Expert Witness

Reliance on science is essential to proper legal process.  The science of memory is particularly essential.  Criminal investigations must often focus on individual memory reports in the absence of corroborative evidence.  Controversial theories alleging “repressed-recovered memories” (RRM) including multiple personality disorder (MPD), dissociative identity disorder, traumatic amnesia, dissociative amnesia, betrayal trauma theory, and related notions have generated some of the most contentious, complex, and forensically challenging issues in the recent history of the mental health and legal systems.

In recent years, hum an factor s and ergonomic s specialists have increasingly filled the role of a warning expert in civil litigation. Such litigation usually involves personal injury and product liability cases. Questions typically addressed by the warning expert are:
(a) Is a warning needed?
(b) Is an existing warning or warning system adequate?
(c) What would an adequate warning system be?
(d) Would an adequate warning system make a difference (effectiveness)?
In this chapter, we review a few of the rules that govern product liability as it pertains to warnings . Several topics regarding the warning expert are addressed including the expert's role, the definition of a warning expert, typical activities of the warning expert, and problems or issues associated with being a warning expert.

Expert witnesses are retained to take the stand and share specialized knowledge with the court - specialized knowledge that may help the trier of fact make the decision they are charged to make. Naturally, expert witnesses (and the attorneys who retain them) want to appear confident and credible on the stand. However, expert witnesses are not necessarily experts at being witnesses (Brodsky, in press). Witness preparation scholar Stanley Brodsky suggests that expertise is situation-specific: an effective expert witness must prepare for the role of expert witness (in press). The rationale for expert witness preparation is supported in empirical research, which has found that experts who are less credible are less persuasive (Boccaccini, 2004; Boccaccini, Gordon, & Brodsky, 2004; Boccaccini, Gordon, & Brodsky, 2005). This article offers a thorough review of the research literature supporting expert witness preparation as a useful tool for effective expert witness communication at trial.

This study was conducted to investigate the relationship between expert witness likeability and jurors' judgments of credibility and tendencies in sentencing. Two actors playing expert witnesses were trained to present themselves as high and low in likeability in a standard testimony scenario in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. The effects of extraversion and gender of the 210 psychology undergraduates serving as mock jurors attending to expert testimony were also examined. The dependent variables were the jurors' perceptions of the witnesses' credibility and their agreement with the testimony. The likeability of the expert witnesses was found to be significantly related to the jurors' perception of their trustworthiness, but not to their displays of confidence or knowledge or to the mock jurors' sentencing decisions. The women rated highly likeable experts as more credible than the less likeable ones, but the men did not differentiate between the two types. As extraversion increased, the male jurors' agreement with testimony increased, but the female jurors' agreement decreased. The results suggest that likeability can be an important element in the credibility of the source and that attorneys and trial consultants now have an empirical foundation for addressing likeability as part of witness preparation. Final published version of the article available free to JAAPL members or via a free JAAPL trial access period to non-members at http://www.jaapl.org/

Through an analysis of a land-dispute case involving indigenous Ch ́ol community members in the state of Chiapas, Mexico, this article critically examines the role of anthropological knowledge in the production of the judicial arena as a terrain through which are disputed not only collective rights claims but also a sense of justice. The case of the Ch ́ol ejido, or communal land holding, of Tila reached Mexico’s Supreme Court in 2010. Yet five years later, tired of the excruciatingly slow pace of the judicial apparatus, Ch ́ol ejido authorities rendered their own verdict by way of an assembly decision that reclaimed the 130 hectares under dispute as their own. This para- state legal verdict unsettled the pre-ascribed role of different political actors—the state judicial apparatus, human rights organizations, and anthropologists—whose interplay grants certain cohesion and sediment to the current judicial arena in the country when indigenous communities are implicated. The assembly decision and subsequent actions in the ejido Tila displaced these actors, including the Supreme Court judges, and in doing so rendered visible the racialized hierarchies that neither human rights organizations nor anthropologists were effectively able to subvert. [legal activism, cultural expert witness reports, Indigenous territorial claims, racial justice, Latin America]

Forensic anthropologists anticipated a significant impact from the 1993 Supreme Court Daubert decision, which addressed the standard of admissibility for expert testimony. In response, many forensic articles cited Daubert in the search for objective techniques or a critique
of established subjective methods. This study examines challenges to forensic anthropological expert testimony to evaluate whether Daubert has actually affected the admissibility of such testimony. Thirty cases were identified that addressed the admissibility of the testimony,
including 14 cases prior to Daubert and 16 after Daubert. Examination of these cases indicates that post-Daubert cases do not result in more exclusions. Yet, this lack of exclusions may instead be viewed as a manifestation of the field’s overall surge toward more objective and quantifiable techniques in a self-regulating response to Daubert.

