Bradley Strawser
US Naval Postgraduate School, Defense Analysis, Faculty Member
The latest NPS Big Ideas Exchange showcases five NPS speakers that bring forward new and potentially game-changing ideas to address grand challenges in American national security. Presentations focus on innovation in the military, the... more
The latest NPS Big Ideas Exchange showcases five NPS speakers that bring forward new and potentially game-changing ideas to address grand challenges in American national security. Presentations focus on innovation in the military, the ethics of unmanned systems, and advancements in explosives through metallurgy
Research Interests:
Are contemporary soldiers exploited by the state and society that they defend? More specifically, have America’s professional service members been uniquely exploited insofar as they have disproportionately carried the moral weight of... more
Are contemporary soldiers exploited by the state and society that they defend? More specifically, have America’s professional service members been uniquely exploited insofar as they have disproportionately carried the moral weight of America’s collective warfighting decisions since the inception of the all-volunteer force post-Vietnam and particularly since 9/11? In this work, Michael Robillard and Bradley Strawser argue that many of American soldiers have indeed been exploited in this unique way. By offering their original normative theory of “moral exploitation”—the notion that persons or groups can be wrongfully exploited by being made to shoulder an excessive amount of moral responsibility, moral risk, and exposure to “dirty hands”—Robillard and Strawser make the case that such a state of affairs describes America’s present relationship with its military. By offering a thorough and in-depth analysis of some of the exploitative and misleading elements of present-day military recr...
Research Interests:
The Big Idea Exchange (BIX)Includes presentation slidesA burning aluminum cube releases much more energy than a detonating TNT cube. What if we could force aluminum to burn very rapidly? Next generation weapons may pack a bigger bang in a... more
The Big Idea Exchange (BIX)Includes presentation slidesA burning aluminum cube releases much more energy than a detonating TNT cube. What if we could force aluminum to burn very rapidly? Next generation weapons may pack a bigger bang in a smaller package by clever use of metal combustion
Research Interests:
Debate over the ethical obligations of technology corporations has recently extended to the obligations of those who support them financially. In June 2020, numerous companies that advertise on social media platforms withdrew their... more
Debate over the ethical obligations of technology corporations has recently extended to the obligations of those who support them financially. In June 2020, numerous companies that advertise on social media platforms withdrew their business, citing failures of the platforms (especially Facebook) to address the proliferation of hateful content [1]. Many were inspired by the #StopHateForProfit campaign initiated by the Anti-Defamation League. These events invite reflection on an understudied topic: the ethics of boycotting by corporations. Although value-driven consumerism has generated significant recent discussion in applied ethics, that discussion has focused almost exclusively on the consumption choices of individuals. As this paper underscores, value-driven consumerism by business corporations complicates these issues and invites further research. We begin by arguing that, at least through June 2020, Facebook was involved in injustice significant enough to raise questions of complicity by its advertisers. But does this injustice generate an obligation for advertisers to cancel their contracts? Recent views on the ethics of boycotting by individuals hold that boycotts are a generally permissible form of political expression and likely morally required under certain conditions [2]–[4]. However, we argue that boycotting by companies raises additional considerations and provides a helpful test case for various positions on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Indeed, we suggest that boycotting by corporations may sometimes be morally required, and this obligation challenges the plausibility of certain minimalist conceptions of CSR [5]. Yet, boycotting by corporations may also threaten democratic forms of political contestation, by inhibiting deliberation and equal participation in the resolution of political controversies [6]. This observation reveals the limits of corporate citizenship conceptions of CSR, which encourage corporations to be forceful activists for social change [7]. We propose preliminary principles for the ethics of boycotting by corporations; indicate how these principles relate to different CSR paradigms; and show how these insights contribute to efforts to improve the accountability of technology corporations.
