Cynics

Vivimos en una época cínica, como denuncia Peter Sloterdjik, y profundamente ideologizada con no-ideologías, como señala Slavoj Žižek. Una manera de atacar estos problemas es volviendo a la Razón desfachatada y burlona, a la crítica socarrona y la filosofía vital de los quínicos antiguos, como Diógenes de Sínope, el quinismo medieval franciscano, la sátira renacentista y, en general, la argumentación no demostrativa, sino propositiva, del arte en general.

Se ofrece un análisis detallado de los testimonios y fragmentos de los filósofos cínicos transmitidos en la «Antología» de Juan Estobeo (s. V d.C.), y se aborda la cuestión de la visión que este podía tener de la aportación del cinismo y, en general, de los filósofos que, lejos de realizar su actividad en el seno de las escuelas convencionales, se dirigían al conjunto de sus contemporáneos, y en este sentido pueden ser caracterizados como «populares», según la denominación acuñada por la filología decimonónica alemana. Estobeo parece haber manifestado un interés muy particular por este tipo de filósofo «popular», y en su «Antología», donde recoge lo más relevante a sus ojos de la literatura griega pagana, nos ha conservado al respecto piezas enormemente raras y valiosas, entre las que se encuentran y destacan por su antigüedad los fragmentos de las «diatribas» del moralista Teles del siglo 3º a.C.

L’expression « vérité héroïque » (III, 12 : heroikè alètheia) a posé problème aux philologues, qui ont souvent tenté de la corriger. L’article montre que rien n’autorise de telles « corrections », à partir d’un rapprochement avec un fragment de Favorinus cité par Aulu-Gelle, qui fait un lien à ma connaissance unique dans la littérature antique, entre parrhsiva et mélancolie héroïque. La vérité héroïque, c’est la vérité que proclame le héros mélancolique, sans tenir compte des convenances. L’expression est donc à verser au dossier d’un Marc Aurèle « mélancolique ».

Učebnica Kynizmus grécky a moderný I. je uvedením do problematiky kynizmu a jeho štúdia. Hlavným zámerom je historické a systematické vymedzenie kynizmu, t. j. širokého myšlienkového hnutia, ktoré bolo počas antiky najpopulárnejším propagátorom sókratovského spôsobu myslenia a života. Prvá časť sa pokúša o vymedzenie kynizmu z hľadiska jeho historického vývoja. Druhá časť sa snaží o systematickejšie uchopenie kynizmu ako spôsobu myslenia a štýlu života.

Ancient Cynicism is entirely based on the relationship between subject, context, and environment: it outlines the discovery of a kind of «instrumental» and «strategic» rationality founded on the concept of Selbstbehauptung, that
is the instance supporting, on the one hand, the treatment of the self, and, on the other hand, Cynic’s behavior in regard to the world. Through conveniently directed work on himself (askesis), the Cynical philosopher strengthens himself,
makes himself reactive, becomes the architect of his own place in reality and in different societies: he is able to resist and prove victorious. The treatment of others is expressed in a series of attitudes, now aggressive, now defensive (including particularly autárkeia), which validate the Cynical criticism of human foolishness, conventional values, and fixed social behaviors.

Keywords: Diogenes of Sinope, Socrates, Aristotle, Cynical Rationality, Treatment of the Self and the Others.

While Foucault’s work on biopolitics continues to inspire diverse studies in a variety of disciplines, it has largely been missing from the debates on the possibility of “affirmative biopolitics” which have been primarily influenced by the work of Agamben and Esposito. This article restores Foucault’s work to these debates, proposing that his final lecture course at the Collège de France in 1983–1984 developed a paradigm of affirmative biopolitics in the reading of the Cynic practice of truth-telling (parrhesia). The Cynic problematization of the relation between truth and life and their transvaluation of conventional truths by relocating them to the domain of bare life not only seeks to transform one’s life in accordance with the truth but also, through the confrontation with the existing conventions and norms, to transform the world as such. Cynic parrhesia is thus biopolitical, insofar as it reclaims the power of one’s life from the social order and its rationalities of government and applies it to oneself, investing one’s existence with truth. Since Foucault developed this reading of Cynicism in the context of his political engagement on behalf on East European dissidents, the article proceeds to analyse the resonances between parrhesia and Václav Havel’s idea of “living within the truth,” elaborating the biopolitical significance of both practices. We conclude by addressing the implications of our interpretation for Foucault scholarship and the wider debates on biopolitics.

