State Recognition

Recognition from other recognized states is the key to becoming
a fully fledged member state of the international system.
Although many new states are quickly and universally recognized,
the recognition of other aspiring states remains highly
contested. In these cases of contested sovereignty, some countries
but not others extend recognition. However, research on
what shapes a country’s decision to recognize a claim to sovereign
statehood remains relatively sparse. This article focuses on
how religion shapes the incentives of states to extend or withhold
recognition to aspiring states in cases of contested sovereignty.
It posits two mechanisms, one at the domestic level
through religious institutions and one at the international level
through transnational religious affinities. The article uses new
data on all state decisions regarding the international recognition
of Kosovo to test these propositions. The results provide
strong support for these two pathways through which religion
shapes state decisions regarding international recognition.

This book consists of
papers from the published IPJ issue, some of them updated, as well
as new contributions that jointly address a number of important
questions. How do post-Soviet de facto states survive and continue
to grow? Is there anything specific about the political ecology of
Eastern Europe that provides secessionism with the possibility to
launch state-making processes in spite of international sanctions
and counteractions of their parental states? How are these
secessionist movements embedded in a wider network of
separatism in Eastern and Western Europe? And what is the impact
of secessionism and war on the parental states?

The oral history of the Mattaponi people and the documentary record of the Mattaponi Indian Reservation identify multiple historically significant heritage properties that reflect broad patterns of Native American history within the Commonwealth of Virginia. Surrounded by the Mattaponi River and King William County, the Mattaponi Indian Reservation is home to Algonquian descendants of Tidewater’s indigenous peoples and is one of only two extant Native settlements that have been continuously occupied since colonial times. The reservation’s hamlet, historically called Indian Town, is the location of the community’s Mattaponi Indian Baptist Church, their former Indian School, and the residences of the tribe’s chiefly lineages. Through the National Park Service’s Underrepresented Communities grant, and in collaboration with the state-recognized  Mattaponi Indian Tribe, the Virginia Department of Historic Resources [VDHR] seeks to identify, research, and nominate minority populations’ historically significant locales to the state and national registry of historic places. The VDHR project Continuity Within Change: Virginia Indians National Register Project moves that effort forward, through an archival, ethnographic, and oral history investigation of the Mattaponi people, with attention to the tribe’s historic church and school, and the pre-1950 residences of their tribal membership, including those of their chiefly lineages. This study, conducted by the Department of Anthropology’s American Indian Resource Center at the College of William & Mary, provides the supporting materials necessary for nominating historical Mattaponi heritage properties to the National Register of Historic Places.

