Thomas Szasz

In order to better cope with the pressures and stresses of the current day, modern psychology is anxiously seeking to find new therapies to address the increasing disorders within the human psyche. In the process new fields of research, such as humanistic and transpersonal psychology, curiously appear to borrow more and more from the wisdom of the ages. This volume, containing eighteen articles by noteworthy expositors of the perennial philosophy such as Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Frithjof Schuon, presents the spiritual psychology of the wisdom traditions as a much-needed antidote to the current impasse in modern psychology.

Some Endorsements for Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy:

“[Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy] is more than an anthology. It is a wisely crafted collection of classic and contemporary scholarship noting that what many are seeking is what has always been, a perennial philosophy, that remains foundational. As one of the authors, Tage Lindbom, properly notes, ‘Secularization is a fish in troubled waters.’ This book claims the waters and is essential reading for all those who may have forgotten or are simply ignorant of the rich foundation provided by the perennial philosophy.”
—Ralph W. Hood, Professor of Psychology at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, past president of the Psychology of Religion division of the American Psychological Association, co-founder of The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion and co-author of The Psychology of Religion

“A necessary and bracing critique of the assumptions and limitations of contemporary Western psychology, this generous volume is also a passionate call and learned guide towards a truer perspective that embraces man's spiritual nature.”
—Gabor Maté, M.D., and author of In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts: Close Encounters with Addiction

“Knowing the nature of the mind is perhaps the most difficult undertaking, especially in today’s world. To comprehend the nature of mind one needs to turn to the domain of religion and spirituality. Yet the truth of the mind and its complexity cannot explicitly be defined in words. Inner or transcendent wisdom sees the mind’s own nature without the duality of the seer. Suchness (tathatā) of mind is only experiential and not expressible. The words used to describe thought are themselves a product of thought, which is conditioned and limited. Thus, differences and contradictions are unavoidable. Therefore, a comparative study of different viewpoints and commentaries is immensely important to awaken the inner intelligence to see the mind as it is. Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy: Studies in Comparative Religion edited by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos is an outstanding effort in this direction.”
—Samdhong Rinpoche, former Prime Minister (Kalon Tripa) of the Tibetan Government-in-exile, author of Uncompromising Truth for a Compromised World: Tibetan Buddhism and Today’s World

“The rise of psychology has impacted the study and practice of spirituality, the experiences and attitudes relevant to ultimate human values that transcend ordinary behavior. Each chapter of this remarkable book demonstrates this interaction in a unique and provocative way. But rather than using psychology to reduce and ‘psychologize’ spiritual topics, its authors demonstrate how directives from the spiritual traditions can enhance and even illuminate the enduring importance of psychology in the 21st century.”
—Stanley Krippner, Saybrook University, co-author of Spiritual Dimensions of Healing

“The work at hand is a thinking and debating man’s delight. If you have any interest at all in attempting to include an educated and enlightened view of man’s higher functions in your purview of the world, you will learn from and enjoy this collection of essays. If you already have some knowledge in this area, brace yourself: you may see some of your favorites sharply criticized. A thought-provoking work.”
—Bruce W. Scotton, University of California, San Francisco, co-editor of Textbook of Transpersonal Psychiatry and Psychology

“This book, superbly edited by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos, is a masterful critique of the field of psychology and its loss of the sacred ground in which it once was rooted. It offers depth psychologists an opportunity to contemplate timeless truths echoed through the centuries by perennial philosophers who have always claimed psyche is subordinate to Spirit. Although ignored in depth psychology’s early years due to prejudice and lack of understanding, this is a message today’s psychotherapists must take seriously. Human beings need a deeper and wider transpersonal vision of who and what we are, which the saints and sages of the world’s spiritual traditions have always pointed to. In psychotherapy with a therapist committed to such a vision, patients penetrate into their unconscious depths and not infrequently awaken to the Ground of all Being. Their suffering itself occurred because they had turned away from Spirit. Above all, this volume passionately calls upon depth psychology to remember its origin in the perennial wisdom at the core of the great religions. There is something of a polemic in these pages. It deserves to be considered by depth psychologists of all persuasions.”
—Bryan Wittine, Transpersonal psychologist and Jungian psychoanalyst

“This anthology from Samuel Bendeck Sotillos is a must reference for anyone who is interested in psychology and its relationship to spirituality, and in developing an inclusive dialogue between disciplines that favor an integral outlook on the person and his or her potential. Selections in this anthology will inspire us to reexamine the metaphysical underpinnings of psychology, and remind us how important it is to rise above science’s attempt to reduce the human being to an epistemic object.”
—Sangeetha Menon, National Institute of Advanced Studies (Bangalore, India), Board Member of the International Transpersonal Association (ITA), author of The Beyond Experience: Consciousness in Bhagavad Gita

“This anthology has some of the most discerning essays and reviews on spirituality and psychology, which provide much-needed care and caution to all those engaged in bringing them together or who wish to do so in future. Therefore, it is a must-read for all those who teach, research, consult, or study in such frontier areas as transpersonal psychology, states of consciousness, mind-body relation, holistic health, Indian psychology, and so on. It will be an invaluable textbook for courses in these and other related areas. I congratulate the editor of the book.”
—Kiran Kumar K. Salagame, University of Mysore (India), Board Member of the International Transpersonal Association (ITA), author of The Psychology of Meditation: A Contextual Approach

“One of the finest collections of essays on the Perennial Philosophy—a must-read for all psychologists who are engaged with spirituality and transpersonal psychology. The essays which critique modern psychology (including transpersonal psychology, and the framework of Carl Jung), in the light of the Perennial Philosophy are a revelation and make compelling reading. The book serves as a corrective to the excesses of modern psychology, and to this end Sotillos has done a commendable job. I for one will include the book in some of the graduate courses that I teach.”
—Suneet Varma, University of Delhi, co-editor of Foundations of Indian Psychology

“To its credit modern science by-and-large is becoming more cognizant of the essential connection between spirituality and psychological health and well-being and most of all its positive implications within the field of psychology. While there is ample data to document this in a plethora of academic journals and books, this new book Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy adds a novel contribution to the dialogue between psychology and spirituality, which captures many nuances that for the most part go unnoticed within these discussions, and last but not least, it provides a keen eye of discernment to understand this intricate relationship on a deeper level that is crucially needed. This work will be a valuable asset to students and long term mental health practitioners and professors alike who seek to better understand the relationship between psychology and spirituality.”
—Harold G. Koenig, Duke University, Director of the Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health, co-author of The Handbook of Religion and Health