The cynics saw in the rigorous training that the mythical Heracles did on a day to day basis in order to resist the adversities an example to guide them towards the practice of virtue. Thus, the hero went on to have a special significance to cynics and represented the incarnation of the ascetism that they sought out to practice. We can observe how this very peculiar way to practice virtue did not end with cynicism, on the contrary, it went on in later Greek philosophical schools, like Epicureanism and Stoicism, which took several of its tenets and made them part of their doctrine. This somehow led the ideology of the cynics to indirectly keep force in the passing of all the antiquity that succeeded them.

The ancient Cynics occupy a unique place in Hellenistic thought for the physicality of their self-representation. On the one hand, Diogenes is depicted accusing philosophers, in particular Plato, of idle talk, himself advocating double training (mental and bodily), and performing his philosophy through acts of “street theatre” in various public spaces. On the other hand, he derides athletes and the folly of those following them to athletic festivals. While the two directions of criticism differ in aim and scope, they must be viewed in tandem to establish the Cynic view of the body.

This paper attempts to reinterpret verses 118-28 of Persa of Plautus from multiple perspectives. In particular, the identification of the cynic mentioned therein with Diogenes of Sinope is definitively excluded and is suggested the presence of a general reference to the Cynics in the verses 118-26 and the presence of a specific allusion to Crates of Thebes in verses 127f. This examination helps to reconsider the relation of Persa with the eventual “original” greek, the dating of the latter, the Roman audience's reaction to philosophical references of this type, and the comic ploys used by Plautus. Conversely, in philosophy, the importance of Plautus’ testimony in the world of ancient Cynicism sources is re-discussed, with emphasis on highlighting the need for caution in respect to the overwhelming predominance of Diogenes of Sinope’s fame in relation to other Cynics in the anecdotal literature and in other works as well.

study of Anth. Gr. vii 419 (Meleager) in the literary format of an imaginary funerary epigram written as a trilingual inscription the text citing Greek, Aramaic and Phoenician; the study also examines its relationship to the Hellenistic Cynic cosmopolitanism of Meleager

On the 24th February I have presented at the Cleanthes' Seminar of the prestigious Academy of Athens my 4-year research and my postdoctoral project on Cleanthes of Assos. The original purpose then was to translate and comment on Hans von Arnim’s section dedicated to the Philosopher, sc. SVF 1. 463-619 + appendix. The research quite changed during those 4 years, especially to fit with the state-of-the-art editions with Philosophical commentaries. Furthermore, two major works changed completely the way I assessed the innovative character of what I thought I was doing:  Verbeke’s Kleanthes van Assos and Watanabe’s PhD dissertation supervised by Marcovich, which intended to do almost word by word the exact same thing, except for the translation part. Due to the huge volume of translation I had to do, the commentary was badly damaged and there is still Philosophical work to be done. And today I will present the development, features, and outcomes of the corpus I built for Cleanthes; then I will show my current work as a postdoctoral junior  researcher at the Dept. Philosophy (Univ. Sao Paulo); finally I shall try to contribute to the seminar by presenting 3 fragments I added to Cleanthes’ ethics section.

The purpose of this dissertation is to identify why and how the Jews’ avoidance of pork was singled out from among all of the other other Jewish dietary restrictions in the Greco-Roman world. Approached from the perspective of historical anthropology, pork avoidance is explored through the inter-cultural dialogue among Greeks, Romans, and Jews. Looking at the avoidance of pork as a problem, the dissertation endeavors to understand the way this problem was formulated and resolved within different discourses: the historical narrative of the Maccabbean revolt, Greco-Roman explanations of pork consumption and avoidance, as well as ethnological or philosophical discourses. The avoidance of pork became a symbol of separation not because of a traumatic event (as Mary Douglas proposed) but due to a gradual process. It is shown that Greco-Roman explanations of Jewish pork avoidance, both negative and positive, are understood in the light of: 1) The Greco-Roman conception of the pig, and its sacrifice or avoidance in Greco-Roman cults; 2) The philosophical debate between Stoicism (and later on Christianity) and Platonism on the status of the animal, the limits of the moral community, universalism, and philanthropy.

