provisions of the Regulation, i.e. Articles 5 to 15 of the Regulation). Consequently, it is more than appropriate to examine the purpose of the rule enshrined in Article 26 of the Regulation, i.e. in which situation the recognition and enforcement would have a result that is principally incompatible with the public policy of the respective Member State. No problems arise if the recognition concerns an individual normative act, i.e. an individual court decision rendered in connection with specific insolvency proceedings, for instance, in connection with a creditor’s claim or the bankrupt’s obligation. It is unclear whether the liquidator’s powers in the main insolvency proceedings can be contested and, for instance, their registration be denied in public registers in terms of Article 21 of the Regulation, such as the Land Register, the Companies Register, etc. We may probably agree that the ordre public exception is not applicable in such cases, as it is not applicable for instance in connection with the debtor’s eligibility as a party to the insolvency proceedings (cf. Article 16(2) of the Regulation, or here in the entire context of the Regulation, i.e. especially, though not exclusively, in terms of Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation, etc.). Similarly, the ordre public exception is also not applicable if, for instance, the rescue plan relating to the bankrupt’s assets (estate) impairs the creditor’s status compared to the option of liquidating, i.e. selling, the estate. Besides, the rescue plan must still rest on the principles that guarantee due procedure, primarily the following principles: (i) each creditor must obtain at least as much as they would obtain if the estate were liquidated, (ii) further operation of the enterprise must be based on a sufficient estate, so that obligations that arise in the future in connection with the due operation of the business will be satisfied, (iii) the absolute priority rule is observed, which requires that the priority satisfaction rights are honored, or that the payment of benefits to lower classes of creditors before satisfaction of the higher classes of creditors is contingent on the latter’s consent, and (iv) the rescue plan for the bankrupt’s enterprise is subject to the court’s consent, and such consent must be withheld if the plan is contrary to laws or good morals, provided that it is approved by the majority of creditors during a separate vote within the individual classes of creditors.

This article examines how the adoption of children under Hindu law in India is regarded by British private international law and immigration law. Through an analysis of case-law, it focuses particularly on how British judges regard the legitimacy of exclusion by the British immigration control system of children who have been adopted under a ‘foreign’ legal system which essentially permits private adoption arrangements. Examining the background to the regime of Indian Hindu law adoptions (which applies to Sikhs aswell asHindus), and the private international law and immigration rules which apply to such adoptees in the UK, the article finds some evidence in the judicial decisions of a more activist, human rights-based, plurality-conscious position being taken. However, tracking the case-law further, the article
concludes that such activism has not been followed through in more recent decisions leaving the conflictual position between transnational adopters and British legal systems largely unresolved.

The article analyses the fundamental premises of the differentiation between substantive and procedural rules in private international law and arbitration. The author opens the paper with the general differentiation between substantive and procedural rules and the reasons for such differentiation. The opening paragraphs are followed by a chapter dealing with the fundamental issues and premises of the differentiation between substantive and procedural rules in private international law. At the same time, the author endeavours to define a general approach applicable to such differentiation. Attention is devoted primarily to the specifics of such differentiation in arbitration and to a comparison with litigation. The general comments are followed by an analysis of the legal nature of limitation of actions and offset (set-off), the classification of which is significantly different in civil law countries (especially from the continental European approach) and in common law countries. The author also deals with the conflict-of-laws premises and the consequences of their nature, as they are perceived differently under the individual legal systems. Analysing the nature of these legal institutions and their conflict-of-laws implications helps to outline the general theoretical premises and the practical consequences of differentiation between the nature of substantive and procedural rules.
Procedural and substantive rules in private international law and in arbitration ought to be distinguished according to the lex loci arbitri/fori (based on the classification according to the lex fori/arbitri), with the potential possibility of correcting inappropriate and manifestly unjust solutions using functional classification. We must neither forget that the classification according to the lex fori / lex arbitri is sometimes replaced with a contractual or autonomous classification with respect to certain legal instruments of international law and instruments of a cross-border nature (such as European Union law), depending on the type of legal instrument and the specific arrangements agreed by the signatories.

Problematika rozhodčího řízení a diskuse s ní spojené v posledních letech neustávají. Hovoří se o ní na odborných fórech a setkáních právnických stavů, odborníci z praxe i z akademické sféry se snaží nalézt odpovědi na otázky, které průběžně vyvolává praxe i judikatura Nejvyššího soudu ČR i Ústavního soudu ČR. Proto není divu, že se rozhodčí řízení jako forma mimosoudního řešení sporů pravidelně objevuje také v programu Pražského právnického podzimu.