Thomas Szasz. Texto de J.C. Ruiz Franco1. Tradução2: Ezequias Nogueira3. Publicação em Espanhol: Thomas Szasz, el psiquiatra libertário. Site: www.academia.edu. pág.1-2. Em 8 de setembro de 2012, morreu em Manlius, Nova York, uma das figuras máximas da cultura atual, o doutor Thomas Szasz, Psiquiatra, escritor e, por cima de tudo, grande defensor das liberdades individuais e do consumo de sustâncias psicoativas. "Se você fala com Deus, está orando. Se Deus fala com você, é porque você tem esquizofrenia "(Thomas Szasz) O falecido psiquiatra anti-psiquiatra, foi o médico que se atreveu usar a voz para denunciar os erros epistemológicos e metodológicos da disciplina médica dedicada aos pacientes com doenças mentais, assim como toda violação moral e social que causava. BIOGRAFIA: De família Judia, Nascido em 15 de Abril de 1920, em Budapest (Hungría), Szasz viaja a Paris para estudar Medicina. Mas os planos de sua família tiveram que mudar, uma vez que a doutrina nazista se expandiam pela Europa central. 1 Licenciado em Filosofia pela Universidade Complutense de Madrid (1989) < https:// ucm.academia.edu/JCRuizFranco/CurriculumVitae> Acesso: 17-11-2019. 2 Ouve algumas modificações para melhor compreensão do leitor. 3 Apenas mais um na fila do pão.

Resumen

El origen del internamiento psiquiátrico, la historia de la locura y la excesiva medicalización de nuestras sociedades farmacráticas, así como las complejas relaciones entre Psiquiatría, Derecho y las transnacionales farmacéuticas, en un juego de intereses y colusiones, han dado lugar a la llamada «humanización de la pena». Esto es, el recurso a la «demencia» como atenuante penal en un límite difícil de discernir entre lo jurídico y lo ético. Justo aquí se plantea, a partir del rótulo de «enfermedad mental», la posible anulación retroactiva de la responsabilidad penal de una persona que se encuentra supuestamente incapacitada para actuar por sí mismo en la esfera jurídica. De este modo la institución psiquiátrica se nos presenta hoy como una instancia  de poderes omnímodos, con aparatos de tele-vigilancia, que apuntan a la constitución de una ya anunciada «policía del pensamiento», cuya presencia y voz autoritaria se hacen oír con tono perentorio en las instituciones como la educación, el trabajo y demás ámbitos donde lo que está en entredicho es el margen de las libertades civiles; así, la clínica ha ido delimitando en el orden civil un límite difícil de discernir entre normalidad y anormalidad, esto con ecos foucaultianos evidentes, en tanto estas categorías se aplican disciplinariamente en los ámbitos educativos, laborales y criminales con una presencia opresora. De allí que algunos autores como el psiquiatra Thomas Szasz, nos muestre cómo los internamientos psiquiátricos funcionan bajo una conspiración de silencio hacia aquellos que incomodan con sus comportamientos anormales, de donde se sigue que la esencia de la locura es el disturbio social, lo que —en un alcance político— podemos denominar disidencia. La «enfermedad mental» se transforma así en el mecanismo social, regulado y determinado por la psiquiatría, para patologizar la heterogeneidad humana, su carácter antinómico y su singularidad. Este carácter inquisidor que adquiere la psiquiatría será el punto cardinal en este ensayo, y se tratarán con él otros puntos vinculantes como la necesidad de un replanteamiento del significado de «sanidad mental», los márgenes de la locura y las dinámicas entre médico y paciente en lo que respecta a la enfermedad psíquica.
Dr. Adolfo Vásquez Rocca

Tematem niniejszej antologii nie jest obłęd rozumiany w duchu Nervala. O nim traktowała w dużej mierze książka wydana w pierwszej serii „Biblioteki Romantycznej” – Ciemne drogi szaleństwa Aliny Kowalczykowej. Autorami tekstów zamieszczonych tutaj są wyłącznie ci, którzy „posługują się tym słowem «choroba»”. Najczęściej lekarze – twórcy rozpraw naukowych, opisów przypadków, ocen sądowych. Ale nie tylko. To również urzędnicy państwowi, autorzy ustaw dotyczących funkcjonowania szpitali publicznych, a także zarządcy szpitali prywatnych. Chciałam uwzględnić w ten sposób różne sposoby funkcjonowania i wykorzystania wiedzy medycznej – pokazać, jak stawiano diagnozy, jak przebiegało przyjmowanie obłąkanych do szpitala, jak ich tam traktowano i na podstawie czego orzekano o niepoczytalności. Psychiatrię jednak chciałam potraktować jako jeden z języków służących projektowaniu i podtrzymywaniu społecznego ładu.

Debemos tener en cuenta que cuando hablamos sobre creencias ya estamos hablando de una percepción diferente de lo real, adentrándonos en el terreno de la fe, que en ciertos casos, sirve para justificar acciones irracionales en una obediencia ciega a una autoridad divina.
La religión como enfermedad mental. Reflexiones marginales. Revista virtual. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Año 6. Número 34.
Agosto-Septiembre 2016
Estética de la mirada. ISSN 2007-8501. Disponible en: http://reflexionesmarginales.com/3.0/la-religion-como-enfermedad-mental/

Essay on mutual relations between mental illness, social opression, genius, art and creativity. Contains references to ideas of Hans Prinzhorn, Cesare Lombroso, Michel Foucault and Thomas Szasz, as well as works of Paul Klee, Andre Masson, Adolf Wölfli, Jean Dubuffet and the like.

The purpose of this analysis is to review and critique current US dual diagnosis theories and to apply a new methodology to dual diagnosis in the practical setting of everyday nursing care.  Although the term or concept of dual diagnosis has been around since 1985, it is only recently that new models of understanding this diagnosis have developed, not being a disorder of its own.

