Opportunism

The literature on the rational PBC suggests that politicians systematically manipulate economic and fiscal conditions before elections to increase their chances of eelection. Most tests of this theory look for evidence of pre-election distortions in fiscal policy. We propose a new test that explores the two-way interaction between the magnitude of the opportunistic distortion and the margin of victory. The test is implemented using a large panel of Portuguese municipalities. The results show that opportunism leads to a larger winmargin for the incumbent and that incumbents behave more opportunistically when their win-margin is small. These results are consistent with the theoretical model.

This paper sets out to explain how the implementation of an environmental management systems (EMS) conditions the way firms respond to environmental pressures exerted by their stakeholders. While the most common approaches to be found in the literature consider the certification of such systems to be an indicator of proactivity and cooperation with stakeholders, this article posits that it is also a mechanism firms use to discriminate between stakeholders, allowing firms to react to the pressure of certain stakeholders only. ...

A theoretical framework to understand the adversarial relationship between stakeholders in Malaysian construction industry is proposed. It applies the non-cooperative Game Theory (GT) and Transaction Cost Economic Theory (TCE) to traditional procurement. Both theories give insights into the heart of the industry’s problem – opportunism in the nature of the relationship among stakeholders especially between client and contractor. There can be a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation at the core of the client-contractor relationship, which may be the cause of project inefficiency. This is echoed by the assumption in TCE literature that there are limitations to stakeholder’s rationality – bounded rationality, due to the incapacity to process information without error. Such a situation gives rise to opportunism as they need to protect themselves from possible loss. The attitudes of the contracting parties and the cooperative relationships among the project stakeholders are important to alleviate opportunism for successful project delivery. GT that emphasises the importance of future relationship as pre-condition for cooperative behaviours and Relational Contracting (RC) principles found in TCE may serve as a useful strategy towards fostering cooperative relationship and better teamwork within the construction industry. Therefore, a relationship-based procurement arrangement such as strategic partnering will improve project performance. Since the data collection is still ongoing, the discussion and analysis reported were based on the literature review and pilot survey carried out. The findings should provide a strong foundation for further research towards the development of an effective relationship-based procurement model in Malaysia.

Contrary to the interpretation of timeliness (shi 時) in the Huainanzi 淮南子 as the cultivation of skills and techniques to successfully respond to change, this paper argues that in the Huainanzi, actions are not judged opportunistically by their success or failure, regardless of their accordance with moral principles. Instead, throughout the text, the inconsistent definition and application of the concept serves as a rhetorical tool to accommodate the theoretical and practical inconsistency between moral values and worldly success - a long standing problem in early Chinese philosophical discourse. On the one hand, this paper shows that in practice timely action functions as a “moral excuse” that allows a violation of moral codes while maintaining efficacy and relieving its agent of moral regret. On the other hand, the text allocates the responsibility of actions to heaven, which allows immoral people in power to be criticized. This paper first explains the idea of timeliness in the Huainanzi and its contradictory attitudes towards it. Secondly, it objects to the understanding of timeliness as a justification for actions – which would render it opportun-istic. Thirdly, it presents how timeliness functions as a moral excuse for dealing with the struggle between values, success, and moral regret. Finally, it situates this perspective from the Huainanzi within early Chinese philosophical discourse.

Britain is a major imperialist power. Over the last 150 years, the very structure of British capital and, therefore, the nature of the working class movement have been determined by this obvious, but, until recently, seldom acknowledged reality.

The imperialist character of Britain has been decisive in determining all the major economic and political developments in this country. Yet it has taken the brutal and barbaric US and British occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan and the growing resistance to that occupation to force the term ‘imperialism’ back into the political vocabulary of the left. David Yaffe analyses the nature of British imperialism.

Acknowledgment of the existence of imperialism is a step forward and is to be welcomed. But, as will be shown, the British left acknowledges the existence of imperialism only to deny imperialism’s central characteristics. This is inevitably reflected in practical political activity and presents a serious obstacle to the development of a revolutionary working class movement in Britain. That is why it has to be exposed. It is, therefore, necessary to briefly outline the central characteristics of imperialism before analysing the particular concrete features of British imperialism today.

