Iwo Zmyślony

Praca zawiera eksplikację metodologicznych i epistemologicznych poglądów Michaela Polanyiego, w aspekcie problemów, twierdzeń i założeń wyznaczających treść i zakres pojęcia wiedzy niejawnej (tacit knowledge). Eksplikacja pojęcia wiedzy niejawnej stanowi tu nadrzędny, zaś eksplikacja poglądów Polanyiego – tj. ich systematyzująca rekonstrukcja w aspekcie genezy, struktury i funkcji – cel instrumentalny.

Rozdział pierwszy stanowi podsumowanie stanu badań. Zawiera on rekonstrukcję typowych interpretacji poglądów Polanyiego, jakie funkcjonują na gruncie polskiej i światowej (anglo- i niemieckojęzycznej) literatury filozoficznej oraz typowych sposobów rozumienia kategorii „tacit knowledge”, jakie funkcjonują zarówno na gruncie pism Polanyiego, jak i poza nimi – w literaturze z zakresu socjologii nauki, językoznawstwa oraz psychologii poznawczej. Większość z tych analiz ma charakter semiotyczny – tzn. zdaje sprawę wyłącznie ze sposobów użycia samego terminu (słowa).

Rozdział drugi zawiera analizę poglądów Polanyiego w aspekcie przedmiotowym, skoncentrowaną na rekonstrukcji oraz systematyzacji jego twierdzeń rozproszonych w tekstach źródłowych. Rekonstrukcja ta przebiega w porządku diachroniczno-synchronicznym. Oznacza to, że obie omawiane w tym rozdziale koncepcje – niejawnych przesłanek (tacit premisses) oraz osobistej decyzji (personal decision) – nie tylko składają się na swoiste dla Polanyiego, oryginalne pojęcie nauki, ale i wyznaczają punkt zwrotny na drodze ewolucji jego poglądów epistemologicznych. Z jednej strony mają one stanowić alternatywę dla obiektywistycznego modelu poznania i wiedzy, którego krytyka jest zasadniczym celem jego pierwszych prac – „Science, Faith and Society” [1946], „Logic of Liberty” [1951] oraz „Personal Knowledge” [1958], z drugiej strony stanowią trzon założeń koncepcji niejawnego poznania, którą Polanyi opracowuje dopiero na przełomie lat 60. i 70. – na gruncie „The Tacit Dimension” [1966], „Knowing and Being” [1969] oraz „Meaning” [1975].

Rozdział trzeci zawiera rekonstrukcję ostatniej fazy poglądów Polanyiego – koncepcji niejawnego poznania (tacit knowing), opracowanej przezeń pod koniec życia – na przełomie lat 60. i 70. Podstawowym celem tej koncepcji jest wyjaśnienie genezy niejawnych przesłanek, tj. odpowiedź na pytanie, w jaki sposób nabywamy kompetencji poznawczych i pozapoznawczych oraz w jaki sposób je stosujemy i korygujemy; w szczególności zaś – w jaki sposób nabywamy takich kompetencji, które umożliwiają diagnozowanie, rozwiązywanie problemów i dokonywanie odkryć, tj. rozpoznawanie takich stanów rzeczy, których nie potrafi rozpoznać osoba niekompetentna.Ze względu na tezę o specyficznym paralelizmie struktury poznania i bytu, rozdział ten zawiera również rekonstrukcję poglądów ontologicznych Polanyiego, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem idei hierarchicznej struktury emergentnych poziomów bytu oraz teleologicznej interpretacji koncepcji ewolucji.

W zakończeniu pracy wyróżniam jedenaście typowych sposobów rozumienia wiedzy niejawnej funkcjonujących w poglądach samego Polanyiego oraz szesnaście typowych sposób rozumienia tego pojęcia funkcjonujących na gruncie innych koncepcji. Wskazuje ponadto siedem postulatów znaczeniowych, które powinno spełniać ogólne pojęcie wiedzy niejawnej – niezależne od założeń funkcjonujących na gruncie takiej czy innej koncepcji.