Research Interests:
This paper examines the morality of cyber weapons, offering conditions under which they are not only ethical under just war theory, but morally preferred over their kinetic counterparts. When these conditions are satisfied, states not... more
This paper examines the morality of cyber weapons, offering conditions under which they are not only ethical under just war theory, but morally preferred over their kinetic counterparts. When these conditions are satisfied, states not only have the option of using cyber weapons, but could even acquire a moral duty to do so over other forms of warfare. In particular, we show that states are morally obliged to use cyber weapons instead of kinetic weapons when they can be deployed for a purpose already deemed just under the law of armed conflict and without any significant loss of capability. The reason behind this moral obligation is that cyber weapons can reduce both the risk to one's own (putatively just) military and the harm to one's adversary and non-combatants. The paper discusses this obligation, using examples to illustrate cases where it does or does not apply. It also addresses several objections that have been raised about the use of cyber weapons, showing that th...
Research Interests:
In the domain of cyber defense, the concept of active defense is often taken to mean aggressive actions against the source of an attack. It is given such names as “attack back” and “hack back” and equated with offensive cyber strikes. It... more
In the domain of cyber defense, the concept of active defense is often taken to mean aggressive actions against the source of an attack. It is given such names as “attack back” and “hack back” and equated with offensive cyber strikes. It is considered dangerous and potentially harmful, in part because the apparent source of an attack may be an innocent party whose computer has been compromised and exploited by the attacker.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Following the humanitarian horrors of the 1990s, the international community began to seek consensus on a new norm to help address the tension between upholding the sovereign right of states to administer their own internal affairs, and... more
Following the humanitarian horrors of the 1990s, the international community began to seek consensus on a new norm to help address the tension between upholding the sovereign right of states to administer their own internal affairs, and the pressing need for civilian populations to be protected from their own government in certain situations. The result was the responsibility to protect initiative from the UN, accepted as an emerging norm and based on existing legal structures although not itself necessarily accepted as law. This volume looks not only at the humanitarian-inspired interventions of the past 15 years, such as those that took place under the Force for Good banner of the UK Government under New Labour, but also looks at what this has meant for the people actually involved in doing them. What responsibilities do states have towards their own soldiers when sending them to protect ‘other’ people? Should that responsibility extend to moral and psychological protection as well as physical protection, and if so, how? How far does the duty go when considering the protection of one’s own citizens who have deliberately placed themselves in harm’s way, such as journalists who have chosen to leave the safety of a protected area? What happens when institutions are faced with the choice of protecting their people or their reputation? What does it feel like for the inhabitants of a state who become ‘protected’ by the international community?
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Saint Bernard of Clairvaux is known to history for being one of the most powerful church leaders of the twelfth century, reforming the Cistercian Order, rallying the Second Crusade, and negotiating the end of a schism. In addition to... more
Saint Bernard of Clairvaux is known to history for being one of the most powerful church leaders of the twelfth century, reforming the Cistercian Order, rallying the Second Crusade, and negotiating the end of a schism. In addition to these exploits, he also apparently led a campaign against mills.1 Yes, mills: those structures where local farmers would bring their grain to be milled and turned into flour. As more and more mills were developed throughout the Middle Ages, they often became the center for social interactions and villagers would congregate at them. Perhaps predictably, so too would those who engage in the profession even older than farming. Indeed, mills became such a hotbed for prostitution and other illicit activity that it was the mills themselves that eventually became the focus of Saint Bernard’s scorn.2
Research Interests:
PART I: OPENING ARGUMENT 1. More Heat Than Light: The Vexing Complexities of the Drone Debate Bradley Jay Strawser PART II: FIRST ROUND OF RESPONSES 2. Is Targeted Killing War? Lisa Hajjar 3. Drones Threaten Democratic Decision-Making... more
PART I: OPENING ARGUMENT 1. More Heat Than Light: The Vexing Complexities of the Drone Debate Bradley Jay Strawser PART II: FIRST ROUND OF RESPONSES 2. Is Targeted Killing War? Lisa Hajjar 3. Drones Threaten Democratic Decision-Making Steven Levine 4. Even War Has Limits Feisal H. Naqvi 5. On Adopting a Posture of Moral Neutrality John Fabian Witt PART III: STRAWSER'S RESPONSE 6. Reply to Critics: No Easy Answers Bradley Jay Strawser PART IV: SECOND ROUND OF RESPONSES 7. A Sociological Intervention on Drones and Targeted Killing Lisa Hajjar 8. Drones: Between Principle and Policy Steven Levine 9. The Other Side of the Line Feisal Naqvi 10. A Duty to Capture? John Fabian Witt PART V: CONCLUDING RESPONSE 11. Arguing in Good Faith about Drones Bradley Jay Strawser
Research Interests: Psychology, Just War, Pakistan, Environmental Ethics, Just War Theory, and 15 moreFaith, Democracy, Duty, Ethics of War and Peace, Targeted Killing, Drones, Ethics of War, Liability, Pakistan drone attacks policy, Drone, Drone in Pakistan, Drones Strikes on Pakistan, Predator Drone Warfare, Legality of Use of Drones, and Drone Warfare
Research Interests:
... to know that fact? Philosophia DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9284-3 BJ Strawser (*) Philosophy Department, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA e-mail:Bradley.Strawser@uconn.edu Page 2. Conventionalists have an easy ...
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Business, Military Ethics, Applied Ethics, Just War, Environmental Ethics, and 15 moreJust War Theory, Emerging Technologies, Duty, Ethics of Emerging Technologies, Ethics of War and Peace, Drones, Military Drones, Ethics of War, Harm, Ethics of Emerging Technology, Drone, Ethics and morals of war, Aside, eTHICS OF JUST WAR, and Ceteris Paribus
Research Interests: Law, Philosophy, Political Science, Just War, Just War Theory, and 15 moreAnalysis, Michael Walzer, Morality, War Ethics, Just War Tradition, Ethics of War and Peace, Ethics of War, Jeff McMahan, Doctrine, Ethics and morals of war, The Ethics of War and Peace, Problems With Just War Theory, Just and Unjust War, eTHICS OF JUST WAR, and Terrorism and Just War Theory
... Yet, like McDowell and Wiggins, his approach holds promise as an attempted tertium quid. ... A reader may not always agree with Griffin's conclusions and occasionally wish him to not be as coy with providing definitive answers to... more
... Yet, like McDowell and Wiggins, his approach holds promise as an attempted tertium quid. ... A reader may not always agree with Griffin's conclusions and occasionally wish him to not be as coy with providing definitive answers to many of the puzzles he probes, but he often pre ...
Research Interests:
Modern weapons of war have undergone precipitous technological change over the past generation and the future portends even greater advances. Of particular interest are so- called ‘autonomous weapon systems’ (henceforth, AWS), that will... more
Modern weapons of war have undergone precipitous technological change over the past generation and the future portends even greater advances. Of particular interest are so- called ‘autonomous weapon systems’ (henceforth, AWS), that will someday purportedly have the ability to make life and death targeting decisions ‘on their own.’ Despite the strong and widespread sentiments against such weapons, however, proffered philosophical arguments against AWS are often found lacking in substance. We propose that the prevalent moral aversion to AWS is supported by a pair of compelling objections. First, we argue that even a sophisticated robot is not the kind of thing that is capable of replicating human moral judgment. This conclusion follows if human moral judgment is not codifiable, i.e. it cannot be captured by a list of rules. Moral judgment requires either the ability to engage in wide reflective equilibrium, the ability to perceive certain facts as moral considerations, moral imagination, or the ability to have moral experiences with a particular phenomenological character. Robots cannot in principle possess these abilities, so robots cannot in principle replicate human moral judgment. If robots cannot in principle replicate human moral judgment then it is morally problematic to deploy AWS with that aim in mind. Second, we then argue that even if it is possible for a sufficiently sophisticated robot to make ‘moral decisions’ that are extensionally indistinguishable from (or better than) human moral decisions, these ‘decisions’ could not be made for the right reasons. This means that the ‘moral decisions’ made by AWS are bound to be morally deficient in at least one respect even if they are extensionally indistinguishable from human ones.