V pondělí 23. listopadu 2015 se v pražském hotelu Olšanka uskutečnila další akce IV. ročníku Pražského právnického podzimu. Jednalo se o workshop nazvaný Aktuální otázky rozhodčího řízení a jeho partnery se stali Advokát Dr. Alexander J. Bělohlávek a Česká (& Středoevropská) ročenka rozhodčího řízení a mediálním partnerem tohoto workshopu byl deník Lidové noviny. Záštitu této akci poskytl místopředseda Nejvyššího soudu ČR JUDr. Roman Fiala.

Workshop řídila advokátka a šéfredaktorka Rodinných listů JUDr. Daniela Kovářová, jednotlivé odborné panely moderovali prof. JUDr. Naděžda Rozehnalová, CSc., vysokoškolská pedagožka brněnské Právnické fakulty a její bývalá děkanka a v současnosti prorektorka Masarykovy univerzity Brno, a prof. Dr. Alexander J. Bělohlávek, advokát a vnitrostátní i zahraniční rozhodce.

Stalo se už tradicí, že z akcí v rámci Pražského právnického podzimu zaměřených na rozhodčí řízení zpracovávají pořadatelé sborník. Základem monografie, kterou čtenář právě drží v ruce, je jednak záznam prezentací hlavních přednášejících a nejzajímavějších částí diskuse, která zmíněného podzimního odpoledne v průběhu workshopu proběhla, jakož i autorské materiály zpracované a předložené účastníky pro přípravu této publikace. Tematicky byl celý program zaměřen na dvě oblasti. Tou první se stala aplikace procesních standardů v rozhodčím řízení z pohledu rozsahu autonomie rozhodců a stran. Druhou pak byla problematika použitelnosti občanského soudního řádu v rozhodčím řízení, resp. diskuze z pohledu interakce rozhodčího řízení v. řízení soudního ve věcech spadajících pod pomocné a kontrolní funkce soudů právě ve vztahu k rozhodčímu řízení a rozhodčím nálezům. Kmenovou část doplňuje přehled tuzemských titulů týkajících se rozhodčího řízení a vydaných v roce 2015 a stejně jako u loňského vydání analogické publikace především podrobné anotace aktuální judikatury Ústavního soudu ČR a Nejvyššího soudu ČR ve vztahu k rozhodčímu řízení z posledních let, včetně rozborů, komentářů a poznámek k těmto vybraným rozhodnutím. V závěru je připojen podrobný rejstřík zpracovaný editory, a to rejstřík věcný, rejstřík odkazů na předpisy tuzemského, jakož i cizozemského původu a rejstřík odkazů na judikaturu tak, jak je na tyto předpisy a judikáty odkazováno v textu.

Adaptation or adjustment has to date received little general attention in EU private international law. The Brussels Ia Regulation, the Succession Regulation and the Matri monial / Registered Partnership Property Regimes Regulation explicitly provide for the tool of adaptation. Nevertheless, those provisions only deal with one certain category of that tool, what is termed transposition. In general, adaptation refers to the judge's discretion to deliberately deviate from a rule in an exceptional case in which two different national laws apply in juxtaposition and the combined application could lead to a contradictory result intended by neither of the two national systems. Adaptation diminishes or eliminates those contradictions. The judge's discretion to adapt national and EU rules implicates questions about the relationship between EU and Member State competence. The present analysis is the first to address this topic comprehensively. It develops a system to decrease contradictions between EU PIL and national law.
As the EU PIL system is still only fragmentary, the analysis is twofold. First, the article analyses the necessity, requirements and means of adaptation in a case that is governed by two EU PIL rules. Second, the article analyses whether the outcome changes if the applicable law is determined by one EU PIL rule and one national PIL rule.