Law pertaining to competence governs the ability of a witness to give evidence at trial. It determines whether or not he can be 'heard' by the court. As will be seen, that regulating compellability governs whether the same witness can be forced to testify, even if he does not wish to do so, in the sense that he will be punished if he does not appear to give evidence. Historically, at common law, many groups of witnesses were deemed not to be competent to give evidence, and so could not testify, even if they could provide potentially important information. Including: atheists, convicted felons, and 'interested' parties to both civil and criminal litigation (i.e. the litigants themselves). Additionally, spouses could not normally give evidence for or against each other. A variety of reasons lay behind this rather restrictive situation.

At the heart of this proof of evidence is an evaluation of the regeneration benefits and disbenefits of the First Development Site (FDS) proposals for the Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) Land. In my evidence I will describe, explain and analyse how the FDS proposals are likely to impact on the Aylesbury Estate and contribute to the well-being of Estate residents in Sites 1b and 1c, in the interests of the residents and in the wider public interest. In order to do this I will provide an explanation and discussion of four complex concepts: ‘gentrification’, ‘community’, ‘regeneration' and ‘mixed communities’.  Gentrification, due to its conceptual weaknesses, struggles to encompass the complexities of the FDS proposals.

Mixed communities-led regeneration is supported by independent academic research for the benefits it can bring. Despite this, it is regarded by some objectors and academics as de facto gentrification. That position is not tenable and objectors have to explain how the disbenefits of the FDS scheme outweigh the obvious and substantial benefits in the short, medium and long term. The policy and practice of mixed communities are not perfect and do not offer utopian solutions in the case of the Estate. It is evident though, that this approach in the present socio-economic climate, has the capacity to deliver genuine improvements to troubled estates, the Aylesbury included.

I conclude that the FDS proposals will bring genuine aspirational regeneration to the Estate. The FDS proposals are likely to bring significant sustainable improvements in the conditions of Aylesbury residents suffering from aspects of deprivation, often multiple in nature. Others to benefit will be incoming residents who find a home in the FDS, especially an affordable one, and those who find employment during the long construction phase and after completion. Nevertheless, a long term view must be taken regarding: safeguarding, delivery and resourcing of this estate regeneration programme.

Finally, I conclude that under section 226, the Council must show that the FDS proposal for the CPO Land promotes or improves one or more of the: social, economic or environmental well-being of the area. This is right and proper because the FDS scheme impinges on tenants’ and leaseholders’ property rights. There are undoubtedly and unfortunately some disbenefits associated with the CPO proposals. However, drawing on the evidence presented in this proof, I am convinced that the regeneration benefits of the FDS scheme for the CPO Land are substantial, guaranteed to be delivered and far outweigh the disbenefits. I look forward to the CPO being confirmed so that the benefits can be achieved, to improve the lives, livelihoods and life chances of Aylesbury Estate residents.

Assignment Format.

About: Forensic Psychology Is a profession devoted to psychological aspects of the legal processes in Courts.

Notes: Anyone interested in learning a little something about this, I highly recommend giving it a read. It's a quick fun read.

In 2001, Andrea Yates did the unthinkable: she drowned her five children one by one in a bathtub within the course of minutes. She immediately confessed and explained that she killed them because she under the influence of Satan did not want them to be “tortured by Satan” as she was. Despite the defense uncovering evidence of Yates’ history of postpartum depression and psychosis, the jury did not accept her insanity defense and convicted her of capital murder with a sentence of life in prison. Influential in this decision was the testimony of prosecution expert Dr. Park Dietz, who pushed the view that Yates had rationally planned the murders. Dietz’s testimony was troubling, not only because there was little, if any, empirical basis for his conclusions, but because the defense discovered that he had introduced false testimony during the trial. During cross-examination, Dietz explained that he was a consultant for Law & Order and that one episode aired prior to Yates’ crime involving a woman with postpartum depression who drowned her children in a bathtub and was found insane. Yet the defense discovered no such show existed. Even though a grand jury found Dietz innocent of perjury, the defense appealed Yates’ sentence. Given the degree of Dietz’s impact on the jury, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case. In this second trial in 2006, Yates was no longer eligible for the death penalty and much more information had been uncovered regarding Yates’ mental condition. The jury unanimously found Yates not guilty by reason of insanity. While the Yates case helped to inform the world of the pervasiveness of postpartum depression and psychosis, no substantive changes have been made in Texas insanity law. This chapter explains how the state’s definition of insanity influenced the first trial and both constrained and confused how the jury could view Yates’ actions.