Njohja ndërkombëtare e shteteve është një prej elementëve më të rëndësishëm që përcakton vetë ekzistencën e shtetit si subjekt i njohur i së drejtës ndërkombëtare. Parë në këtë prizëm, lind pyetja nëse njohja ndërkombëtare ështe një hallkë e pestë (akt formal) që i shtohet kritereve të Montevideos,  apo mund të konsiderohet si burim faktik që legjitimon ekzistencën e një shteti në momentin e konstituimit? Artikulli 12 i Kartës së Organizatës së Shteteve Amerikanë (OAS) për shembull shprehet se: “[e]kzistenca politike e një shteti është e pavarur nga njohja prej shteteve të tjerë. Edhe përpara se të njihet, shteti ka të drejtë të mbrojë integritetin dhe pavarësinë e tij.”
Ka një lidhje organike mes kritereve që duhet të përmbush një entitet për t`u quajtur shtet në të drejtën ndërkombëtare, gjë që vihet re vencarisht të kriteri i katërt, pra aftësia e një shteti për të hyrë në marrëdhënie diplomatike me shtete të tjerë. Mundësia për të hyrë në marrëdhënie të tilla është e kushtëzuar nga njohja e cila ose duhet të bëhet paraprakisht nga shteti në fjalë, ose merret e mirëqënë në castin që shteti hyn në marrëdhënie diplomatike. Në terminologjinë e së drejtës ndërkombëtare ky është debati mes konceptit deklarativ dhe atij konstitutiv të njohjes ndërkombëtare. 
Sikundër shprehet Puto “në të drejtën ndërkombëtare nuk ka ndonjë normë që të imponojë njohjen e shtetit të ri,”  por përgjithësisht e drejta ndërkombëtare zakonore,  ashtu sikundër edhe jurisprudenca botërore i ka dhënë përparësi konceptit deklarativ. Kjo edhe për faktin se ‘konstituiviteti’ ka dy probleme themelore. Së pari, sepse nuk parashikon nullitetin e mundshëm të njohjes faktike të një shteti për shkak të rebus sic stantibus, ose konsideratave të natyrës gjeopolitike dhe së dyti për shkak se koncepti është relativ. Sikundër është shprehur filozofi i shquar i së drejtës, Kelzen “...ekzistenca legale e një shteti... ka një karakter relativ. Një shtet ekziston vetëm në marrëdhënie me shtete të tjerë. Nuk ka dicka të tillë si ekzistencë absolute.”  Ky relativitet ngushtohet vetëm nëse konsiderojmë kontrollin efektiv të territorit si kriter absolut në vendimin për njohjen e shtetit. Sikundër shprehet Sir Terence Shone, i mbiquajtur ‘eminenca gri’ në njohjen e shteteve: “Problemi i njohjes duhet të vendoset bazuar në faktet dhe jo në pëlqimin ose jo të qeverisë në fjalë. Njohja duhet të bazohet në kontrollin e territorit dhe/ose shtetit dhe nuk duhet të përmbajë interpretime morale.”
Njohja nga pala e tretë është gjithashtu koncept filozofik mjaft i rëndësishëm. Mjaft të kujtojmë paradigmën e fashme hegeliane ku masteri dhe skllavi të izoluar në një ishull të shkretë nuk mund kurrsesi të jenë komodë me faktin që këtë lidhje mes tyre nuk mund ta shohë, gjykoj apo pranojë një palë e tretë. Është pikërisht pala e tretë ajo që i jep legjitimitet marrëdhënies. Në të drejtën ndërkombëtare për vetë karakteristikat e saj (mungesë kodifikimi, aspekti horizontal, pesha por edhe shpesh konfliktualiteti i precedentëve, raporti i normës zakonore me konventat dhe traktatet si dhe vetë evoluimi i së drejtës ndërkombëtare), krijohen premisa për interpretim të ndryshëm të normës mbizotëruese në rastin e njohjes së shteteve të reja. Gjithashtu vlen të theksojmë paraprakisht ndryshimin mes njohjes së shteteve dhe njohjes që i atribuohet qeverive. Në rastin e shteteve, nuk kemi thjesht të bëjmë me ndryshim rregjimi në mënyrë anti-konstitucionale apo me mjete para-politikë, por me krijim të një entiteti të ri, i cili mund të shoqërohet ose jo me shuarje të një entiteti të mëparshëm (psh., federatë apo shtet paraekzistues). Ky operacionalizim është i rëndësishëm pasi definon fushështrirjen konceptuale të njohjes ndërkombëtare që trajtojmë në këtë punim shkencor.
Përsa i përket precedentëve të mëparshëm në njohjen e shteteve në të drejtën ndërkombëtare publike, këto mund t`i klasifikojmë ceteris paribus në raste të suksesshëm, pra që kanë arritur brenda një kohe të shkurtër të fitojnë përkrahje ndërkombëtare për ekzistencë legjitime nga komuniteti i shteteve, raste të dështuara, të cilat janë shoqëruar me c`njohje të mëpasshme ose me status quo të ngrirë, ose raste të ndërmjetme, të cilat janë në evoluim e sipër ose statusi i tyre aktual të pengon për t`i klasifikuar në dy grupet e mësipërme. Në grupin e parë për qëllimet e këtij punimi bëjnë pjesë vende si Bangladeshi apo Eritrea (si dhe thuajse të gjithë vendet që që ndoqën procesin e dekoloniazimit në Afrikë dhe Azi), vende të cilat kanë fituar njohje ndërkombëtare thuajse të menjëhershme pak kohë pas shkëputjes së tyre nga shtete ekzistuese. Në grupin e dytë bëjnë pjesë Biafra, Saharaja Perëndimore, Transdnistria, Palestina, Tajvani etj. Ndërsa në grupin e vendeve të ndërmjetme, do merret si rast studimor në seksion të vecantë Kosova, për dy arsye kryesore. Së pari, për shkak të debatit juridik dhe politik që ka ngjallur në komunitetin ndërkombëtar, me shumicën e shteteve të botës me një pozicionim solid (pro apo kundra) ndaj rastit në fjalë dhe së dyti, për shkak se Gjykata Ndërkombëtare e Drejtësisë i duhet të shprehet për legjitimitetin e shkëputjes,  duke krijuar ndoshta një precedent të ri dhe mjaft të rëndësishëm në të drejtën ndërkombëtare.
Struktura e temës është si vijon. Në pjesën e parë, do trajtohet historiku i periudhave më të rëndësishme në procesin e njohjes ndërkombëtare për shtetet e reja, ku do trajtohen kryesisht tre etapa: a) krijimi i shteteve-kombe me revolucionet e 1848; (b) Procesi i dekolonizimit dhe formësimi i shteteve te reja në Afrikë dhe Azi dhe (c) shbërbërja e shteteve federative apo proceset unifikuese në periudhën pas-90 dhe krijimi i shteteve të reja. Në pjesën e dytë dhe të tretë do trajtohen raste të sukseshme të njohjes ndërkombëtare të shteteve dhe raste të dështuara. Seksioni vijues do i kushtohet një trajtimi empirik të rastit të Kosovës duke e parë me anë të lenteve teorike të trajtuara në seksionet paraardhës. Ndërsa në pjesën e fundit do rreshtohen konkluzionet, rekomandimet dhe anekset.

