Coalition Government

This book examines the governability crisis faced by Israeli governmental institutions. For a long period of time, observers of Israel’s government have reported the same phenomena: instability in most political positions not allowing for proper policy design, enhanced control of the bureaucracy over the policy making process, and complete uncertainty regarding the implementation of policies by the bureaucracy. However, while one expects that with such a toxic combination of all the wrong policy making components Israel would collapse, Israel has been able to achieve quite impressive landmarks in its overall performance. During the first decade of the 21st century, Israel became an OECD member and enjoyed high growth when the world was facing stagnation and economic collapse. Israel’s government, which regularly faces quandaries in a variety of policy fields, is able to initiate large scale policies when needed. Yet, this same government refrains from initiating large-scale reforms in institutional structures. Hence, for analysts of political institutions, the Israeli state of affairs is one of choice: while initiating changes to reform and overhaul the Israeli institutional system is possible it is also perilous. To cope with that duality Israeli political leadership on all sides has developeda variety of mechanisms that allow them to provide the policy output needed so as to maintain the status-quo. This book examines these mechanisms as they exist in different facets of government work and explains their output and persistence. Examples include coalitional making and breaking, the ways in which ruling coalitions maneuver in parliament, and policy design and implementation. The book also explores the problem that exists in Israel’s governability: the lack of a strategic high-order far sighted decision making. Finally, it offers a method of electoral reform that can address both of these systemic maladies.

In presidential regimes, gridlock-the inability to enact policy change despite elite or mass demands-derives from the combination of fixed terms and the interdependency of the separately elected legislative and executive branches. The potential consequences of this have been examined extensively in a comparative context, inspired by Linz's (1990) work on the potential for regime-threatening paralysis in presidentialism. Most scholarly work on gridlock focuses on the US case, where the combination of a weak president, divided government, supermajority rules, and centralized agenda control make gridlock a persistent phenomenon (Binder 2004). As the causes of gridlock in the US depend on the policy preferences of elites, party polarization in the US Congress has restricted cooperation between parties and exacerbated the consequences of gridlock (Barber and McCarty 2015). In what follows, we discuss the possibilities for gridlock in parliamentary regimes and discuss the role of elite polarization in relation to this. We then use the Swedish case as an empirical example.

Este artigo, partindo da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, analisa os poderes do chefe de Estado e de Governo da Sexta República brasileira. E, ainda, dos poderes exercidos de facto pelo Presidente da República. Entende-se que essa é uma temática atual e relevante tendo em vista que o papel do Presidente da República não vem sendo desempenhado conforme o desenho institucional imaginado pela referida Constituição. Para tanto, situa-se brevemente o momento histórico estudado e delimitam-se importantes fundamentos jurídicos e filosóficos da Constituição de 1988. Na sequência, analisa o chamado presidencialismo de coalizão, ante o grau de utilização dos poderes conferidos ao Presidente da República durante a Sexta República brasileira. A opção metodológica escolhida foi, numa abordagem indutiva e utilizando técnicas de estudos bibliográficos, dar enfoque à edição de decretos e medidas provisórias pelo Poder Executivo e à instabilidade política conferida ao regime da Sexta República brasileira, por tal poder. O resultado obtido foi o de que o período da Sexta República foi mais um dos períodos politicamente instáveis deste país, instaurando um sistema Presidencialista que confere ao Presidente poderes excessivos, que por sua vez se traduzem em um sistema político engessado, irresponsável e, por excelência, de legislatura de exceção.

"Le degré de séparation des pouvoirs dépend beaucoup plus du système des partis que des dispositions prévues par les Constitutions. ... La séparation réelle des pouvoirs est donc le résultat d´une combinaison entre le système des partis et le cadre constitutionnel". Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques (1951) "It is necessary to have more than 'a scheme of checks and balances within the governmen' ... So in a republic 'parties take the place of the old system of balances and checks'". Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System (1969), citando a Frederick Grimke, The Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions (1848)

On 26 May 1918 Noe Ramishvili, one of the influential Social Democrats was approved by the National Council as a Chairman of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. He stayed in this position for about a month, after, on June 24, 1918 Noe Jordania accepted the post of Prime Minister.

The article discusses efforts of N. Ramishvili in building of democracy in a newly established Georgian State; In the text main place is given to the history of replacement of the first prime minister and highlighting of the reasons and circumstances which led to such changes in a short period of time.

Some scholars see “a premature crisis of the government " in this fact and believe that this phenomenon was caused by the opposition; one part of them considers this incident as “an impeachment”, others call it “a coup d’état”.

The paper substantiates the notion that Noe Ramishvili’s request for resignation was neither a result of influence imposed on the prime nor a coup d’état; It is emphasized that the resignation of Noe Ramishvili was a voluntary act.