The article undertakes to explicate the concept of art criticism by analyzing the content and the scope of the term. In other words  it reviews essential conceptual connotations of the term and characterizes typical cases of various practices it designates. Undertaken approach involves presentation of structural aspects of the notion, its historical origin, functions and typical ways of understanding. Results are presented in four stages. At first, a commonsensical uses of the term are expounded, as it funtions in natural language. Secondly, two different versions of art criticism are distinguished, i.e. the rational and emotional, with references to historical examples and highlighting the role of aesthetic judgment and pragmatic functions of evaluation. Thirdly, there are analized similarities and differences between art criticism, philosophy of art and historiography of art. Finally, there are pointed out some social factors which may have an impact on contemporary art criticism.

The goal of the article is to identify the merit of controversy between essentialism and antiessentialism in contention about definition of art. Both stands I take here as two different, incommensurable ways of understanding of how to define the art – what exact functions its definition is supposed to bear; in what way and on what basis one ought to formulate it. According to my argument, the main motive of divergences – and the hidden merit of controversy by the same time – is not the question whether there are some general properties of artworks (“the essence of art”), but metaaesthetic presumptions concerning the way of how to conceive general properties at all and how one may come to know them. These presumptions are to be identified by differentiation between two aspects of definition’s method – habitual and verbal one. Habitual definition of art is being formulated by competent verdicts within the art world, while verbal reconstruction of presupposed presumptions is the aim of aesthetics.

The goal of the paper is to expound a notion of conceptual apparatus, by revealing structure and functions of objects it designates. The notion has been developed by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz in the mid of 30ties, within a standpoint of radical conventionalism. According to its proponents, a picture of world one bears is not stated directly by the data of experience, but depends on conceptual apparatus chosen. Ajdukiewicz defines the notion consequently, referring it to a set of all meanings attributed to expressions in a closed and compact language. Nevertheless, it turns out to be vague, since it inherits the vagueness from presupposed categories, especially from ambiguously used category of meaning.

The article comprises therefore a progressive reconstruction of assumed notions, including idea of closed and compact language, idea of meaning rules and idea of matrix of a language. As inquiry exposes, the structure of conceptual apparatus consists of: (1) meaning rules forcing to assert a set of statements within a closed and compact language and (2) the set of statements, which may be asserted. Its function is to force the user of the language to assert some of those statements, while facing data of experience. The notion, however, seems to be inconsistent, in order to the presupposed idea of closed and compact language. Bearing on its basis, it is impossible to face the same data of experience within two different conceptual apparatuses. Apart of the critique, article arises a set of new problems worth further studies within the topic, including the issue of relation of the notion to some related ones, e.g. to interpretative framework or cognitive scheme.

The paper contains an analytical description of different ideas of tacit knowledge, occurring both in texts by Polanyi and by some of his major interpreters.
The results of research carried out in American, German and Polish literature are reported in six steps. First, the most typical interpretations of Polanyi’s philosophy are noted. Secondly, the results of a linguistic analysis of the investigated term are presented and (briefly) outlined. Third, various notions of tacit knowledge as concealed in Polanyi’s main works are reconstructed with a diachronic order. Fourthly, the problem of definition of the category is stated and is briefly discussed. Fifth, a typology of various internal and external notions of tacit knowledge is listed. And the final point submits ideas related to the quest for the basics of tacit knowledge.
The main claim is that – though ideas of tacit knowledge vary according to particular contexts – one may distinguish between two basic interpretations, both of which are contained within Polanyi’s conception of mind and cognitive actions (as developed in The Tacit Dimension). The first basic idea of tacit knowledge refers to a knowledge one seems to have about spontaneously indwelling particulars of experience (the proximal term content); the other refers to a knowledge of how to integrate these particulars into a meaningful whole. Both of these ideas of tacit knowledge modify the traditional idea of knowledge as a justified, true belief, since they presuppose an externalistic idea of justification as something non-accessible as regards introspection of a subject, blended with a behavioral idea of belief as a disposition to action.