Предметом исследования в статье является автомифотворчество А. Н. Толстого 1930-х годов. Под автомифотворчеством мы понимаем совокупность способов создания собственно-го мифа, отличающегося от реальной биографии литератора. В отличие от символистских жизнетворческих практик оно имеет прагматическую цель- закрепление в «поле литературы» и не претендует на теургическое переустройство мира. При анализе этого феномена мы концентрировались на дискурсивных и поведенческих жестах писателя. Главной особенностью автомифотворчества А. Н. Толстого в 1930-е гг. являлось одновременное использование двух противоречащих другу поведенческих линий - трикстерской и цинической. При использовании данной дихотомии мы опирались на концепцию совет-ского трикстера, предложенную М. Н. Липовецким и базирующуюся на философских построениях П. Слотердайка. Главное различие между ними заключается в целеполагании: если для циников главной целью является достижение материальных и символических благ, то в трикстерском автомифотворчестве прагматика редуцируется, а выживание внутри советской системы приобретает черты перформанса, направленного на подрыв авторитетного дискурса. А.Н. Толстой при построении персонального мифа использует указанные выше стратегии: с одной стороны он сознательно использует приобретенный авторитет советского классика для достижения материальных благ и легитимации политического курса Сталина (это происходит, в частности, в статьях по «делу троцкистов»), а с другой-пародирует официозные властные ритуалы (публичное по-каяние) и авторитетный дискурс, порой практически цитируя поведение персонажей-трикстеров. Подобное использование полярных поведенческих жестов осложняет рецепцию толстовского автомифотворчества как современниками, так и сегодняшними исследователями-толстоведами.

Abstract. The article focuses on self-mythmaking of A. N. Tolstoy in the 1930s. Self-mythmaking is interpreted in the article as a series of ways to create one's own myth, significantly different from the real biography of the man of literature. Unlike symbolists' life-creating practices, it has a pragmatic purpose-to gain a foothold in the field of literature-and does not purport to wage a theurgical reconstruction of the world. In analyzing this phenomenon, attention is focused on the discursive and behavioral gestures of the writer. The main characteristic feature of Tolstoy's self-mythmaking in the 1930s was the simultaneous use of two contradicting lines of conduct-those of the trickster and of the cynic. When using this dichotomy, the author of the article relied on the concept of the Soviet trickster, introduced by M. N. Lipovetskiy and based on the philosophical constructions of P. Sloterdayke. The main difference between them is in goal setting: for the cynic, the main goal is to achieve material and symbolic benefits; in trickster's, self-mythmaking pragmatics is reduced, and survival within the Soviet system acquires the features of performance aimed at undermining authoritative discourse. While building his personal myth, A. N. Tolstoy combines the above mentioned strategies: on the one hand, he consciously uses the acquired authority of the Soviet classic to achieve material benefits and to legitimize Stalin's political course (this becomes salient, in particular, in the articles on "the case of Trotskyists"), and on the other-he ridicules official power rituals (public repentance) and authoritative discourse, sometimes virtually quoting the behavior of popular trickster characters. Such use of polar behavioral gestures significantly complicates the reception of Tolstoy's self-mythmaking for both the writer's contemporaries and of the modern researchers of A. N. Tolstoy.