The use of the word "relative" shows complexity of the task. It can seem insignificant; however, we must be aware that none of the governmental structures can exist in their purest forms. This means that even though categorization of governmental systems can help to examine the processes within the state, it only gives a basic framework. The aim of this essay is to evaluate advantages and disadvantages of the systems constituting the core of political life within a state.

This book provides a detailed historical and political analysis of Israel's policy decision-making process towards the Occupied Territories. The book argues that Israel did not have a strategic policy towards the Occupied Territories and instead engaged in non-decision making.

Academy schools have now been part of the educational landscape in England for nearly two decades. Originally introduced by the New Labour government (from 1997 – 2010) in 2000, and significantly expanded and evolved by the Conservative-led Coalition government (from 2010 – 2015) in 2010, this school model has consistently adhered to Neoliberal governmentality and rhetoric, and has promised to raise educational standards and reduce the achievement gap between the most and least disadvantaged pupils. However, over the years, a growing body of contradictory evidence has fuelled major criticism and uncertainty surrounding academies and their complex relationship(s) with achievement, autonomy, accountability and collaboration. This was the focus of this paper, to delve into these debates, and review, analyse and critique the past and current evidence on the Coalition Academy Programme, ultimately questioning its success or failure in addressing the social class achievement gap.
By critiquing the growing evidence surrounding the Coalition ‘converter’ academy model (through the sociological lenses of Functionalistic, Marxist and Social and Cultural Reproduction Theory), it was found that this Academy Programme was and is being used by the Coalition (and the current Conservative) government as a functionalistic and exploitative medium for legitimising and reproducing social and educational inequality, which poses the greater risks of increased academy school selective practices, the further social segregation and exclusion of disadvantaged pupils and a continuation of the gaps in achievement between advantaged and disadvantaged pupils.
However, by critiquing other conflicting evidence surrounding the Coalition ‘sponsored’ academy model and academy chains (through the different interpretations and counter-arguments of other traditional and more contemporary researchers), it was found that working class parents themselves contribute to this social segregation, and that even though this academy policy is founded upon Neoliberal principles, they are employed through ‘quasi-markets’ and seemingly democratic rhetoric, which differs from the traditional educational markets. Policy which promises the development of the ‘self-improving school system’, increased cooperation and collaboration between schools, and a realistic and sustainable solution to the social class achievement gap.

Inter-party conflict management is a typical coalitional problem in parliamentary governments. To study how and why conflicts in coalitions emerge and how parties cope with them can enhance our knowledge of coalition governance. Here, I propose a framework for comparative studies on the topic. The framework is based on the conception of coalition politics as politics of exchange. It looks at inter-party interactions, but also accounts for the impact of intra-party politics. Moreover, I provide a classification of inter-party conflicts in coalitions and point out when they are more likely. The process of conflict management is operationalized with two proxies - actors and arenas - and a taxonomy of conflict terminations is presented. The viability of the framework is tested both mapping coalition governments according to their modes of managing internal conflicts and, after deriving research hypotheses, through empirical inquiries of conflict management in diverse coalitions

Why Minority Governments Work tackles central questions in political science: how well minority parliamentary governments govern; how they build majorities; and why some perform better than others. To account for governing capacity, it examines the design of political institutions, the reconcilability of party goals and the contingent partisan bargaining circumstances, all in multilevel, territorial perspective.

The book empirically examines Spain's minority governments in comparative perspective. Spain's heavily decentralized political system with powerful regional governments and a variety of regionally-based parties might appear to exacerbate the challenges of minority government. However, Spain's minority governments work not despite its complex territorial politics but rather in part because of them. Spain's minority governments are effective in part because the political institutions and contingent partisan bargaining circumstances tend to strengthen the government's bargaining position. Moreover, the goals of Spain's statewide governing parties and regional parties are distinct yet often reconcilable, fostering cooperation during minority governments.

Stojanović, Boban (2013), “Koalicije i izbori 2012. godine u Srbiji”, u: Jovanović, Milan; Vučićević, Dušan (ur.), Izbori u Srbiji 2012. godine: (ne)očekivana promena, Beograd: Institut za političke studije, str. 117 - 137.