Research Interests: Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, Military Ethics, Philosophy, Epistemology, and 13 moreMoral Psychology, Autonomous Cognitive Agents, Machine Learning, Political Science, Autonomous Robotics, Just War, Moral Philosophy, Military and Politics, Just war theory (Philosophy), Moral Reasoning, Moral Judgment, Military Technology, and Emerging Technology
Research Interests:
Modern weapons of war have undergone precipitous technological change over the past generation and the future portends even greater advances. Of particular interest are so- called ‘autonomous weapon systems’ (henceforth, AWS), that will... more
Modern weapons of war have undergone precipitous technological change over the past generation and the future portends even greater advances. Of particular interest are so- called ‘autonomous weapon systems’ (henceforth, AWS), that will someday purportedly have the ability to make life and death targeting decisions ‘on their own.’ Despite the strong and widespread sentiments against such weapons, however, proffered philosophical arguments against AWS are often found lacking in substance. We propose that the prevalent moral aversion to AWS is supported by a pair of compelling objections. First, we argue that even a sophisticated robot is not the kind of thing that is capable of replicating human moral judgment. This conclusion follows if human moral judgment is not codifiable, i.e. it cannot be captured by a list of rules. Moral judgment requires either the ability to engage in wide reflective equilibrium, the ability to perceive certain facts as moral considerations, moral imagination, or the ability to have moral experiences with a particular phenomenological character. Robots cannot in principle possess these abilities, so robots cannot in principle replicate human moral judgment. If robots cannot in principle replicate human moral judgment then it is morally problematic to deploy AWS with that aim in mind. Second, we then argue that even if it is possible for a sufficiently sophisticated robot to make ‘moral decisions’ that are extensionally indistinguishable from (or better than) human moral decisions, these ‘decisions’ could not be made for the right reasons. This means that the ‘moral decisions’ made by AWS are bound to be morally deficient in at least one respect even if they are extensionally indistinguishable from human ones.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Terrorism, Political Violence and Terrorism, Torture, War on Terror, State Complicity in Torture, and 13 moreTicking Bomb, Enhanced Interrogation, Prohibition of Torture, Liability, Peace and human rights and against torture, Debate, Torture, Guantanamo, UN Convention against torture, Prohibition of Torture and Other Forms of Ill-treatment In International Treaties, Ticking Time Bomb Scenario, Defensive Harm, Tracing and the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility, Moral Liability to Defensive Harm, and Epistemic Contextualism
A cornerstone of traditional just war theory is that combatants on both sides of any conflict are legitimate targets of attack. This is not because they are engaged in wrongdoing but because they pose a threat to others. So long as they... more
A cornerstone of traditional just war theory is that combatants on both sides of any conflict are legitimate targets of attack. This is not because they are engaged in wrongdoing but because they pose a threat to others. So long as they follow the jus in bello rules of proportionality and discrimination, those who fight for an unjust cause and those who fight for a just cause are moral equals: both may permissibly kill and both may permissibly be killed. This is the doctrine of the ‘moral equality of combatants’ (MEC) and it has long been the standard view. A revisionist challenge, however, argues that one is not liable to be killed if one fights for a just cause. People have a presumptive right against being killed, after all, so why should a soldier fighting for a just cause lose that right for posing a justified threat against an unjust enemy? Jeff McMahan makes the case for this revisionist view in Killing in War. He explicitly rejects the MEC and instead endorses an asymmetric view of the morality of combatants. Critics object that this revision makes just war impossible because without the MEC it is impossible to justify our convictions about legitimate and illegitimate targets. In this article, I defend the revisionist view against this objection. My defence, in turn, leads me to propose a new and more adequate account of enemy status.