Heterodoxy Aristo of Chios stated that the goal of existence is a life led indifferently with respect to what is intermediate between virtue and vice, without our making any kind of discrimination whatsoever among those intermediates, but instead setting all of them on an equal basis. For, he argued, the sage resembles a good actor who, whether he takes up the role of Thersites or of Agamemnon, plays either part as the part demands. This striking dictum, 1 drawn from one of Aristo's many famous analogies, 2 gives as clear a statement of his moral doctrine as one could hope to find among his scant remains. It also gives us a taste of the philosophical impression he strove to leave behind. Here Aristo earns his modern tag, "heterodox," "here-tic," or "radical," for he seems to be swimming hard against the current of a Stoic view that, destined to become mainstream, found no incompatibility in maintaining virtue and vice to be absolute points of reference for moral action while justifying the existence of a separate class of motives in the same realm of moral action, these latter constituting an intermediate, naturally sanctioned set of values (things according to nature, ta kata phusin), which in themselves This paper began in 1989 as an inquiry into Philodemus and Aristo (undertaken with the generosity of the National Endowment for the Humanities) and later developed into a study of Aristo 's Cynic tendencies, thanks to the impetus of Bracht Branham. I am especially indebted to Alan Code, Brad Inwood, Tony Long, Sara Rappe, and David Sedley for saving me from many errors, even if I have persisted in others. r. D.L. 7.r6o (SVF 1.351). 2. Some of these were collected together by Stobaeus (SVF r .383-87, 391-94, etc.).

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In his discussion of decorum Cicero supposes that most people would agree to the general principle that in our speech, bodily deportment, and actions we should avoid giving offense to others and should avoid generating feelings of disgust or revulsion. This is because we possess a sense of shame or verecundia. The particular details are very culture-specific: customs and conventions largely set the parameters of verecundia, and we do well to follow them. Cicero also admits that philosophical figures often flout established customs and conventions: he points to Socrates, who is justified in doing so owing to his great and godlike virtue, and the Cynics, who are not justified in doing so at all (1.148). He then sets out a bold thesis: ‘Indeed the reasoning of the Cynics must be rejected absolutely; for it is inimical to a sense of shame (verecundia), without which nothing can be upright (rectum), nothing honourable (honestum)’. For the Cynics, verecundia is not natural; hence we are justified in flouting customs and conventions. Cicero develops a counter-argument: the source of shame or verecundia is indeed natural. I explore his argument for this thesis (which appears at 1.126ff.) and assess his critique of the Cynics.

Učebnica Kynizmus grécky a moderný I. je uvedením do problematiky kynizmu a jeho štúdia. Hlavným zámerom je historické a systematické vymedzenie kynizmu, t. j. širokého myšlienkového hnutia, ktoré bolo počas antiky najpopulárnejším propagátorom sókratovského spôsobu myslenia a života. Prvá časť sa pokúša o vymedzenie kynizmu z hľadiska jeho historického vývoja. Druhá časť sa snaží o systematickejšie uchopenie kynizmu ako spôsobu myslenia a štýlu života.

Deleuze opposes a Stoic-Cynic image of the philosopher of the surfaces, which descri- bes philosophy as movement of perversion, to the platonic image of the philosopher of altitudes, which describes philosophy as a manic-depres- sive movement. We aim to demonstrate that even though his interpretation reads Platonism from a contemporary point of view, this does not hinder its historical accuracy, which emphasizes novel aspects

Abstract : In Book VI of the Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laertius presents Cynicism as a philosophical school with origins in Socrates and prefiguring Stoicism, through the sequence: Socrates–Antisthenes–Diogenes–Crates–Zeno. However, the part of the sequence linking Diogenes to Crates is not unanimously accepted. Diogenes Laertius himself mentions that Crates had two other teachers: Bryson of Achaea and Stilpo. The first is unknown, but the sources tell us enough about the second to discern certain similarities between his philosophy and that of Crates. When he wrote Book VI, Diogenes Laertius dismissed this parallel tradition connecting Crates to the Megarian school, preferring to link Stoicism to Socrates via Cynicism exclusively. Although Crates is unquestionably the philosophical heir of Diogenes, it is quite possible that he may have been influenced by both the Cynics and the Megarians.