Рад се бави темом коалиција политичких партија пре и после избора у Србији 2012. године. Коалиције су неопходност парла­ментарних демократија. Ретко се дешава да партије саме освоје већину у парламенту, те су приморане на преговарања и форми­рање владајуће већине (коалиције). Партије желе да маскимизира­ју добит и због тога улазе у предизборне коалиције. Предизборне коалиције настају из два разлога: велике партије желе да се пред­ставе као лидери и победници, а мале се плаше да неће освојити довољно гласова да учествују у расподели мандата. На проце­се формирања коалиција утичу изборна правила. Демократска странка (ДС) и Српска напредна странка (СНС) су на својим избор­ним листама имале 7, односно 11 партија и организација. Након избора се приступило преговорима о формирању владе. Иако су
сви очекивали коалицију дојучерашњих партнера, ДС и Социјали­стичка партија Србије (СПС) нису нашли заједнички интерес. Под­стакнута резултатима избора и великим коалиционим потен­цијалом, СПС је „тражила превише“, односно ДС није била спремна на толике уступке у погледу поделе позиција у влади и избору тре­ћег партнера. На формирање постизборне коалиције утицали су и резултати другог круга председничких избора и победа Томисла­ва Николића, лидера СНС. Постизборну коалицију склопиле су ко­алиције окупљене око СНС, СПС и Уједињених региона Србије (УРС).

Coalitions of political parties are a very common feature of parliamentary systems, as well as a research subject for many studies in political science. In particular, the literature has singled out four main focuses: coalition formation; portfolio allocation; coalition stability and termination; and coalition governance. They may be also conceived as phases of coalitions’ life, respectively, the birth (formation and portfolio allocation), the “existence” in the strict sense of the word and the end. Thinking of them in these terms gives a new perspective for the study of coalition politics. It becomes a continuing process of inter-party interactions inside the context of a (life) cycle in which what an actor does in a certain moment depends both on what has occurred in the past and on the expectations about the future. This paper, by adopting this theoretical framework, gives a broad reasoned and critical review of many theoretical and empirical works concerning the phases of coalition politics. First, the developments of the subfield interested in the factors affecting the composition of the coalitions are taken into account. Subsequently, I focus on the process of portfolio allocation among parties and, thirdly, on the reasons of government terminations and the related topic of government stability. The last part is dedicated to several aspects of the so called coalition governance, placed between the first two processes and the last moment. Some promising research outlooks are finally pointed out

Brasil experimenta una situación sin precedentes en su historia, y no solo en su historia democrática, con un animal político completamente nuevo que ocupa el gobierno nacional. En primer lugar, es un presidente extremista con una trayectoria política marginal. En segundo lugar, la familia nuclear presidencial nunca ha tenido tanta influencia a nivel nacional en los asuntos gubernamentales. En tercer lugar, Bolsonaro tomó una decisión algo audaz: eligió no formar una coalición gubernamental en un país cuyo sistema político se define como "presidencialismo de coalición". Un gobierno de unos pocos meses se convirtió en una administración caótica. El propósito de este capítulo es comprender cómo Brasil llegó al punto de elegir un gobierno con tales características. Se discuten los antecedentes de este proceso, los aspectos peculiares de la elección de Jair Bolsonaro y la importancia de su gobierno para la política brasileña.