Research Interests: War Studies, Just War, Just War Theory, War on Terror, Just war theory (Philosophy), and 19 moreJust war theory (Philosophy) (Philosophy), Michael Walzer, War Ethics, Just War Tradition, Drones, Targeted Killing, Ethics of War, Targeted Killing, Drone Warfare, Ethics of War, Ethics of War and Peace, War & Ethics, Pacifism, Ethics of War, Ethics of War, Jeff McMahan, Ethics and morals of war, The Ethics of War and Peace, War, Killing, Morality, Ethics In War Collateral Damage and Just War Theory, Problems With Just War Theory, Just and Unjust War, eTHICS OF JUST WAR, and Terrorism and Just War Theory
Realism about material objects faces a variety of epistemological objections. Recently, however, some realists have offered new accounts in response to these long-standing objections, many of which seem plausible. In this paper, I raise a... more
Realism about material objects faces a variety of epistemological objections. Recently, however, some realists have offered new accounts in response to these long-standing objections, many of which seem plausible. In this paper, I
raise a new objection against realism vis-à-vis how we could empirically come to know mind-independent essential properties for objects. Traditionally, realists hold kind-membership and persistence as bound together for purposes of tracing out an object’s essential existence conditions. But I propose kind-membership and persistence for objects can conceptually come apart and function epistemologically distinctly from one another—in which case the usual reliance by realists on an assumption of persistence to determine kind-membership conditions is unjustified. Thus, present realist attempts to explain how empirical detection of mind-independent essential properties for objects could possibly occur inevitably results in circularity. The charge against the realist is to explain why we don’t have to first discover persistence conditions for an object before we can ascertain kind-membership conditions for an object. If no answer is forthcoming, then it seems the weight of the epistemological objection to realism is back in full force.
raise a new objection against realism vis-à-vis how we could empirically come to know mind-independent essential properties for objects. Traditionally, realists hold kind-membership and persistence as bound together for purposes of tracing out an object’s essential existence conditions. But I propose kind-membership and persistence for objects can conceptually come apart and function epistemologically distinctly from one another—in which case the usual reliance by realists on an assumption of persistence to determine kind-membership conditions is unjustified. Thus, present realist attempts to explain how empirical detection of mind-independent essential properties for objects could possibly occur inevitably results in circularity. The charge against the realist is to explain why we don’t have to first discover persistence conditions for an object before we can ascertain kind-membership conditions for an object. If no answer is forthcoming, then it seems the weight of the epistemological objection to realism is back in full force.
Research Interests:
A variety of ethical objections have been raised against the military employment of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs, drones). Some of these objections are technological concerns over UAVs abilities’ to function on par with their... more
A variety of ethical objections have been raised against the military employment of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs, drones). Some of these objections are technological concerns
over UAVs abilities’ to function on par with their inhabited counterparts. This paper sets such concerns aside and instead focuses on supposed objections to the use of UAVs in principle. I examine several such objections currently on offer and show them all to be wanting. Indeed, I argue that we have a general duty to protect an agent engaged in a justified act from harm to the greatest extent possible, so long as that protection does not interfere with the agent’s ability to act justly. UAVs can afford precisely such protection. Therefore, we are obligated to employ UAV weapon systems for a justified mission if it can be shown that their use does not significantly reduce a warfighter’s operational capability. Of course, if a given military action is unjustified to begin with, then carrying out that act via UAVs is wrong, just as it would be with any weapon. But the point of this paper is to show that there is nothing wrong in principle with using a UAV and that, other things being equal, using
such technology can be, in fact, obligatory.
over UAVs abilities’ to function on par with their inhabited counterparts. This paper sets such concerns aside and instead focuses on supposed objections to the use of UAVs in principle. I examine several such objections currently on offer and show them all to be wanting. Indeed, I argue that we have a general duty to protect an agent engaged in a justified act from harm to the greatest extent possible, so long as that protection does not interfere with the agent’s ability to act justly. UAVs can afford precisely such protection. Therefore, we are obligated to employ UAV weapon systems for a justified mission if it can be shown that their use does not significantly reduce a warfighter’s operational capability. Of course, if a given military action is unjustified to begin with, then carrying out that act via UAVs is wrong, just as it would be with any weapon. But the point of this paper is to show that there is nothing wrong in principle with using a UAV and that, other things being equal, using
such technology can be, in fact, obligatory.