How the idea of tacit knowledge is being understood typically? The article reconstructs interpretations in context of three different disciplines: (1) linguistics, (2) cognitive psychology and (3) sociology of knowledge. Furthermore, it proposes (4) definitional criteria for a general notion of tacit knowledge.

Within philosophical interpretation of N. Chomsky’s generative grammar, the term refers to knowledge of linguistic universals and grammar rules. This knowledge is tacit, since it manifests only through ability to (a) recognize grammar proprieties of expressions in natural language, as well as to (b) generate and understand practically infinite number of them. According to J. Fodor it can be identified with ability to speak (making verbal utterances), hence cannot be substantially distinguished from any other forms of embodied or habitual knowledge. According to alternative inter-pretation this kind of tacit knowledge (a) has propositional status, (b) is innate and (c) enable all possible grammar forms to be deduced from it.

Within context of cognitive psychology tacit knowledge is understood habitually, i.e. as knowledge that manifest itself only through skilful action and cannot be lin-guistically verbalised. This idea derives form distinction between declarative and procedural memory, inspired by G. Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and knowing that. Habitual knowledge is (a) completely unaware or almost unaware, (b) cannot be fully made aware nor verbalised, is (c) person-related and (d) context-specific.

Third way of understanding was proposed by Harry Collins, who has recently (2010) introduced three own types of tacit knowledge – (a) somatic, (b) relational and (c) collective. According to his idea knowledge has basically tacit character, since it circulates „throughout the universe” as physically understood information („pattern”) inscribed on different physical carries („strings”). Relational tacit knowledge can be fully verbalized and implemented in human body or any physical automaton. Somatic tacit knowledge cannot be fully verbalised, since – apart of its quasi-mechanical dimension – it also includes improvisatory (ever-adaptive) aspect of human skills, it can be however transferred to animals (like riding a bike). Collective tacit knowledge cannot be verbalised at all – it is specific exclusively to social dimension of cognitive activities (like driving a car), i.e. cannot be transferred to any sort of animals or automata.

Apart of descriptive reconstruction of listed ideas, the article propose four general criteria to define an idea of tacit knowledge sensu largo. According to author’s stand, the term „tacit knowledge” designates (a) all kinds of non-propositional knowledge or unaware propositional knowledge; (b) all kinds of a priori knowledge; (c) dispositional knowledge (skills; competence); (d) knowledge conceived as infor-mation acquired by any system.

Tacit premises of science constitute researcher’s cognitive scheme, i.e. a set of a priori conditions of knowledge acquisition and application. Couple of assumptions make Polanyi’s idea considerably different than Kantian or behavioural or structural interpretations of cognitive scheme. He sees it more in hermeneutical or habitual terms — as system of (a) skills (dispositions to act), which (b) defines the level of competence; (c) cannot be verbally articulated; (d) is embodied (and hence unaware); (e) innate or acquired through practice — in master-pupil relations; (f) undergoes constant modifications when applied; (g) conditions both theoretical actions (eg. categorisation, acts of assertion), as well as practical (manual skills, acts of perception).

The article contains analytical reconstruction of Polanyi’s views originally dispersed throughout all his major works. First two points describe structure and functions of premises — expounded within context of his model of mind and key distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness. Third point analyzes their personal status, focusing on disproportion between their pure functional (habitual) status and linguistic description. Points fourth and five characterise diachronic and synchronic aspects of cognitive scheme as well as closely connected idea of master’s authority and consensus within community of inquirers. Point six contains reconstruction of Polanyian idea of incommensurability and stability of cognitive schemes. Cognitive schemes outline the boundaries of scientific communities. Different schemes are mutually incommensurable in various degree.