Cet article est la version écrite de la contribution orale présentée lors de la Journée d'étude : « Révolutions et droit international », organisée par le Laboratoire de Recherche en Droit Communautaire et Relations Maghreb-Europe de la Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Politiques et Sociales de Tunis, 24 octobre 2014. Le sujet de cette contribution pose deux questions peu ou mal traitées par le droit international, la révolution et la reconnaissance. La difficulté provient de l'absence de consensus sur la définition des deux notions.

This article examines the international law concept of recognition in light of the recent failure of a bid by the State of Palestine; which has being in existence since 1988 and is recognised by some 135 states, for recognition under the aegis of the United Nations.
It sets out briefly, some of the general principles in international law in a bid to address the multiplicity of issues arising such as when does an entity become a State? Is recognition a prerequisite for statehood? What are the factors to be considered when recognising a state? Is there a criteria, amongst many other considerations given the recent spotlight trained on it by the above named incident.
It concludes by asserting that recognition by states is not conclusive proof of statehood given the lack of uniformity in state practice and recommends that a universal criteria clearly outlining the conditions for recognition be considered.

The point of discussion of this paper is to;
i. analyze the doctrines of state recognition
ii. consider the particular situations in which states is crucial for building diplomatic relations.
iii. figure out different schools of recognition of a state, and tell the suitable for the contemporary era.
iv. evaluate the significance of recognition of states in light of theories

The presence of forward forces in foreign soil is not a modern notion but is thought-provoking when a small state projects its military might in multiple locations of similar strategic importance. The United Arab Emirates' (UAE) base lease in Berbera is a case in point which attracted a reproach from the public and politicians. The joint parliament sitting to approve the draft agreement further complicated the reproach, resulting in many stakeholders to argue that the approval process suffered insufficient consultation, citing ambiguity and suspicion. Berbera basing politics is critical to Somaliland's national security but gained little scholarly attention that can explain the rationale and the underlying assumptions. This paper will, therefore, provide a qualitative assessment on the impact of UAE's overseas defense posture on Somaliland's political direction. Specifically, it tends to analyze the structural architect of the basing politics including actors, interests, risks (animosities), and prophesy on scenarios for use. This paper uses secondary and primary sources to sketch out the key issues; it also employs relevant international relations theories: security dilemma, deterrence, defensive, proxy war, geopolitics, pre-emption, beggar-thy-neighbor, and safe-haven concepts to make sense on this matter.