The DSM V changes diagnostic criteria for substance use disorders, placing them on a spectrum similar to the current autistic and schizophrenia spectrum disorders.  The net has been cast wider and nurses will encounter more patients with substance use disorders.  The general nursing discipline will have limited to the new diagnostic criteria.
""

April 2020 marks what would have been the hundredth birthday of Professor Thomas
Stephen Szasz, who passed away in 2012. This year was also the 60th anniversary of the first publication of his iconoclastic thesis on the “myth of mental illness.” In the present paper, Szasz’s main views on mental illness and modern psychiatry are summarized. By showing the origins of Szasz’s ideas in particular, it describes the following topics: Szasz’s distinction between bodily disease and mental illness, his preoccupation with the progressive medicalization of everyday life, his description of psychiatry as an institution of social control, his critique of the therapeutic state, i.e., the alliance between psychiatry and the state, and his deliberations on liberty, personal freedom and responsibility. While addressing Szasz’s main critics, the paper attempts to show the influence of Szasz’s concept on today’s psychiatry and stresses that despite well-deserved criticism he expressed some of the epistemological and ethical problems of modern psychiatry better than anyone else, which makes his legacy still important for the mental health practitioners of today.

Plautus’ Roman comedy Menaechmi (The Two Menaechmuses) of c. 200 BC anticipates in fictional form the famous Rosenhan experiment of 1973, a landmark critique of psychiatric diagnosis. An analysis of the scenes of feigned madness and psychiatric examination suggests that the play (and the earlier Greek play from which it was adapted) offers two related ethical reflections, one on the validity of psychiatric diagnoses, the other on the validity of the entire medical model of insanity—that is, of the popular notion and political truth that mental illness is a (bodily) disease “like any other.” This essay is offered as a contribution to the interpretation of the play as well as to the history of psychiatry.

Psychiatry against itself: Radicals, rebels, reformers & revolutionaries. A philosophical archaeology

Journal of The International Association of Transdisciplinary Psychology, December 2015, 4(1): 1-18.

Abstract

This essay inverts the logic of antipsychiatry to describe various movements critical of the profession as psychiatry against itself. Like Alain Badiou’s contrast of philosophers with anti-philosophers, anti-psychiatrists compel the established tradition of psychiatry to confront fresh problems with new perspectives to renew psychiatric thought. The dual themes that emerge from this study are: tradition vs. innovation and negation vs. affirmation.

This thesis is threefold: (1) What is intriguing about the psychiatrists associated with the anti-psychiatry movement and what unites them is negation. In each case, their work proceeds by a key critical negation, to the point that the defining characteristic of antipsychiatric psychiatrists is precisely negation. (2) Each negation and how it was practised made each anti-psychiatrist, depending on his temperament and circumstances, into a rebel, a radical, a reformer or a revolutionary antipsychiatrist. (3) Each anti-psychiatrist wielded an instrument for change that I have coined Badiou’s sickle. Based on a key critical negation, each anti-psychiatrist resisted the suturing of psychiatry to a given subdiscipline, regional practice, or dominant ideology by separating it gently or more forcefully with Badiou’s scalpel, scissors, shears, scythe or sickle to liberate psychiatry as a general theory and practice and return it to its originary task. Four key 20th century Western psychiatrists who were critical of their field are examined through their basic attitudes and contributions to the redefinition of psychiatry.

Scotsman Ronald David Laing (1927-1989) was a radical psychiatrist-psychoanalyst, returning psychiatry to its clinical roots, with his trenchant critiques of Ludwig Binswanger’s existential analysis and psychiatric practice generally, calling for social phenomenology, negating the mystification of mental illness by placing the suffering of the self in social, family, and political context. The French Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) was both a subversive psychoanalyst and a psychiatric rebel, affirming the centrality of Freud in his construction of psychoanalysis while rebelling against both the psychoanalytic and psychiatric establishment, negating the institutionalization of psychoanalytic practice, whether in the academy or in psychoanalytic institutes. Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia (1924-1980) was a reformer who instigated psychiatric deinstitutionalization around the world with his key text, L’Istituzione negata, “The Institution Negated” (1968) and by joining the Radical Party in the Italian Parliament that reformed Italy’s mental health legislation. As a psychiatrist, philosopher and revolutionary, Martinican Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) negated nothing less than the claim of European psychiatry to universalism in his radical critiques of the psychology of colonization and identity formation, offering a more humane psychology on which to found psychiatry in a revolutionary program for a new society. Fanon’s critiques were far more trenchant than other anti-psychiatrists, with far-reaching impacts on critical theory, post-colonial studies and Marxist political theory, yet his project remained unfulfilled when he died all-too-young, bequeathing us psychiatry’s unfinished revolution.

Two other critical thinkers are examined to complete this study. One is Hungarian-American Thomas Szasz (1920–2012) whom I characterize as a reactionary psychiatrist in the guise of a progressive who negated the reality of psychiatric disorders. Szasz trivialized mental and relational suffering as mere “problems in living,” arguing against the majority of psychiatric disorders having biomedical origins, thus promoting the medical model in its most reductive form. In contrast with the other antipsychiatrists, Szasz’s negation was destructive, leading the way to greater stigmatization of mental illness and diminished resources and services.

Finally, the work of French psychologist and philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) overshadows the entire discourse of anti-psychiatry, just as he informs and impels us to reorder medical perceptions and psychiatric thought, upending the very “order of things.” Foucault’s negation was the most disturbing to psychiatric thought because he questioned the very basis for imagining madness and reason/unreason.

The publication in 1960 of Thomas Szasz’s The Myth of Mental Illnes, subtitled Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct was received with hostility by members of the psychiatric establishment . One of his central claims is that psychiatrists such as Sigmund Freud and Emile Kraepelin, unable to find any genuine organic disturbances, played an “epistemological trick” on us by transferring the naturalistic concept of disease from “abnormal bodily structure” to “abnormal personal behaviour” (1979, p.12). What Szasz calls “problems in living” (ibid, p.45) have been misdiagnosed as diseases of the mind. I propose that an endorsement of Szasz’s position is inconsistent with the most standard bioethical principles of medical practice. Secondly, by means of an analogy with racial categories, I argue that the ontological status of mental illness should not change our medical attitude to the mentally ill. Lastly, I advance a virtual case study that would leave the most ardent critic of psychiatry with no solid grounds for denying a person mental health treatment

PSYCHIATRY AGAINT ITSELF:
Radicals, Rebels, Reformers, and Revolutionaries

A Philosophical Archaeology


Abstract

This essay inverts the logic of anti-psychiatry to describe various movements critical of the profession as psychiatry against itself. Like Alain Badiou’s contrast of philosophers with anti-philosophers, anti-psychiatrists compel the established tradition of psychiatry to confront fresh problems with new perspectives to renew psychiatric thought. The dual themes that emerge from this study are: tradition vs. innovation and negation vs. affirmation.