Main thesis of this conception is following: premises function solely in tacit mode, i.e. in pure habitual (embodied; indwelled; incorporated) fashion. We derive their existence from „meaningful wholes”, i.e. outcomes of our actions. Typical examples of such actions are gestalt-seeing and diagnosing, bike-riding, playing chess, problem-solving, operating in laboratory, uttering, understanding and asserting (or rejecting) of statements.

Structure of skilfully performed actions (both theoretical and practical) can be reconstructed in strictly verbalized, methodological directives („explicit rules”). No rule however can be applied automatically in all possible cases of experience. Hence application of all methodological directives requires always some tacit premises. Paradigmatic outcome of tacit premises are introspective gestalt-type appearances. According to Polanyi these personal, theory-laden phenomena, distinguish competent researcher from a laymen. Most of them are „intuitive”, i.e. consist purely phenomenal and aesthetic content. Some of them contain additionally conceptual and propositional compounds which can be verbalised. Difference between the subjective „meaning” — i.e. a purely phenomenal, introspective content of gestalt-type perceptions, and „orthodox”, linguistic meaning, conveyed by words, remains vital for understanding of whole Polanyi’s epistemology.

The aim of the article is to explicate Polanyi’s idea of science in aspect of its origins, i.e. criticism of Marxist policy of planning in science followed by defence of scientific freedom in initiating and conducting researches independently of any extraneous pressure.

The first point of article contains reconstruction of Polanyi’s interpretation of Marxist idea of science, which denies a key distinction between pure and applied science, reconstructed in the second point. Further two points describe Polanyi’s criticism of planning in science and expound his idea of scientific freedom. Point five consists in synthetic reconstruction of his notion of science in its four dimensions – objective (verbal and non-verbal), personal, habitual and social.

The aim of article is to expound Polanyi’s notion of science in aspect of its origins, i.e. his criticism of objectivistic ideal of science, conceived as a set of postulates demanding elimination of personal and habitual (i.e. tacit) components of science. As fulcrum of the ideal he points out (1) the laplacean idea of cognition and knowledge and (2) the idea of scientific theory formulated by Ernst Mach. Polanyi’s method of criticism consists on revealing inapplicability of both ideas by comparing them to actual scientific practice within fields of astronomy and mathematics, followed by formulation of an alternative idea of objectivity for scientific theory.

The aim of article is to reconstruct principles of Michael Polanyi's ‘post-critical philosophy’ and the critique of doubt, which is its point of departure. First point reveals origins and aims of Polanyi’s interests, supplemented with explication of his central notions, i.e. ‘meaningful whole’, ‘personal decision’, ‘tacit knowing’ and ‘commitment’. Second point expounds postulates of ‘fiduciary programme’, as formulated against demands of methodological skepticism, produced within tradition of critical philosophy. Third point describes distinction between explicit and tacit forms of doubt, followed by Polanyi’s arguments against ‘reasonable’ and ‘universal’ doubt. Forth point differentiates between propositional and non-propositional aspects of tacit premises of science.

Essay on mutual relations between mental illness, social opression, genius, art and creativity. Contains references to ideas of Hans Prinzhorn, Cesare Lombroso, Michel Foucault and Thomas Szasz, as well as works of Paul Klee, Andre Masson, Adolf Wölfli, Jean Dubuffet and the like.

Immanuel Kant, in seeking the irrefutable foundations of unshakeable knowledge, set two separate spheres against each other – the world of things which we experience using our senses (predominantly sight) and all that which is beyond the realm of the senses, yet which we arrive at through logical thinking. He labelled the former "phenomena" – etymologically speaking – that which manifests (the Greek phainomenon), and the latter "things-in-themselves" or noumena (the Greek for mind is nous). The first of these concepts has now become a permanent part of the philosophical canon, giving birth, among other things, to the study of phenomenology (Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger). The second, however, seemed suspect from the very start, hence it was very quickly removed from broader philosophical discourse and eventually forgotten.