Devlet kavramını felsefi söylem olarak ele alırsak; Platon'a göre devlet, filozof kralın bilgisinin ve insan ruhunun ideal bir form halinde somutlaşması, Aristo için bireyin siyasi sahip olduğu yapı, Hobbs için insanın varlığını güvence altına alan siyasi güç, Hegel'de tanrının yeryüzündeki yansıması, Marks'a göre radikal biçimde egemenlerin baskı aracı, günümüzde ise modern dünyanın şekillenmesinde en büyük katkıya sahip olan temel kurumlardan biri. 1 Günümüzde devlet kavramı, Alman filozof Georg Jellınek'e göre " İnsan, toprak ve egemenlik unsurların oluşturduğu bir varlıktır. " Bu şartları genel çerçevede sağlandığında karşımıza devlet unsuru çıkmaktadır. Bununla beraber uluslararası hukukun devlet olarak varlığını kabul etmesi, bir devlet olarak tanınması için taşıması gerektiği asgari şartları belirleyen 1993 tarihli Devletlerin Hak ve Yükümlülüklerine ilişkin Montevideo Sözleşmesinin birinci maddesine göre devlet olmanın dört öğeye sahip olması gerekir: Sürekli insan topluluğu, sınırları belirli bir ülke toprağı, siyasi otorite, diğer devletlerle ilişkiye girebilme kapasitesi. 2 Bu şartları sağlayan devlet sahip olduğu egemenliği, yaptırım gücünü ve varlığını kabul ettirmek için ülke içinde iç egemenlik uluslararası toplumda da dış egemenlik araçlarını kullanır. Meşruiyetini sadece ülke içinde kabul ettirmek günümüzdeki küresel dünyada tek başına yeterli değildir. Küreselleşmenin özellikle ekonomik, teknolojik alandaki yeniliklerin etkisi, Avrupa Birliği gibi ulus ötesi, küresel değer sistemlerin yer edineceği düşüncesi; egemenliği, iktidar otoritesini azalttığı görüşleri sebebiyle devlet olarak varlığını devam ettirmek ve korumak için dünyadaki topluluklar nezdinde kabul görme ve etkileşim içinde olma arzusunu ön plana çıkartmaktadır. Bu bağlamda devlet iç ve dış egemenlikle sahip olduğu varlığı uluslararası toplumda hissettirmek ister. Diğer devletlerce tanınmak ve uluslararası bir mekanizmanın bir parçası olma arzusunu taşımaktadır. Devlet tanımını bu çıkarımları göz önüne alarak hukukçu J. Leslie Brienly'nin şöyle yorumladığını göreceğiz: " Bir devleti oluşturan kriterler devamlı, kesin belirli bir toplum olmak, kesin ve belirli toprak parçasına sahip olmak, uluslararası ilişkileri yürütebilecek bir derecede bağımsızlığa sahip olmaktır.

The Red Power movement of the 1960s and 1970s was not universally endorsed and accepted by all Native communities, particularly in areas where other forms of indigenous accommodation and resistance to settler colonialism had already developed long-term strategies. The situation in the U.S. South was complicated by issues of race, and must be understood in the historical context of, first, slavery, and subsequently, Jim Crow. In these systems, activism by non-White populations carried different meanings within the wider political economy of the region. Understanding the push and pull factors of a desegregating South is required to explain Virginia’s mid-century indigenous political landscape. Attention should be given to the various and multiple reasons for Native community action in each specific context, especially to race-based civil rights activism within a state where the Eugenics Movement, Racial Integrity, and the ‘one drop rule’ had historically loomed large. Like other states across the South, the Commonwealth of Virginia officially recognized eleven tribes of ‘Virginia Indians’ between 1983 and 2010, an outcome of post-Red Power indigenous political activism. Virginia tribes’ political positioning during the civil rights era requires an analysis that historically situates their long-term alliance building and strategic essentialism as alternative approaches to those that were promoted by Red Power.

Commentaire de la sentence CAS 2016/A/4602, Football Association of Serbia (FSS) c. Union des associations européennes de football (UEFA), sentence du 23 janvier 2017, in Chronique de jurisprudence arbitrale en matière sportive (dir. : Mathieu MAISONNEUVE), Revue de l’arbitrage, 2017, n° 3, pp. 1030-1037.

IV. LE DROIT APPLICABLE AU FOND : intérêt/qualité pour agir ; conditions d'affiliation aux organisations sportives internationales ; reconnaissance d'Etat ; droit applicable (droit associatif suisse, droit international public) ; valeur du précédent ; techniques interprétatives ; convention européenne des droits de l'homme.