The goal of this study was to analyze the decision by child welfare supervisors to remove children from their parents. This was accomplished by studying the effect that three specific factors have on that decision. The three factors were 1) physical abuse, 2) domestic violence and substance abuse, and 3) availability of services to help the family.

Decision theory provided the conceptual framework for understanding the microstructure and interplay of variables involved in a decision. Decision theory was viewed within the context of the current functioning of the child welfare system. The goal was to present an integrated approach that led to development of a scale that was used to rate specific factors that this research studied. Emphasis was placed on survey research methods to help determine decision making factors used by managers.

Eighty-seven child welfare supervisors were surveyed from the northeast region of the Massachusetts Department of Social services. The prediction that a combination of factors of physical abuse and domestic violence/ substance abuse would increase the certainty of a manager removing a child from his parents was confirmed by data. The prediction that the likelihood of managers removing a child from his/her parents is greater with evidence of severe physical injury to the child than with presence of only general domestic violence and substance abuse by parents was not supported by data. The prediction that certainty of managers removing a child from his/her parents increases with lack of services (such as daycare, in-home intensive counseling, and availability of the agency worker) was confirmed by data.

As a consequence of this study, useful information was provided for those interested in protective services for children, e.g., social workers, managers, students, lawyers, child advocates, and society as a whole.

Analysis of demographic and attitudinal variables indicated a relationship to decision making. The variables that were analyzed included the influence of manager's gender, number of children, attitude toward spanking, history of spanking, and their opinion on importance of problems 2 and solutions to challenges within the system.

Completion of the project has contributed to the knowledge base of the management of child protective services. A contribution to the understanding of how the system currently works, and suggestions for social change within the profession have been made. Findings of this study point to the continued need for the implementation of specific criteria to guide supervisory decision making. Formulation of sound decision making guides will not only increase the supervisor's competence when deciding to remove children from a parent(s), but will also help to improve the efficacy of decisions for both removal and non-removal interventions.

This posting of an annotated bibliography on gesture user interfaces, on-line character recognition (a.k.a.  dynamic character recognition, a.k.a. pen and touch computing), both hardware and software, has been a continuing work-in-progress since the 1980s. It includes information on related application topics, such as digital rights management (DRM), portable computing, cryptographic communications, and biometric authentication. I am posting it as a service to those with interest in the field. It may also be of special interest to anyone investigating any of the areas of digitizer tablets, touchscreens, character recognition, touch/gesture user interfaces, multi-touch computing, touch and proximity sensors, augmented reality, haptics, context-dependent intrepretation of user input, and applications including the same. It covers the time period from approximately 1891 (first electronic tablet) through 1914 (first gesture/handwriting-recognition input system) to the present day.

Sistem pengadilan Indonesia mengenal beberapa barang bukti yang sah dalam persidangan. Salah satunya adalah keterangan ahli dari saksi ahli. Dalam menghadirkan seorang saksi ahli dalam persidangan, maka harus ada persyaratan yang harus dipenuhi oleh saksi ahli agar dapat dikatakan sebagai saksi ahli. Selain itu, saksi ahli juga harus mempunyai etika dan profesionalisme dalam menjalan tugasnya sebagai seorang saksi ahli. Paper ini nantinya akan membahas tentang saksi ahli lebih lanjut, bagaimana syarat menjadi saksi ahli, bagaimana sikap seorang saksi ahli dalam persidangan, etika dan profesionalisme saksi ahli, dan kemudian membahas salah satu contoh kasus bagaimana seorang saksi ahli melanggar etika dan profesionalismenya.

In a recent article on science and the law, Susan Haack suggested that “we could learn something from the experiences of other nations that are equally technologically advanced, but have different…legal arrangements.” Her suggestion is both appropriate and timely, as the evidence mounts on the problems with the current judicial management of complex science.