We are referencing The Kantian differentiation here as a sort of conceptual item which will not only help us appreciate the conceptual complexity of the works of Pawel Bownik, but we can also use to then ask several questions about the current status of photography as a whole. Today, it seems, due to the widespread use of new technologies, we are more and more often thinking of photography only in terms of that which can be seen – the flat image to be enjoyed whether it is found in a " white cube " gallery, printed on shiny paper in a coffee table book or scrolling across a smartphone screen. We feel no difference between any of these contexts, forgetting about that which has meaning, yet remains inaccessible to the human eye.

Critical analysis of one of the most prominent art exhibitions in 2015. Despite of curarorial declarations, it hasn't emancipated non-western artworlds, but strengthened postcolonial tensions instead. Text published previously on Contemporary Lynx: http://contemporarylynx.co.uk/archives/10289

Analizuję krytyki podejścia design thinking (Dan Saffer, Natasha Jen, Lee Vinsel, Bruce Nussbaum, Donald Norman) oraz przypadki udanych (PepsiCo) i nieudanych (Oticon) wdrożeń tej metodologii. Na koniec tekstu definiuję pojęcie.

Artykuł ukaże się w publikacji "Robimy studium" towarzyszącej konferencji "Innowacyjne projektowanie miast" organizowanej przez Biuro Architektury i Projektowania Przestrzennego m.st. Warszawy (9-10 maja 2018)

http://robimystudium.pl/
https://issuu.com/beczmiana/docs/robimy_studium

Na przykładzie kuratorskich założeń wystawy "Późna polskość" (marzec-sierpień 2017, U-jazdowski) krytykuję kunktatorstwo polskich instytucji sztuki. Zastanawiam się również czy polska sztuka współczesna musi być lewicowa i postuluję otwarcie przestrzeni jej instytucji w duchu agonistycznym na inne niż lewicowe konteksty ideowe. Tekst zamówiony przez "Pressje" ukaże się w 50. numerze pisma.

Analizując powierzchowne interpretacje pracy Daniela Rycharskiego pokazuję jak łatwo postulowany przez Chantal Mouffe i Ernesta Laclau agonizm przeistacza się w krytykowany przez nich antagonizm. Widzę w tym symptom wyczerpania projektu sztuki krytycznej oraz dominującego w polskiej krytyce artystycznej paradygmatu prześmiewczo-konfrontacyjnego.

Szkicowa prezentacja podstawowych mechanizmów funkcjonowania świata sztuki istotnych z perspektywy początkującego artysty. Tekst stanowi podsumowanie cyklu warsztatów dla studentów polskich Akademii Sztuk Pięknych realizowanych pt. "Artysta - Zawodowiec" przez Fundację Sztuki Polskiej ING w kwietniu i maju 2017 roku (Kraków, Katowice, Wrocław, Szczecin, Poznań, Toruń, Warszawa).

Skrócony zapis debaty na temat performatywnych i politycznych funkcji języka krytyki artystycznej zorganizowanej 14 marca 2016 roku we współpracy z "Kulturą Liberalną" w CSW Zamek Ujazdowski i sfinansowanej z funduszy MKiDN w ramach programu Młoda Polska. W debacie wzięli udział: Ewa Gorządek, Andrzej Draguła, Igor Stokfiszewski, Iwo Zmyślony oraz osoby z sali (m.in. Zuzanna Janin oraz Hanna Wróblewska). Prowadzenie: Katarzyna Kasia. Pełen zapis debaty znajdzie się w przygotowywanej książce na temat aktualnego statusu krytyki artystycznej (planowana publikacja w połowie 2017 roku).

W obecnej sytuacji społeczno-politycznej ugruntowany paradygmat sztuki oparty na krytyce i antagonizmie okazuje się anachroniczny i dysfunkcjonalny. Polska kultura nie potrzebuje więcej antagonizmu. Dziś prawdziwa awangarda to awangarda dialogu. Tej zmiany potrzebujemy w polskim świecie sztuki.