La justice arbitrale sportive se voit occasionnellement confier des litiges qui, loin de ne se rapporter qu'à la compétition, ont une dimension géopolitique notable. En l'espèce, le TAS était saisi de l'affiliation à l'UEFA de la fédération kosovare de football (FFK), contestée par la fédération serbe (FSS) au motif, entre autres, que le Kosovo n'était pas un « Etat indépendant reconnu par l'ONU » (condition d'admission fixée par les Statuts de l'UEFA).

There are few questions more interesting and more important for the international community than the issue of how new states are created and accepted into the wider global system through the process of recognition. While there are thousands of ethnic groups around the world, there are just 193 member states of the United Nations. And yet, for many years, the foreign policy aspects of secession and the recognition of seceding territories have received relatively little attention by scholars in the field of politics and international relations. This was largely because the subject was seen to be a marginal interest. Few territories managed to stage a credible attempt at secession. Almost none managed to gain widespread acceptance. However, over the past decade, there has been a significant growth in the attention given to secession and recognition in international relations. This has been particularly apparent since Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, in 2008, and because of heightened secessionist tensions in the former Soviet Union.

To date, the question of de facto states—territories that are unrecognized or partially recognized—has been at the heart of studies into secession and recognition in the field of politics and international relations. Attention in this area has tended to focus on the nature, structure, and international interaction of unrecognized territories. However, the scope of research is now widening. As well as interest in the historical development of attitudes towards secession and recognition practices, scholars are now looking at the way in which parent states—as the territories they have broken away from are generally known—attempt to prevent de facto states from being recognized or otherwise legitimized by the international community. Meanwhile, increasing attention is also being given to the role of external parties, such as great powers, as well as to the efforts of secessionist territories themselves to find ways to encourage recognition, or at least to participate more widely in the international system. Therefore, while the community of scholars working in the field of secession and recognition is still relatively small, the subject itself is undergoing rapid growth.

Previous research has shown how peasant rebellions were translated by local and central elite into institutional change. But not all statebuilding measures were meant to build the state as we know it and states rarely moved in a single direction. In this article, I argue that historians, dealing with change and continuity, require a definition of the state that acknowledges and problematizes the transformational and instable nature of the international order.
I propose that the concept of recognition can be used to challenge the perception of states as sovereign and continuous entities and highlight challenges towards the statebuilding process. Based on a case study in Sweden 1719, I show how states’ recognition of subjects’ political agency enabled negotiations during wartime rebellions. Furthermore, subjects could withhold or retract their recognition of a state. Their actions signalled the breakdown of the sovereign state, at least temporarily, and thwarted the statebuilding process.

Why do some states get recognized, while others are denied the privilege? This article examines the underlying logic behind the contingency and inconsistency in the application of statehood standards to unrecognized, de facto states. When it comes to the practice of state recognition, the article argues, it is not merely a question of Great Power politics. Nor is it a question of whether a state has earned sovereignty and thus has a legally rightful claim to international recognition. Instead, the norms of state recognition can be better understood as a refl ection of the balance of powers in the international order, rather than being a guiding principle for assessing claims to statehood. Central to this balance is the question of whether right corresponds with might and vice versa. If such a balance is absent, we observe what are considered to be double standards in the practice of international recognition. The theoretical framework draws on Baruch Spinoza's idea of right being coextensive with power. Based on this assumption, the article demonstrates that the problem is not the incoherence of norms regulating international recognition, but rather the absence of a necessary equilibrium between might and right to ensure the universal applicability of those norms. The argument is illustrated through a comparison of the right to self-determination that was granted to peoples in former colonies during the Cold War period and the US-led recognition of Kosovo, followed by Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. The article shows that the practice of international recognition is conditional on global responses to particular concerns and circumstances. It is thus contingent on the degree to which powers agree as to how to address these concerns. The key suggestion put forward in the article is that, ultimately, there is no signifi cant conceptual diff erence between the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples that marked the shift from the achievement of eff ective statehood to eventual independence and the 2008 wave of recognitions for non-colonial cases. Both show that norms and their enforcement depend on the same logic of right and power being mutually constitutive.

