Cartels

Mexico's cartels are significant social, political, and economic actors. The extent of their socioeconomic and political influence is the subject of great debate yet, as their recent response to natural disaster demonstrates, they are influencing the populace in new and diverse ways. In the aftermath of recent hurricanes (i.e., Hurricanes Manuel and Ingrid) in Mexico cartels provided " humanitarian " aid to the victims of the storms. As a result they positioned themselves in a positive light in the communities they assisted. This strategic note documents and assesses this cartel foray into the provision of social goods—specifically " humanitarian aid. " Cartel Disaster Relief On 22 September 2013, Proceso reported that the Gulf Cartel (Cártel del Golfo/CDG) dispensed tons of supplies to persons impacted by Hurricane Ingrid in Tamaulipas. In this report, it was noted that the CDG posted a video on YouTube claiming that " they help because they have a heart " (" Si ayuden es por que tienen corazon ").[1] The video—punctuated by a " rap style corrido " voice over—shows pickup trucks loaded with supplies: food, water, rice, masa, milk, that are then dispensed to the affected community.[2] The ability for the cartel to mobilize and distribute groceries and aid without government interdiction raises questions about state capacity in the contested disaster zone. Questions about state capacity and cartel intentions were raised on social media in the immediate aftermath of the storm. Tweets became the common method of sharing disaster situation reports. Social media also became a way for the CDG to publicize its relief efforts. As one report noted: The most interesting twist came Sunday when an Internet video claiming to be from the Gulf Cartel began circulating through social media. The video shows several pickup trucks filled with food items being driven across the state and through dirt roads where the food was delivered to the communities. In the video, a written message claiming to be from the Gulf Cartel says that the organization is from Tamaulipas and cares for the people of the state.[3] The aid to the town of Aldama provided by the CDG was publicized on social media and widely reported

Any organization should seek the efficiency maximization, namely the achievement of an effect/effort ratio as high as possible. In order to apply this economic ground rule, some companies use strategies based on gaining a competitive advantage over competitors. In contrast, other companies choose lighter options to increase profitability. They apply strategies focused on agreements with competitors that aim to maintain prices at a certain level regardless of economic factors governing the market mechanism. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the positive and negative effects of cartels as a management strategy. In this regard, the first part of the article summarizes the most important theories about cartels and their characteristics, while the second part presents some European and Romanian cartels, based on data provided by the European Commission and the Competition Council. The final part presents the most important findings and conclusions but also some recommendations fo...

While it is common to highlight the negative aspect of cartels, it has also been argued that cartels have positive aspects that can be illustrated with concrete examples. With regard to economic growth, the issue of cartels thus remains extremely controversial issues. This article analyses the impact of the emergence of a cartel from the early stages of development of the Korean automotive industry. The Korean government encouraged this cartel in order to improve the efficiency and the competitiveness of the industry and it actively intervened, in particular during economic downturns. As a result, the Korean automotive industry stabilized and enhanced its competitiveness sufficiently for Korea to become one of the top five automobile-producing countries in the world.

The facilitators or informers have become important subjects in the field of Competition Law. However, just as they have served to fight against the cartels, they have also been used by the latter to facilitate and cover up their organization and activities.
In the present article, the author seeks to explain and analyze the first cases resolved by the national competition authority in which said facilitators have been immersed. Likewise, an analysis of the jurisprudence on the subject is made in the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. Finally, the national legislation and jurisprudence on the subject is analyzed in the light of comparative law.

Los facilitadores o delatores se han convertido en importantes sujetos en el campo del Derecho de la Competencia. Sin embargo, así como han servido para la lucha en contra de los cárteles también se han usado por parte de estos para facilitar y encubrir su organización y actividades.
En el presente artículo, el autor busca explicar y analizar los primeros casos resueltos por la autoridad de competencia nacional en los cuales dichos facilitadores se han visto inmersos. De igual manera, se realiza un análisis de la jurisprudencia sobre el tema en Estados Unidos, Reino Unido y la Unión Europea. Finalmente, se analiza la legislación y jurisprudencia nacional acerca del tema a la luz del derecho comparado.