This Article starts with a simple related premise, that the proper balance of legal process and scientific expertise is not a uniquely American problem. If this is true, then we should, as Haack suggests, seek inspiration for reform in the varying methodologies of other nations. After beginning with a critical examination of the U.S. system, this Article discusses the handling of expert witnesses in several common law nations, Canada and the U.K., and in several civil law nations, Germany and Japan. After examining those systems, this Article makes recommendations as to which methodologies, currently in use and tested in those nations, offer the most promise in fixing the weaknesses exposed in our system.

By reviewing the weaknesses in Daubert assessment of complex expert testimony, how other nations handle similar evidence, and how certain discrete areas of foreign law could address the weaknesses identified in the U.S. approach, this Article offers reform alternatives to assist judges in balancing the need for accuracy and reliability of the science presented in court with the need to maintain our traditions of legal process.

The relationship between forensic science and legal adjudication is intricate mainly because the need to inform fact-finders on issues going beyond the layman's knowledge poses challenges both on empirical and normative dimensions, in particular with regards to the specific role and duties of the different participants in the legal process. While rationality is widely upheld as one of the aspirations of the legal process across many modern jurisdictions, a pending question is how to remedy the uneasy relationship between general propositions (and knowledge claims) conditioning expert witness testimony, and individualized decisions taken by fact-finders. The focus has hitherto been put on the utilization of model-based and formal methods of reasoning while, regrettably, the concepts of judgment and decision-making have not received equal attention. A first aspiration of our paper will thus be to further clarify the nature of this systemic relationship in the particular area of the legal process involving scientific experts, by conducting a critical transversal analysis of current empirical, normative and doctrinal understandings of expert witness testimony. As a second aim, we will use this insight to argue in favor of the view that structural features of expert witness testimony are embedded in a decision-making process, and that the understanding of this decisional dimension is important for clarifying the respective roles of expert witnesses and fact-finders, and for favoring their mutual understanding thereof. To substantiate this perspective, and attest to its growing recognition as a frontier understanding, we will provide real-world examples from forensic science reporting practice and policy documents of professional bodies.

The first section of this paper explains why assessing the worth of expert testimony poses special epistemological difficulties. The second traces the history of the various rules and procedures by means of which the U.S. legal system has tried to ensure, or at least control, the quality of the expert testimony on which it so often relies — from the Frye Rule, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Daubert trilogy to recent constitutional cases regarding the appearance of forensic witnesses in court and experiments with court-appointed experts and scientific education for judges. The third and final section suggests some lessons to be learned from the limited success of these efforts, and explores what might be better strategies going forward.

RESUMEN. Este trabajo analiza el problema de la deferencia judicial en el ámbito de las pruebas cien-tíficas y apunta algunos elementos para su superación. Se sostiene en primer lugar que, especial-mente en el ámbito de las disciplinas forenses identificativas, la deferencia viene alimentada por el uso de expresiones individualizadoras para comunicar las conclusiones de las pericias, y que la crítica a estas prácticas ha impulsado un nuevo paradigma forense que exige recuperar para el juez su papel como decisor. A la luz de este paradigma se examinan dos exigencias para superar la deferencia: una relativa a la formulación del informe pericial y otra sobre el control judicial de fiabilidad de la prueba. Finalmente se sostiene que ninguna medida alcanzará ese objetivo si no se refuerza la base cognoscitiva del juez, y se ofrecen algunas sugerencias para ello. Palabras clave: prueba pericial, prueba científica, deferencia judicial, control de fiabili-dad de la prueba, formación de los jueces, valoración racional de la prueba. ABSTRACT. This paper addresses the problem of judicial deference to forensic experts and puts forward some ideas about how to overcome it. It is first argued that in the field of forensic identification deference is prompted by the widespread use of individualization statements when reporting forensic findings to the courts, and it is also held that the new forensic paradigm resulting from the criticism to this practice calls for restoring the courts to their role as decision-makers. On the basis of the new paradigm, two types of measures for overcoming deference are examined: one relating to the content of expert reports, the other to judicial scrutiny for their reliability. Finally, the claim is made that no measure will meet that objective without previously enhancing the cognitive basis of fact-finders, and suggestions in this respect are offered.