This thesis is threefold: (1) What is intriguing about the psychiatrists associated with the anti-psychiatry movement and what unites them is negation. In each case, their work proceeds by a key critical negation, to the point that the defining characteristic of anti-psychiatric psychiatrists is precisely negation. (2) Each negation and how it was practised made each anti-psychiatrist, depending on his temperament and circumstances, into a rebel, a radical, a reformer or a revolutionary anti-psychiatrist. (3) Each anti-psychiatrist wielded an instrument for change that I have coined Badiou’s sickle. Based on a key critical negation, each anti-psychiatrist resisted the suturing of psychiatry to a given subdiscipline, regional practice, or dominant ideology by separating it gently or more forcefully with Badiou’s scalpel, scissors, shears, scythe or sickle to liberate psychiatry as a general theory and practice and return it to its originary task. 

Four key 20th century Western psychiatrists who were critical of their field are examined through their basic attitudes and contributions to the redefinition of psychiatry. Scotsman Ronald David Laing (1927-1989) was a radical psychiatrist-psychoanalyst, returning psychiatry to its clinical roots, with his trenchant critiques of Ludwig Binswanger’s existential analysis and psychiatric practice generally, calling for social phenomenology, negating the mystification of mental illness by placing the suffering of the self in social, family, and political context. The French Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) was both a subversive psychoanalyst and a psychiatric rebel, affirming the centrality of Freud in his construction of psychoanalysis while rebelling against both the psychoanalytic and psychiatric establishment, negating the institutionalization of psychoanalytic practice, whether in the academy or in psychoanalytic institutes. Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia (1924-1980) was a reformer who instigated psychiatric deinstitutionalization around the world with his key text, L’Istituzione negata, “The Institution Negated” (1968) and by joining the Radical Party in the Italian Parliament that reformed Italy’s mental health legislation. As a psychiatrist, philosopher and revolutionary, Martinican Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) negated nothing less than the claim of European psychiatry to universalism in his radical critiques of the psychology of colonization and identity formation, offering a more humane psychology on which to found psychiatry in a revolutionary program for a new society. Fanon’s critiques were far more trenchant than other anti-psychiatrists, with far-reaching impacts on critical theory, post-colonial studies and Marxist political theory, yet his project remained unfulfilled when he died all-too-young, bequeathing us psychiatry’s unfinished revolution.

Two other critical thinkers are examined to complete this study. One is Hungarian-American Thomas Szasz (1920–2012) whom I characterize as a reactionary psychiatrist in the guise of a progressive who negated the reality of psychiatric disorders. Szasz trivialized mental and relational suffering as mere “problems in living,” arguing against the majority of psychiatric disorders having biomedical origins, thus promoting the medical model in its most reductive form. In contrast with the other anti-psychiatrists, Szasz’s negation was destructive, leading the way to greater stigmatization of mental illness and diminished resources and services. Finally, the work of French psychologist and philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) overshadows the entire discourse of anti-psychiatry, just as he informs and impels us to reorder medical perceptions and psychiatric thought, upending the very “order of things.” Foucault’s negation was the most disturbing to psychiatric thought because he questioned the very basis for imagining madness and reason/unreason.

Análise do conceito psicopatia como ilustração da natureza dos termos que estão subsumidos no diagnóstico psiquiátrico, à luz das teorias críticas da regulamentação dos comportamentos indesejados e da filosofia da psiquiatria. Nossa questão principal foi procurar saber qual o significado de um diagnóstico psiquiátrico. Fundamentamos nossa pesquisa no fato de que a psiquiatria nasceu vinculada à filosofia, que sempre teceu críticas sobre os conceitos usados pelos médicos alienistas, bem como sobre os fundamentos epistemológicos dessa ciência. A própria fusão dos tratados de psiquiatria como médicos e filosóficos atesta essa relação, o que tem deixado a filosofia da psiquiatria muito à vontade para questionar e contribuir com a psiquiatria ao longo de sua história. Uma dessas críticas tem sido direcionada à função social da psiquiatria como órgão de controle contra os comportamentos indesejados. A acusação é a de que os termos psiquiátricos são fabricações literárias sem respaldo médico tradicional ou comprovação empírica, com o intuito de justificar as ações morais contra os indesejados ou divergentes. No tocante à psicopatia, isso pode ser mais facilmente observado: ao longo dos anos foram surgindo diversas propostas para a composição de um significado desse termo, algumas das quais inconciliáveis, cujo propósito tem sido o de interditar um tipo de personagem conceitual classificado como o que há de pior na humanidade. Nossa proposta analisou essa construção por meio da análise do conceito em sua historicidade, composição, consistência, relação com outros conceitos e seu caráter fragmentado. Coletamos informações sobre esse processo nas mais importantes tradições psiquiátricas e documentos oficiais para a regulação da atividade psiquiátrica. Verificamos as ferramentas e as propostas metodológicas para a elaboração de um diagnóstico diferenciado de psicopatia. Nossas análises nos levaram a reforçar a tese de que os termos psiquiátricos, pelo menos os usados no diagnóstico da psicopatia, são livremente usados, forjados dentro de um processo de trocas de influências e manipulação midiática, não por descobertas médicas. Isso pode ter feito com que o termo tenha migrado da área médica para a criminal, conquanto não tenha abandonado parte da ritualística médica tradicional e ainda se valha das três maiores ferramentas psiquiátricas: a compaixão, o diagnóstico e a interdição. Outras possibilidades de leitura das condições subsumidas sob oconceito psicopatia existem, como as do homem amoral ou do homem sereno, mas isso pressupõe outra forma de abordagem moral dos comportamentos: de uma visão moral excludente a uma moralidade que reconhece a diversidade como legítima.

Szasz’s legacy involves two issues in current psychiatry: First, he criticized the concept of mental illness. The DSM-5 debate shows that psychiatry still suffers from unresolved conceptual problems. The definition of the general concept of mental disorder remains unclear. Specific classificatory entities (e.g., autism spectrum disorder) are notoriously contested. Second, he criticized coercive psychiatric practice. Recent developments suggest an ongoing identity crisis of psychiatry as a medical institution. Psychiatry’s tasks are partly related to societal interests (e.g., dealing with dangerous persons). Two psychiatric forms of intervention are therapeutic coercion and compulsion to prevent harm to others. Whether the latter can be squared with therapeutic purposes is unclear. To justify paternalistic interventions such as therapeutic coercion is difficult. Hence, there is enormous pressure on psychiatry’s medical identity. Szasz asked the right questions, not necessarily providing the most convincing answers. Psychiatry would benefit from a thorough, less prejudiced assessment of his publications.