Ioan Grillo's new work, Blood Gun Money, is a cutting-edge expose that chronicles the flow of firearms from the United States into Mexico for use by the gangs and cartels (and within the U.S. itself and even into Honduras and Colombia to criminals/non-state actors as a lesser theme). It is more investigative reportage than academic research with the tradeoff being readability (and enjoyability) vs methodological rigor, though his extensive use of field interviews more than satisfy academia’s ‘primary source material’ criteria of scholarship. Just as the US and Mexico enjoy formal economy trade and manufacturing relationships alongside demographic migrations (typically northward) and remittance flows (southward), crossover (from formal to illicit) and purely illicit relationships also exist with regard to drugs, guns, cash, and other commodities. In his work, Grillo delves into these crossover and illicit economy relationships from a firearms trafficking perspective.

An edited version of this paper was published in the Philippine Law Journal, Volume 93, No. 2 (April 2020)

The Philippines is the 8th largest sugar producing country in the world, but not a major player in the international sugar trade because of higher production costs. 1 The industry is highly regulated with quantitative import/export restrictions and production quotas, which impact sugar output, supply, and prices. There have been reports of a cartel among sugar traders and other anti-competitive conduct. It appears that the newly-formed Philippine Competition Commission (PCC) has similar concerns when it included the sugar industry in its 2019 priorities for market investigation.

If the competition concerns can be substantiated, we have a curious case of government regulations facilitating collusion and other anti-competitive conduct, or at least, failing to thwart them. It can mean a confrontation between the PCC and the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA), and not to mention an old, but still strong political class with ties to the industry. This paper analyses the possible competition issues in the sugar sector and the interface between sector-specific regulations and competition rules. To understand these competition issues, we take a brief overview of the structures and practices in the industry that have deep historical roots dating back to American colonial times (Part I). It  analyses their anti-competitive effects within the industry itself, on consumers, and downstream manufacturing industry (Part II). The paper does not attempt to conclusively prove anti-competitive behaviour, which will require a thorough sector investigation. However, it identifies possible competition issues, based on existing literature on competition and the sugar industries in the Philippines and other countries.

To address these issues, we need to know the competition law framework and its boundaries with sector regulations. Part III summarizes the Philippine Competition Act’s (PCA) key provisions, prohibited acts, and PCC’s powers vis-à-vis sector regulators. Possible overlaps between competition and regulation are discussed in Part IV. In view of the competition framework and overlap with regulations, and the structural, behavioural and regulatory constraints identified in the first four parts, Part V delves into approaches that a nascent competition authority can take as it tests its wings and attempts to establish a strong competition framework, while avoiding unnecessary conflicts with sector regulators and the political establishment, which can clip the wings of the competition law before it can take flight.

While the strategic and operational levels of the
Mexican cartel war have gained much prominence in
analytical assessments, the tactical level has received
less attention. This article is an attempt at tactical assessment of
the drug war. It will provide a brief sketch of evolving tactical
missions in the cartel war and the challenges faced by Mexican
police and military forces. Cartel tactics have undergone a
disturbing evolution over the past few years. The resulting trend
includes greater proficiency, lethality, and barbarism as the conflict matures.

Le projet de développer une régulation international de la concurrence est ancien et protéiforme car il s'est manifesté tant l'enceinte du GATT / OMC, que de la CEE / UE, de l'ONU ou de la CNUCED. Au carrefour de l'histoire économique et de l'histoire globale, cet article reconstitue une ambition ancienne, portée par des individus aux motivations variées, des pays du Sud réclamant un contrôle des entreprises du Nord, aux néolibéraux souhaitant promouvoir la mondialisation libérale. En particulier, un certain nombre d’acteurs européens, en particulier des juristes inspirés par l’expérience allemande, ont tenté de faciliter la mise en place d’une régulation mondiale de la concurrence, fondée en partie sur l’expérience européenne, dans les années 1990, sans succès.

This article explores the changes in news agency mechanisms that accompanied the restructuring of Europe after World War I. During the interwar period, a new form of negotiation replaced the pre-World War I conception of English, French and German spheres of influence with a more cooperative vision of the collection and dissemination of news. I argue that the private and business-oriented nature of news agency cooperation enabled it to outlast better-known political attempts at multilateralism. Indeed, it often produced more concrete results by offering different incentives for cooperation to all involved from large global agencies, such as Reuters, down to the small agencies of new Central and Eastern European nation-states. Overall, the agencies' cooperation until the outbreak of World War II suggests alternative periodizations of the interwar period than the division into a fairly internationalist 1920s followed by the increasing bilateralism of the 1930s.

