Sexual Orientation & the Law

American antidiscrimination law has addressed harmful stereotypes since, at least, the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Stereotypes about the different abilities of men and women, or of black and white workers, lay underneath much of the segregation and workplace inequality that Title VII sought to correct. However, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins has radically expanded our conception of stereotypes as discrimination, and in doing so has introduced revolutionary ideas to the workplace and the courts. Prior to Price Waterhouse, Title VII had been thought to apply only to ascriptive stereotyping—to monolithic misconceptions burdening all members of a disfavored group. Price Waterhouse's extension of Title VII protection to victims of prescriptive stereotype has constituted a massive, and heretofore unstudied, conceptual leap. This Note examines how Price Waterhouse's prohibition against stereotyping can transform American workplace law and analyzes one area where it already has—antigay discrimination. By contrasting the requirements for proving antigay discrimination under a Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory with the traditional Title VII methods that many states use to protect LGBT workers, I show both how Price Waterhouse can complement proposed LGBT-specific protections such as the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), and how its normative vision is a vital addition to existing antidiscrimination law.

The premise on which human rights is founded is that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. The human rights which are provided for in the various human rights documents include with great certainty the freedom from discrimination of any kind and on any basis whatsoever.
This study is based on the case of Toonen v Australia. The decision in the case of Toonen v Australia was to abolish discrimination based on sexual orientation. This object of this study is to find the substantive laws and rights which protects persons with different sexual orientations in Ghana and in instances where there are none give suggestions for remedying the situation. In light of the deficiencies of Ghanaian law when dealing with homosexual rights the study recommends that:
1. The Criminal Offences Act 1960, Act 29 should be amended to so as not to criminalise homosexual acts
2. The Labour Act 2003, Act 651 should be amended so as to make provision for the rights of homosexuals at work places.

ABSTRACT Human dignity can be analyzed from its own perspectives, emphasizing the philosophical thought on the subject and its legal process. On their understanding of constitutional principle and its application in three senses: direct, through fundamental rights and in the rights of the personality. From now on, one wonders: is it possible to withdraw a dignity from someone? Does this process occur in a heteronomous, autonomous way, or in both as hypotheses? Finally, how would you consider yourself to be a legally unworthy person? It is directly related to the object of this study - discrimination based on sexual orientation and its resulting damages - the analysis becomes important, since it is the acceptance of the idea that heterosexual behavior is not the only intrinsic to the human being. Considerations on cognitive and behavioral behaviors, considering behavioral and / or deviant behaviors, considering individuals with sexual orientation, indeed, as a consequence, losing their dignity as a human being. Thus, the essays analyzed are the following: the supposed self-degeneration of the human being by the exercise of his non-heterosexual orientation and then as attitudes of those who claim to be heterosexual by morally attacking nonheterosexuals by acrem that they are unworthy.







KEYWORDS  DIGNITY OF HUMAN PERSON. PERSONALITY RIGHTS. SEXUAL ORIENTATION.

Sandberg, Russell 2011. The right to discriminate. Ecclesiastical Law Journal 13 (2) , pp. 157-181.

The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed a number of controversies surrounding the interaction between law and religion in the United Kingdom. In particular, tensions have emerged between laws protecting religious freedom and those which prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. In particular, Parliament has repeatedly examined the scope and ambit of exceptions afforded to religious groups which allow them to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation when specific conditions are met. And these exceptions have reportedly led to tensions within both the Blair and Brown cabinets and rebukes from the Vatican and the European Commission, criticising the exceptions for being too narrow and too broad respectively. The exceptions have also been challenged by way of judicial review, have been applied or commented upon in a number of high-profile cases and have attracted comment in the print and broadcast media. A number of employees have brought claims asserting that new legal requirements promoting equality on grounds of sexual orientation are incompatible with their religious beliefs. This article seeks to explore the legal changes that have occurred in the first decade of the 21st century affecting religion and sexual orientation with particular reference to how courts and tribunals have dealt with clashes between the two. It discusses the extent to which English law allows religious groups and individuals to follow their own beliefs regarding human sexuality.

same-sex marriage may be categorized as both paternalistic and moralistic. This article addresses
ethical and legal considerations surrounding the right of same-sex couples to marry. Three subject
areas are analyzed: equality, individual liberty, and morality. The implications of the analysis reveal
that prohibition of same-sex marriage is not justified based upon the criteria necessary for
paternalistic and moralistic policies.