אנו מציגים כאן ניתוח רב-מערכתי של משילות הממשלה בהתבסס על סדרות של מדדים המקובלים 
בתחומי מדע המדינה, ממשל ומדיניות ציבורית. הממשלה בה אנו ממוקדים בדו"ח זה היא זו לגביה
.19- שמשלה במקביל לכנסת ה 33- בה פעלה הממשלה ה 2014 יש לנו תמונת נתונים מקיפה: שנת
(מכסה המאפיינת ממשלות בשיטת 0.75 היות ומדובר על ממשלה שבפועל לא הספיקה למלא אפילו
ממשל פרלמנטרית-רב מפלגתית) מתקופת כהונתה, הרי שלפנינו מקרה של חוסר משילות והמטרה
בפועל היא למצוא מהי נקודת הכשל בתהליך המשילות.
, אנו בוחנים משילות כיכולת למשול: היכולת לגבש קואליציה פוליטית על בסיס קווי מדיניות מוסכמים 
יכולת הקואליציה לפעול במשותף עם בסיס קווי מדיניות אלה בכדי לעצב מדיניות ציבורית ולפעול מול
המגזר הציבורי כדי לבצע את המדיניות הנקבעת.
מבחינה מבנית, התמונה שמייצרת קואליציה זו היא של מפלגה המקימה את הממשלה דרך ברית 
עם מפלגה קטנה ממנה, אך כשהברית הזו קורסת, מוצאת עצמה המפלגה הגדולה למעשה שוות
כוחות מול המפלגה שניה בגודלה, המהווה שותפה בכירה וקואליציה ובפועל שונה בכל עמדותיה מזו
של מקימת הקואליציה. מעבר לפער הקטן בין שתי מפלגות אלה מבחינת מושבים, הכנסת עצמה
הייתה מפוצלת מבחינת כמות המפלגות האפקטיבית בתוכה.
ללא מצע בחירות פורמלי אך 2013 הורכבה על ידי הליכוד-ביתנו שניגש לבחירות 33- הממשלה ה 
שלא 2009 בעצם עם מצע כפול (כלומר של הליכוד מצד אחד וישראל ביתנו מצד אחר) של בחירות
שונה. שילוב זה כלל קווי מדיניות מוסכמים לצד קווי מדיניות מעורפלים שאיפשרו הקמת ממשלה
שהתבססה על שילוב כוחות מנוגדים. ההסכמים הקואליציוניים כללו פשרות רבות מצד הליכוד-ביתנו
כלפי 'יש עתיד' ,'הבית היהודי' ו'התנועה'. עם זאת, חלק גדול מהתיקים בממשלה היה בידי הליכוד
מה שאמור היה להבטיח לו שליטה סביב שולחן הממשלה ועל מעשיה בפועל.
על פי ניתוח תוכן שביצענו של מצעי המפלגות, של ההסכמים הקואליציוניים ובדיקת יישום ההסכמים, 
כמו גם בחינת הניצול התקציבי של משרדי הממשלה, ניתן לראות כי שלא כמו מפלגות אחרות פעלו
שרי 'יש עתיד'  באופן נמרץ כדי להשיג את מטרות המצע שלהם הכולל קווי מדיניות המנוגדים לקווי
המדיניות המוגדרים של  הליכוד-ביתנו ושל הבית היהודי. כך מצא עצמו הליכוד בראש קואליציה
שפועלת להשגת מטרות שאינן משקפות את רצונותיו.
נתניהו מצא עצמו בראש קואליציה שמבצעת מדיניות שאינה עולה בקנה אחד עם קווי המדיניות בהם 
הוא מעוניין (ואף בפועל שבוי בתוכה). הדבר נתן לו תמריץ לחפש חלופה אחרת גם במחיר של הליכה
) ולבקש ממנו מנדט חדש לניווט המדינה. McLean 2001 אל הבוחר שמהווה שחקן וטו לא-וודאי (
זהו דיוקנה של חוסר משילות: פיצול בין-מפלגתי, פער קטן מבחינת מושבים בכנסת בין המפלגות 
המועמדות להקמת הקואליציה, השתלטות טקטית של מקימת הקואליציה על תיקים רבים, כאשר
ברמה העניינית אותם תיקים וכוחות הופכים להיות מכשיר ליישום מדיניות המנוגדת לקווי היסוד של
המפלגה המקימה את הקואליציה. 
ביקשנו לבחון את יכולת הדרג הפוליטי להפעיל את הדרג המנהלי דרך ביצוע סקר בכירים שסיימו 
את שירותם הציבורי בחמש השנים האחרונות. הסקר שבוצע על ידי מכון "מדגם" בהנהלת הד"ר
משתתפים עם רקע מגוון מבחינת שירותם הציבורי. הם התבקשו לדרג את 130 מינה צמח, כלל
מקצועיות המגזר הציבורי ואת תרומת החלקים השונים שבו לביצוע הוראות הדרג הפוליטי, כמו גם
להתייחס לפעילות היבטים שונים בתהליך הארגוני במגזר הציבורי ולהשפעתה על יישום מדיניות.
התמונה אותה הם תיארו הייתה של מגזר ציבורי מקצועי, המסוגל לבצע מהלכים בהינתן הוראות
ברורות של הדרג הפוליטי והתעלמות מאינטרסים האישיים והפוליטיים שלו עצמו. צוינו לטובה
כמכשירים מבצעים בהקשר זה אגף התקציבים והיועץ המשפטי, כמו גם סוכני ביצוע מהמגזר העסקי
והשלישי. מי שצוינו כגורמים מעכבי יישום היו נציבות שירות המדינה, החשב הכללי וארגוני העובדים.
אם נצרף את 'מידע הפנים' הזה למה שראינו למעלה, הרי שלטובת שרי יש עתיד שבאו עם סדר יום
מפורט ורצון לפעול, עמד מגזר ציבורי שמסוגל לבצע את פעולותיו. כך שאם הליכוד יכול היה לסמוך
על ריבוי המשרדים תחת חסותו וההנחה שיוכל לתמרן את פעילותו על בסיס ייצוגו סביב שולחן
הממשלה, הרי שיש עתיד יכלו לנצל את שליטתם על המשרדים השונים בכדי לקדם תהליכים לאורך
ולרוחב המגזר הציבורי.
יוצא דופן בהקשר זה היה התחום המאקרו-כלכלי, שהתמצה באותן שנים בריסון תקציבי והתמודדות 
עם הגרעון הממשלתי. משמעות הפחתת הגרעון הממשלתי הייתה בהגדרה הפחתת ההוצאה
הציבורית ופגיעה בצמיחה תוך הפחתת מעורבות הממשלה כשחקן פעיל במשק. מאמץ זה הובל על
ידי שר אוצר ממפלגת 'יש עתיד' שהתחייבה במצעה להרחיב את מעורבות הממשלה בכלכלה ולא
להפחיתה. כך כפי שהליכוד מצא עצמו בראש קואליציה שפועלת בניגוד לרצון המדיניות שלו, תועלתה
של יש עתיד מהקואליציה פחתה עקב הקצאת המשאבים המאקרו-כלכלית אותה הובילה הממשלה,
כשהאחריות לתהליך זה מוטלת על שר אוצר מטעם יש עתיד. כך שני הצדדים חוו מציאות מתמדת
של פעילות שלפחות בחלקה מנוגדת למחויבויות היסוד שלהם. 
הייתה אם כן בעיית היעדר ליבה בתוך הקואליציה, שהובילה 33- בעיית המשילות של הממשלה ה 
להסכם קואליציוני שהזיק למקימת הקואליציה. הסכם זה יצר את הרקע ואת חלוקת התיקים
שאיפשרה לשרי יש עתיד לקדם את מדיניותם המנוגדת לזו של הליכוד. במצב כזה תועלת הליכוד
מהשותפות הזו הלכה וירדה. מבחינת יש עתיד למרות שזו יכולה הייתה לקדם מדיניות בסדרה שלמה
של ערוצים, הרי שבמישור המאקרו-כלכלי היא מצאה עצמה מקדמת מדיניות של ריסון תקציבי,
שבמידה רבה עמדה בניגוד למצע הבחירות שלה .בסיכומו של עניין, נראה כי הלחצים המנוגדים הללו
על שתי המפלגות המובילות בקואליציה הגביר את רצון שני הצדדים לפזר את הקואליציה, הממשלה
והכנסת וללכת לבחירות חדשות.