Pablo Escobar and Colombian Narcoculture
Aldona Bialowas Pobutsky

“Pobutsky’s innovative research into the transcultural afterlife of Colombia’s foremost kingpin takes her into the world of telenovelas, surgical enhancement, and drug tourism, proving just how encompassing and unnerving Escobar’s legacy continues to be.”—Ryan Rashotte, author of Narco Cinema: Sex, Drugs, and Banda Music in Mexico’s B-Filmography

“The first comprehensive study of the relationship between the figure of Pablo Escobar and popular culture. It is key in understanding how and why narcocultura is so ubiquitous in Latin America.”—Juan Carlos Ramírez-Pimienta, author of Cantar a los Narcos

“Pablo Escobar is the quintessential Latin American drug lord. In this timely study, Pobutsky deciphers the broad impact of Escobar, not only on Colombia and the United States but on popular culture and the consumer marketplace worldwide.” —Howard Campbell, author of Drug War Zone: Frontline Dispatches from the Streets of El Paso and Juarez

In the years since his death in 1993, Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar has become a globally recognized symbol of crime, wealth, power, and masculinity. In this long-overdue exploration of Escobar’s impact on popular culture, Aldona Bialowas Pobutsky shows how his legacy inspired the development of narcocultura—television, music, literature, and fashion representing the drug-trafficking lifestyle—in Colombia and around the world.
Pobutsky looks at the ways the “Escobar brand” surfaces in bars, restaurants, and clothing lines; in Colombia’s tourist industry; and in telenovelas, documentaries, and narco memoirs about his life, which in turn have generated popular interest in other drug traffickers such as Griselda Blanco and Miami’s “cocaine cowboys.” Pobutsky illustrates how the Colombian state strives to erase his memory, while Escobar’s notoriety only continues to increase in popular culture through the transnational media. She argues that the image of Escobar is inextricably linked to Colombia’s internal tensions in the areas of cocaine politics, gender relations, class divisions, and political corruption, and that his “brand” perpetuates the country’s reputation as a center of organized crime, to the dismay of the Colombian people. This book is a fascinating study of how the world perceives Colombia and how Colombia’s citizens understand their nation’s past and present.

Aldona Bialowas Pobutsky is associate professor of modern languages and literatures at Oakland University.

A volume in the series Reframing Media, Technology, and Culture in Latin/o America, edited by Héctor Fernández L’Hoeste and Juan Carlos Rodríguez

History/Latin America
May
280 pp. | 6 x 9 | 19 b/w illus.
ISBN 978-1-68340-151-3 | Printed Case $85.00s

The first-phase cartel form originated in Colombia during the 1980's in response to the increasing demand for cocaine in the United States. This type of cartel, characterized by the Medellin model, realized economies of scale not known to the individual cocaine entrepreneurs of the mid-1970's. This early cartel was an aggressive competitor to the Westphalian state because of its propensity for extreme violence, uncompromising nature, and willingness to directly challenge the authority of the state. The Medellin model was hierarchical and revolved around its kingpin, Pablo Escobar. The second phase of the cartel form also originally developed in Colombia in the city of Cali. Unlike its Medellin counterpart, the Cali group, which emerged in the early 1980's, was a shadowy organization devoid of an actual kingpin. Its organization was more distributed and network-like, rather than traditionally hierarchical. Many of its characteristics and activities were stealth-masked and dispersed, thereby providing many operational capabilities not possessed by the first-phase cartel form. Third-phase cartels, if and when they emerge, have the potential to pose an even more significant challenge to the modern nation-state and its institutions. A third-phase cartel would result from unremitting corruption and co-option of state institutions. Although this "criminal state successor" has yet to emerge, warning signs of its eventual arrival are present in many States worldwide. Such an entity would challenge our current institutions and, at least during a transitional period, could be expected to exploit corruption, co-option, terrorism, crime, and violence toward its ends.

Either on or immediately before Tuesday 12 April 2022, Guardia Nacional (GN) forces in Jamay, Jalisco seized an improvised armor fighting vehicle (IAFV), a narco tank (narco tanque), belonging to the Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). These vehicles have been utilized by the Mexican cartels for over a decade, increasingly integrated into their operational units (commandos), and have proliferated over time. The circumstances of this IAVF seizure, related to its being discovered in the back of a semi-tractor-trailer, are of great interest because they provide a glimpse into the mechanisms behind the logistical supply of CJNG operational units.

Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a ‘criminal insurgency’ against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors.

This presentation examines the dynamics of this controversial proposition. The control of territorial space—ranging from ‘failed communities’ to ‘failed regions’—will be examined. The presentation will examine the exploitation of weak governance and areas (known as ‘lawless zones,’ ‘ungoverned spaces,’ ‘other governed spaces,’ or ‘zones of impunity’) where state challengers have created parallel or dual sovereignty, or ‘criminal enclaves’ in a neo-feudal political arrangement. The use of instrumental violence, corruption, information operations (including attacks on journalists), street taxation, and provision of social goods in a utilitarian fashion will be discussed. Finally, the dynamics of the transition of cartels and gangs into ‘accidental guerrillas’ and ‘social bandits’ will be explored through the lens of ‘third generation gang’ theory and ‘power-counter power’ relationships. This presentation will serve as a starting point for assessing the threat to security from transnational organized crime through lessons from the Mexican cartels.

This chapter focuses on the role of the Caballeros Templarios cartel in
local governance from 2011 to 2013. I conducted thirteen months of fieldwork in Michoacán, spread out over five visits between 2013 and 2017. My hypothesis is that drug cartels in Michoacán transformed patronage relations and brokerage practices by displacing, replacing, or mirroring brokers that lie at the center of political and social mediation. In so doing,
they were able to impose a new moral and political economy in the territories they socially and geographically control.
This territorial control is not merely an occupation of land. It lies at the base
of their ability to transform social relationships and hierarchies, to impose
alternative social orders, and to build governance models that extract resources from the drug trade, as well as the public and private sectors.

This article explores the construction-or reconstruction-of brokerage channels by violent actors in Mexico. It focuses on the construction of the Autodefensas de Michoacán (Self-Defense Groups of Michoacán) and studies the process that put illegal armed leaders in active dialogue with the Mexican federal government, but also how they became brokers capable of controlling access to strategic political resources, economic markets, and the connections that tie local citizens and the central state. Through the concept of political intermediation, I investigate how coercion, as a skill and resource, has become central to governance in Mexico; and how this leads to consolidating intermediaries that participate in reproducing local, violent political order. This article shall contribute to the understanding of brokerage in contexts of violence, and shed new light on the political logic fueling the dynamics of violence in Mexico's war on drugs.

Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent,” a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats.

El diseño gráfico es una disciplina que se encarga de elaborar discursos
visuales con la finalidad de emitir una idea concreta. Esto es bastante
complejo, lo cual ha llevado a diversos investigadores del diseño gráfico
a buscar sostén en otras áreas del conocimiento como la semiótica, la
tradición retórica o las ciencias cognitivas. Todas estas disciplinas
abordan un marco teórico aleaborado y muy diverso, aunque tienen un punto en donde se llegan a ligar: la metáfora.

En la semiótica tiene lugar en la semántica al ser el proceso de metaforización un mecanismo mental del ser humano para asignarle significaciones distintas a los objetos, haciéndolos signos.

This publication attempts to create a better understanding of the nature, origins, and evolution of organized crime in Central America by examining the dynamics of organized crime in the three countries of the so-called Northern Triangle—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—as well as the broader regional context that links these case studies. The authors investigate the challenge organized crime poses to the state, its institutions, and governability in general.  This publication is part of a series on the sub-regional dynamics  of organized crime, focusing especially on the linkages between Central America, Mexico, and the Andean region as well as the growing insertion of Latin America in global transnational crime networks.

Con el objetivo de entender las dinámicas transnacionales del crimen organizado y la manera cómo los cambios en las tendencias regionales impactan en las situaciones nacionales y locales—y viceversa—el Woodrow Wilson Center convocó a un grupo de investigadores para el análisis de tres “clusters”: Gema Santamaría examinó la situación en lo que se denominó el cluster mexicano (con vínculos con Estados Unidos, Centroamérica y Suramérica), Marianna Olinger se enfocó en el cluster brasileño (con vínculos con el Cono Sur y África) y Daniel Rico estudió el cluster colombiano (con vínculos en la región Andina, el Caribe y el Cono Sur).