One of the main purposes of private international law is the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction in civil matters. In the European Union (EU), this goal is pursued by an articulate body of Regulations, forming part of what is usually labelled as ‘European procedural law’ or ‘European civil procedure’. In criminal law, by contrast, no such system exists: although Eurojust aims at resolving conflicts of jurisdiction by facilitating the identification of the jurisdiction that should prosecute cross-border crimes,  no hard-law instrument regulates this matter in a binding fashion.
Having noted this legislative gap, in January 2013 the European Law Institute accepted a project proposal dealing with the prevention and settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal law. One of the tasks of the Working Group focusing on this project was a comparison between private international law and criminal matters, so as to assess whether and to what extent the solutions adopted in the former field could be successfully transposed to the latter. This Chapter presents some reflections of the topic, triggered by the Working Group’s meetings and discussions.
The Chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part preliminarily highlights some fundamental differences between civil and criminal justice, which must be taken into account. As the Chapter will show, the differences at hand constrain, to a certain extent, the feasibility of a cross-sectoral comparative exercise, but they by no means make it impossible. The second part looks at private international law in general and argues that some of its basic principles should be adopted in the field of conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal law too. Finally, the third part draws some specific lessons from European civil procedure in particular.

International arbitration differs from domestic court litigation with respect to evidence and the burden of proof, in that there are no formal rules as to the taking of evidence, nor with respect to the burden of proof. This article focuses on certain specific issues relating to the taking of evidence in investor-state disputes connected with the rights and duties of the parties.

The expression “burden of proof” refers not to the degree of proof that is required in order for a fact to be deemed established, but rather to the question of which party has the onus of proving the given allegation. The parties present a wide range of facts to the arbitrators, and it is more or less irrelevant who has the burden of proof. Insofar as these facts are disputed, the parties will present and the tribunal will take evidence. Only if a clear and convincing answer to a factual question cannot be found will the tribunal have regard to the duty to submit evidence and the burden of proof in order to decide to whose disadvantage such non liquet situation has to be resolved.

Discovery in international arbitration is usually limited to exchanges of certain documents and has to be limited, because arbitration would otherwise be deprived of its fundamental functions and advantages. This also applies to investor-state disputes, which are also often specific for a special interest in not submitting or presenting, respectively, certain documents or facts due to a qualified public element.

This French version of an original Romanian paper focuses on comparison as an interpretative method within the European Brussels regime.
A historical overview will uncover some pre-European tentative to use comparison to unify law.
Then, the analysis will focus on European judges’ comparative practice in the unified maters of the Brussels regime (more specifically, Brussels Convention). In the 70s, the European judge started to use comparison to interpret the obscure terms of the Brussels Convention.
Based on some essential cases, we will establish the place of comparison among other methods used by the judge (such as historical and teleological interpretation). We will equally ‘translate’ this use of comparison by European judges as a grammatical method of interpretation.
This kind of comparison used by European judges is still an unrivalled practice, far in advance to other tentative from International Private Law to unify the application of uniform rules. Nevertheless, this might be an essential contribution of Europe in a field primarily forgotten by methodological doctrine.

The Czech courts do often deal with transportation matters. For example the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic decided on 28 March 2012 about the Scope of the CMR Convention. The court concluded that the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR Convention) shall apply to every contract for the carriage og consignments by road vehicles for remuneration, when the place of taking over the consignment and the place designated for delivery thereof, as specified in the contract, are situated in two different countries, of which at least one is a contracting party to the CMR Convention. The court concluded further in the same decision that a contract does not qualify as a contract of carriage if the person designated as consignor in the international consignment notes is not simultaneously the person or entity that ordered the carriage.