Rekonstrukcja ogólnych systemowych uwarunkowań aktualnej pozycji krytyki artystycznej oraz analiza możliwych przyczyn jej faktycznego kryzysu, z uwzględnieniem m.in. wpływu internetu oraz wzrostu znaczenia instytucji sztuki. Główna teza brzmi następująco: jedną z głównych przyczyn upadku znaczenia krytyki jest ugruntowanie sposobu postrzegania świata sztuki w kategoriach władzy oraz zanik otwartej, inkluzywnej dyskusji o kryteriach. Jest to pierwotna wersja tekstu, który w znacznie skróconej formie opublikowany został w Obiegu (22.12.2015)

How the idea of tacit knowledge is being understood typically? The article reconstructs interpretations in context of three different disciplines: (1) linguistics, (2) cognitive psychology and (3) sociology of knowledge. Furthermore, it proposes (4) definitional criteria for a general notion of tacit knowledge. Abstracts 163 Within philosophical interpretation of N. Chomsky’s generative grammar, the term refers to knowledge of linguistic universals and grammar rules. This knowledge is tacit, since it manifests only through ability to (a) recognize grammar proprieties of expressions in natural language, as well as to (b) generate and understand practically infinite number of them. According to J. Fodor it can be identified with ability to speak (making verbal utterances), hence cannot be substantially distinguished from any other forms of embodied or habitual knowledge. According to alternative interpretation this kind of tacit knowledge (a) has propositional status, (b) is innate and (c) enable all possible grammar forms to be deduced from it. Within context of cognitive psychology tacit knowledge is understood habitually, i.e. as knowledge that manifest itself only through skilful action and cannot be linguistically verbalised. This idea derives form distinction between declarative and procedural memory, inspired by G. Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and knowing that. Habitual knowledge is (a) completely unaware or almost unaware, (b) cannot be fully made aware nor verbalised, is (c) person-related and (d) contextspecific. Third way of understanding was proposed by Harry Collins, who has recently (2010) introduced three own types of tacit knowledge — (a) somatic, (b) relational and (c) collective. According to his idea knowledge has basically tacit character, since it circulates „throughout the universe” as physically understood information („pattern”) inscribed on different physical carries („strings”). Relational tacit knowledge can be fully verbalized and implemented in human body or any physical automaton. Somatic tacit knowledge cannot be fully verbalised, since – apart of its quasi-mechanical dimension – it also includes improvisatory (ever-adaptive) aspect of human skills, it can be however transferred to animals (like riding a bike). Collective tacit knowledge cannot be verbalised at all – it is specific exclusively to social dimension of cognitive activities (like driving a car), i.e. cannot be transferred to any sort of animals or automata. Apart of descriptive reconstruction of listed ideas, the article propose four general criteria to define an idea of tacit knowledge sensu largo. According to author’s stand, the term „tacit knowledge” designates (a) all kinds of non-propositional knowledge or unaware propositional knowledge; (b) all kinds of a priori knowledge; (c) dispositional knowledge (skills; competence); (d) knowledge conceived as information acquired by any organic system through permanent interaction with environment.