【摘要】本文第一部分解释为何评价专家证据的效力会存在特殊的认识论困境。第二部分追溯不同
规则和程序的历史，美国法律制度通过这些规则和程序尽力保障或控制严重依赖的专家证据的质量—从
Frye 规则、联邦证据规则、Daubert 三部曲到近代专家证人出庭的宪法案件，法庭指定专家的试验以及法
官科学教育。第三和最后一部分指出从这些有限的成功经验中吸取的教训，并且探索未来更好的策略。
【关键词】认识论；美国专家证据的法律规定；Frye 规则；Daubert 三部曲; 法庭指定专家; Melendez-
Diaz 及其衍生案；法庭科学

The first section of this paper explains why assessing the worth of expert testimony poses special epistemological difficulties. The second traces the history of the various rules and procedures by means of which the U.S. legal system has tried to ensure, or at least control, the quality of the expert testimony on which it so often relies— from the Frye Rule, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Daubert trilogy to recent constitutional cases regarding the appearance of forensic witnesses in court and experiments with court-appointed experts and scientific education for judges. The third and fi nal section suggests some lessons to be learned from the limited success of these efforts, and explores what might be better strategies going forward.

RESUMEN: Para muchos operadores jurídicos la prueba testimonial impone cautela, por los peligros e incertidumbres que puede deparar dentro del proceso. En ese sentido, resulta per-tinente focalizar el análisis en el tipo de relato, narración o declaración que ofrece el testigo, ilustrando acerca de la insuficiencia de la visión clásica del Derecho procesal, que entiende esa declaración como representativa, y el pasaje a la visión actual-cargada de aportes inter-disciplinarios-que considera la declaración del testigo como reconstructiva. El testigo no puede transmitir a través de su declaración una mera representación de lo ocurrido, sino la reconstrucción de los hechos percibidos. Como corolario de lo anterior, se reflexionará acerca de si dicho relato puede contener opiniones, valoraciones, juicios del testigo, y cómo se debe afrontar el reto del interrogatorio al testigo técnico, en ocasiones, cargado de con-ceptos, manifestaciones o explicaciones de carácter extrajurídico. PALABRAS CLAVE: prueba testimonial (o testifical); declaración testimonial; testigo técnico. ABSTRACT: Many jurists treat testimonial evidence with extreme caution due to the dangers and uncertainties that this evidence may bring to the process. Therefore, the author focuses on the analysis of the witness deposition, trying to go beyond the classical representative view of the declaration in favour of a reconstructive approach with interdisciplinary contributions. Witnesses don't declare what they saw as an ideal representation; instead, they reconstruct what they perceived. Furthermore, the paper discusses the possibility of inserting in the statement opinions or assessments of the witness, and also how to face the declaration of an expert witness, always dealing with non-juridical concepts or explanations. SUMARIO: I) Introducción. Una llamativa contradicción. II) El relato o narración que ofrece el testigo. i) La memoria y los recuerdos. Algunos aportes interdisciplinarios de interés. ii) Hechos, percepción e interpretación. III) ¿Puede el testigo dar su opinión acerca de los he-chos? El interrogatorio reflexivo, hipotético o relativo a opiniones del testigo. Las preguntas comparativas. IV) El caso del llamado testigo técnico. V) A modo de cierre.

This is an open source public document produced in connection with a UK urban regeneration CPO public inquiry. It should be read in association with other public inquiry documents including my proofs and those of Loretta Lees. In evidence, Professor Lees drew the Inspector’s attention to her current Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded research project. Attention was also drawn to the ESRC website which was said to contain a copy of the relevant research bid document. In fact, the website contains only a summary (appendix 1) of the full bid document that was submitted in evidence on 31 January 2018. The website identifies Professor Lees as the Principal Investigator. At the outset, I would note that the general subject of Professor Lees’ ESRC research outlined in the bid is welcome and necessary. The wish to evaluate the impacts of estate regeneration policy is commendable. That said, this response statement is intended to help the Inspector and the Secretary of State (SoS) understand the relevance of the research bid in the light of this CPO Public Inquiry and the evidence of Professor Lees. This statement provides a response to the research brief as it was called in evidence, for the ESRC project above. The brief is, in effect, the research bid that secured the funding for the project. This response is in two parts: 1) a response to the full research bid and 2) a response to the Abstract that is published on the ESRC website. This website Abstract contains the reference to Mr Boris Johnson’s “Kosovo-style social cleansing” that was referred to in oral evidence by Professor Lees.