This map charts where employment law, Constitution or other provisions protect on the grounds of sexual orientation. It also shows where hate crime and incitement to hatred laws on these grounds exist, and where national human rights institutions around the world include sexual orientation in their mandates.

This article focuses on the manner in which the law interacts with personal relationships. This interaction takes three forms. First, there are instances in which the law treats individuals differently as a response to a personal relationship of which they are (or have been) part. Second, there are situations in which the law recognises an existing relationship. Third, there are situations in which the law does not just recognise a relationship but partially constitutes that relationship. The most obvious example of this is marriage. Here the relationship is constituted partially through the utterance of words to which the law attributes significance and which are uttered on account of that significance. Confusingly, a large part of the justification for treating the utterances as significant is that the people involved knew that significance would be accorded to their words. The law treats these relationships as serious because it knows that people take them seriously. However, the law only knows that people take these relationships seriously because people enter into the relationship knowing how seriously the law will treat it. Traditionally, opposite-sex marriage has been the primary relationship that has been legally constituted by the State and recognised by the State qua relationship. In recent years, a significant social phenomenon has been the demand from those in same-sex relationships for them to be allowed partake in some legal constitution of their relationship. Sometimes the claim is for same-sex marriage; sometimes the claim is for other forms of union. In Burden v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights considered the ECHR rights of two English sisters who had lived together for their whole lives. The sisters argued that their Convention rights were breached by the discrimination in inheritance tax rules as between their situation and the situation of married couples or civil partners. The Court rejected this argument. This case, and the attendant academic and political commentary, brings into sharp focus the questions posed above. This article analyses the judgment of the Court with a view to exploring the issues that arise when the law interacts with interpersonal commitment.

Many individuals who form same sex intimate relationships argue that the social and legal protection associated with heterosexual marriage should be extended to their relationships. This is  understandable because marriage in South Africa remains the
focal point for the protection and regulation of the interests of individuals who engage in intimate relationships of any kind. However, merely extending marriage rights to same sex couples whose relationships mirror the idealised heterosexual norm will be
problematic. Because of homophobia and prejudice many  individuals in same sex  intimate relationships will not be able to freely ‘choose’ to get married. Others will form intimate relationships that will not be recognised because they will be
insufficiently similar to the traditional heterosexual notion of marriage. Those who do not marry will therefore once again be marginalised and the law will once again fail to protect the weaker and more vulnerable partners in such relationships. The early
case law of the Constitutional Court recognised that the right to substantive equality entails a right to equal concern and respect across difference and thus hinted that not only marriage like intimate same sex relationships, but also non traditional forms of
suchrelationships should be constitutionally protected and respected. However, later judgments seem to suggest that intimate relationships that stray too far from the model of traditional heterosexual marriage, are less worthy of respect and protection. This narrow conception of what constitutes worthy intimate relationships is deeply problematic, not only for individuals in non traditional same sex relationships but also for the millions of individuals in different sex relationships who are not married,
because it marginalises them and fails to extend legal protection to some of the most vulnerable members of society. The legal regulation of intimate relationships should therefore completely move away from the marriage model and should instead be based
on a functional model which takes account of the unequal power relations in intimate relationships.

Despite some drawbacks in the field of gender equality and gender-mainstreaming, there has been notable developments in the field of gender equality. This poster deal with the recent legal developments in the field of sexual orientation and gender equality. This poster has been presented in Leiden University Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Summer School of Leiden University on 24th of July, 2019.

State courts handle the vast majority of the country’s cases, yet little is known about the backgrounds of judges who sit on them. Much of the information about who seeks and gets judicial seats is not publicly available and, in many states, is not even collected in a systematic way. This report by Lambda Legal and the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy maps out how states can collect and release “judicial diversity data”—data about the demographic and professional backgrounds of state judges and judicial candidates.