Formal control and trust are two typical governance mechanisms employed to safeguard business transactions. Yet the effectiveness of each mechanism for firm relationship outcomes remains unclear. Some relevant literature suggests that formal control and trust simultaneously can help secure transactions,
whereas other research argues the two control mechanisms can substitute for each other. This study applies social embeddedness theory and differentiates strong tie from weak tie relationships. In so doing, it reveals the role of strong versus weak social ties in leading to parallel conclusions about the relationship between
formal control and trust and their effects on relationship outcomes. On the basis of empirical tests in a Chinese
marketing channels context, this study finds that the joint effects of formal control and trust on governing transactions depends on the relational tie that the focal partners share. Specifically, formal control and trust complement each other only in weak tie relations. On the basis of this new perspective, the authors offer theoretical and managerial implications for managing interfirm governance mechanisms in transitional economies such as China.

This paper discusses how problems of eco-opportunism in metals markets escalate due to market failures because of the increasing scarcity of precious metals. Establishing the right sourcing strategy for recycled material, therefore, is crucial for supply chains and for managing corporate sustainability tensions. We analyse the transaction costs in three strategic models of sourcing from 'make' inside the supply chain to contract, and 'buy' in the grey market for metals. 'Blood metals' leak into the grey markets when there is lack of control, information asymmetry in global supply chains and eco-opportunism in recycling of electronic products. Consequently, the need for traceable supply encourages companies to integrate closed-loop recycling of their products. Furthermore, scarcity of valuable metals along with consumer preferences for sustainable products lead to specific investments in product design and robot technology that disassemble end-of-life products. Together, these factors provide an integrated system that reduces transaction costs and increases recycling efficiency. Therefore, specific assets designed to facilitate reuse of scarce metals like the Apple robot Daisy is a key corporate strategy to secure sustainable performance. Specific investments in disassembling technology like robots in the smartphone industry, should, according to transaction cost theory, be organised as a vertically integrated circular economy. The integrated closed-loop model presented here, control eco-opportunism and the unsustainable character of grey markets for recycled material in electronics. ARTICLE HISTORY

Research on buyer-supplier relationships (BSRs) has often focused on only one side of the relationship and, thus, has tended to overlook asymmetries. Yet, a buyer (supplier) may often deal with a bigger supplier (buyer) or one that has higher levels of trust, respect, and reciprocity. Therefore, we examined how two types of asymmetries—size and relational capital—affect perceived opportunism and performance. We used dyadic data from 106 buyers and their matched suppliers gathered from a survey and an archival database. The results demonstrate that the degree and direction of both asymmetries affect the BSR. Our results also reveal that an imbalance of relational capital in a firm’s favor may have the opposite effect from that intended.  In other words, the firm’s counterpart perceives more, rather than less, firm opportunism. The results also suggest that a buyer observes lower benefits in the presence of size asymmetry, whereas the supplier’s perception of benefits is unaffected. Thus, our research represents a significant step forward in understanding BSRs and asymmetries by (i) bringing attention to two key asymmetries inherent in BSRs and (ii) showing that these asymmetries are not unidirectional in their influence on perceived opportunism and performance.

Purpose – Strategic alliances involve uncertainty, interdependence, and vulnerability, which often create adverse situations. This paper seeks to understand how alliance managers respond to these adverse situations by examining the influence of four exchange variables on response strategies.

Design/methodology/approach – A scenario-based experiment provides empirical support for a typology consisting of seven conceptually and empirically distinct response strategies: exit, opportunism, aggressive voice, creative voice, considerate voice, patience, and neglect.

Findings – The results indicate that economic satisfaction, social satisfaction, alliance-specific investments, and the availability of attractive alternatives differentially and interactively affect response strategies.

Research limitations/implications – The study offers two main contributions to alliance literature. First, the seven response strategies accurately represent reactions that alliance managers use to deal with adverse situations. Second, the study findings validate and extend previous alliance research by highlighting that a comprehensive response strategy typology is necessary to disentangle the effects of the four exchange conditions on response strategy use, which fosters theory development and managers' ability to manage their alliances effectively.

Originality/value – The study contributes to the process perspective on strategic alliances by highlighting the various response strategies that alliance managers use to deal with adverse situations and their antecedents.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that costs reduction is no longer a complete indication of performance and should not be attained at the expense of the firm’s sustainable social responsibility and environmental aspects. The question of whether outsourcing is a “blessing” or a “lesson” remains unresolved in the minds of practitioners and researchers alike. The literature is replete with the up- and down-sides of outsourcing, all going in different directions, making it very cumbersome particularly for practitioners to articulate when and what to outsource (if at all) and how to contain or mitigate outsourcing downsides. Design/methodology/approach Outsourcing as a two-edged sword can be value creating strategy or a firm’s soft spot. This paper focusses on the latter through a review of sourcing in two leading multinational companies: Benetton, in the fast fashion industry, and Nestlé, in the food industry. Findings Benetton experienced the biggest catastrophe in t...