This book scrutinizes the emergence of historical forensic contribution in some of the most important national and international legal ventures of the last century. It aims to advance the debate from discussions on whether his- torians should testify or not toward nuanced understanding of the history of the practice and making the best out of its performance in the future.

The Government must provide an indigent defendant any tools necessary to prepare an adequate defense. If an indigent defendant can demonstrate that a psychiatrist will likely be necessary, then the government must provide one. While an indigent defendant has a right to a psychiatrist, it is still unclear whether the psychiatrist will act as an advocate or as a neutral party. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant has the right to a psychiatrist if necessary. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Ake wanted to grant the indigent defendant a neutral, state appointed psychiatrist. Some courts have held that compliance with Ake only requires a neutral, state appointed psychiatrist. Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Ake requires an advocate to assist in the preparation of the defense. The outcome of Ake indicates that the psychiatrist can be used as a tool to prepare an indigent defendant’s adequate defense. Confusion has persisted because Justice Marshall also stated that an indigent defendant was entitled to an independent psychiatrist, but that the state should determine how to implement that entitlement. The ruling in Ake requires that a psychiatrist be provided for an indigent defendant that is an advocate for the defendant.

Ponencia presentada en el marco de las 3as Jornadas de Debate y Actualización en Temas de Antropología Jurídica que se desarrollaron en Buenos Aires en la Universidad Nacional de San Martín los Jueves 21 y viernes 22 de agosto de 2014.
Esta ponencia fue presentada en el GT4 intitulado "Discusiones y actualización en problemas metodológicos y epistemológicos de la antropologia jurídica
"  coordinado por Morita Carrasco y Gustavo Ludueña
 por Silvina Ramírez y Karina Bidaseca.

The last thirty years have seen an explosion of neuroscience research on how the mind functions. This research paints a revised image of what constitutes human nature and behavior and how the criminal law can handle those extremes of it that endanger individuals and their society. The revision is important to the criminal law because key criminal law concepts of culpability depend on the internal workings of individuals’ minds. Research into intentionality, consciousness, and brain plasticity are just some examples of areas where new discoveries could help enhance validity and reliability within the criminal justice system. Not surprisingly, lawyers have increasingly introduced neuroscience evidence into the courtroom, a trend suggesting that the complexity of the legal issues raised will only expand as the science progresses. On a more fundamental level, neuroscience is also an excellent resource to revitalize the Model Penal Code’s original focus on subjective determinations of an individual defendant’s blameworthiness, based on that particular defendant’s mental state. Over the last sixty years, the American criminal justice system has become far more punitive, and the subjective inquiry has been overshadowed by a more objective standard that downplays the need to assess individual culpability. The incorporation of modern neuroscience research into the criminal law would bring back a system of justice that more accurately reflects a given defendant’s mental state as well more effectively protects the rest of society. But to benefit from neuroscience in this way, we must first penetrate the mystique that often surrounds the meaning and applicability of the science. We must move on from misconceptions, fears, and misguided debates. And we must realize that although neuroscience brings unique insight to the law, there is nothing about neuroscience that merits unique treatment by the law.

This chapter looks at the interactional behaviour of expert witnesses and counsel acting within the adversarial trial’s constraints. Adopting a discourse-analytic perspective, it demonstrates what stances the expert witnesses and the counsel adopt and what interactional resources they employ to position themselves vis-à-vis their interactants and their knowledge claims. Drawing on such linguistic concepts as 'speaker commitment', 'epistemicity' and 'evidentiality', the chapter examines how expert knowledge is claimed, disclaimed, attributed and contested. The chapter specifically considers the interplay of the pronouns 'I', 'you' and 'we' with verbal markers of experiential, cognitive and communicative stance (Marín-Arrese, 2009) as well as negation. The analysis reveals a correlation between the participants’ roles and communicative goals and the type of stance they adopt during testimony. It thus demonstrates the discursive processes of turning facts and expert opinions into evidence and explains how 'legal truth' is constructed in courtroom proceedings.