Siguiendo un marco conceptual común, los autores buscaron responder las siguientes preguntas, en un ejercicio considerado como exploratorio: ¿Por qué las organizaciones criminales deciden—o se ven forzadas a migrar de un país a otro? ¿Para qué las organizaciones criminales incursionan en nuevos territorios y cómo lo hacen? ¿Cuál es su alcance real? ¿Qué factores facilitan la expansión de las facciones criminales? ¿Qué factores contribuyen a contener la difusión transnacional de la delincuencia organizada? Las ideas y recomendaciones contenidas en documento están basados en los principales hallazgos y conclusiones de estos estudios.

This chapter examines the reconfiguration of power within states as the are challenged by illicit transnational networks.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This chapter examines the problématique of illicit networks and transnational crime’s impact on sovereignty.  Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and gangs challenge states and sovereignty in a variety of ways.  These include eroding state solvency through corruption, subtle co-option of state officials and institutions, direct assault on state functions and, in the worst case, state capture or failure under the threat of criminal challengers.  Rarely do criminal enterprises totally supplant states; rather they change the nature of state functioning.  This chapter looks at how gangs and TCOs influence state change at local, state, federal, and transnational levels.  Specifically, this chapter looks at networked TCOs and transnational gangs in Mexico and Latin America (Colombia, Guatemala, and Brazil) to gauge the current and emerging threats to state functions.

MAIN ARGUMENT

State reconfiguration, including co-option, and the rise of criminal enclaves involves the establishment and proliferation of lawless or other-governed zones (including failed communities or failed zones) through corruption and the application of force by private non-state armies.

“Criminal insurgency” is a mechanism for “battle for the parallel state” (dual sovereignty) and the potential rise of “narco-states” and “narco-networks.”

The logic structure of criminal state-challengers facilitates the establishment of “neo-feudal” governance structures.
The emergence of gangs and criminal cartels as “accidental insurgents” and/or “social bandits,” as well as the use of information operations, narcocultura, and instrumental violence to free themselves from state interference (aka sovereignty) is Central to this discussion.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The potential—or actuality—of gangs of criminal cartels emerging as new warmaking and potentially networked state-making entities.

“Criminal insurgency” is a means of removing the criminal enterprise from the control of the state, enabling it to pursue its goals to dominate the illicit economy. Despite this economic agenda, a political agenda emerges.

Gangs and TCOs become political actors influencing the reconfiguration of states requiring a strategy for addressing “criminal insurgency” and violent non-state actors.

Bid rigging prevents public procurers from obtaining the best value for money. While public procurers are advised to be vigilant as to bid rigging in public markets, public procurement rules as well as administrative practices of public procurement authorities, are integral contributors to the formation and stability of bid rigging. By looking at factors facilitating bid rigging in public procurement, this article determines the extent to which current regulations and administrative practices of Vietnamese public procurers facilitate bid rigging. The findings reveal that Vietnamese public procurement legislation as well as administrative practices of public pro-curers unintentionally facilitate the formation and stability of bid rigging. Particularly concerning are unnecessary and excessive selection criteria leading to limited participation of bidders, regulation of joint-bidding, information disclosure and frequent communication between bidders. Responsive suggestions are accordingly made to tackle the problems identified. These findings provide valuable lessons for both Vietnamese and international policy-makers by emphasising the need for assessing the practical impact of public procurement rules and practices on bid rigging practices.

Transnational organized crime is a pressing global security issue. Mexico is currently embroiled in a protracted drug war. Mexican drug cartels and allied gangs (actually poly-crime organizations) are currently challenging states and sub-state polities (in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and beyond) to capitalize on lucrative illicit global economic markets. As a consequence of the exploitation of these global economic flows, the cartels are waging war on each other and state institutions to gain control of the illicit economy. Essentially, they are waging a 'criminal insurgency' against the current configuration of states. As such, they are becoming political, as well as economic actors. This presentation examines the dynamics of this controversial proposition. The control of territorial space -- ranging from 'failed communities' to 'failed regions' -- will be examined. The presentation will examine the exploitation of weak governance and areas (known as 'lawless zones,' 'ungoverned spaces,' 'other governed spaces,' or 'zones of impunity') where state challengers have created parallel or dual sovereignty, or 'criminal enclaves' in a neo-feudal political arrangement. The use of instrumental violence, corruption, information operations (including attacks on journalists), street taxation, and provision of social goods in a utilitarian fashion will be discussed. Finally, the dynamics of the transition of cartels and gangs into 'accidental guerrillas' and 'social bandits' will be explored through the lens of 'third generation gang' theory and 'power-counter power' relationships. This presentation will serve as a starting point for assessing the threat to security from transnational organized crime through lessons from the Mexican cartels.