Os ministros influenciam a alocação de recursos pelo Executivo Federal? O presente trabalho discute
em que medida o poder dentro do Executivo é compartilhado entre o presidente e os partidos que formam a
coalizão governativa, analisando a alocação de recursos pelo Executivo Federal. O foco específico está nas
emendas parlamentares ao orçamento federal no período de 2004 a 2010. Busca-se identificar se o controle de
ministérios pelos partidos da coalizão significa um canal privilegiado para os membros dos partidos da coalizão.
A hipótese central é que ser membro do partido do ministro ao qual o recurso está vinculado aumenta a chance
de liberação da emenda parlamentar. Os resultados indicam que parlamentares do mesmo partido do ministro
são beneficiados na alocação de emendas. Contudo, o viés partidário não é extremo, de forma que o partido do
presidente é igualmente beneficiado e os demais partidos da coalizão também recebem recursos, indicando a
atuação de mecanismos de coordenação pela Presidência da República.

What explains minority government performance? An analysis of Spanish governments (1979–2008) finds mixed support for the importance of parliamentary procedural mechanisms. Yet an analysis of the Zapatero government (2004–8) reveals that a governing party with a central position in the party system can indeed shift alliances, which is consistent with the hypothesis that shifting facilitates effective governance. Additionally, the evidence indicates that minority governments may also or instead rely on alliances across governmental levels in a multilevel system. Regional parties with representation in the national parliament and sub-national governing responsibilities provide the critical link between governmental levels.

This chapter analyzes the decision-making process in Italian political executives and highlights affecting factors. After presenting constraints and opportunities of Italian cabinets, the chapter provides an overview of the years 1948-1994, characterized by the presence of a pivotal party and weak prime ministers. Subsequently, the focus moves to the period of government alternation (1994-2011) and the return of proportional logics, yet under political personalization (2011-2018). The most recent developments are finally assessed from a long-term perspective

On August 31 2016, the Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff was removed from her role as Head of State by the Senate. Her dismissal was the culmination of an impeachment process that started in April of the same year. This event marks the end of almost two decades of leadership of the Worker’s Party (the Partido dos Trabalhadores), which was founded by Dilma’s mentor and main political supporter, former president Inácio Lula da Silva. Steep economic growth and a roughly stable government characterized the period leading up to Dilma Rousseff’s presidency. Indeed, President Lula was widely popular among the population, in particular the poorest ones, thanks to his socially inclusive initiatives such as the famous program Bolsa Família. Therefore, her dismissal turned out to be the most disruptive event since the impeachment of Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992. 