Hancomb Intercontinental have established an international task force to support its clients in the construction, engineering and shipbuilding industries following the Coronavirus COV-19 outbreak being declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation. Experts are drawn from a number of disciplines including legal, medical, engineering, planning, contract, commercial, accounting and will be able to provide expert advice and expert witness services to clients to protect their position and succeed in prosecuting  or defending claims for time and money arising out of the crisis. Indeed our quantum and delay experts will be able to play a key role in helping you record and gather information needed in order to succeed in securing entitlements.
Our teams are able to work remotely using the latest technology and software  and our plans provide for business continuity no matter how worse the national and global situation becomes.
Whilst every client and contract will have different facts; we have set out some common issues and information by jurisdiction but would confirm that this does not constitute legal advice and  that you contact our team or a legal firm for legal advice based on the actual facts of your specific and unique case. Our dedicated email address for the COV-19 is being monitored 24 hours a day and we have teams across the world’s time zones.
COV-19@hanscombintercontinental.com

This work aims to analyse the legislation proposed by The Law Commission in Great Britain in order to establish statutory criteria for expert evidence in court. The proposal is assessed against the amendment of the Criminal Procedure Rules (CPR) initiated by The Government. From this comparison implications for expert witnesses are derived. For illustrative purposes, the case study of fictitious divorce proceedings of Peter Morgan is dealt with. The study shows legal remedies available to a party against its expert witness in negligence cases. Methodologically, expert evidence admissibility criteria are discussed on the background of common law rules and the Criminal Procedure Rules (2015). Legal academic literature is consulted to enrich the argument. The findings show that the Criminal Procedure Rules (2015) are rooted in settled case law, albeit stressing expertise enhancement and professional qualifications. The discussion of the Peter Morgan case study provides for a legal route for negligence claims based on the case law of Jones v Kaney. The originality of this work is based upon a thorough analysis of case law and legal writings, with the focus on newly introduced Criminal Procedure Rules and recent landmark cases.

Apstrakt: Tema rada su veštačenja društvenih naučnika u procesima vođenim pred Haškim tribunalom, čiji se doprinos sagledava u svetlu dugog razvoja ove prakse. Šire diskusije o sudskoj upotrebi naučnog znanja ukazuju na niz problema u regulisanju veštačenja. Analiziraju se mehanizmi kojima se u različitim pravnim kontekstima obezbeđuje naučna pouzdanost i procesna relevantnost veštačenja, kao i primenljivost tih mehanizama na forenzičke doprinose različitih društvenih nauka. Regulisanje veštaèenja u Haškom tribunalu se posmatra kao osobeno rešenje čije se posledice prate kroz učešće veštaka u postupcima i kroz javnu percepciju angažmana društvenih naučnika u tom svojstvu. Cilj ovakvog pristupa je nijansiranje dominantnih predstava o ulozi društvenih nauènika u Haškom tribunalu i stvaranje preduslova za razumevanje specifičnog karaktera njihove veštačke uloge. Ključne reči: Haški tribunal, veštačenje, suđenje Slobodanu Miloševiću, metodologija društvenih nauka

This review of women’s participation in the legal system as expert witnesses examines the empirical literature on the perceived credibility and persuasiveness of women compared to men experts. The effects of expert gender are complex and sometimes depend on the circumstances of the case. Some studies find no differences, some find favorable effects for women and others for men, and still others find that expert gender interacts with other circumstances of the case. The findings are interpreted through social role theory and the role incongruity theory of prejudice. Future directions for research are identified and implications are considered for attorneys who select and prepare expert witnesses. Suggestions for men and women’s behavior as expert witnesses are provided.