Foreword—The Hon. Michael Kirby, AC, CMG
Love matters: Editor’s introduction—Victor Marsh

Why gay marriage?—Dennis Altman
Historical contexts for a very public Australian lesbian coupling—Barbara Baird
Out in the ACT—Andrew Barr and Anthony Toms
Christianity, marriage, love and friendship—Michael Carden
A history of freedom to marry in Australia—Rodney Croome AM
Married in Canada, living in Oz—Elaine Crump
Not so private lives—Sharon Dane
How to grow a lawn—Michelle Dicinoski
The ins and outs of marriage (and divorce)—Luke Gahan
Make my daughter equal—Evelyn Gray
Stuck on the mezzanine—Ryan Heath
‘On my 50 year anniversary I want a letter from the queen’—Lynne Hillier and Tiffany Jones
Thoughts of a marriage agnostic—Crusader Hillis
Head over falls in love—Walter Jennings
Tying the K(NOT)!—Tiffany Jones
I’m not even sure I really like rainbows—Benjamin Law
‘Are you and Ali married, Grandma?’—Rev. Dorothy McRae-McMahon
Gathering the pieces—Paul Martin
When worlds, happily, collide—Alyena Mohummadally and Catherine Roberts
Marriage at the edge—Chris Morgan
A brief history of relationship law reform in Australia—Wayne Morgan
Supporting same-sex marriage as a heterosexual, Bible-believing, Baptist Pastor—Rev. Nathan Nettleton
‘Messing up the couples cabinet’—Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli
No more lame excuses—Kerryn Phelps AM
The racial politics of marriage claims—Damien W Riggs
Customs—Donald Ritchie
Love is not a threat—Wendell J Rosevear OAM
Our family—Lulu Shapiro and Jannine Lockyer
It makes no sense: Adoption by same-sex couples in Australia—Adiva Sifris & Paula Gerber
Dear Julia, the public supports gay marriage. Why won’t you?—Peter Tatchell
Greetings from the Isle of Lesbos—Yantra de Vilder
Working as a civil celebrant—Zenith Virago
I got married, some can’t. That’s not fair—Deb Wain
Respecting diversity and rights—Tim Wilson
Love triumphing over fear—Tim Wright

APPENDIX

Legal recognition of same-sex couples in the countries of the world: a chronological overview—Kees Waaldijk

The General Equal Treatment Law - adopted in 1994 - is a landmark in the history of homosexual emancipation in the Netherlands. It took two decades before the first proposals for a legal ban of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation would be transformed  into law. Background of this controversy is the clash between the equalityprinciple and the freedom of education. The compromise reached – the so-called single fact-construction - however sent a double message: being gay was not a justified reason for unequal treatment, but some forms of behaviour were incorporated as a legal exception. It took another twenty years before this flaw in the law would be changed..
This article analyses the political debates behind these legal developments. What was the problem that the various drafts for this new legislation were supposed to solve? Which definitions of discrimination on the basis of homosexuality were used and how did they change over time? The adoption of the law and its ‘reparation’ twenty years later are mainly a question of symbolic politics. They reflect the development of the growing acceptance of homosexuality in Dutch society and have stimulated its further growth. Their actual legal effects seem far less important.
Drs. Joke Swiebel studeerde politicologie. Zij werkte negen jaar aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam en 22 jaar als beleidsambtenaar voor de Rijksoverheid. Daarna (1999-2004) was zij lid van het Europees Parlement voor de PvdA. Een uitgebreidere versie van dit artikel is te vinden op https://jokeswiebel.nl/ 290

The Supreme Court’s recent judgment reading down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code is a landmark on many counts. But while we celebrate the judgment, it is important to remember that Section 377 meant different things to different groups of queer people. While for some it was the symbolic harm of their desire being designated as “unnatural,” for others it had a material significance in their everyday negotiations with harassment and violence in public spaces.

In Koushal v Naz the Indian Supreme Court overturned a High Court judgment which had declared unconstitutional section 377 of the Indian Penal Code criminalising 'carnal intercourse against the order of nature‘. In doing so, it has rebranded gay and transgendered Indians as criminals. This case note explores some of the structural problems that led to this judgment. The first problem is the transformation of the Indian Supreme Court into a populist, quasi-legislative, institution that sees itself as a tool of governance. This has put significant pressure on its counter-majoritarian role. The second relates to the sheer size of the Court's docket (given its wide jurisdiction and lax standing rules), coupled with the Indian legal academy's inability and unwillingness to continuously demand judicial fidelity to the law. These factors have led to the normalisation of unreasoned or poorly-reasoned judgments and a breakdown of stare decisis.