O nietrywialnej relacji między filozofią a psychiatrią nowaorgiamysli.pl/index.php/2019/05/27/o-nietrywialnej-relacji-miedzy-filozofia-a-psychiatria/ Psychiatria i filozofia-w zgodzie ze współczesną specjalizacją nauk-są uprawiane jako odrębne dyskursy, posiadają odmienne strategie metodologiczne i aparaty pojęciowe. Nie ma w tym nic dziwnego, biorąc pod uwagę praktyczne i teoretyczne cele tych dziedzin. Jednakże psychiatria może wnieść istotne treści w rozumienie problemów filozoficznych i vice versa. Pomimo oczywistej separacji paradygmatów, istnieją zbieżności przedmiotowe dyskursu psychiatrycznego i filozoficznego, obie dziedziny interesuje ludzki umysł oraz powiązana z nim racjonalność, która jest normatywną kategorią jego funkcjonowania. Foucault uważał, że Rozum jest możliwy do zdefiniowania tylko w opozycji do Nierozumu (Déraison)-szaleństwa, psychopatologii [1]. Tym samym odniósł się krytycznie do Oświecenia, które określiło negatywnie swoją istotę, wynosząc Rozum na sztandary i wykluczając to, co nieuporządkowane, niezmobilizowane-słowem: nierozumne. Filozoficzny konstrukt pojęciowy racjonalności rozpropagowany przez Kartezjusza i jego epigonów został ukradkiem przeszczepiony do nowożytnej psychologii i psychiatrii, stając się, po pewnych przekształceniach, obiektywną kategorią

I highly recommend this book by Thomas Szasz (1920-2012).
Szasz, Thomas (1996).  The Meaning of Mind:  Language, Morality, and Neuroscience.  Westport, Connecticut:  PRAEGER.
Szasz's argumentation is irresistible and he certainly gives a compelling alternative view to the now popular materialist view of mind = brain.

Cette essai inverse la logique de l’antipsychiatrie et décrit les différents mouvements critiques de la profession : la psychiatrie contre elle-même. Pareil au contraste des philosophes avec les antiphilosophes d’Alain Badiou, les antipsychiatres poussent la tradition établie de la psychiatrie à confronter les difficultés qui apparaissent avec de nouvelles perspectives pour relancer la pensée psychiatrique. Le double thème qui émerge de cette étude : tradition contre innovation et négation contre affirmation.

Cette thèse est composée de trois parties : (1) L’enjeu intriguant des psychiatres associés au mouvement antipsychiatrique est la négation qui les unit. Dans chaque cas, leur travail procède par une négation clé critique, au point que la caractéristique déterminante des psychiatres en antipsychiatrie devient la négation elle-même. (2) Chaque négation et comment elle était mise en place transforme chaque antipsychiatre, selon son tempérament et les circonstances, à un rebelle, un radical, un réformateur ou un antipsychiatre révolutionnaire. (3) Chaque antipsychiatre a brandi un instrument, que j’ai nommé la faucille de Badiou, pour provoquer un changement. En se basant sur une négation clé critique, chaque antipsychiatre a résisté à la suture représentée par la psychiatrie d’une sous-discipline donnée, d’une pratique régionale, ou d’une idéologie dominante en la divisant doucement ou brutalement avec le scalpel, les ciseaux, les cisailles, la faux ou la faucille de Badiou pour libérer la psychiatrie en termes de théorie et de pratique générale, et la retourner à sa mission originaire.

Quatre psychiatres réputés occidentaux du XXe siècle, qui avaient critiqué leur domaine, sont étudiés à travers leurs attitudes fondamentales et leurs contributions à la redéfinition de la psychiatrie. L’Écossais Ronald David Laing (1927-1989) était un psychiatre-psychanalyste radical qui a retourné la psychiatrie à ses racines cliniques avec ses critiques incisives de l’analyse existentielle de Ludwig Binswanger et des pratiques psychiatriques en générale, en faisant appel à la phénoménologie sociale et en niant la mystification de la maladie mentale en plaçant la souffrance de soi dans son contexte social, familial et politique. Le Français Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) était à la fois un psychanalyste subversif et un rebelle de la psychiatrie qui a confirmé la centralité de Freud dans sa construction de la psychanalyse tout en se rebellant contre l’établissement de la psychanalyse et celui de la psychiatrie, en niant l’institutionnalisation de la pratique psychanalytique, que ce soit dans le milieu de l’enseignement ou les instituts psychanalytiques. Le psychiatre Italien Franco Basaglia (1924-1980), réformateur, il a été l’instigateur de la désinstitutionnalisation psychiatrique à travers le monde avec son texte clé, L’Istituzione negata, « L’institution en négation » (1968) et en se joignant à la Partie Radicale du Parlement italien qui a réformé la législation de la santé mentale en Italie. À titre de psychiatre, philosophe et révolutionnaire, le Martiniquais Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) a contesté, rien de moins que la réclamation de la psychiatrie européenne à l’universalisme dans ses critiques radicales de la psychologie de la colonisation et la formation d’identité, en offrant une psychologie plus humaine sur laquelle on bâtirait la psychiatrie dans un programme révolutionnaire pour une nouvelle société. Les critiques de Fanon étaient bien plus tranchantes que celles des autres antipsychiatres avec des impacts d’une grande portée sur la théorie critique, les études postcoloniales et la théorie politique de gauche; cependant, son projet est demeuré inaccompli quand il est décédé, encore trop jeune, en nous léguant la révolution inachevée de la psychiatrie.

Deux autres penseurs d’esprit critique sont examinés pour compléter cette étude. Il s’agit du Hongrois-Américain Thomas Szasz (1920-2012) que je définis comme un psychiatre réactionnaire sous la forme d’un progressiste qui a dénoncé la réalité des troubles psychiatriques. Szasz a banalisé la souffrance mentale et relationnelle comme de simples « difficultés éprouvées dans la vie », en s’opposant contre la majorité des troubles psychiatriques d’origine biomédicale, et par conséquent en avançant le modèle médical dans sa forme la plus réductive. Contrairement aux autres antipsychiatres, la négation de Szasz a été destructive, en donnant lieu à une plus grande stigmatisation de la maladie mentale et en diminuant les ressources et les services. Finalement, le travail du psychologue et philosophe Français Michel Foucault (1926-1984) qui éclipse le discours au complet de l’antipsychiatrie, quand il nous informe et incite à remettre de l’ordre dans les perceptions médicales et la pensée psychiatrique, en bouleversant « l’ordre des choses », au sens strict du terme. La négation de Foucault était la plus perturbante à la pensée psychiatrique car il mettait en cause la base même d’avoir imaginé la folie et la raison/déraison.