Tacit premises of science constitute researcher’s cognitive scheme, i.e. a set of a priori conditions of knowledge acquisition and application. Couple of assumptions make Polanyi’s idea considerably different than Kantian or behavioural or structural interpretations of cognitive scheme. He sees it more in hermeneutical or habitual terms — as system of (a) skills (dispositions to act), which (b) defines the level of competence; (c) cannot be verbally articulated; (d) is embodied (and hence unaware); (e) innate or acquired through practice — in master-pupil relations; (f) undergoes constant modifications when applied; (g) conditions both theoretical actions (eg. categorisation, acts of assertion), as well as practical (manual skills, acts of perception). The article contains analytical reconstruction of Polanyi’s views originally dispersed throughout all his major works. First two points describe structure and functions of premises — expounded within context of his model of mind and key distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness. Third point analyzes their personal status, focusing on disproportion between their pure functional (habitual) status and linguistic description. Points fourth and five characterise diachronic and synchronic aspects of cognitive scheme as well as closely connected idea of master’s authority and consensus within community of inquirers. Point six contains reconstruction of Polanyian idea of incommensurability and stability of cognitive schemes. Cognitive schemes outline the boundaries of scientific communities. Different schemes are mutually incommensurable in various degree. Main thesis of this conception is following: premises function solely in tacit mode, i.e. in pure habitual (embodied; indwelled; incorporated) fashion. We derive their existence from „meaningful wholes”, i.e. outcomes of our actions. Typical examples of such actions are gestalt-seeing and diagnosing, bike-riding, playing chess, problem-solving, operating in laboratory, uttering, understanding and asserting (or rejecting) of statements. Structure of skilfully performed actions (both theoretical and practical) can be reconstructed in strictly verbalized, methodological directives („explicit rules”). No rule however can be applied automatically in all possible cases of experience. Hence application of all methodological directives requires always some tacit premises. Paradigmatic outcome of tacit premises are introspective gestalt-type appearances. According to Polanyi these personal, theory-laden phenomena, distinguish competent researcher from a laymen. Most of them are „intuitive”, i.e. consist purely phenomenal and aesthetic content. Some of them contain additionally conceptual and propositional compounds which can be verbalised. Difference between the subjective „meaning” — i.e. a purely phenomenal, introspective content of gestalt-type perceptions, and „orthodox”, linguistic meaning, conveyed by words, remains vital for understanding of whole Polanyi’s epistemology.

"Tacit premises of science constitute researcher’s cognitive scheme, i.e. a set of a priori conditions of knowledge acquisition and application. Couple of assumptions make Polanyi’s idea considerably different than Kantian or behavioural or structural interpretations of cognitive scheme. He sees it more in hermeneutical or habitual terms — as system of (a) skills (dispositions to act), which (b) defines the level of competence; (c) cannot be verbally articulated; (d) is embodied (and hence unaware); (e) innate or acquired through practice — in master-pupil relations; (f) undergoes constant modifications when applied; (g) conditions both theoretical actions (eg. categorisation, acts of assertion), as well as practical (manual skills, acts of perception). The article contains analytical reconstruction of Polanyi’s views originally dispersed throughout all his major works. First two points describe structure and functions of premises — expounded within context of his model of mind and key distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness. Third point analyzes their personal status, focusing on disproportion between their pure functional (habitual) status and linguistic description. Points fourth and five characterise diachronic and synchronic aspects of cognitive scheme as well as closely connected idea of master’s authority and consensus within community of inquirers. Point six contains reconstruction of Polanyian idea of incommensurability and stability of cognitive schemes. Cognitive schemes outline the boundaries of scientific communities. Different schemes are mutually incommensurable in various degree. Main thesis of this conception is following: premises function solely in tacit mode, i.e. in pure habitual (embodied; indwelled; incorporated) fashion. We derive their existence from „meaningful wholes”, i.e. outcomes of our actions. Typical examples of such actions are gestalt-seeing and diagnosing, bike-riding, playing chess, problem-solving, operating in laboratory, uttering, understanding and asserting (or rejecting) of statements. Structure of skilfully performed actions (both theoretical and practical) can be reconstructed in strictly verbalized, methodological directives („explicit rules”). No rule however can be applied automatically in all possible cases of experience. Hence application of all methodological directives requires always some tacit premises. Paradigmatic outcome of tacit premises are introspective gestalt-type appearances. According to Polanyi these personal, theory-laden phenomena, distinguish competent researcher from a laymen. Most of them are „intuitive”, i.e. consist purely phenomenal and aesthetic content. Some of them contain additionally conceptual and propositional compounds which can be verbalised. Difference between the subjective „meaning” — i.e. a purely phenomenal, introspective content of gestalt-type perceptions, and „orthodox”, linguistic meaning, conveyed by words, remains vital for understanding of whole Polanyi’s epistemology."