Uluslararası hukukta devletlerin tanınma teorileri iki grupta incelenir. Kurucu teori, tanımanın hukuki oluşturucu özelliğini savunurken, ulusla- rarası hukukun işleyişi bağlamında yöntemsel sorunlar yaratır. Bu sorunlara tepki gösteren açıklayıcı teori, tanınma eyleminin oluşturucu etkisi olmadı- ğını savunur. Çalışma, teorilerin, karşılıklı tanınma eyleminin uluslararası kişileri niteleyici özelliğini hesaba katma bağlamında yetersiz kaldığını eleştirel olarak ortaya koyar. Temel farklılıklarına rağmen, her iki teorinin kavramsal zemininde, tüm çelişkileri ile birlikte, Emer de Vattel’in mutlak egemenlik fikrinin yattığını ve bahsedilen yetersizliğin esas nedeninin bu olduğunu gösterir. Mutlak egemenlik fikrinin tanınma kavramını kısıtlı bir ekonomi içerisine hapsettiğini ve ancak bu kısıtlamanın giderilmesi durumunda devletler arası ilişkisel durumun karşılıklı oluşturucu etkisinin açıklanabileceğini savunur.

Few grassroots-based coalitions from a " peripheral " region have affected high international politics to the degree of creating a global domino effect. However, the process that led to Brazil's declaration of Palestinian state recognition on 3 December 2010, followed by regional and worldwide echoes of similar actions, provides a pertinent illustration. This analysis examines the winding road to the declaration, focusing on the domestic circumstances that conditioned this Brazilian policy. Using process tracing and content analysis techniques, it describes how a pro-Palestinian Transnational Advocacy Network grew in its degree of institutionalisation, political access, and popular mobilisation, managing to constrain Brazilian policy-makers’ preferences. The findings suggest some novel insights about the changing nature of diplomacy and the role of civil societies in the “Battles for Legitimacy” that characterise contemporary global politics.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Diplomacy and Statecraft on March 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592296.2017.1275521

Full quote: Wajner, Daniel F. "Grassroots Diplomacy in Battles for Legitimacy: The Transnational Advocacy Network for the Brazilian Recognition of the Palestinian State." Diplomacy & Statecraft 28.1 (2017): 128-151.‏

[Abstract] State remains the central actor, possessing a key-place within the international system even now, in our era of multi-level international organization. Since the late ’1990s to nowadays, the international community faced several precedents of ‘grey areas’, territorial situations of disputed legality and a plethora of ‘faits accomplis’ whose authors attempted to find justification under some interpretation of the modern or classical doctrine of International Law in order for their legality to be established and acknowledged. However, in most of these cases the initial illegality paved the way for the establishment of yet another ‘unlawful territorial situation’ stressing the normative persistence of the Principle of Legality (EX INIURIA IUS NON ORITUR) within the international legal order. Which are the Criteria of Statehood in the current international doctrine? Does non compliance with the Legality Principle at the initial phase of state-genesis exclude the possibility of a sovereign territorial entity’s lawful/acceptable creation? Does International Law impose upon the States-members of the international community a Positive Obligation of Non-Recognition vis-à-vis certain territorial entities? If yes, when does such an obligation arise? Does the –supposedly– newly established ‘Caliphate’ under the name ‘ISLAMIC STATE’ or ‘ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND LEVANT (SYRIA)’ satisfy the criteria of statehood? Could it be recognized as a State by the other sovereign actors of the international system? Is there a structural incompatibility so fundamental as to exclude any possibility of recognition? Read more on the newest addition to Curia.gr’s (google translate friendly site) international jurisprudence e-collection
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[Περίληψη] Το κράτος αποτελεί τον κεντρικό δρώντα, κατέχει τη θέση-κλειδί στο διεθνές σύστημα ακόμη και σήμερα. Ήδη από τη δεκαετία του ’1990 κι έως την εποχή μας, η διεθνής κοινότητα έχει έρθει αντιμέτωπη με πληθώρα φαιών ζωνών, αμφιλεγόμενων εδαφικών καταστάσεων και σωρεία faits accomplis τα οποία πασχίζουν να ανεύρουν διεθνο-νομική έκφραση και να εδραιωθούν εκ του λόγου τούτου στο διεθνές πεδίο. Στην πλειονότητα των περιπτώσεων ωστόσο πρόκειται περί «π α ρ ά ν ο μ ω ν  ε δ α φ ι κ ώ ν  κ α τ α σ τ ά σ ε ω ν» οι οποίες δοκιμάζουν την κανονιστική αντοχή της Αρχής της Νομιμότητας (Ex iniuria ius non oritur) εντός των κόλπων του σύγχρονου Διεθνούς Δικαίου. Ποια είναι τα κριτήρια τα οποία θέτει το τελευταίο τούτο για την σύσταση ενός Κράτους; Η μη τήρηση της Αρχής της Νομιμότητας κατά την ιδρυτική περίοδο απωθεί το ενδεχόμενο εδραίωσης μιας εδαφικής οντότητας; Πότε το Διεθνές Δίκαιο επιβάλλει θ ε τ ι κ ή  υ π ο χ ρ έ ω σ η  Μη Αναγνώρισης ορισμένης εδαφικής οντότητας στα κράτη-μέλη της διεθνούς κοινότητας; Το ‘Χαλιφάτο’ του ‘ΙΣΛΑΜΙΚΟΥ ΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ ΤΟΥ ΙΡΑΚ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΛΕΒΑΝΤΕ (ΣΥΡΙΑΣ)’ είναι κράτος; Θα μπορούσε να θεωρηθεί κράτος και να αναγνωρισθεί στο διεθνές πεδίο; Ή μήπως  υπάρχει μια θεμελιακή ασυμβατότητα;
Διαβάστε περισσότερα στο <http://curia.gr/to-islamiko-kratos-tou-irak-kai-levante-isil-mia-nea-proklisi-gia-tin-arxi-tis-nomimotitas-sto-diethnes-sistima-2/>