This article evaluates the failure of sexual minorities to gain recognition within the human rights bodies of intergovernmental organizations.  There is a widespread view that sexual orientation presents cross-culturally controversial issues, and must therefore be approached with greater caution than other human rights issues.  In this article, that view is rejected.  It is argued that sexual orientation does indeed pose problems, but no more than those caused by issues of race, ethnicity, religion or gender, which have nevertheless received considerable attention.  Part I surveys some of the gains already made by sexual minorities.  It is argued that the European Court of Human Rights has recognized some rights, but only to a limited degree, and only after reforms in many Member States have already been completed.  The UN Human Rights Committee, too, has begun to recognize sexual orientation as a human rights issue.  However, its mandate is limited to the interpretation of one treaty, and has had no real effect on other UN human rights bodies.  Part II examines the issue of sexual orientation in a broader context.  The exclusion of sexual minorities is examined with reference to the common justification of “ancient traditions.”  It is argued that those “traditions” derive more from discourses of post-colonial nationalism than from any record of historical fact.

Greater recognition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity led the United Nations to take a direct stand against school-based homophobic bullying. The UN Secretary-General called the prevalence of this specific type of bullying a public health crisis. UNESCO has released several documents guiding education sectors globally to explicitly address it. Education leadership in WA are advised to take urgent action, and to prevent the need for a reactive approach to homophobic discrimination and bullying driven by the type of legal actions and public protests now emerging across several Australian states. The report concludes with a series of recommendations arising out of recent research, consultations with the WA EOC Working Group and Steering Committee and UNESCO, and key informants from the Victorian and NSW contexts. These recommendations are directed to government, education authorities and schools. Important features include the need for policy-based leadership, clear guidelines and training and specific structural provisions. Many different education stakeholders are seen as having a role in preventing discrimination and bullying on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity

Building on the example of gay rights and, specifically, the likely change in the cross-border acceptance of same-sex families and unions in the EU, this paper focuses on the analysis of the growing limitations of the EU Member States' capacity to make legal-political choices grounded in abstract moral considerations limiting the freedom of intimate association within the scope ratione materiae of EU law. It does this by applying to the legal context of EU law of Kreimer’s vision of federalism, Karsts analysis of the freedom of intimate association, and Koppelman’s representation of sexual-orientation discrimination as sex discrimination. The paper demonstrates that EU law currently has all the potential needed to reinvent the notion of prohibited sex discrimination in such a way that will improve the lives of millions of EU citizens.

In this paper I respond to Linda McClain’s new book, Who’s the Bigot? Learning from Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law, by further clarifying the meaning and function of attributions of bigotry. In Section I, I put forth an analysis of bigotry and explain its relationship to related concepts such as racism. In Section II, I use this analysis to shed light on various “puzzles about bigotry” that McClain identifies in her first chapter and references throughout the book. In Section III, I discuss the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, comparing and contrasting it to other refusals of service (including those involving baker Marjorie Silva of Azucar Bakery and restauranteur Maurice Bessinger of Piggie Park BBQ) to draw lessons about ongoing controversies.

Hungary has been in the spotlight for all the wrong reasons for quite a while. From legislation targeting ‘foreign-operating universities’ to border walls to keep refugees from entering Hungarian territory, the populist right-wing government of Viktor Orban has been sparking outrage in many sectors of Hungarian society, and the European institutions. The most recent reason for alarm again relates to migration and refugees, an area of widespread criticism of Hungarian authorities. Building on extremely hostile policies towards refugees that have been admonished by both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Hungarian authorities now intend to resort to highly dubious means to assess the applications of individuals claiming asylum on grounds related to their sexual orientation. It was already public knowledge that this category of claimants was subjected to poor treatment by the Hungarian authorities, but recent events suggest that the authorities have reached a new low.