We can study pain, chronic diseases and death from different angles to the biomedical model, to the perspectives and models of psychology, to palliative and terminal care, and even more, to the branch of medicine that scientifically studies pain and its treatment, algology. ES | Abstract: Podemos estudiar el dolor, las enfermedades crónicas y la muerte desde ángulos distintos al modelo biomédico, a las perspectivas y modelos de la psicología, a los cuidados paliativos y los cuidados terminales, y más aún, a la rama de la medicina que estudia de forma científica el dolor y su tratamiento, la algología.

LA PSYCHIATRIE CONTRE ELLE-MÊME
Radicaux, rebelles, réformateurs et révolutionnaires

Vincenzo Di Nicola

Résumé

Ce séminaire inverse la logique de l’antipsychiatrie et décrit les différents mouvements critiques de la profession : la psychiatrie contre elle-même. Pareil au contraste des philosophes avec les antiphilosophes d’Alain Badiou, les antipsychiatres poussent la tradition établie de la psychiatrie à confronter les difficultés qui apparaissent avec de nouvelles perspectives pour relancer la pensée psychiatrique. Le double thème qui émerge de cette étude : tradition contre innovation et négation contre affirmation.

Cette thèse est composée de trois parties : (1) L’enjeu intriguant des psychiatres associés au mouvement antipsychiatrique est la négation qui les unit. Dans chaque cas, leur travail procède par une négation clé critique, au point que la caractéristique déterminante des psychiatres en antipsychiatrie devient la négation elle-même. (2) Chaque négation transforme chaque antipsychiatre à un rebelle, un radical, un réformateur ou un antipsychiatre révolutionnaire. (3) Chaque antipsychiatre a brandi un instrument, que j’ai nommé la faucille de Badiou, pour provoquer un changement. En se basant sur une négation clé critique, chaque antipsychiatre a résisté à la suture représentée par la psychiatrie d’une sous-discipline donnée, d’une pratique régionale, ou d’une idéologie dominante en la divisant doucement ou brutalement avec le scalpel, les ciseaux, les cisailles, la faux ou la faucille de Badiou pour libérer la psychiatrie en termes de théorie et de pratique générale, et la retourner à sa mission originaire.

Quatre psychiatres réputés occidentaux du XXe siècle, qui avaient critiqué leur domaine, sont étudiés à travers leurs attitudes fondamentales et leurs contributions à la redéfinition de la psychiatrie. L’Écossais Ronald David Laing (1927-1989) était un psychiatre-psychanalyste radical qui a retourné la psychiatrie à ses racines cliniques en faisant appel à la phénoménologie sociale et en niant la mystification de la maladie mentale en plaçant la souffrance de soi dans son contexte social, familial et politique. Le Français Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) était à la fois un psychanalyste subversif et un rebelle de la psychiatrie qui a confirmé la centralité de Freud dans sa construction de la psychanalyse tout en se rebellant contre l’établissement de la psychanalyse et celui de la psychiatrie, en niant l’institutionnalisation de la pratique psychanalytique. Le psychiatre Italien Franco Basaglia (1924-1980), réformateur, il a été l’instigateur de la désinstitutionnalisation psychiatrique à travers le monde avec son texte clé, L’Istituzione negata, « L’institution en négation » (1968) et en se joignant à la Partie Radicale du Parlement italien qui a réformé la législation de la santé mentale en Italie. À titre de psychiatre, philosophe et révolutionnaire, le Martiniquais Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) a contesté, rien de moins que la réclamation de la psychiatrie européenne à l’universalisme dans ses critiques radicales de la psychologie de la colonisation et la formation d’identité, en offrant une psychologie plus humaine sur laquelle on bâtirait la psychiatrie dans un programme révolutionnaire pour une nouvelle société.

Deux autres penseurs d’esprit critique sont examinés. Il s’agit du Hongrois-Américain Thomas Szasz (1920-2012) que je définis comme un psychiatre réactionnaire sous la forme d’un progressiste qui a dénoncé la réalité des troubles psychiatriques. Contrairement aux autres antipsychiatres, la négation de Szasz a été destructive, en donnant lieu à une plus grande stigmatisation de la maladie mentale et en diminuant les ressources et les services. Finalement, le travail du psychologue et philosophe Français Michel Foucault (1926-1984) qui éclipse le discours au complet de l’antipsychiatrie, quand il nous informe et incite à remettre de l’ordre dans les perceptions médicales et la pensée psychiatrique, en bouleversant « l’ordre des choses », au sens strict du terme. La négation de Foucault était la plus perturbante à la pensée psychiatrique car il mettait en cause la base même d’avoir imaginé la folie et la raison/déraison.

Readers of Aeschylus’ Libation Bearers, a Greek tragedy of 458 BC, routinely assert or assume that the hero, Orestes, kills his mother at the behest of the god Apollo. The work of the American psychiatrist Thomas Szasz (1920-2012) shows us why we ought not make that assumption. It thus sets the tragedy in an entirely new light and, if set alongside the evidence of Plautus’ The Menaechmus Brothers, entails important consequences for the history of (paranoid) schizophrenia in Western society.

Published in The Humanist, January/February 2015.

Since the author has published a Spanish translation of his book, I offer readers a translation of my review as well.  I should emphasize that this is simply a translation of my review of the English version, not the Spanish one, which I have not seen. I thank Mrs. Xiomara Gomez for helping me improve my translation.

Desde el autor ha publicado una traducción al español de su libro, ofrezco a los lectores una traducción de mi reseña también. Debo enfatizar que esto es simplemente una traducción de mi crítica de la versión en Inglés, no el español, que no he visto. Doy las gracias a la señora Xiomara Gómez por ayudarme a mejorar mi traducción.