Research Interests: Military Ethics, Just War, Just War Theory, Just war theory (Philosophy), Emerging Technologies, and 18 moreUAV and Aircraft control, War Ethics, Ethics of Emerging Technologies, Drones, Targeted Killing, Ethics of War, Targeted Killing, Drone Warfare, Ethics of War, Ethics of War and Peace, Ethics, Military Ethics, Leader Development, War & Ethics, Drones, Military Drones, Military Technology, Ethics of War, Ethics of Emerging Technology, Pakistan drone attacks policy, Ethics and morals of war, Ethics In War Collateral Damage and Just War Theory, eTHICS OF JUST WAR, and Military Ethics and Technology
Research Interests: Just War, Just War Theory, Just war theory (Philosophy), Just war theory (Philosophy) (Philosophy), War Ethics, and 15 moreJust War Tradition, Drones, Targeted Killing, Ethics of War, Targeted Killing, Drone Warfare, Ethics of War, Ethics of War and Peace, War & Ethics, Ethics of War, Liability, Ethics and morals of war, War, Killing, Morality, Ethics In War Collateral Damage and Just War Theory, Defensive Harm, Problems With Just War Theory, eTHICS OF JUST WAR, Terrorism and Just War Theory, and Moral Liability to Defensive Harm
In Plato’s Sophist (245e–247e) an argument against metaphysical materialism in the “battle of gods and giants” is presented which is oft the cause of consternation, primarily because it appears the characters are unfair to the... more
In Plato’s Sophist (245e–247e) an argument against metaphysical materialism in the “battle of gods and giants” is presented which is oft the cause of consternation, primarily because it appears the characters are unfair to the materialist position. Attempts to explain it usually resort to restructuring the argument while others rearrange the Sophist entirely to rebuild the argument in a more satisfying form. I propose a different account of the argument that does not rely on a disservice to the materialist nor restructuring Plato’s argument. I contend, instead, that the argument is enthymematic in nature, allowing the definitions employed to flow out of the reasoning as originally presented. Moreover, it suggests that Plato’s idealism was so deeply ingrained that modern defenses of materialism were not even live options.
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Plato, Ancient Philosophy, "Middle" Platonism, Platonism, and 5 moreARISTOTLE - PLATO - METAPHYSICS - EPISTEMOLOGY, Plato's Late Dialectic Sophist Metaphysics Predication, Plato Language Knowledge Reality Metaphysics Epistemology Philosophy of Language, Plato Metaphysics, and Platonic and Aristotelian Metaphysics
Research Interests:
In the domain of cyber defense, the concept of active defense is often taken to mean aggressive actions against the source of an attack. It is given such names as “attack back” and “hack back” and equated with offensive cyber strikes. It... more
In the domain of cyber defense, the concept of active defense is often taken to mean aggressive actions against the source of an attack. It is given such names as “attack back” and “hack back” and equated with offensive cyber strikes. It is considered dangerous and potentially harmful, in part because the apparent source of an attack may be an innocent party whose computer has been compromised and exploited by the attacker.
Our purpose in writing this paper is to show that active cyber defense is a much richer concept that, when properly
understood, is neither offensive nor necessarily dangerous.
Our approach is to draw on concepts and examples from air
defense to define and analyze cyber defenses. We show that
many common cyber defenses, such as intrusion prevention, have active elements, and we examine two case studies that employed active defenses effectively and without harming innocent parties. We examine the ethics of active cyber defenses along four dimensions: scope of effects, degree of cooperation, types of effects, and degree of automation. Throughout, we use analogies from air defense to shed light on the nature of cyber defense and demonstrate that active cyber defense is properly understood as a legitimate form of defense that can
be executed according to well-established ethical principles.