Claims that the State should provide recognition for same-sex partnerships necessarily require some argument as to why such recognition should be provided: these are moral arguments.  Intellectual honesty and political expediency combine: gay rights advocates must rely on moral arguments. My purpose in this paper is not to construct the most convincing moral argument in support of the recognition of same-sex partnerships. Rather my purpose is to examine a number of moral arguments advanced in support of and against such recognition. My selection of arguments is, as will quickly become apparent, far from exhaustive. I focus on natural law arguments against partnership recognition and egalitarian arguments in favour of recognition. My basis for focusing on natural law arguments is my intuition that arguments against the recognition of same-sex partnerships are at root moral arguments that rely on some natural law type account of human sexuality.  My basis for focusing on egalitarian arguments is my intuition that equality provides the most compelling basis on which to argue for partnership recognition. Clearly my argument is incomplete, but my hope is to make some contribution to those aspects of this debate that I have chosen, somewhat arbitrarily, to focus on. Within these limits, the purpose of this paper is ultimately two-fold: first, to assess whether some recognition of same-sex partnerships is morally permissible or required; secondly and if so, to assess which form of recognition best reflects the moral argument that justified recognition in the first instance.

In countries where sexual minorities are branded as somehow outside the polity because they are believed to be (or depicted as) subhuman or as engaged in practices that are alien to the nation, it can be strategically deeply problematic to invoke the human rights paradigm to fight for their emancipation. The  protection of human rights matter most to those who have nothing but their mere existence as human beings to protect them, those who are defined as outside the polity, as metaphorically or literally stateless. However, those of us who
are branded as pigs and dogs, as agents of alien ‘un-African’ beliefs and practices, and hence as falling outside the definition of the nation or even the polity, can easily be branded as not deserving of any protection and thus not covered by human rights protection. Invoking the human rights discourse and attempting to rely on human rights based mechanisms
to deal with this metaphoric or literal expulsion from the polity can be ineffectual or, worse, counter-productive. This problem is exacerbated in countries in which the very idea of human rights can be stigmatized as part of a neo-colonial project aimed at imposing ‘Western’ values on the population of a country already devastated by colonial conquest and
continuing globalization. (Often well-meaning) Western donors, Western governments and Western-based NGOs typically invoke a human rights paradigm when they challenge attitudes and practices in various countries on the African continent where sexual minorities are marginalized and made vulnerable and where they are exposed to legal sanction and violence
by the state or private individuals. However, I ask whether this approach is strategically the most effective to begin the  process of the emancipation. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that I would have been classified as ‘white’ by the apartheid state that I am male identified, and that I am a constitutional law scholar, as it may well be argued that by writing about the topic at all, I am practicing a form of
neo-colonialism.  By posing this question I am not making an absolute claim that in certain settings, human rights cannot be
effective to advance the struggle for the emancipation of sexual minorities. I deliberately leave that question open. Instead, I ask whether there are ways in which one might engage in such discussions and in struggles for the emancipation of sexual minorities that take cognizance of the history of human rights and the complex set of power relations within which such struggles occur? If there are such avenues for strategic engagement, what might they be?

Under international human rights law, multilateral state-centric treaties, agreed upon and acceded to by states that are represented by their governments, are greatly relied on as the most significant instruments in dealing with, paradoxically, the relationship between governments and individuals. Regarding treaty interpretation, international lawyers are traditionally restricted by the rules provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This article however argues for a cosmopolitan perspective to replace international legal positivism to qualify the primary purpose of contemporary human rights norms. The former views the world as a global community accommodating inter-cultural diversities rather than an anarchic non-community of inter-national sovereignties. Such a contention sustains especially when it comes to a social transformation that occurs transnationally, from the bottom up, such as the global SOGI rights and justice social movement. Through a case study of the development of ‘equality and non-discrimination clause’ of the International Bill of Human Rights, I argue for the potential of such constructivism to reframe the rights of being human, out of its specialties in resisting state power, as adaptable to the changing social realities.