This article recalls the recognition-colonialism conjuncture to examine how prior normative rights to self-determination, independence and decolonisation influence current recognition practice, and asks how they compete with contingent factors. The interrogation of this inter-pretive process provides insights into how recognition of states operates. This reveals how state recognition in current colonial conflicts is qualified based on an assessment of contingent factors such as the international consensus and level of involvement. For this purpose, Sweden's recognition practice towards Palestine and Western Sahara present apposite empirical cases. This article argues that the practice of recognition is a hermeneutic and evolving process, which is contingent on the interpretation of different situational and political aspects. This has far-reaching implications for international recognition and order, as colonised/occupied peoples' prior normative right to self-determination and independence ends up being qualified, contested and adjudicated in connection with contingent political factors. Link: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1884064

Whereas the US government recognised Venezuean opposition leader as the head of state, even before one could speak of a government de facto, the UK imposed condition upon the current government, thus postponing possible decision on transfer of recognition. In the article I suggest that this time factor play a role in the analysis of financial sanctions imposed by both nations against Venezuela.

Skripsi ini menganalisa tentang upaya yang dilakukan Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Irak untuk memperoleh pengakuan internasional dalam mendirikan negara berdaulat pada tahun 2005-2017. Lahirnya upaya memperoleh kemerdekaan ini tidak terlepas dari keinginan Etnis Kurdi yang ingin memiliki negara sendiri dan perlakuan dari pemerintah Irak yang tidak sama dengan wilayah Irak lainnya. Selain itu, kemampuan KRG mendirikan negara dan menjalin hubungan dengan negara lain juga mendukung upaya memperoleh pengakuan dalam mendirikan negara berdaulat. Seiring berjalannya waktu, KRG terbentuk sebagai daerah otonomi yang membuatnya mendapatkan pengakuan secara de facto dari Turki. Hal ini menandakan bahwa KRG merupakan wilayah proto-state. Pemberian otonomi daerah ini membuat KRG dapat mengatur pemerintahannya sendiri dan dapat menjalin hubungan dengan negara lain.

This study explores whether and how regional parliaments facilitate collective state recognition, a question that has been overlooked within a literature that focuses more on recognition by individual states or international organizations more generally. We do that through a scoping exercise of how regional parliaments of four major international organizations (AU, CoE, EU, OSCE) have responded to past and present contested statehood efforts that are associated with conflicts, such as in Palestine, Western Sahara, Kosovo, or the post-Soviet space. Based on this, we conceptualize three different stances: recognition, non-recognition, and titular recognition (of a right to, as opposed to the presence of, statehood) and we propose that these stances become apparent declaratively, through resolutions or other formal texts of regional parliaments, or institutionally (e.g., through membership). We also find that regional parliaments display a certain agency through using specific parliamentary instruments to respond to statehood claimants, promoting debates on those claims, and expressing recognition stances different from the executive bodies of the organization. Further, we illustrate these arguments through a more in-depth analysis of the European Parliament's approach toward Kosovo's statehood. In this regard, the paper offers a missing but important account of how regional parliaments facilitate collective recognition and contribute to defining what is a state, one of the most fundamental questions of international relations, which sits at the heart of long and complex conflicts. The proposed conceptual and theoretical arguments can facilitate further studies on state recognition, particularly collective recognition and the role of international organizations.