In another decision, namely in the judgment of 10 October 2012 the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic concluded that the CMR Convention does not regulate all issues related to international carriage by road. The Convention does not regulate the process of formation of the contract for carriage of things (consignment, goods) and its essential components. These issues, which are not regulated under the CMR Convention, must be examined according to domestic regulations as the governing substantive law determined according to the rules of private international law. The Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), binding on the Czech Republic, shall apply to a contract that entails the carriage of consignments by road vehicles for remuneration, when the place of taking over of the consignment and the place designated for delivery thereof, as specified in the contract, are situated in two different countries, of which at least one is a contracting party to the CMR Convention, irrespective of the states in which the registered office, place of business or place of residence of the parties is situated.27 If the parties entered into a contract of carriage,28 the liability for damage and losses incurred in the course of the carriage must be assessed according to the CMR Convention. Article 4 of the CMR Convention stipulates that the contract of carriage shall be confirmed by the making out of a consignment note. The absence, irregularity or loss of the consignment note shall not affect the existence or validity of the contract of carriage, which shall remain subject to the provisions of the CMR Convention. Article 9 of the CMR Convention stipulates that, unless proven otherwise, the consignment note shall be prima facie evidence of the making of the contract of carriage, the contents of the contract and the receipt of the consignment by the carrier. Information provided in the consignment note therefore establishes a refutable legal presumption regarding the existence or the contents of the contract of carriage, as applicable. Article 3 of the Convention on the Contract for the
International Carriage of Goods by Road [CMR Convention] must be interpreted in conjunction with Article 29 of the CMR Convention. Article 3 of the CMR Convention stipulates that the carrier is responsible for the acts and omissions of their agents and servants, and of any other persons of whose services they make use for the performance of the carriage, as well as for the acts and omissions of the agents, servants and any other persons whose services are used by the carrier’s subcontractor or the subcontractor’s subcontractor, as long as such agents, servants or other persons are acting within the scope of their employment. Acts within the scope of one’s employment also include any acts of the person whereby he or she committed a criminal offence, thereby advancing only his or her own interests or the interests of a third party, not the interests of the carrier. In terms of Article 3 of the CMR Convention, the carrier is liable for the acts of their employees or, as applicable, persons of whose services they have made use in the carriage of the vehicle, even if these persons act contrary to the orders given by the employer; the reason is that the carrier is also liable for the proper choice of their employees or subcontractors, as applicable. The carrier is therefore also liable for any theft or embezzlement of goods, as the case may be, committed by the ‘persons used’ if the goods were entrusted to them in the performance of the contract of carriage. The carrier’s liability under Article 17(1) of the CMR Convention is strict liability. The carrier cannot be relieved of this liability by proving a lack of fault, but only by proving the existence of grounds for liberation. Liability for damage to the goods or losses caused during the carriage as a result of a criminal offence committed by the driver who participated in the theft of the goods rests with the carrier in compliance with Article 17(1) of the CMR Convention. Information provided in the consignment note establishes a refutable legal presumption regarding the existence or the contents of the contract of carriage, as applicable. This does not mean, however, that Section 610 of the Czech Commercial Code could not apply. Determination of the amount of damage under Article 23(2) and (3) of the CMR Convention is principally made by reference to the invoice (or any similar document) issued and submitted by the supplier (here the foreign supplier), without exceeding the limits of damages under Article 23(3) of the CMR Convention. When interpreting international treaties or agreements as the source of law, the national court may also invoke the case law of foreign courts that examined the same or a similar issue.

In its Resolution of 9 January 2013 the Czech Supreme Court concluded that International jurisdiction in international disputes from carriage that fall within the CMR Convention is governed by Article 31(1)(b) of the CMR Convention. Agreement of the parties (choice-of-court agreement/ prorogatio fori) takes precedence in the determination of the international jurisdiction of court in disputes from carriage that fall within the CMR Convention. In the absence of the parties’ agreement, the jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the state in whose territory the place is located in which the  consignment was received for carriage, or in whose territory the place is located in which the consignment was designated for delivery. As concerns international jurisdiction of courts, the CMR Convention does not rule out the application of EU law, namely Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. If the consignment was released in the territory of the Czech Republic (Cheb), the courts of the Czech Republic have international jurisdiction. But if the conditions for territorial jurisdiction are absent (the respondent company does not have its registered office, or enterprise or branch in the Czech Republic and the circumstances are absent that would establish optional territorial jurisdiction), the territorial jurisdiction shall be determined by the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic following the principle of economy of the proceedings. The place (court) that best corresponds to this principle is the jurisdiction of the district court in whose district the transported consignment was released (delivered). In the case at hand, the respective principle is best fulfilled by the determination of the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court in Cheb [Czech Republic], before which the proceedings were commenced and in whose district the transported consignment was released (delivered) to the respondent.

Together with international treaties the main source of law on contracts is in the Czech Republic the Civil Code in effect as of 1 January 2014, which has replaced the previous Civil Code of 1964 as amended and the Commercial Code of 1991 as amended. The paper analyzes in its second part the Czech law on contracts in detail and comparing at the same time both regulations.