On 2 January 2007, the Ontario Court of Appeal released its judgment in A.A. v. B.B. recognising that a five-year-old boy can legally have two mothers and a father. The case was widely presented as another victory in the struggle for lesbian and gay rights and a fundamental reordering of parental rights and responsibilities. The analysis in this comment suggests that the real significance of the case lies elsewhere. The decision is more rightly situated in the developing caselaw on new methods of conception and parenting. At the same time, because the case is grounded in the exercise of a court’s parens patriae discretionary jurisdiction, the case simply cannot be read as allowing all children to have more than two parents. This comment will argue that the Court of Appeal’s decision in A.A. v. B.B., as sound as the reasoning may be, will likely impact on only a small number of families, despite the fact that many issues raised in that case are at the cusp of changing social and scientific conditions affecting an increasing number of families. Rather, it is time for lawmakers to initiate comprehensive law reform in relation to legal parentage.

Measuring homophobia at country level is important to guide public health policy as reductions in stigma are associated with improved health outcomes among gay men and other men who have sex with men. Methods: We developed a Homophobic Climate Index incorporating institutional and social components of homophobia. Institutional homophobia was based on the level of enforcement of laws that criminalise, protect or recognise same-sex relations. Social homophobia was based on the level of acceptance and justifiability of homosexuality. We estimated the Index for 158 countries and assessed its robustness and validity. Western Europe is the most inclusive region, followed by Latin America. Africa and the Middle East are home to the most homophobic countries with two exceptions: South Africa and Cabo Verde. We found that a 1% decrease in the level of homophobia is associated with a 10% increase in the gross domestic product per capita. Countries whose citizens face gender inequality, human ...

The title of this paper suggests there is a firm link between the jurisprudence on sexuality and gender authored by Justice Albie Sachs during his tenure on the Constitutional Court and the work conducted in the field that has become known as queer legal theory.1 That such a link exists needs to be affirmed since there is perhaps no other South African judge whose jurisprudence has considered the question of the legal empowerment and/or emancipation of sexual minorities as seriously as that of Justice Sachs. Yet, as we suggest in this paper, there is good reason to insist on putting the word ‘queer’ in inverted commas when it is used to describe Justice Sachs’ jurisprudence on gender and sexuality. As we read it, this is the case because there is a tension throughout this jurisprudence that causes the jurisprudence to be ‘queer’ in at least two senses of that word.

A legal review of the anti gay bill that has just been passed in the senate on Nov 29 2011. The author is of the opinion that religiously motivated laws set a dangerous precedent in a country which avers to be secular but which is torn apart by religious strife and bigotry.

The title of this paper suggests there is a firm link between the jurisprudence on sexuality and gender authored by Justice Albie Sachs during his tenure on the Constitutional Court and the work conducted in the field that has become known as queer legal theory. That such a link exists needs to be affirmed since there is perhaps no other South African judge whose jurisprudence has considered the question of the legal empowerment and/or emancipation of sexual minorities as seriously as that of Justice Sachs.

The past decades have seen significant changes in the way same-sex sexualities are regulated in European countries, albeit discrimination and heterosexism are still occurring on a daily basis. The research through semi-structured interviews was conducted on lesbian and gay respondents in France, Iceland, Italy and Spain, four European countries with different social contexts and legal frameworks. In a comparative perspective, it examines how laws are perceived to impact one’s relationships and one’s parental project. Discrimination is still present in the four countries at different degrees, however the existence of laws on access to marriage and parenting is regarded by many as crucial for fostering inclusion. From a social and economic point of view, the narratives evidenced that the law is not only a framework to live within: when legal support is provided, adaptation to the heteronormative structures are facilitated and welcomed by all while this lack of support makes everyday l...

Research has shown that beliefs about sexual orientation, including the naturalness, discreteness,
and informativeness of sexual orientation categories, are associated with varying levels of sexual prejudice. Less is known about how these and other sexual orientation beliefs may correspond with broader social and political attitudes, including party affiliation and voting behavior. The present study explored voting intention and political party affiliation, as well as other constructs not directly associated with sexuality, among a sample of emerging adults (N = 286) immediately prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Using a person-centered statistical approach, we replicated sexual orientation belief profiles found in prior research and observed significant associations between belief profiles and intentions to vote for certain candidates, as well as party affiliation, ambivalent sexist attitudes, and number of reported lesbian, gay, and bisexual friends. Notably, “born this way”-type beliefs in the innateness and immutability of sexual orientation did not significantly distinguish respondents’ support for presidential candidates or political party affiliation. We situate these results within existing research on essentialist beliefs and point to implications of these findings for ongoing research, clinical work, and advocacy for sexual minority rights.

