US Military History

Throughout history the taking of prisoners has always been an artifact of warfare. Prisoners taken during ancient times could have been released back to their own sides after the payment of ransom. Some prisoners as was the Roman practice, were taken back to Rome and pressed into a lifetime of slavery. In some cultures, and unfortunately throughout the history of warfare, some prisoners where held briefly and then killed.  The fact of prisoners as a natural and expected consequence of conflict was often planned for and the conditions of their imprisonment and treatment, was in the 16th century and up into the 20th century codified into Treaty and International Statute.  Because of the shifting nature of warfare particularly in the beginning of the 21st century, prisoners no longer neatly fit into the categories set forth in existing law. In some instances they are not even referred to as “prisoners” but rather as “detainees”  as if to confer on them some kind of particular or different status.  The question of what to do with those involved in armed resistance and how to categorize them created confusion and indeed violations of international law during the operations both at first in Afghanistan but later Iraq.  This paper will focus on the status of detainees in Iraq and the treatment of those captured and interned.

The importance of the Occupation within Japanese economic history is beyond doubt, however there still remain various partially explored regions within the scholarly landscape of the period. One subject which falls into this category is the impact of small four-wheel-drive passenger vehicles, or jeeps, during the Occupation. This subject can be considered ‘partially explored’, as within the scholarship its cultural impact is clearly mapped out, and often linked in the process to the power of the Occupation itself, but within the economic sphere, the jeep remains all but invisible, somewhat akin to the censorship of the jeep (and all other visible symbols of the Occupation) from Japanese films produced at the time. The reasons for this curious partial absence of perhaps the most visible symbol of the Occupation vary, as detailed below. Indeed, the jeep could be said to be in some ways a mechanical embodiment of the Occupation; an alien, militarised, and undeniably American presence in postwar Japan. The jeep, being the omnipresent transportation of General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (GHQ) personnel, also traverses the entire landscape of Occupation. As well as being the ‘steed’ which bore everything the Occupation brought, the jeep itself also exerted other direct influences on Japan during the years 1945-1952. Some of these were cultural, influencing many Japanese people’s ideas about personal transportation and automobiles in general. Others were clearly economic, with the maintenance, refurbishment, and later, manufacture of jeeps, forming a major but rarely examined, element within the development of the postwar Japanese automotive industry. This highly symbolic (and literal) reconstruction an iconic piece of Americana in Japan was also one which laid some of the foundations of the subsequent success of several of Japan’s postwar automotive giants. This paper attempts to examine the impact of the jeep from both of these perspectives, reassessing the already well established cultural interpretations of the jeep’s impact, and detailing the hitherto neglected economic influences of the jeep during the era.

The socioeconomic composition of the officer corps of the Continental Army has not received as much attention as that of the enlisted soldiers; the officers are generally assumed to have been members of America's colonial elite. The need for large numbers of men to fill leadership positions in the nation's first regular army presented an opportunity greater than at any time previous in America for the attainment of rank and status through an officer's commission. Based upon research on the Maryland Line, this article argues that a larger segment of the Continental Army's officer corps originated in a " middling " socioeconomic range than presently thought. * I would like to thank J. Scott Price, Charles R. V. O'Quinn, and Charles Neimeyer for their insightful suggestions and encouragement. I am grateful to Terry Bouton for his guidance when this project was in the research and thesis stage. I am thankful as well to Bruce Vandervort and the anonymous reviewers at the Journal of Military History. The contributions and helpful criticisms offered by all the above made this a far better product. Any and all errors are entirely mine.. Authorization to photocopy items for internal and personal use is granted by the copyright holder for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), 121 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923 USA (www.copyright.com), provided the appropriate fee is paid to the CCC.

O livro tira do esquecimento a origem da disputa entre China e Estados Unidos pela autonomia da Coreia do Norte, da balança de poder da Ásia e do status quo político internacional. A Guerra Sino-Americana entre 1950 e 1953 foi travada por três milhões de soldados de vinte e seis diferentes nacionalidades. Os desenvolvimentos das operações militares e negociações diplomáticas na Península Coreana entre a coalizão de países formada por China, Coreia do Norte e União Soviética e a coalizão de membros dos cinco continentes das Nações Unidas liderada pelos Estados Unidos alteraram as relações internacionais da Guerra Fria e as relações políticas e de segurança regionais da Ásia e da Europa.