Resumen: en su Sentencia de 21 de junio de 2018, en el asunto Petronas Lubricants Italy, el TJUE afirma la viabilidad de una reconvención del empleador contra el trabajador respecto de unos créditos cedidos por otro empleador. La Sentencia tiene aspectos positivos, pues consolida la competencia del juez inicial para una reconvención por razones de economía procesal, incluso cuando el demandante reconvencional sea una parte más fuerte jurídica y económicamente, como es un empleador. En su ha-ber, también, exigir que la reconvención tenga un origen común a la demanda inicial, pues en este foro también persiste el objetivo de buscar resoluciones coherentes. Entre los aspectos negativos, el Tribunal, al aplicar la doctrina general al caso concreto, legitima una situación abusiva. El demandante reconvencional está utilizando el entramado de sociedades del grupo para diseñar la reconvención y lo hace a través de una cesión de créditos que afecta a la posición procesal del demandado reconvencional. Y ello cuando este demandado reconvencional no participa de dicha cesión (es un acto ajeno) y ni siquiera puede calcular sus efectos, al ser posterior a la interposición de la demanda inicial. Palabras clave: contrato de trabajo, competencia judicial internacional, reconvención. Reglamento "Bruselas I.bis".

Abstract: in its Judgment of 21 June 2018, in case Petronas Lubricants Italy, the EUCJ affirms the viability of a counterclaim by the employer against the worker with respect to credits assigned by another employer. The Judgment has positive aspects, due to it consolidates the jurisdiction of the initial court for a counterclaim for reasons of procedural economy, even when the counterclaimant is a stronger legal and economic party, such as an employer. Also it is positive to require that the counterclaim has a common origin to the initial claim, because this jurisdiction rule keeps the purpose of seeking coherent decisions. Among the negative aspects, the Court, when applies the general doctrine to the specific case, legitimizesan abusive situation. The counterclaimant is using the network of group companies in order to design the counterclaim by an assignment of credits that affects the procedural position of the counterclaim defendant. That occurs when this counterclaim defendant does not participate in said assignment (it is an external act) and cannot even calculate its effects, since it is subsequent to the filing of the initial claim.

This simple essay has as subject oil arbitration, concretely, the rules applicable to the
merits of the dispute. To a better understanding it seems advisable to show, at a glance, the oil industry. These considerations allows the enhancement of the oil arbitration within its international and investment context; the existence of different kinds of arbitrations and the applicable legal frames enshrined in several international and national legal sources.
In the aftermath, it seems suitable to tackle some problems and solutions dealt by the
arbitrators when it comes to apply the rules to the merits of the dispute. Indeed it is a very difficult and delicate subject. At last, some conclusions will be pointed out. We are
perfectly aware that factors related to the nature, difficulty of this issue and due time does not allow us to present an exhaustive treatment of the subject.


RESUMO Este modesto trabalho tem como objeto a arbitragem petrolífera; porém, e tendo em consideração a amplitude do assunto, resolvemos cingi-lo às regras de direito aplicáveis ao mérito da causa. Para sua melhor percetibilidade julgou-se adequado fazer um sumário enquadramento da atividade petrolífera. Este esclarecimento prévio permite destacar a importância da arbitragem petrolífera no contexto da arbitragem internacional e do investimento; respetivas modalidades e instrumentos legais de fonte internacional e nacional que a contemplam. Aqui volvidos consideramos estar em condições para enunciar alguns problemas e soluções com que se depara um árbitro, na delicada e complexa tarefa, aquando da aplicação das regras de direito ao mérito da causa. Por último, seguem-se as principais conclusões a extrair num tema controvertido. A Signatária não tem a veleidade e pretensão de fazer um tratamento exaustivo da questão em virtude da sua natureza; dificuldade dogmática e do fator tempo.