"How the idea of tacit knowledge is being understood typically? The article reconstructs interpretations in context of three different disciplines: (1) linguistics, (2) cognitive psychology and (3) sociology of knowledge. Furthermore, it proposes (4) definitional criteria for a general notion of tacit knowledge. Within philosophical interpretation of N. Chomsky’s generative grammar, the term refers to knowledge of linguistic universals and grammar rules. This knowledge is tacit, since it manifests only through ability to (a) recognize grammar proprieties of expressions in natural language, as well as to (b) generate and understand practically infinite number of them. According to J. Fodor it can be identified with ability to speak (making verbal utterances), hence cannot be substantially distinguished from any other forms of embodied or habitual knowledge. According to alternative inter-pretation this kind of tacit knowledge (a) has propositional status, (b) is innate and (c) enable all possible grammar forms to be deduced from it. Within context of cognitive psychology tacit knowledge is understood habitually, i.e. as knowledge that manifest itself only through skilful action and cannot be lin-guistically verbalised. This idea derives form distinction between declarative and procedural memory, inspired by G. Ryle’s distinction between knowing how and knowing that. Habitual knowledge is (a) completely unaware or almost unaware, (b) cannot be fully made aware nor verbalised, is (c) person-related and (d) context-specific. Third way of understanding was proposed by Harry Collins, who has recently (2010) introduced three own types of tacit knowledge – (a) somatic, (b) relational and (c) collective. According to his idea knowledge has basically tacit character, since it circulates „throughout the universe” as physically understood information („pattern”) inscribed on different physical carries („strings”). Relational tacit knowledge can be fully verbalized and implemented in human body or any physical automaton. Somatic tacit knowledge cannot be fully verbalised, since – apart of its quasi-mechanical dimension – it also includes improvisatory (ever-adaptive) aspect of human skills, it can be however transferred to animals (like riding a bike). Collective tacit knowledge cannot be verbalised at all – it is specific exclusively to social dimension of cognitive activities (like driving a car), i.e. cannot be transferred to any sort of animals or automata. Apart of descriptive reconstruction of listed ideas, the article propose four general criteria to define an idea of tacit knowledge sensu largo. According to author’s stand, the term „tacit knowledge” designates (a) all kinds of non-propositional knowledge or unaware propositional knowledge; (b) all kinds of a priori knowledge; (c) dispositional knowledge (skills; competence); (d) knowledge conceived as infor-mation acquired by any system."

How the idea of tacit knowledge is being understood typically? The article reconstructs interpretations in context of three different disciplines: (1) linguistics, (2) cognitive psychology and (3) sociology of knowledge. Furthermore, it proposes (4) definitional criteria for a general notion of tacit knowledge. Abstracts 163 Within philosophical interpretation of N. Chomsky’s generative grammar, the term refers to knowledge of linguistic universals and grammar rules. This knowledge is tacit, since it manifests only through ability to (a) recognize grammar proprieties of expressions in natural language, as well as to (b) generate and understand practically infinite number of them. According to J. Fodor it can be identified with ability to speak (making verbal utterances), hence cannot be substantially distinguished from any other forms of embodied or habitual knowledge. According to alternative interpretation this kind of tacit knowledge (a) has propositional status, (b) is innate an...

Tacit premises of science constitute researcher’s cognitive scheme, i.e. a set of a priori conditions of knowledge acquisition and application. Couple of assumptions make Polanyi’s idea considerably different than Kantian or behavioural or structural interpretations of cognitive scheme. He sees it more in hermeneutical or habitual terms — as system of (a) skills (dispositions to act), which (b) defines the level of competence; (c) cannot be verbally articulated; (d) is embodied (and hence unaware); (e) innate or acquired through practice — in master-pupil relations; (f) undergoes constant modifications when applied; (g) conditions both theoretical actions (eg. categorisation, acts of assertion), as well as practical (manual skills, acts of perception). The article contains analytical reconstruction of Polanyi’s views originally dispersed throughout all his major works. First two points describe structure and functions of premises — expounded within context of his model of mind and k...