A Guerra Sino-Americana é o caso exemplar do tipo de guerra limitada - em que se luta enquanto se negocia - e das consequências da falta de apropriados arcabouços conceituais, organizacionais e doutrinários para trava-la. Ambos os países tiveram que aprender sobre ela enquanto conduziam suas campanhas, e seus oficiais militares, exércitos e países sofreram com as graves discórdias entre suas respectivas lideranças políticas e comandantes, resultando em desgastes de suas instituições e maiores e menores graus de expurgos de suas forças armadas.

O livro executa uma metodologia de análise crítica de guerras contemporâneas a partir da Teoria da Guerra de Carl von Clausewitz sobre fontes primárias e secundárias ocidentais e orientais e estudos de campo na Coreia do Sul e na Zona Desmilitarizada (DMZ). Como resultado, ele infere minuciosamente as condições e instituições políticas, as possibilidades estratégicas, o teatro de operações coreano, os comandantes e as forças combatentes envolvidas, os planos de guerras, as negociações diplomáticas entre e dentro das duas coalizões, as campanhas e as batalhas dessa guerra.

The tradition of the US Army dates back to the era of patrimony of the Continental army, which was established on June 14, 1775. Topics related to land troops of the US Army are very complex and involve many substantial threads from the 18th to the 21st century. Publications on this subject can be divided into articles published in scientific journals, popular-science articles, and books. The books on the army can be further divided into synthesis (general overviews), anthologies, encyclopedias and dictionaries, autobiographies and biographies (personal and collective), journalistic reports, and monographs. In terms of thematic monographs, there are monographs of individual battles, campaigns, wars, intervention units, doctrines, and weapons. Autobiographies and biographies relate specifically to leaders of the US Army, and in doing so highlight related topics of the US Army’s evolution and history. Encyclopedias and dictionaries of armed conflicts focus on concepts or people. Journalistic reports apply to individual campaigns. These publications represent the achievements of military institutions connected with the US Army, analytical centers, think-tanks, and independent researchers. The most valuable publications, in terms of the merit, are those issued by the US universities and research institutions associated with the US Army, including the official US Army Center of Military History.

Throughout both early and modern history, military forces have been contingent on civilian contractors/companies to give their military forces flexibility, or to fulfill logistical and support functions that would ease the burden on enlisted soldiers. During the Vietnam War the military relied heavily on civilian contractors to maintain equipment needed for the field in areas such as communication and maintenance of most field equipment. With the advancement of new and specialized equipment the ordinary soldier is not equipped with the necessary technical skills to repair specialized equipment, so the military uses civilians to keep the various systems and field equipment in running order. After the Cold War conventional warfare and the use of military has changed from conventional to unconventional warfare, guerilla warfare.Private military companies maybe one of the most important concept within the security studies that has developed over the past decade or so. This new industry, where these companies not only supply the necessary equipment of warfare, but also fulfill many of the professional functions within warzones, is not only significant to the defense community, but has wider ramifications for international policies and warfare.

Forward. This paper is, for all intents and purposes, a group effort, based on research and images gathered by myself and others who have been generous enough to share their finds. While Continental Army regimental coats show some design trends at different periods of the war, there was no standardized coat pattern until 1779. Even after that, military clothing manufacture was open to differing patterns, contractor malfeasance, field modifications, and use of captured British apparel.

Forward. This paper is, for all intents and purposes, a group effort, based on research and images gathered by myself and others who have been generous enough to share their finds. While Continental Army regimental coats show some design trends at different periods of the war, there was no standardized coat pattern until 1779. Even after that, military clothing manufacture was open to differing patterns, contractor malfeasance, field modifications, and use of captured British apparel.