Existing within a relatively short time frame (2013-2015), the Michoacán Autodefensas (selfdefense groups) are a particularly fruitful case study for analyzing vigilantism. What we find here is an armed movement that was devoted to (re)creating a local order through the practices of investigation, vigilante justice, and classification of the social world. Beyond what it reveals about vigilantism as a “judicial” procedure, and as a desire to return to intimacy (in this case, that of familial and village interknowledge), the example of the self-defense groups suggests that vigilantes do not necessarily have as their mission the eradication of crime. Rather, they may settle for managing it, in particular by making it more legible locally. As such, they are involved in intense struggles for identification and classification.
Their reordering attempts, however, often bring new disorderly possibilities and opacities, as shown by the aporia of the security model implemented by the self-defense groups.

Conflict and crime are converging in interesting ways worldwide.  Gangsters, revolutionaries, and terrorists interact in a variety of ways complicating state response, policing, military, and intelligence operations.  This article looks at the Bacrim—an emerging adaptive adversary—in this ‘convergence’ of war and crime in Colombia, the epicenter of contemporary drug wars.

L’articolo analizza la decisione del Consiglio di Stato del 15 luglio 2019, n. 4990 sul complesso caso Avastin/Lucentis a seguito dei principi di diritto e degli accertamenti di fatto demandati dalla Corte di giustizia in sede di rinvio pregiudiziale. In particolare, si commentano i profili relativi agli  accertamenti delle autorità competenti e dei giudici nazionali nonché quelli relativi alle informazioni ingannevoli sul c.d. Avastin off-label chiedendosi se, ed in che misura, tali aspetti siano stati presi in considerazione dal Consiglio di Stato, anche alla luce dei principi
sull’intensità del sindacato giurisdizionale del giudice amministrativo
evocati dallo stesso giudice d’appello nella propria decisione.

The essay explores the religious imperatives of the Mexican cartel; The Knight Templars, led by Nazario Moreno Gonzalez. By adopting a case study methodology, the religious and syncretic aspects of the organization are set out through a detailed account of Nazario’s rise to head The Knight Templars and the organizations unique religious features. The essay is able later on, to delineate and touch upon several academic notions proper to religious terrorism and challenge their effectiveness and shortcomings as academic tools when understanding an organization such as The Knight Templars. However, the essay does conclude religion is able to be instrumentalized so as to provide a criminal organization with a clear depiction of an enemy through the notion of an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, justification through ordained rules or texts and symbolism behind criminal or terrorist actions. Moreover, it advises that the best manner of approaching The Knight Templars is not through a religious lens, but through a secular one, mainly that of ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ as opposed to religious terrorists.

Resumo: Direito do trabalho e direito antitruste nunca caminharam juntos, mas questões recentes passaram a destacar a importância da análise interdisciplinar. Este estudo, por meio do método comparativo e exploratório, aponta recentes questões que relacionam o direito do trabalho com o direito antitruste nos EUA, tais como cartéis de fixação salarial (wage-fixing cartels), acordos de não contratação de trabalhadores (no poach agreements), cláusulas de não concorrência nos contratos de trabalho e trocas de informações sensíveis entre concorrentes sobre termos e condições de trabalho. Ao final, é apresentada uma reflexão do tema dentro do contexto brasileiro.

Abstract: Labor law and antitrust law have never gone together, but recent issues have highlighted the importance of interdisciplinary analysis in situations. This study, through the comparative and exploratory method, points out current concerns regarding labor law and antitrust law in the United States (US), such as wage-fixing cartels, no-poach agreements, non-compete clauses in labor agreements and information exchange between competitors about terms and conditions of work. In conclusion, we carried out a reflection of the theme within the Brazilian context.

Algorithmic collusion is a hot topic within antitrust circles in Europe, US and beyond. But some economists downplay algorithmic collusion as unlikely, if not impossible. This paper responds to these criticisms by pointing to new emerging evidence and the gap between law and this particular economic theory. We explain why algorithmic tacit collusion isn't only possible, but warrants the increasing concerns of many enforcers.