In the case between a Kosovar limited liability company and a Greek SA, the Greek Supreme Court was confronted with the question, whether the non-recognition of Kosovo by the Hellenic Republic may be considered as a valid ground for opposition against a payment order issued by a Greek court. The Supreme Court dismissed the final appeal, confirming the rulings issued by the instance courts

Somaliland is an example of a territory that has fulfilled the conditions that are pre-requisite for state recognition in the international system. Somaliland is however, not recognised as a state. Questions abound about why Somaliland finds itself in this situation when there are territories which obtained recognition after fulfilling a fraction of what Somaliland has achieved. This study contributes to answering the aforementioned questions. This study has certain objectives. It delved into the examination of the criteria that is used for the recognition of states in the international system. It also analyses the role of intergovernmental organizations in the non-recognition of Somaliland. The objective of this study is also to make an assessment of the nature of interactions between Somaliland, and other actors in the international system.

The Kosovo Serbia Agreement, signed at the White House on 4 September 2020, was hailed as a major diplomatic victory for the Trump Administration. But, in truth, the agreement achieved little new for Balkan peace. If anything, it has created more problems for Serbia and Kosovo than it has solved, not least of all because of the inclusion of Israel in the 'deal'. So, what in fact was the Serbia Kosovo Agreement? And how did it happen?

The agreement between Kosovo and Serbia was presented by President Trump and his envoy, Richard Grenell, as a major breakthrough for the Balkans. In truth though, it achieved more for the United States than either side. Indeed, in many ways it was a wish list of US foreign policy goals: loosen relations with Russia, shun telecoms technology from China and integrate into US intelligence sharing networks. However, the most controversial element of the agreement was the decision to focus on Israel. In a wholly unexpected development, it was announced that Israel and Kosovo had recognised each other and that Kosovo and Serbia would locate their embassies in Israel in Jerusalem. The problem is that this is a clear violation of UN Security Council Resolution 478. Taken with the other elements of the agreement, this will inevitably serve to complicate Serbia and Kosovo's relations with key partners. The question now is how much of the Agreement will eventually be implemented. And does it matter if it isn't?

Channel Link: http://www.youtube.com/c/JamesKerLindsay

State-building undertaken by de-facto states can roughly be divided according to three goals towards which it strives: ensuring stability and democracy in the society, providing internal legitimacy for the political elites, and serving as a foreign policy instrument for increasing external legitimacy  and encouraging recognition by the international community. The focus of this paper will be to analyze this third aspect in more detail by drawing on existing literature exploring the relations between democracy, legitimacy and recognition. State-building in de-facto states will be understood as a foreign policy instrument for increasing legitimacy beyond its borders, where individual components of state-building (for example referenda, elections and institution-building)  as well as the corresponding discourse also serve as public diplomacy strategies. The author will argue that democratisation in de-facto states is not just an internal process, but also very much projected outwards in their quest for recognition, developmental assistance and investment. In this light, state-building and in particular democratisation in three Caucasus de-facto states – Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia – will be looked at more closely, especially in comparison with democratisation in parent and patron states. Furthermore, the prospect of understanding non-recognition as an opportunity for democratization will be examined. Finally, the role of state-building as a foreign policy instrument and its successfulness will be assessed in the conclusion.

The International Court of Justice gave its Advisory Opinion on the “Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo” few months ago. It found no prohibition in general international law, including state practice, the principle of territorial integrity, Security Council resolutions, the principle of self-determination and the right to remedial secession. Neither Resolution 1244 (1999) nor the Constitutional Framework prevented the authors from declaring independence. The author analyses the Court’s approach, its conclusions and the issues which remain open.