Our purpose in writing this paper is to show that active cyber defense is a much richer concept that, when properly
understood, is neither offensive nor necessarily dangerous.
Our approach is to draw on concepts and examples from air
defense to define and analyze cyber defenses. We show that
many common cyber defenses, such as intrusion prevention, have active elements, and we examine two case studies that employed active defenses effectively and without harming innocent parties. We examine the ethics of active cyber defenses along four dimensions: scope of effects, degree of cooperation, types of effects, and degree of automation. Throughout, we use analogies from air defense to shed light on the nature of cyber defense and demonstrate that active cyber defense is properly understood as a legitimate form of defense that can
be executed according to well-established ethical principles.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This paper examines the morality of cyber weapons, offering conditions under which they are not only ethical under just war theory, but morally preferred over their kinetic counterparts. When these conditions are satisfied, states not... more
This paper examines the morality of cyber weapons, offering conditions under which they are not only ethical under just war theory, but morally preferred over their kinetic counterparts. When these conditions are satisfied, states not only have the option of using cyber weapons, but could even acquire a moral duty to do so over other forms of warfare. In particular, we show that states are morally obliged to use cyber weapons instead of kinetic weapons when they can be deployed for a purpose already deemed just under the law of armed conflict and without any significant loss of capability. The reason behind this moral obligation is that cyber weapons can reduce both the risk to one’s own (putatively just) military and the harm to one’s adversary and non-combatants. The paper discusses this obligation, using examples to illustrate cases where it does or does not apply. It also addresses several objections that have been raised about the use of cyber weapons, showing that they fail to fully counter the obligation to use cyber weapons derived from their reduction of risk and harm properties.
Research Interests:
Review of Griffin's On Human Rights.
Research Interests: Ethics, Normative Ethics, Human Rights Law, Human Rights, International Human Rights Law, and 8 moreHuman Rights Education, Human Rights Theory, History of Human Rights, Social and Political Theories of Justice & Human Rights, Human Rights, International Development, Diversity, Training, Capacity Building, Peacebuilding, Corporate Social Responsibility Youth Leadership, Conflict Resolution, Normative Political Theory, Normative Ethics and Metaethics, and Theory and Practice of Human Rights
A new powerful military weapon has appeared in the skies of world and with it a new form of warfare has quickly emerged bringing with it a host of pressing ethical questions and issues. This book brings together some of the best scholars... more
A new powerful military weapon has appeared in the skies of world and with it a new form of warfare has quickly emerged bringing with it a host of pressing ethical questions and issues. This book brings together some of the best scholars currently working on these questions and provides timely and important arguments on many of the most significant and previously unexplored areas of this recent debate. Essays range from broad theoretic questions regarding the moral permissibility of killing by drones to specific examinations of particular uses of unmanned weapons such as their role in counterinsurgency operations, humanitarian interventions, and their controversial use in “targeted killings.” Some scholars engage remarkably vexing issues such as what happens to classic military virtues such as bravery for the warriors who fly remotely controlled drones from complete safety, half a world away from the combat in which they operate. Others wrestle over the future of such technology and whether “autonomous” weapons should be allowed to kill human beings. All of the views presented are given wide berth to contest, dispute, and provide sharp critical scrutiny and analysis to these contentious questions.