Především rozvoj obchodních vztahů ruku v ruce s celosvětovou globalizací nás konfrontuje v podstatě v každodenní právní a obchodní praxi s celou řadu institutů, která jsou některým právním řádům buď zcela neznámé nebo tyto dokonce s ohledem na některé základní principy takových institutů často nemohou být aprobovány (nebo jen s obtížemi), a to ani v případě použití cizího práva jako práva rozhodného, je-li dán prostor pro takové použití cizího práva. Jedním z těchto, pro řadu právních řádů poněkud kontroverzních, institutů je bezesporu trust, který je v mezinárodní (především, avšak nikoliv jen obchodní) praxi poměrně běžně používanou konstrukcí, a to ať již z pohledu osobního statusu jako typ právnické osoby či quazi právnické osoby nebo jako smluvní typ, tedy jako institut práva závazkového. Předem je zapotřebí poznamenat, že předmětem tohoto příspěvku je trust z pohledu mezinárodního práva soukromého – závazkového / smluvního, když podrobné pojednání o tomto institutu včetně (avšak nikoliv jen) z pohledu statusového, by zcela jistě vybočil z rámce pro tento příspěvek přijatelný. Na druhou stranu všechny tyto roviny přirozeně v řadech ohledů navzájem kolaborují a významně se prolínají, či dokonce se vzájemně podmiňují. Právě neschopnost komunitární legislativy jednoznačně trust identifikovat buď jako institut používaný v souvislosti s osobním statutem (tak, jak je tomu typicky v common law) a jeho porovnání s celou řadou bezesporu analogických institutů kontinentálních, které ovšem jednotlivé národní právní řády řadí do oblasti smluvního závazkového práva vedl k  k vyloučení trustu (expresis verbis) z věcného rozsahu Nařízení č. 593/2008 ze 17. června 2008 o právu rozhodném pro smluvní závazkové vztahy (Řím I.) (dále v rámci tohoto příspěvku Nařízení Řím I.), které v rámci své věcné, subjektivní a především teritoriální působnosti nahrazuje od 17. prosince 2009 Úmluvu o právu rozhodném pro smluvní závazkové vztahy, uzavřená v Římě dne 19. června 1980 / dokument EHS zn. 80/934/EHS a který se tak zcela bezesporu v brzké době stane nejdůležitějším nástrojem (komunitárního původu) mezinárodního práva soukromého v rámci kolizní úpravy práva rozhodného pro smluvní závazkové vztahy. Vyloučení trustu ve smyslu čl. 1 odst. 2 písm. h./ Nařízení Řím I. (analogicky jako v případě úpravy dle čl. 1 odst. 2 písm. f./ Římské úmluvy) však není tak jednoznačné, jak by se mohlo na první pohled zdát a jak se to (bohužel poněkud zjednodušeně) snaží podat určitá část jak zahraničních tak tuzemských komentátorů. To je pak o to významnější, že obchodní a právní praxe je i u nás s trustem konfrontována ve skutečnosti velmi často, a to i přesto, že odpovídající analogii v tuzemském právu nenalezneme.

International arbitration differs from domestic court litigation with respect to evidence and the burden of proof, in that there are no formal rules as to the taking of evidence, nor with respect to the burden of proof. This article focuses on certain specific issues relating to the taking of evidence in investor-state disputes connected with the rights and duties of the parties.

The expression “burden of proof” refers not to the degree of proof that is required in order for a fact to be deemed established, but rather to the question of which party has the onus of proving the given allegation. The parties present a wide range of facts to the arbitrators, and it is more or less irrelevant who has the burden of proof. Insofar as these facts are disputed, the parties will present and the tribunal will take evidence. Only if a clear and convincing answer to a factual question cannot be found will the tribunal have regard to the duty to submit evidence and the burden of proof in order to decide to whose disadvantage such non liquet situation has to be resolved.

Discovery in international arbitration is usually limited to exchanges of certain documents and has to be limited, because arbitration would otherwise be deprived of its fundamental functions and advantages. This also applies to investor-state disputes, which are also often specific for a special interest in not submitting or presenting, respectively, certain documents or facts due to a qualified public element.


Mezinárodní rozhodčí řízení se liší od vnitrostátního soudního řízení v záležitostech dokazování a důkazního břemene v tom směru, že nejsou stanovena žádná formální pravidla dokazování a žádná formální pravidla týkající se důkazního břemene. Předmětem tohoto příspěvku jsou některé specifické otázky související s dokazováním ve sporech na ochranu investic v návaznosti na práva a povinnosti stran.

Výraz „důkazní břemeno“ není výrazem označujícím to, jak přesvědčivé musí být důkazy, aby bylo možno skutkovou okolnost jimi prokazovanou označit za prokázanou, ale spíše se tím míní to, která strana je zatížena povinností prokazovat určité tvrzení. Strany předkládají rozhodcům řadu skutečností a je při tom víceméně nerozhodné, kdo má důkazní povinnost. Pokud jsou tyto skutečnosti sporné, strany budou předkládat důkazy a soud je bude provádět. Pouze v případě, že se nedaří nalézt jasnou a přesvědčivou odpověď na skutkovou otázku, zohlední soud důkazní povinnost a důkazní břemeno, aby rozhodl, k tíži které strany je nutno tuto nerozhodnou situaci vyřešit.