Indeed, a number of scholars interrogated themselves on the reasons behind the Brazilian presidential crisis. However, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff should not be seen as an isolated case, nor it should be studied as such. In fact, many studies show that presidential crises and impeachments have been a common feature of the Latin American region. Using a comparative approach when studying the Brazilian case is the best option to understand what led to Ms. Rousseff’s dismissal, and, more generally, what are the principal factors and events behind crises and interruptions in presidential systems of governments. These kinds of studies and comparisons help us better understand past crises and teach us how to prevent future ones. 

According to one group of academics, some features of the presidential system of government are enough to cause a presidential crisis. Some even believe that this system could facilitate democratic breakdowns. Among the main issues of presidential systems, these scholars identified fixed terms, multipartism, lack of majority support and non-cohesive coalitions. Another group of political scientists agree that specific events in a country are what cause presidential crises. In short, they see macroeconomic problems, social unrest and scandals that involve the government as the main drivers of a crisis. All the theories that these two groups developed are based on studies of past presidential crises and breakdowns and are crucial for understanding what happened in Brazil.

This dissertation is structured in the following way: the first chapter will briefly describe the rise to power of Lula and the Worker’s Party, which set the bases for Dilma Rousseff’s presidency. It will then portray her two terms and the main challenges it faced, as well as the impeachment process. The second chapter will analyze the main theories on presidential crises and impeachments, in particular in Latin America. They will be divided between institutionalist and ‘external’ or ‘exogenous’ causes for presidential failure. The last chapter will apply said theories to the case of Dilma Rousseff, and we will try to provide the best approach to study her impeachment as well as future cases of presidential crisis.

The article is dedicated to analysing types of cabinets and cabinet stability in Central and Eastern European parliamentary democracies. The author proposed several classifications of cabinets and analysed which types of cabinets in each classification are more stable. The scientist analysed the experiences of 147 cabinets in ten Central and Eastern European countries and argued that majority cabinets are more stable than minority cabinets, single-party cabinets are more stable then coalition cabinets. The researcher also suggested the logic of different types of cabinets’ stability. Special attention was focused on stability of different types of coalition cabinets.
Keywords: cabinet, cabinet stability, party and nonparty cabinets, single-party and coalition cabinets, majority and minority cabinets, minimal winning and surplus coalitions, Central and Eastern Europe.

Whereas the classic literature on strategic voting has focused on the dilemma faced by voters who prefer a candidate for whom they expect has little chance of winning a seat, we consider the dilemma faced by voters in PR systems who do not expect their preferred party to be in government. We develop hypotheses relating to strategic voting over multi-party governments that we test using the New Zealand Election Study (NZES) campaign study of 2002. We find evidence that expectations play a role in structuring vote choice. While there is clear evidence of wishful thinking there is also evidence that voters respond to expectations about government formation. These expectations may mobilize voters and lead them to defect from their first preference.

El siguiente artículo se detiene sobre indicios que marcan la tendencia hacia un cambio en la manera de gobernar en Argentina. El presidente electo deberá gobernar sin mayoría en ninguna Cámara Legislativa. Por eso es necesario pensar un cambio de forma: del hiperpresidencialismo a un presidencialismo de coalición.

The aim of the study is to give an overview of the press policies of the Coalition period between 1944 and  1948. The author presents the press which newly appeared in the short period between the beginning of Soviet military operations and the formation of the Interim National Government, as well as the difficulties of the licensing process of the publication. The attidudes of tehe parties forming the Hungarian Nation Independence Front towards the press also briefly outlined. Then the period between December 1944 and April 1945 is examined, and the press policy of the Interim National Government, the three statues concerning the press, as well as the efforts made by the government and the parties in order the secure the paper supply for the journals ar dealt with. The period extending from April 1945 to the elections in November was already one of the tensions. It is here that the first press scandal, erupted in summer of 1945, during the which the central journal of the National Peasant Party did not appear fora couple of days, is discussed. Next, the vicissitudes of licensing and the difficulties of paper suppy are examined. The latter remained unresolved and even deteriorated even after the eclections of 1945 the new chief institution of information policy, the Ministry of Information Provision had been formed. Moreover, from early in 1946 questions of press policy and press policing were also raised. The Ministry of Home Affairs wanted to introduce a new statue of press regulation, which, however, aborted. From spring of 1946 the number of those journals which were temporarily banned by the Ministry for some reason increased constantly. One of the results was a grownig adaptation of both the press and press policies to political changes. After the elections of 1947 the press, still so variegated around thr turn of 1944 and 1945, paled definitively, as the direction of press policies were gradually taken in hand by the Hungarian Communist Party. In the process, the Ministry of Information Provision was suppressed, and in 1948, after the Hungarian Workers' Party had been established, the direction of the press was totally subordinated to the Party.