In a pair of articles in the Journal of Humanistic Psychology, E. Fuller Torrey’s psychiatry is castigated by Thomas Szasz. In return, Torrey dismisses Szasz’ criticism as “increasingly anachronistic.”  The current exchange clarifies the early ties between the two and their subsequent unraveling.  Apparently at opposite ends of the psychiatric spectrum, Szasz and Torrey in fact have much in common and share foundational assumptions about mind and body, the definition of “disease,” the nature of medical practice and the nature of medical science.  Their presuppositions, all readily challenged, are problematic for all of medicine including psychiatry.  Physicians treat persons not diseases; people go to the doctor with ailments and illnesses and not with diseases; mental illnesses are not necessarily diseases; medicine is a social response to human need and not a pure science; medical science is a practical not a pure science.  What is true for medicine in general is of course also true for psychiatry.

In the film classic Blade Runner, the story explores the notion of personal identity through that of carefully crafted androids. Can an android have a personality; can androids be persons? The title of the original story by Philip K. Dick is Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? The story suggests that our sense of being a person depends on our having memories that connect us with our childhood. In the movie, the androids are only a couple of years old, but have adult bodies. To complete them as persons they are given simulated memories of childhood. Some psychiatrists have decided that even humans dream only of electric sheep. I explore how Popper’s world 3 can help to defend a notion of personhood that can be used to criticise the thesis that persons are simply complex physical processes and that all their serious life-problems can be conceptualised as a form of physical illness.

A letter reflecting on "The Celebration of the Life and Work of Thomas Szasz," sponsored by the Department of Psychiatry at Upstate Medical University August 8, 2014.  Text by Michael Fontaine, introduced by Jeffrey Schaler.  Primarily hosted on http://www.szasz.com/.

Abstract: Podemos estudiar el dolor, las enfermedades crónicas y la muerte desde ángulos distintos al modelo biomédico, a las perspectivas y modelos de la psicología, a los cuidados paliativos y los cuidados terminales, y más aún, a la rama de la medicina que estudia de forma científica el dolor y su tratamiento, la algología. EN | Abstract: We can study pain, chronic diseases and death from different angles to the biomedical model, to the perspectives and models of psychology, to palliative and terminal care, and even more, to the branch of medicine that scientifically studies pain and its treatment, algology.

Dr. Thomas Szasz (1920-2012) was one of the greatest thinkers and prose stylists of the last 100 years. Enough time has passed since he died that we can start to take stock of his legacy. This important new collection of essays by former colleagues, psychiatrists, philosophers, and legal experts does just that.

Institutionalization of the Mind

Organizers: Alexandra Bacopoulos-Viau (McGill) and Vincent Guillin (UQÀM)

Keynote Speaker: Todd Meyers (NYU Shanghai)
 
Participants:
- Vincenzo Di Nicola (Université de Montréal)
- Isabelle Perreault (Université d’Ottawa)
- Allan Young (McGill University)
 
Titre : « L’antipsychiatrie, ou la décolonisation de l’esprit »

Vincenzo Di Nicola, Université de Montréal

Résumé : Cette présentation inverse la logique de l’antipsychiatrie et décrit les différents mouvements critiques de la profession : la psychiatrie contre elle-même. Les antipsychiatres poussent la tradition établie de la psychiatrie à confronter les difficultés qui apparaissent avec de nouvelles perspectives pour relancer la pensée psychiatrique. Cette thèse est composée de trois parties : (1) L’enjeu intriguant des psychiatres associés au mouvement antipsychiatrique est la négation qui les unit. Dans chaque cas, leur travail procède par une négation clé critique, au point que la caractéristique déterminante des psychiatres en antipsychiatrie devient la négation elle-même. (2) Chaque négation transforme chaque antipsychiatre à un rebelle, un radical, un réformateur ou un antipsychiatre révolutionnaire. (3) Chaque antipsychiatre a brandi un instrument pour provoquer un changement. En se basant sur une négation clé critique, chaque antipsychiatre a résisté à la suture représentée par la psychiatrie d’une sous-discipline donnée, d’une pratique régionale, ou d’une idéologie dominante pour libérer la psychiatrie en termes de théorie et de pratique générale, et la retourner à sa mission originaire.

Quatre psychiatres occidentaux critiques sont étudiés : (1) L’Écossais Ronald David Laing (1927-1989) était un psychiatre-psychanalyste radical qui a retourné la psychiatrie à ses racines cliniques en faisant appel à la phénoménologie sociale et en niant la mystification de la maladie mentale en plaçant la souffrance de soi dans son contexte social, familial et politique. (2) Le Français Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) était à la fois un psychanalyste subversif et un rebelle de la psychiatrie qui a confirmé la centralité de Freud tout en se rebellant contre l’établissement de la psychanalyse et celui de la psychiatrie, en niant l’institutionnalisation de la pratique psychanalytique. (3) Le psychiatre Italien Franco Basaglia (1924-1980), réformateur, il a été l’instigateur de la désinstitutionnalisation psychiatrique à travers le monde avec son texte clé, L’Istituzione negata, « L’institution en négation » (1968) et avec la Partie Radicale a réformé la législation de la santé mentale en Italie. (4) À titre de psychiatre, philosophe et révolutionnaire, le Martiniquais Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) a contesté rien de moins que la réclamation de la psychiatrie européenne à l’universalisme dans ses critiques radicales de la psychologie de la colonisation et la formation d’identité.

Biographie : Bio: Vincenzo Di Nicola, MPhil, MD, PhD, Professeur titulaire de psychiatrie, Université de Montréal, est co-directeur du cours, “Psychiatrie et sciences humaines,” et participe à la Mission Haïti auprès de l’Université Notre Dame d’Haïti. Projets actuels incluent la thérapie familiale culturelle, trauma et santé mentale globale. Parmi ses écrits récents : “Two trauma communities: A philosophical archaeology of clinical and cultural trauma theories,” dans Peter Capretto & Eric Boynton, eds., Trauma and transcendence (Fordham University Press, sous presse), “Pedagogy of the Event,” dans Antonio Garcia, ed., Zizek and education (Sense Publishing, à venir), et avec Drozdstoj Stoyanov, Psychiatry in crisis: at the crossroads of social science, the humanities, and neuroscience (Springer Publishing, à venir). Di Nicola est aussi l’auteur de : A stranger in the family: culture, families, and therapy (W.W. Norton, 1997) et Letters to a young therapist (Atropos Press, 2011), ainsi que On the threshold: selected papers of Vincenzo Di Nicola, MD, PhD. Volume 1: children, families, and cultural change., Armando Favazza, ed. (Atropos Press, sous presse).
Title: “Anti-psychiatry, or the Decolonization of the Mind”