Sri Lanka has been pursuing constitutional reforms since President Maithripala Sirisena came to power in 2015. LGBT activists hope the process will yield legal protections that could curb abuses ranging from police harassment to job discrimination. While the island nation has been praised for a progressive policy on gender recognition for transgender people, same-sex sexual acts between consenting adults are still criminalized. In an email interview, Yuvraj Joshi, a law fellow with Lambda Legal who documented abuses against LGBTI people in Sri Lanka for Human Rights Watch in 2015 and 2016, describes recent gains made by activists and how the government has positioned itself on LGBT issues.

Since the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has slowly developed an increasingly sophisticated body of asylum law and policy, known as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). This framework – both in the shape of legislative instruments and case law – has inevitably also affected those asylum seekers who claim asylum on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity (SOGI). This has been vividly demonstrated by particular norms in EU asylum instruments and judgments of the Court of Justice of EU (CJEU). The current CEAS can be said to have several shortcomings in relation to SOGI claims, including in relation to: accelerated procedures; country of origin information; the notion of ‘safe country of origin’; the burden of proof and the principle of benefit of the doubt; the concept of a ‘particular social group’; and the definition of persecution.

A new set of proposals for reform of the CEAS was put forward in 2016, and these also affect SOGI asylum claims in precise and acute ways. This contribution scrutinises these proposals of reform, including the different positions of the Commission, Parliament and Council, where relevant. In particular, this contribution will assess the extent to which these proposals and different institutional positions address, ignore or aggravate the issues that currently affect SOGI asylum seekers.

The past decades have seen significant changes in the way same-sex sexualities are regulated in European countries, albeit discrimination and heterosexism are still occurring on a daily basis. The research through semi-structured interviews was conducted on lesbian and gay respondents in France, Iceland, Italy and Spain, four European countries with different social contexts and legal frameworks. In a comparative perspective, it examines how laws are perceived to impact one’s relationships and one’s parental project. Discrimination is still present in the four countries at different degrees, however the existence of laws on access to marriage and parenting is regarded by many as crucial for fostering inclusion. From a social and economic point of view, the narratives evidenced that the law is not only a framework to live within: when legal support is provided, adaptation to the heteronormative structures are facilitated and welcomed by all while this lack of support makes everyday l...

Shifting from an essentialist to a constructionist perspective on sexual identities, I move from a consideration of the homosexual legal subject, as presently treated under the European Convention on Human Rights, to the elaboration of a universal sexual legal subject. The universal sexual legal subject enjoys two basic rights: the right to choose sexual activity and sexual identity and the right to establish relationships and families in accordance with this choice. The possibility of including these two rights within the Convention presupposes their insertion into a set of sexually neutral standards which grant the universal sexual legal subject equality of choices. By examining the case law of the European Court and Commission of Human Rights on decriminalization of same-sex sexual activity, and family and relationship issues, I question the sexual particularity of the construction of the homosexual legal subject. This analysis of the case law provides the legal material and principles around which the insertion of the two sexual rights into the Convention is discussed. Both sexual rights are located within the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8). Equality of choices can only be guaranteed if the right to marry and found a family (Article12) is erased and marriage is ‘privatised’ into Article 8 on an equal footing with other sexual and relational choices.

Equality is the thread running through the fundamental liberties enshrined in our Constitution. ... Equality, expressed in Art 12 of the [Singapore] Constitution, is also a specific right enforceable by the court. The difficulty comes in applying this deceptively simple concept to real-life situations. ... In considering the validity of legislation, Singapore and Malaysian courts have generally favored rational review, a modest conception of equal protection, unlike their American counterparts which have adopted a more expansive reading in the form of strict and intermediate review. This article examines how these three levels of equal protection review operate, and argues that the scheme of Art 12, explicit judicial and academic approval, and policy support a wider interpretation of equal protection. As an illustration, we will look at whether criminal exclusions of male homosexual activity in private under ss 377 and 377A of the Penal Code violate the right to equal protection.