Anti-competitive conduct poses a huge threat to the EU internal market. Public enforcement of the competition rules has so far always played a central role in the EU, whereas private enforcement seems to have been more on the sideline, unlike in the US. Directive 2014/104/EU of 26 November 2014, better known as the Antitrust Damages Actions Directive, aims to change this situation, introducing a much-needed balance between public and private enforcement so as to ensure that undertakings are not only penalized for anti-competitive behaviour, but also that victims are awarded appropriate compensation.
This Research Project examines this Directive, shedding some light on how this is going to affect the Maltese scenario. Starting off with a comparative analysis of the EU’s public and private enforcement mechanisms, the Research Project then shifts its focus onto the latter mechanism by providing a general overview of the lead-up to this Directive, particularly as to how the Court of Justice managed to deal with damages actions in the absence of concrete provisions. The following section then delves into further detail on the different elements and principles introduced by the Directive, including the right to full compensation, quantification of damages, passing-on defence and limitation periods.
This analysis is then used to understand the way private enforcement currently operates in Malta mainly through Article 27A of the Competition Act, and to determine whether any amendments are required in Maltese law for the effective transposition of this Directive. This study shall provide the reader with a clearer picture as to what changes this Directive has brought about in the EU as a whole and whether its objectives have been reached.

Keywords:
Competition Law, Antitrust Damages Action Directive, Article 27A Competition Act, Cartels, Compensation

Despite the growing sophistication of antitrust regimes around the world, export cartels benefit from special treatment: they are almost universally tolerated, if not encouraged in the countries of origin. Economists do not offer an unambiguous policy recommendation on how to deal with them in part due to the lack of empirical data. This article discusses arguments for and against export cartels and it identifies the existing gaps in the present regulatory framework. The theoretical part is followed by an analysis of the recent case law: a US cartel challenged with different outcomes in India and South Africa, as well as Chinese export cartels pursued in the USA. The Chinese cases are particularly topical as the conduct at stake, apart from being subject to private antitrust actions before US courts, was also challenged within the WTO dispute settlement framework, pointing out to the existing interface between trade and competition. While the recent developments prove that unaddressed issues tend not to vanish, the new South–North dimension has the potential of placing export cartels again on the international agenda. Pragmatic thinking suggests looking for the solution within the WTO framework.

The aim of this research is to understand the role of transnational organized crime in human trafficking along Mexico’s eastern migration routes, from Central America to Mexico’s northeastern border. In this region, drug traffickers are smuggling and trafficking unauthorized migrants in order to diversify their revenue streams. This project analyzes the new role of Central American gangs and Mexican-origin drug trafficking organizations—now known as transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)—in the trafficking of persons from Central America to Mexico’s northeastern border.

In a relatively small time frame (2013-2015), the Autodefensas of Michoacán offer a rich case-study for the analysis of vigilantism. They make up an armed movement dedicated to the (re-)creation of a local order through investigative practices, rough justice and new interpretative grids of the social world. Beyond what it reveals of vigilantism as a set of “judicial” procedures, and as a longing for intimacy (such as that attributed to tightly-knit family units or village communities, here), the example of the Autodefensas suggests that vigilantes are not only right-doers but also providers of legibility. As such, they are involved in intense struggles for identification and classification. Their reordering attempts, however, are often pregnant with new disorderly possibilities and opacities. This is exemplified by the aporia of the security model implemented by the Autodefensas.

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Dans un cadre temporel relativement restreint (2013-2015), les Autodéfenses du Michoacán constituent un cas d’étude particulièrement riche pour l’analyse du vigilantisme. On se trouve en effet ici en présence d’un mouvement armé voué à la (re)création d’un ordre local à travers des pratiques d’enquête, d’auto-justice et de classement du monde social. Au-delà de ce qu’il révèle du vigilantisme comme procédure « judiciaire » et comme désir de retour à l’intime (celui de l’interconnaissance familiale et villageoise, ici), l’exemple des Autodéfenses suggère que les vigilantes n’ont pas nécessairement vocation à éradiquer le crime et peuvent se contenter de l’encadrer, notamment en le rendant plus lisible localement. Redresseurs de torts autant qu’opérateurs de lisibilité, les vigilantes sont engagés dans d’intenses luttes d’identification et de classement. Bien souvent, leurs tentatives de remise en ordre sont cependant porteuses de nouveaux désordres et de nouveaux brouillages. C’est ce que démontrent les apories du modèle sécuritaire porté par les Autodéfenses.