Área do Direito: Processual Resumo: O presente trabalho objetivou noticiar a evolução do tratamento do controle da prova pericial no direito norte-americano. Tomou-se um sistema da família da common law como objeto de estudo em função do estágio de desenvolvimento e pesquisa encontrado nos Estados Unidos da América. Devido a certas peculiaridades do sistema, como a indicação do perito realizada pelos ligantes, e não pelo juiz, as Cortes daquele país se viram obrigadas a dar uma resposta à crescente utilização de teses e técnicas científicas não confiáveis nos depoimentos dos peritos no julgamento. Fez-se uma análise detalhada do caso Daubert, onde a Suprema Corte Norte-Americana revisita o precedente criado em 1923, no caso Frye, e elabora critérios objetivos para o julgador execer o juízo de admissibilidade da prova pericial a ser produzida. Palavras-chave: Perícia-Prova pericial-Admissibilidade-Jurisprudência americana Abstract: This work intended to point out the evolution in the control of expert evidence in American law. A common-law related system was taken as the subject of the studies because of its stage of development and research in the USA. Due to some peculiarities of the system, like the fact that the parts choose their experts instead of the judge, the Courts in that country caught themselves oblied to give an answer to the fast-growing use of unreliable thesis and scientific techniques in the experts depositions during trial. A detailed analysis of the Daubert case was brought to show how the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the precedent created, in 1923, by the Frye case, and to elaborate objective criteria for the judge to exercise his admissibility control over the expert evidence proposed. Keywords: Skill-Proof expert-Admissibility-American Jurisprudence Sumário: 1. Introdução-2. Peculiaridades do sistema norte-americano-4. Conclusão-5. Referências bibliográficas 1. Introdução Sempre que para a solução do litígio o julgador deva se socorrer da opinião de especialista em outra área do conhecimento apresenta-se a necessidade de realização da denominada prova pericial. Cada sistema jurídico indica o procedimento a ser adotado na sua produção e a forma varia de acordo com aspectos como a atuação do juiz e das partes no processo, o grau de confiabilidade de que gozam os cientistas locais e a função que o Estado reserva para a jurisdição, entre outros. O legislador brasileiro conferiu ao juiz o poder de nomear o perito e fixou critérios para a indicação. O perito é, assim, auxiliar da justiça de confiança do julgador e possuidor de conhecimento técnico ou científico necessário para gerar subsídios que viabilizem o acertamento dos fatos e a tomada de decisão. Talvez em função dessa relação de confiança entre o juiz e o perito, não há na legislação brasileira a exigência de controle sobre o resultado da perícia e, muito menos, indicação de requisitos objetivos que possibilitem esse controle. O presente estudo visa, destarte, noticiar a experiência norte-americana no controle da prova pericial, traçando um percurso que se inicia com o caso Frye, de 1923, passando Admissibilidade da prova pericial e a evolução da jurisprudência norte-americana Página 1

This survey of 206 forensic psychologists tested the " filtering " effects of preexisting expert attitudes in adversarial proceedings. Results confirmed the hypothesis that evaluator attitudes toward capital punishment influence willingness to accept capital case referrals from particular adversarial parties. Stronger death penalty opposition was associated with higher willingness to conduct evaluations for the defense and higher likelihood of rejecting referrals from all sources. Conversely, stronger support was associated with higher willingness to be involved in capital cases generally, regardless of referral source. The findings raise the specter of skewed evaluator involvement in capital evaluations, where evaluators willing to do capital casework may have stronger capital punishment support than evaluators who opt out, and evaluators with strong opposition may work selectively for the defense. The results may provide a partial explanation for the " allegiance effect " in adversarial legal settings such that preexisting attitudes may contribute to partisan participation through a self-selection process.

On the basis of the analysis of questions taken from lawsuits, this paper reflects on the aspects related to the practical reality of the professional who acts as an expert on language in court, what is expected of him and which tools he uses in order to meet demands. For this purpose, we revisited the origins of Forensic Linguistics, its contextualization and its development in the world. Afterwards, we discussed the role of experts in language practices, their knowledge and established experience, reflecting on the concepts of adherence and non-adherence, formulated by Schwartz. Finally, we highlighted the questions which, grouped by theme, brought an overview of the unique nature of the expert's work, which we hope will greatly contribute to make a profile of the performance of this professional.
Keywords: Forensic linguistics; Questions directed to an expert witness; Expertise; Discursive image.

Economists regularly appear as expert witnesses in antitrust litigations. The chapter analyzes how their models and methodologies have performed vis-à-vis the standards of relevance and reliability affirmed by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. (1993). New data are provided on the number of antitrust economists whose expert testimonies have not survived a Daubert challenge. Explanations for such a poor record range from the judges' insufficient economic literacy to skewed procedural rules, from the high specificity of antitrust cases to widespread identification problems in economic models.

My paper is in four parts. First I will shortly introduce a debate that goes on in applied legal anthropology for a long time now, which has to do with the problems arising from the so-called epistemological divide which would separate legal thinking and anthropological thinking. In this debate it is proposed that anthropologists should apply some form of strategic essentialism in their encounter with the law. In my second part I will try to show that this strategic essentialism argument is based on an implicit essentialism–what is essentialized is legal thinking itself. In my third part I will ask Derrida what he thinks about this, and try to argue with him that all this is not about essentialism, strategic or otherwise, but about the act of decision. Finally, I will propose to scale it all down: that not " strategic essentialism " , but " courtroom tactics " is what legal anthropology should think about more.