Résumé : Au livre VI des Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres, Diogène Laërce présente le cynisme comme une école philosophique issue de Socrate et préfigurant le stoïcisme, à travers la séquence Socrate - Antisthène - Diogène - Cratès - Zénon. Le maillon de la chaîne unissant Diogène à Cratès ne fait pourtant pas l’unanimité. Au sein même de son ouvrage, l’auteur mentionne deux autres maîtres attribués à Cratès, soit Bryson d’Achaïe et Stilpon. Si le premier nous est inconnu, les sources nous renseignent assez sur le second pour apprécier des recoupements entre sa philosophie et celle de Cratès. Cette tradition parallèle, qui relie Cratès au mégarisme, fut écartée par Diogène Laërce au moment de la composition du livre VI, au profit d’une version liant le stoïcisme au socratisme via le cynisme exclusivement. Bien qu’il ne fasse aucun doute sur le plan philosophique que Cratès est l’héritier de Diogène, nous ne pouvons toutefois pas exclure la possibilité que le philosophe ait subi une double influence cynique et mégarique.

Antisthenes (446–366 BCE), a student of Socrates (469–399 B.C.), was the originator of Cynicism. Diogenes (404–323 B.C.) elaborated the ideas of the Cynics, and by association, those of Socrates. However, the notions of the Cynics, while inspired by Antisthenes’ teacher, were far from identical to Socrates’ doctrines. The genealogical relationship between Socrates and the Cynics is a troubled one. The Cynics twisted the content and meaning of Socrates’ teachings, falsely claiming that they were close relatives. My point is that the Cynics were the original philosophical revisionists.

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The manuscripts of De officiis all record something strange at 1.148: Cicero says that the philosophers Socrates and Aristippus had exceptional licence to flout social custom and convention owing to their “great and divine good qualities” (magna et divina bona). There are no worries about Socrates, but the example of Aristippus seems preposterous. This paper makes the following argument: (1) elsewhere Cicero defines divina bona in such a way to exclude hedonists; this should rule out crediting Aristippus with magna et divina bona alongside Socrates; (2) all scholarly efforts to account for the presence of Aristippus at 1.148 fail to convince; (3) the name Aristippus at 1.148 should, therefore, be remedied; (4) there are excellent philosophical reasons to think that Antisthenes, a follower of Socrates who is credited with setting in motion the Cynic philosophical tradition, is the name that Cicero wrote or should have written in the original.

In the Lives of Eminent Philosophers Diogenes Laërtios recounts the story of Hipparchia, the cynic philosopher, versus Theodoros the Atheist. While at a symposium, a space normally not open to respectable women, Hipparchia engaged in an argument with Theodoros. Realizing that he was about to be beaten at his own game, Theodoros tried to expose her body to the eyes of all present by pulling up her himation. She did not lose her temper and calmly replied that she, unlike other women, had made the choice to cultivate her mind, instead of spending her time weaving. While Theodoros was trying not to lose face among his peers, Hipparchia was competing for her place in the public sphere. If we trust Diogenes' account, Hipparchia won this competition in rhetoric and logic (agōn logōn), by rejecting domesticity and women's traditional chores. We propose to analyze the story of Hipparchia transmitted by Diogenes as an early formulation of an ideology of gender inequality. What this paper will aim to show is that the story of Hipparchia seems to suggest that the only way to be competitive in a male world is to be a man or to live as one. Taking contemporary feminist theory into account, this paper will investigate the case of Diogenes' Hipparchia as an instance within a broader discourse which traces gender difference as biological and therefore 'natural', and thus not easy to overlook, much less overcome.

This paper has as its starting point calls for critical management studies (CMS) to engage more actively with the public. CMS has been relatively successful in gaining an institutional foothold within university business schools, but is criticised from within for a lack of influence outside the institution. We argue that while closer relationships with the public is assumed to be the next phase in the institutional development of CMS, strengthening its position within university business schools is likely only to exacerbate the present lack of public engagement, since this becomes an end in itself. Bigger and better conferences and a proliferation of journals dedicated to the publishing of CMS research takes us further from the everyday world of workplace politics. As part of creating a space in which we can think differently about CMS and the university, we draw on Foucault’s analysis of parrhesia, or fearless speech, which emphasises critique as a personal quality.