The age of the all-metal-cased small arms cartridge is coming to a close. Refinements in materials technology and ammunition design have opened the way for new ammunition construction techniques utilising lightweight and inexpensive polymers in place of traditional brass or steel. Conventionally configured cartridges are far from optimal in terms of overall length, weight, and volume. Cased telescoped (CT) ammunition offers the potential for significant reduction in all of these areas and has the potential to significantly benefit the front-line soldier and rear-line logistician alike. This report provides a high-level overview of the current and historical state of development on a range of cased telescoped (CT) cartridge designs. It also provides a technical analysis of CT ammunition, including defining these cartridges and distinguishing them from semi-telescoped examples. In addition to assessing the technical characteristics and providing historical context, the report also addresses logistical and programmatic concerns, charting the course of the U.S. LSAT programme and associated efforts. The implications of CT ammunition are also explored, with military requirements and opportunities for change assessed.

On morning of 1 July 1945 hundreds of warships and vessels from the United States Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, and the Royal Netherlands Navy lay off the coast of Balikpapan, an oil refining centre on Borneo’s south-east coast. This offensive to land the veteran 7th Australian Infantry Division at Balikpapan was the last of a series amphibious operations conducted by the Allies to liberate areas of Dutch and British territory on Borneo. It was the largest amphibious operation conducted by Australian forces during the Second World War. Within an hour some 16,500 troops were ashore and pushing inland, along with nearly 1,000 vehicles.  More than 33,000 personnel from the 7th Division and Allied forces were landed in the amphibious assault.
Balikpapan is often cited as an example of the expertise achieved by Australian forces in amphibious operations during the war. It was a remarkable development. Four years earlier, the capability of Australia or even the United States to conduct amphibious operations in the South-West Pacific Area was limited if not non-existent. This paper provides a brief outline of the development of amphibious operations in the SWPA during the Second World War.

Rapid advances in disruptive technologies and new emerging threats has impelled the US Army to rethink how it prepares for near-peer and peer-on-peer competition. In 2018, the US Army unveiled its concept of "Multi-Domain Operations" (MDO) and, as with the previous doctrine of AirLand Battle, MDO is influencing the way that the US Army will equip and fight future wars. MDO is not yet doctrine, but it has the potential to be a driving force in the development and procurement of weapon systems for the US Army. MDO is the visualization of the interaction of five domains of modern warfare. These domains are the traditional domains of land, sea and air; combined with the newer warfighting domains of space, and cyber. MDO visualizes the future fight as a contest in all five domains, simultaneously, across the breadth

While there is a trend toward an overly militaristic American foreign policy, this is due more to the American military’s responsiveness and capacity to accomplish non-military activities than a rogue state strategy dedicated to the rule of force. However, American strategic communications have been ineffectual in articulating this distinction, overcoming the stigma associated with militaries as instruments of oppression, and in conveying to the world a concise, sustained and positive message of its National strategy.

The United States has engaged in several years of war in Iraq against the Islamic State (IS) since launching Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in October 2014. The United States estimates that they have killed more than 60,000 IS members, conducted more than 22,000 airstrikes and trained more than 100,000 security forces throughout Iraq. The successful U.S. campaign is in contrast to past operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere and is best encapsulated in the " by, with, and through " approach of letting Iraqis lead operations. This bottom-up approach is tactically successful but is short on strategy, opening the door for Iranian influence in Iraq. The United States is modeling other counterterror operations throughout the world on its Iraq success with other " build partner capacity " programs. Based on two years of fieldwork and interviews, this article examines both the tactical successes and policy implications of the U.S. successes against IS in Iraq.

The Battle of Chipyong-ni in February 1951 was considered the Gettysburg of the Korean War and a decisive turning point in the conflict. This chapter in the anthology "The Wrath of Achilles Essays on Command in Battle" tells the story from the American perspective and provides insights into command, decision-making, and leadership.

Contrary to Robert Dykstra’s contention, we do not attempt to equate Soviet and U.S. crimes. Instead, we present new quantitative evidence that indicates a higher rate of U.S.-perpetrated crime than previously thought. The result should be a re-appraisal of U.S. soldiers’ behavior that penetrates further than the popular narrative that contrasts a peaceful West with a disorderly East. Dykstra’s mistaken critique of our statistical results appears to derive from his failure to appreciate the full relationship between crime reports and crime charges and from his lack of familiarity with the complications surrounding the calculation of the “dark number.”