Research Interests: Military Ethics, Just War, Just War Theory, Just war theory (Philosophy), Just war theory (Philosophy) (Philosophy), and 27 moreEmerging Technologies, UAV and Aircraft control, Ethics of Emerging Technologies, Just War Tradition, UAV systems, Drones, Targeted Killing, Ethics of War, Targeted Killing, Drone Warfare, Ethics of War, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), International affairs of Science and Technology, Globalisation and Emerging Technologies, IPR and Environmental Issues, Drones, Military Drones, Military Technology, Ethics of War, Emerging Technology, Pakistan drone attacks policy, Drone, Problems of Technological Advancement to the Military Training, Drones Strikes on Pakistan, Predator Drone Warfare, Drones and Robots, Legality of Use of Drones, Drone Warfare, Military-technology, Law and Emerging Technologies, Ethics In War Collateral Damage and Just War Theory, Political Assasinations, and Targetted Killing
Does the lethal use of drones pose any new or difficult moral problems? Or is the controversy over these weapons merely a distraction from deeper questions regarding the justice of war and the United States' bellicose foreign policy?... more
Does the lethal use of drones pose any new or difficult moral problems? Or is the controversy over these weapons merely a distraction from deeper questions regarding the justice of war and the United States' bellicose foreign policy? Opposing Perspectives on the Drone Debate pulls no punches in answering these questions as five scholars square off in a lively debate over the ethics of drones and their contentious use in a point-counterpoint debate. The contributing authors are some of the foremost thinkers in international affairs today, spanning the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, political science, and law. Topics debated range from the US's contested policy of so-called "targeted killing" in Pakistan's tribal regions to fears over the damaging effects such weaponry has on our democratic institutions to the more abstract moral questions raised by killing via remote control such as the duty to capture over kill.
Research Interests: Just War, Pakistan, Just War Theory, Just war theory (Philosophy), UAV and Aircraft control, and 17 moreUAV systems, Drones, Targeted Killing, Ethics of War, Targeted Killing, Drone Warfare, Ethics of War, Ethics of War and Peace, Targeted Killing, Drones, Ethics of War, Liability, Pakistan drone attacks policy, Drone in Pakistan, War, Killing, Morality, Drones Strikes on Pakistan, Predator Drone Warfare, Legality of Use of Drones, Drone Warfare, Ethics In War Collateral Damage and Just War Theory, and Targetted Killing
Killing bin Laden: An Ethical Analysis is a short treatise on the possible ethical justification for the U.S. mission to kill Osama bin Laden. After rejecting the standard justifications most commonly used in support of the killing,... more
Killing bin Laden: An Ethical Analysis is a short treatise on the possible ethical justification for the U.S. mission to kill Osama bin Laden. After rejecting the standard justifications most commonly used in support of the killing, Strawser ultimately argues that the killing was ethically permissible as an act of defensive harm on behalf of innocents. The book contends bin Laden was morally responsible for a collection of unjust threats such that he was liable to be killed. Moreover, the many unique features of the bin Laden case –such as the use of pre-emptive harm and the collective agency of al-Qaeda – do not defeat that liability. The monograph also includes discussions of the apparent violation of Pakistan's sovereignty and the morally dubious celebrations of bin Laden's death, among other morally relevant issues.
Research Interests: Terrorism, Just War, Pakistan, Just War Theory, War on Terror, and 14 moreOsama bin Laden, Global War on Terror, Drones, Targeted Killing, Ethics of War, Targeted Killing, Drone Warfare, Ethics of War, Ethics of War and Peace, Targeted Killing, Ethics of War, Pakistan drone attacks policy, Killing, US Navy, Targeted Killings, Killing In War, Ethics In War Collateral Damage and Just War Theory, and Political Assasinations
This volume looks at current and emerging technologies of war and some of the ethical issues surrounding their use. Although the nature and politics of war never change, the weapons and technologies used in war do change and are always... more
This volume looks at current and emerging technologies of war and some of the ethical issues surrounding their use. Although the nature and politics of war never change, the weapons and technologies used in war do change and are always undergoing development. Because of that, the arsenal of weapons for twenty-first century conflict is different from previous centuries. Weapons in today’s world include an array of instruments of war that include, robotics, cyber war capabilities, human performance enhancement for warriors, and the proliferation of an entire spectrum of unmanned weapons systems and platforms. Tactical weapons now have the potential of strategic results and have changed the understanding of the battle space creating ethical, legal, and political issues unknown in the pre-9/11 world. What do these technologies mean for things such as contemporary international relations, the just-war tradition, and civil-military relations?