Proces discovery je v mezinárodním rozhodčím řízení obvykle omezen na výměnu určitých listin a je zapotřebí jej omezovat. Jinak by rozhodčí řízení ztrácelo na svých základních funkcích a výhodách. To platí i pro investiční spory, kde navíc často existuje zvláštní zájem na tom, že některé listiny a skutečnosti nebudou prezentovány s ohledem na kvalifikovaný veřejný prvek.

CONTENTS
Introduction - 5 -
Α. De Terminis: From Jus Gentium to Jus inter Gentes - 10 -
A (I) The Problematic on the Status of Domestic Law within the International Legal Order and the General Principles of Law Trivium - 10 -
A (II) The Genesis of International Law and the Spheres Dichotomy - 19 -
(a) On Definitions - 19 -
(b) Jus Gentium: The Genealogy of a Holistic International Law (Franciscus de Vitoria) - 21 -
(c) Francisco Suárez and the Civitas Maxima - 30 -
Α (III) Private Law and the International Legal Order - 38 -
(a) The Public/Private Dichotomy - 38 -
(b) The Law of Nations Doctrine in the Context of Private International Law - 41 -
(b) a. The 'Curious Case' of the Common Law Tradition: Blackstone and Bentham - 41 -
(b) b. The Usus Modernus in the Continental Doctrine and Praxis - 48 -
(c) a. The Rise of Positivism and the Territoriality Principle - 63 -
(c) b. From the Illinois Central Railroad to the Specialized Institutional Actors - 71 -
B. The Conflict of Law Rules Before International Tribunals - 80 -
Β (I) Legal Categories and Pluralism in Doctrinal Context - 80 -
(a) The Perennial Return of the Public/Private International Law 'Discours' - 80 -
(b) The Functions of Private International Law: Stricto – Lato Sensu - 92 -
(c) The Law of Nations Doctrine Revisited: From late 19th to the 20th Century - 96 -
(d) Private International Law as a Matter of Foreign Policy - 110 -
(c) A 'Hybrid' Paradigm: The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal - 117 -

Β (II) The Contribution of the Permanent Court and the International Court to the Interaction Between Public and Private International Law - 129 -
(c) International Tribunals and the Conflict of Laws' Problematic - 129 -
(b) Doctrinal Issues pertaining to the Introduction of Private International Law in the International Adjudication Process - 130 -
(c) Private International Law, Municipal Law, and the PCIJ - 142 -
(d) The World Court and the Conflict of Laws: Supremacy, General Principles and the Rule of Law - 177 -
(e) The Function of Domestic Law according to the ICJ's Jurisprudence: The 'Renvoi' Rule and the Completeness of the International Legal Order - 222 -
(f) 'Abus de droit' and Fraus Legis Facta: An Exemplary Case in International Adjudication - 234 -

C. The Praxis of the Public/Private Interplay: The New York Convention of 1958 - 241 -
(a) The Doctrinal Value of the International Instrument - 241 -
(b) The Convention and the Public/Private Debate - 243 -
(c) Article VII(1): Variable Relations Between International Regimes and Municipal Rules - 246 -
(d) Reciprocity, Reservations and the Greek Case - 251 -

D. The 'Ordre Public Vraiment International' (OPVI) - 256 -
(a) Revisiting the Public Policy Scheme - 256 -
(b) OPVI in Foro Domestico - 261 -
(c) Private Litigation: Whither International Law? (Concluding Remarks) - 266 -

In the essay in hand the present author re-examines the classic problematic of the 'exorbitant' jurisdiction (namely the jurisdictional connector of nationality) as applied in cases of divorce and parental responsibility within the Greek juridical order. The doctrinal approach is permeated by the Law of Nations and International Human Rights Law analysis, with emphasis placed upon the notion of the ‘best interest of the child’-principle, as recognised by both the CRC and the Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 (BR IIbis). The fundamental idea reappraised within the context of the present paper advocates for the uniform interpretation of this core principle, regardless of the instrument calling for its application, namely whether pertaining to the EU Law or the International Human Rights Law. Finally, the author proposes an alternative tertia pars, aiming to reconcile the ‘excessive’ bases of jurisdiction concept with the current developments within the frame of International and European Law, via the overriding norm ordaining the (as enhanced as possible) protection of the superior interests of the minor, in every procedure and all factual contexts.