General John Yeosock was a leader of singular ability and dedication who served with remarkable distinction as a soldier.  For the better part of four decades, he led America’s soldiers in peace and war, commanding with consummate skill and ability.  I first met John Yeosock when we were both lieutenants in the Brave Rifles--the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.  Throughout our years of close friendship, I have always marveled at his skill and sensitivity as a commander.  Even in those early days, he possessed that vital yet undefineable quality of leadership that drew his soldiers to him.  He inspired every soldier with whom he served to reach his or her full potential.  He understood soldiers, and he loved them.

John Yeosock’s contributions to the Army and to the Nation reached beyond his role as a commander.  He was as much at home in the halls of the Pentagon and the inner circles of national level decision-making as he was in the mud with his soldiers.  He was at once a strategic visionary, a pragmatic leader, and a man of uncompromising integrity, and he brought this unique combination of talents to bear in some of the thorniest challenges the Army confronted.

Perhaps at no time were his abilities more evident than during the Gulf War.  In a complex joint and combined organization, John Yeosock commanded Third U.S. Army--and all the U.S. Army land combat elements in the war.  Executing with operational agility and skill, General Yeosock moved two heavy corps--some eight divisions in all--across the Saudi desert to strike at the Iraqi Army where it least expected it.  As a result, the United States and the Coalition won a victory of historic proportions.

At the same time he was preparing his soldiers for battle, John Yeosock was also the primary coordinator of all support operations in the theater.  Without losing focus on the battle at hand, he insured that U.S. and coalition forces received the full measure of support they required--at the right place and the right time.

It was no accident that General Yeosock performed with such singular skill and ability in the Gulf.  He had been honing his tactical and technical proficiency over an entire career of service to the nation.  The history of John Yeosock is the history of the American leader--and he stands as a model for generations of commanders who will take their places in the defense of the nation., Carl E. Vuono, General, US Army [Ret], 27 March 1998

The paper is a follow up on "USA's semi-hot war for control of Russia's natural resources: the Syrian episode." It does report on a largely unknown and totally ignored land-only channel for illegal refugees and jihadis entering Europe from Turkey.

During World War II a daring action by Australian commandos  to capture an airfield at Kaiapit changed the strategic situation in New Guinea. However, 75 years on, where the 1942 battles of Kokoda and Milne have become famous, the 1943 campaigns in New Guinea - which included stunning actions such as Kaipait - are absent from Australian popular memory.

364 Armed Forces & Society/Spring 1991 Figure 1 African-American Women as Percentage of Active-Duty Female Officers and Enlisted Personnel 40 30 с 0) о i-ш Q. 20-10 0 □ Enlisted В Officers -1 г-^ -».-. — „»» ,~~ _,«___ _ "■ "■■"■■"■ "■ " ■^•юсог^оооо-г-сисо'^- ...

This study examines the social-political and military requirements for and development of a comprehensive strategy by the U.S to detect, degrade, and defeat the Islamic State via the use of both hard and soft power. Various aspects of the U.S. military and operations of influence during Operation Inherent Resolve are here analyzed to underscore strategies, tactics, and techniques of the U.S. against the Islamic State in relation to the Smart Power Theory of political scientist Joseph Nye. This study examines the goals of the U.S. regarding the Islamic State and how they are achieved through the complementary and synchronized development of both kinetic and influence operations. Utilizing a combination of open and axial coding and triangulation of recurring themes and data points to synthesize concepts and categories among the latest capabilities and motives of the Islamic State, and drawing on the current qualitative unclassified literature related to Operation Inherent Resolve, the findings conclude a feasible and necessary course of action for the U.S. This course of action has allowed the U.S. to confront and defeat the Islamic State by the structuring and proper follow-through of an all-encompassing, well-resourced, and synchronized civil-military campaign that utilizes both hard and soft power.

Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have been defined as anything from a firepower system whose overall performance provides a high probability of hitting targets with single-round efficiency, to a weapon capable of achieving a specified circular error probable.  The modern precision weapon era is generally recognised to have begun during the Vietnam conflict.  As part of a new revolution in military affairs, PGMs have mitigated the destruction capable of being inflicted on the environment through aerial warfare. But the environment, as a constant entity that can transcend even the most sophisticated military technology, has directly and indirectly provided both refuge and exposure for human combatants subject to enemy PGM strikes, and been a hindrance or an aid to those precision-guided weapon systems. Namely, there are urban centres, underground facilities, vegetation, and terrain as part of the Earth’s crust on the one hand, and cloud, dust, haze, smoke, and sunlight, or the absence of it, in the atmosphere on the other.  Some PGM types’ guidance systems were less susceptible to atmospheric phenomena, but were by no means infallible. The aerial campaigns in Vietnam, in Iraq during both the 1990-91 conflict and the opening year of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003), in Yugoslavia in 1999, and in Afghanistan in 2001 are of particular interest, since these locations’ environments differ from each other and many PGMs were fired in them. The militaries under study, mainly that of the United States but also that of the United Kingdom, became increasingly reliant on PGMs to achieve their objectives as the period progressed.

Accounts from victims and observers, including new research in the U.S. National Archives and the Bavarian State Archives, suggest that American soldiers committed crimes against persons--especially rape and various forms of assault--and against property in Europe after World War II more often than statistics about charges and prosecutions at the time indicated. More importantly, previously unexamined statistical summaries of crimes committed by American troops, as recorded by the U.S. Provost Marshal, provide unprecedented quantitative information about these crimes in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) during the first postwar year, May 1945 to June 1946. The absolute number of crimes decreased as the number of troops declined, but the rate of crime (number per 10,000 troops) increased during the same period.

[Forthcoming] Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2016), 1-33.

There is an undeniable instrumentalism to the study of history within military institutions. The temptation to draw broad lessons from the past – universally applicable, but often simplistically derived – is alive and well in armed forces around the world. The broader danger of such instrumentalism is the potential of glorifying past military endeavors. In doing so, we risk making military history a tool of propagandistic mythmaking – a “handmaid of militarism,” in the historian Sir Michael Howard’s memorable phrase. To avoid treating military history as a library of reductive “lessons learned,” as an amplifier for uncritical thinking about the role of military leaders, or as a means of perpetuating popular historical myths, future military officers need to study more than just military institutions, commanders, and soldiers. This is particularly true when studying the history of military occupation, where future military officers must broaden their historical inquiries to include the relationships between military and non-military actors – the civilians, aid workers, international organizations, refugees, wounded and sick soldiers, internees, prisoners of war, and demobilized military forces that make the dynamics of military occupation so complex.

Unul dintre cele mai obscure războaie din istoria lumii a fost cel dintre SUA și Marea Britanie de la înseputul secolului 19. Dus în condiții destul de grele, acesta se va lungi timp de aproape trei ani, rămânând în istorie pentru faptul că, în 1814, britanicii au ocupat capitala Washington și i-au dat foc.

This article examines the relationship between scandal and democracy through the case of sexual assault within the US military. Scandal is routinely seen as hostile to democracy. It signals either the corruption of prominent institutions or the decline of ethical journalism. But scandal may have a positive dimension in forcing tainted institutions to correct their course. To explore this thesis, we examine how the US military responded to news reports of sexual assault over a period of nearly four decades. During the first three decades of this period, news reports of sexual assault were widespread but largely ignored by military leaders. During the last decade, however, the fact that sexual assault was endemic but largely ignored by the armed forces triggered a scandal, one senior military figures were forced to address. In light of this case, the article concludes that scandal can function as a mechanism of democratic governance, where it compels social and ethical norms to be properly enforced.

US imperialism is the worst possible imperialism right now in the world. You will understand 1,000% why China is not going to yield to that kind of imperialism, even if military imperialism has been out of the picture since the debacle in Kabul that was nothing but a repeat of the debacle in Saigon with a few more debacles of the same type in Somalia and in Iran, not to speak of the hellish defeat in Iraq and Syria. It is not because US imperialism has been castrated of its military raping power that it is not dangerous anymore. Now it uses commercial weapons which are even worse in many ways since they target the poor of the world. You are telling me "In God, we trust" is their Christian faith? Bone Sorry, man, boy, woman and girl, daughter and son. They are no longer Christian, or they are a new "race" of Christians, the imperialistic Christians of the descent into Hell for everyone they dislike.