Vincenzo Di Nicola, Université de Montréal

Abstract: This presentation inverts the logic of anti-psychiatry to describe various movements critical of the profession as psychiatry against itself. Anti-psychiatrists compel the established tradition of psychiatry to confront fresh problems with new perspectives to renew psychiatric thought. This thesis is threefold: (1) What is intriguing about the psychiatrists associated with the anti-psychiatry movement and what unites them is negation. In each case, their work proceeds by a key critical negation, to the point that the defining characteristic of anti-psychiatric psychiatrists is precisely negation. (2) Each negation and how it was practised made each anti-psychiatrist, depending on his temperament and circumstances, into a rebel, a radical, a reformer or a revolutionary anti-psychiatrist. (3) Each anti-psychiatrist wielded an instrument for change. Based on a key critical negation, each anti-psychiatrist resisted the suturing of psychiatry to a given subdiscipline, regional practice, or dominant ideology by separating it gently or more forcefully to liberate psychiatry as a general theory and practice and return it to its originary task. 

Four Western critical psychiatrists are examined: (1) Scotsman Ronald David Laing (1927-1989) was a radical psychiatrist-psychoanalyst, returning psychiatry to its clinical roots, calling for social phenomenology, negating the mystification of mental illness by placing the suffering of the self in social, family, and political context. (2) The French Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) was both a subversive psychoanalyst and a psychiatric rebel, affirming the centrality of Freud while rebelling against both the psychoanalytic and psychiatric establishment, negating the institutionalization of psychoanalytic practice. (3) Italian psychiatrist Franco Basaglia (1924-1980) was a reformer who instigated psychiatric deinstitutionalization around the world with his key text, L’Istituzione negata, “The Institution Negated” (1968) and through the Radical Party reformed Italy’s mental health legislation. (4) As a psychiatrist, philosopher and revolutionary, Martinican Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) negated nothing less than the claim of European psychiatry to universalism in his radical critiques of the psychology of colonization and identity formation. Fanon’s critiques were far more trenchant than other anti-psychiatrists, with far-reaching impacts on critical theory, post-colonial studies and Marxist political theory.

Bio: Vincenzo Di Nicola, MPhil, MD, PhD, Full Professor of Psychiatry, Université de Montréal, co-directs a course on “Psychiatry and the Humanities” and participates in the Mission Haiti with the Université Notre Dame d’Haïti. Current projects involve cultural family therapy, trauma, and global health. Publications include: “Two trauma communities: A philosophical archaeology of clinical and cultural trauma theories,” in Peter Capretto & Eric Boynton, eds., Trauma and Transcendence (Fordham University Press, in press), “Pedagogy of the Event,” in Antonio Garcia, ed., Zizek and Education (Sense Publishing, forthcoming), and with Drozdstoj Stoyanov, Psychiatry in Crisis: At the Crossroads of Social Science, the Humanities, and Neuroscience (Springer Publishing, forthcoming). Di Nicola is the author of A Stranger in the Family: Culture, Families, and Therapy (W.W. Norton, 1997) and Letters to a Young Therapist (Atropos Press, 2011), as well as On the Threshold: Selected Papers of Vincenzo Di Nicola, MD, PhD. Volume 1: Children, Families, and Cultural Change., ed. by Armando Favazza (Atropos Press, in press).

April 2020 marks what would have been the hundredth birthday of Professor Thomas Stephen Szasz, who passed away in 2012. This year was also the 60 th anniversary of the first publication of his iconoclastic thesis on the "myth of mental illness." In the present paper, Szasz's main views on mental illness and modern psychiatry are summarized. By showing the origins of Szasz's ideas in particular, it describes the following topics: Szasz's distinction between bodily disease and mental illness, his preoccupation with the progressive medicalization of everyday life, his description of psychiatry as an institution of social control, his critique of the therapeutic state, i.e., the alliance between psychiatry and the state, and his deliberations on liberty, personal freedom and responsibility. While addressing Szasz's main critics, the paper attempts to show the influence of Szasz's concept on today's psychiatry and stresses that despite well-deserved criticism he expressed some of the epistemological and ethical problems of modern psychiatry better than anyone else, which makes his legacy still important for the mental health practitioners of today.

* Psychologe und Universitätsdozent, Master in Gesundheit und Psychoanalyse, Aufbaustudium zu Psychoonkologie. Mitglied des Masterstudiengangs für Sozialwissenschaften der Universidad Centroamericana J.S. Cañas-Universidad Don Bosco in El Salvador. Derzeit entwickelt der Autor eine Präsentation mit dem Titel "Die soziale Dekonstruktion der Trauer und der Horizont der Kontinuitäten" für die American Anthropological Association. EN | Abstract: We can study pain, chronic diseases and death from different angles to the biomedical model, to the perspectives and models of psychology, to palliative and terminal care, and even more, to the branch of medicine that scientifically studies pain and its treatment, algology. Abstract: Schmerz, chronische Krankheiten und Sterben kann aus anderen Blickwinkeln untersucht werden, als dem des biomedizinischen Modells, den Perspektiven und Modellen der Psychologie, der Palliativ-und Sterbebegleitung oder der Schmerztherapie.

A humorous, fictional but academic conversation between two of psychiatry's giants Sigmund Freud and Thomas Szasz. Or is it a dream? Through their animated dialogue and critique of each other's theories is elicited a contrasting exploration of their conceptual differences. The dialogue canvases: the origins of psychiatry; the medical-scientific approach to mental illness and the medicalization of the language of psychiatry; psychiatry as science vs. the social construction of mental illness; hysteria; the causes of mental illness; patients' social responsibility vs. illness; the unconscious mind; sublimation of individual freedom vs. metarules of society and coercion vs. treatment. The conversation demonstrates the sharp contrasts between the seminal works of both theorists; on the one hand Szasz's The myth of mental illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct and Freud's Studies in hysteria (with Breuer) and Civilization and its discontents.

Szasz’s proposed solution  to the “epistemological confusion psychiatry has stumbled upon” (1968, p.14), means that we are left with millions of people who have been misdiagnosed, medicated, categorized and labelled. I aim to show that there must be an ethical non-negotiable commitment within the medical community for keeping the concept of mental illness within its concern, even if it is not, as Hanna Pickard (1999) shows, a natural kind.