The coalition government have pledged a commitment to a shift from 'Big Government' that presumes to know best, to the 'Big Society' that trusts in people for ideas and innovation to mend Britain's 'broken society'. While the policy implications of this shift
remain opaque at this stage, further work has been undertaken to articulate what this strategy entails (see Cabinet Office, 2010). Five key themes have emerged which promise a dramatic shake-up of the system. This paper focuses on the theme that most closely relates to notions of 'Big Society' - restorative justice. In the current economic climate it is perhaps unsurprising that the coalition is supportive of restorative justice, as it mirrors the
desire to redistribute power from central government to local communities and individuals.

The Liberal Democrat experimentation with Community Justice Panels (now being referred to as Neighbourhood Justice Panels or NJPs) in the run-up to the general election has been highlighted as a measure that will be introduced to combat low-level offending and antisocial behaviour. This is given particular consideration as it involves local communities and victims themselves responding to offending behaviour rather than the state. NJPs, it is claimed, have a dramatic impact on recidivism rates in comparison to the traditional criminal justice process and a corresponding reduction on police time and resources. However, as Crawford & Newburn (2002) highlight, England has traditionally adopted a more punitive approach towards dealing with offending behaviour due to widespread public anxiety about crime and political competition to secure votes. Thus, this paper seeks to explore the potential implementational difficulties and resistance that may come from communities and criminal justice practitioners, particularly the police, to this model.

This chapter deals with the internal decision-making process of political executives in parliamentary systems, that is, how executives take their own collective decisions. The focus is on the cabinet system as a whole, including both cabinet members and other involved party-political and bureaucratic actors. In particular, the chapter reviews literature’s debates about the nature of cabinet government, the role of prime ministers, and variations of decision-making. A special attention is payed to factors explaining intra-cabinet power distribution and the choice of different decision-making arenas. After introducing the topic, an overview of conceptual issues and main research questions is provided. Subsequently, the work discusses the way in which scholars have addressed these issues and the findings they have reached. The final part stresses existing deficits and seeks to set the agenda for future research

Presidential  legislative  majorities  under  bicameral  congresses
have seldom been  considered  in  the  literature  on  coalition  cabinets.
However,  this  combination  is  far  from  being  an  isolated  or  irrelevant
topic. Bicameral congresses comprise a double round of negotiation for
the  executive,  increasing  the  shadow  of  the  unexpected.  Indeed,
controlling  one  of  the  two  chambers  may  not  be  sufficient  for  a
president  to  guarantee  the  approval  of  policies.  In  this  case,  what  if  a government  does  not  control  both  houses?  How  are  coalition cabinets affected  by  the  non-control  of  one  or  both  chambers?  I  will  focus analysis on the 25 cases of coalition cabinets in Latin America since the return  of  democracy  and  present  a  bicameral  framework.  Through mvQCA,  I  find  that,  contrary  to  common  belief,  the controlling  of  a bicameral  majority  is  neither  necessary  nor  sufficient  to  ensure  stable coalitions.

Resumo Como a literatura vem analisando o Poder Executivo nos diferentes regimes políticos? A partir da diferença institucional básica entre presidencialismo e parlamentarismo pode-se identificar dois conjuntos de contribuições principais para o entendimento do funcionamento do Executivo em democracias: a literatura sobre a presidência americana e as discussões sobre os governos de coalizão no parlamentarismo europeu. O que os dois conjuntos de teorias têm em comum é a preocupação com a política intra-executivo. Esta literatura é analisada, identificando as principais questões, instituições, comportamentos e variáveis enfatizadas. Como resultado tem-se a sistematização e comparação dos principais argumentos sobre o funcionamento interno do Executivo não só no presidencialismo e no parlamentarismo, mas também a contribuição para a explicação do caso específico do presidencialismo de coalizão.

El retorno al sistema democrático implicaba serios riesgos para la sociedad chilena: un esquema multipartidista debía convivir junto a un presidente revestido de importantes facultades constitucionales, amalgama capaz de originar enfrentamientos interpoderes útiles a la realización de un nuevo golpe cívico-militar.

    Ante tal escenario, Patricio Aylwin hizo uso de instituciones informales como el cuoteo, el partido transversal y la democracia de los acuerdos, en pos de mantener estable a la Concertación que le permitió llegar al Palacio de la Moneda. Sin embargo, estas herramientas traspasaron sus propósitos originales, convirtiendo al esquema democrático trasandino en un caso ejemplar.