This paper tests the joint hypotheses that policymakers engage in fiscal policy opportunism and that voters respond by rewarding that opportunism with higher vote margins. Furthermore, it investigates the impact of fiscal illusion on the previous two dimensions. Empirical results, obtained with a sample of 68 countries from 1960 to 2006, reveal that opportunistic measures of expenditures and revenues generate larger winning margins for the incumbent and that the opportunistic manipulation of fiscal policy instruments is larger when the current government is less likely to be re-elected. Furthermore, fiscal illusion contributes to the entrenchment of incumbent policymakers in office and promotes opportunistic behaviour.

A Comparative Econometric Analysis of South African and New Zealand Wineries’ Grape Sourcing Strategies “Towards a Multi-Paradigm Exchange Protection Framework” by Monnane Mokaedi Monnane The Transaction cost economics (TCE) incomplete contracting framework exposes exchange relationships to trading partner(s)‟s opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Despite this limitation, incomplete contracts are still widely used (Dawes, Murota, Jera, Masara, & Sola, 2009; Fraser, 2005). However, TCE does not provide a theoretical reason why companies use contracts even though they expose transactions to exchange hazards. It is against this background that this research has developed an exchange protection framework that protects exchange relationships better than TCE incomplete contracts. The new framework is multiparadigm in nature and integrates the exchange protection qualities of incomplete contracting (Transaction cost economics theory), monitoring and incentives (agency theory), relational norms ...

In 2020 the word “unprecedented” was so often used as to become both grating and a word of the year. It was a time of unprecedented trials and tribulations that highlighted countries in the modern era needed to get better at managing calamities. National policymakers have now become more interested in their nations being much better prepared for possible future misfortunes. The range of such possibilities is though dauntingly large. A conceptual framework is needed that is broad enough to cover the diversity of potential scenarios but narrow enough to be useable by busy, time-stressed policy makers considering disaster response options.
This report works through such a conceptual framework. This comprises four elements: strategy, risk management, resilience and opportunism. Such a framework is useful not just for being prepared to respond to disasters but also to be prepared to exploit crises. A nation would ideally come out of a crisis or disaster better placed, rather than worse.

The problems of economic organization in complex hierarchies was mostly explained by reference to the conjunction of a set of human attributes with a related set of (largely non-technological) opportunism of transactional factors. Human factors appear to be little reason to supplant market organization with some form of nonmarket organization: (1) Bounded rationality refers to rate and storage limits on the capacities of individuals to receive, store, retrieve, and process information without error; (2) Opportunism-strategic disclosure of asymmetrically distributed information by individuals to their advantage and itself manifests during contract execution and renewal; (3) Atmosphere preferences may induce individuals to forego material gains for non-pecuniary satisfactions if the modes or practices are regarded as oppressive or otherwise repugnant. Transactional factors: (1) Uncertainty-inasmuch as a full set of contingent claim markets is infeasible, adaptive, sequential decision-making procedures need be devised; (2) Small Numbers-if a large number of traders are roughly equally qualified to supply the good or service in question-not merely at the outset but also at contract renewal intervals; (3) Information Impactedness-partly an information asymmetry condition: one of agents to a contract has deeper knowledge than does the other.

The main purpose of this study is to examine the
casual model and explain the relationship of opportunism,
conflict, trust, commitment, satisfaction, and loyalty between
hospitals and their suppliers. A survey is conducted of local
community hospitals, regional hospitals and medical centers in
Taiwan. Primary data is gathered using a questionnaire; this
study investigates hospitals’ procurement staffs that are
responsible for selecting medical device suppliers. The sample
consists of 481 valid responses for applying structural equation
modeling (SEM) in this research. The study confirms almost all
hypothesized associations between the constructs examined,
indicating that the supplier’s opportunistic behavior reduces trust
and generates conflict. According to the significant mediation
effect, showed that commitment plays a mediated role between
trust and satisfaction, and satisfaction is a mediated factor to
loyalty. Thereby displaying trust in addition to being an
important factor in the success of supply chain management, but
also an important factor in the success of alliances.