Der Sammelband analysiert, ob der Regierungswechsel hin zu Grün‐Rot in Baden-Württemberg auch zu einem entsprechend rapiden Politikwechsel im Bundesland geführt hat. Nach 57 Jahren Regierungsbeteiligung der CDU kam mit der von Winfried Kretschmann geführten Koalition aus Grünen und SPD 2011 in Baden-Württemberg erstmals in einem deutschen Bundesland eine Koalition unter Führung eines grünen Ministerpräsidenten zustande. Die Abwahl der CDU‐FDP‐Regierungskoalition stellte eine Zäsur in der Politik und der Geschichte des Landes Baden‐Württemberg dar.

En  agosto  de  1997,  la UCRy  el FREPASO integran la  Alianza  para  el  Trabajo,  la Justicia  y  la  Educación, cuya  fórmula presidencial constituye el  primer  Gobierno de coalición de  nuestro  país. Sólo  dos  años  después, la  renuncia  de  Fernando  de  la Rúa implica el fin de una etapa marcada por continuos contratiempos.

    Valiéndonos  del  anterior caso  histórico, indagaremos  si  el  sistema  político argentino brinda los elementos necesarios para la creación y permanencia de coaliciones presidenciales,  o  bien  estas  últimas  no  tienen  posibilidades  de  éxito dentro  de  una arquitectura institucional tan compleja como la nuestra.

This brief considers the relationship between population growth and economic growth in the UK. The fact that populations and economic output tend to grow in tandem, albeit at different rates, has been well-documented. However, the link between population growth and economic growth in the UK appears to have weakened. The implications of this shift are not clear. Certainly, productivity improvements are not driving the present recovery in economic output, and it may be that rapid population growth, in the context of the increasing dependence on labour-intense industries, offers the only viable path to growth for the UK under the present economic model. In advance of the Scottish independence referendum, the Brief also includes specific analysis of the relationship between population growth and economic growth in Scotland.

This article analyses inter- and intra-party relations in the formation of coalition governments in Morocco after the elections held in November 2011, and presided over by Abdelilah Benkirane. Although coalition theory has been applied in democratic contexts, we consider that the study of government coalitions, and in particular of party relations, is also important in hybrid political systems, in which there is significant room for political competition and participation. The methodology of the study is principally based on interviews carried out with members of the Moroccan Government, among them the Head of Government, and also with leaders and members of the parties in the government coalition and in opposition. The comments of these actors are discussed with reference to the academic literature. The results of the research show that despite the limits on democracy in Morocco, there are important interactions between the political parties, which can be seen in the form of alliances, consensus building, the distribution of power, and splits. In this political manoeuvring, ideology plays a secondary role. The context of the Arab Spring does not affect the coalition building, even though the national interest is found in the parties' political discourse for justifying their entry to the government. Thus, the most significant aspect of participation in Government is the acquisition of power and party's strategic interests. Looking at internal party dynamics, we also see that internal factors affect decisions as to whether to participate in government or not. Lastly, despite the reforms carried out in the wake of the Arab Spring, Mohammed VI continues to exert his influence on the formation of the Government. Nevertheless, the parties participating in the government coalition show their acceptance of the current rules of the political system, in which a significant executive role is reserved for the Monarchy.

The recent successes of the social democrats in EU countries suggest a social democratic Zeitgeist for the next ten years. Vienna-based essayist Robert Misik warns of a change of electoral cycle in favour of the SPÖ in the central European country, which was rather unlikely after the last breakthrough of the conservatives and their young leader Sebastian Kurz, now disgraced.

How do political actors value different portfolios? We propose a new approach to measuring portfolio salience by analysing paired comparisons using the Bradley–Terry model. Paired-comparison data are easy to collect using surveys that are user-friendly, rapid, and inexpensive. We implement the approach with serving legislators in Brazil, a particularly difficult case to assess portfolio salience due to the large number of cabinet positions. Our estimates of portfolio values are robust to variations in implementation of the method. Legislators and academics have broadly similar views of the relative worth of cabinet posts. Respondent valuations of portfolios deviate considerably from what would be predicted by objective measures such as budget, policy influence, and opportunities for patronage. Substantively, we show that portfolio salience varies greatly and affects the calculation of formateur advantage and coalescence/proportionality rule measures.

Slovakia entered another stage of its post-communist political development after its last parliamentary elections held in March 2016. These elections could be described as realigning elections, as they brought quite dramatic changes to its party system. The 2016 elections (and its subsequent impact on the party system and party representation in parliament) were followed by forming quite an unusual governing coalition, which did not comply with any of the classic cleavages or any " Slovak traditions " of coalition formation in existence at that time. The aim of this paper is to analyse the factors influencing the post-election coalition formation process, characterize the coalition that was eventually formed after the 2016 elections, identify common political and program features shared by the member parties and therefore attempt to identify the cleavage upon which the coalition was formed.