Lucas Gonzalez
CONICET, Political Science, Faculty Member
- Political Science, Comparative Politics, Federalism, Comparative Federalism, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, and 8 moreRegional Inequality, Redistribution, Social Inequality, Development Studies, Federalismo, Federalismo Fiscal, Presidential Politics, and Subnational Politicsedit
Resumen: Este trabajo analiza la distribución de planes sociales en Argentina y presenta un resultado contraintuitivo. El Partido Justicialista de Argentina, que la literatura describe como clientelar, incrementó los fondos programáticos... more
Resumen: Este trabajo analiza la distribución de planes sociales en Argentina y presenta un resultado contraintuitivo. El Partido Justicialista de Argentina, que la literatura describe como clientelar, incrementó los fondos programáticos durante el gobierno de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, mientras que la coalición Cambiemos, que se presentó como programática, invirtió más en la distribución discrecional durante el gobierno de Mauricio Macri. El estudio presenta un análisis cuantitativo del total de 364 programas del gobierno nacional entre 2008 y 2019, explora los procesos que llevaron a los resultados en ambas administraciones usando fuentes secundarias y concluye con algunas implicancias comparadas. El principal argumento es que ambos partidos distribuyeron fondos discrecionales a través de movimientos sociales para contener posibles estallidos sociales, intercambiándolos por paz social y gobernabilidad.
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Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Science, Politics, Federalism, Comparative Political Economy, and 15 moreFiscal federalism and decentralization, Argentina, Brazil, Comparative Federalism, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Federalismo, Congressional Politics, Ciencias Sociales, Ciencia política, Economia Politica, Presidential Politics, Discretion, Distributive Politics, Equity Law, and Latin Americans
Mitigating climate change requires a global transition from fossil fuels to a “green economy” driven by renewable energies. This shift has fostered massive investments in mining resources, notably lithium in South America, needed to store... more
Mitigating climate change requires a global transition from fossil fuels to a “green economy” driven by renewable energies. This shift has fostered massive investments in mining resources, notably lithium in South America, needed to store renewable energies. These mining ventures often produce harmful externalities where lithium is located. In Argentina, a major producer, striking variation has occurred in the fortunes of lithium-mining projects. In some instances, mining companies offered concessions that mitigated environmental damage and improved local socioeconomic conditions. In others, companies made minimal concessions, and in a third set they halted projects in response to local resistance. Why do mining ventures result alternatively in negotiated, unnegotiated, or aborted extraction? The article proposes a new typology of modes of extraction together with a multilevel explanatory framework that centers on the strengths and strategies of transnational mining companies, subnational governments, and local communities in setting the terms for extracting lithium.
Research Interests: Federalism, Lithium, Argentina, Comparative Federalism, Latin American Politics (Political Science), and 12 moreFederalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Argentinean Politics, Federalismo, Green Energy, Latin American Political Economy, Mineria, Extractivism, Energy transition, Relaciones Intergubernamentales, Extractivismo, Litio, and Mining Policy and Governance Issues
Can opportunities for undergoing voluntary oversight improve bureaucratic motivation and effort? Drawing on insights from the social sciences, we argue that voluntary oversight increases front-line bureaucrats’ sense of autonomy and... more
Can opportunities for undergoing voluntary oversight improve bureaucratic motivation and effort? Drawing on insights from the social sciences, we argue that voluntary oversight increases front-line bureaucrats’ sense of autonomy and competence, and may therefore increase their motivation and effort. Partnering with a provincial auditing body in Argentina, we implement an encouragement design in which school principals are invited to receive a voluntary audit of a publicly funded school meal program. We employ a two-level randomization, in which regions are first randomly assigned to a higher or lower rate of invitations, and then schools within regions are randomly assigned to treatment or control. We find divergent effects of treatment based on the density of treatment; in the group of regions assigned to the lower rate of invitations, school principals assigned to treatment report increased motivation and a decrease in school closings. In contrast, in the group of regions assigned to the higher rate of invitations, we observe the opposite effect. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork, we speculate that a higher rate of invitations may generate pressure to accept the invitation and thereby undermine any positive effects of volunteering. Our results suggest the promise of voluntary audits as well as the need for further research on the conditions under which voluntary oversight may have differing consequences for bureaucratic effort and motivation.
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Why do some governments manage to curb protest while others cannot and turmoil escalates to a social outbreak? This study proposes a theoretical argument that specifies how discretionary spending reduces conflict, highlighting the role of... more
Why do some governments manage to curb protest while others cannot and turmoil escalates to a social outbreak? This study proposes a theoretical argument that specifies how discretionary spending reduces conflict, highlighting the role of social movements in managing protests. It examines this and alternative arguments in Argentina, a country with strong social movements and historically large mobilizations, using statistical analysis with an original database on protests and a population of 364 national government programs between 2008 and 2019. The article makes an empirical contribution by finding a differential effect between specific types of social spending, programmatic and discretional, and protests. It also specifies the linkage between the main variables using qualitative evidence during two presidencies. The goal of discretionary distribution is not to win an election but to ensure governance. The article finally raises some comparative implications on the role of social movements and welfare spending in Latin America.
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How do governments address complex, cross-sectoral problems, like the COVID-19 pandemic? Why were some Latin American countries more successful at containing the pandemic's most devastating health outcomes? We argue that national... more
How do governments address complex, cross-sectoral problems, like the COVID-19 pandemic? Why were some Latin American countries more successful at containing the pandemic's most devastating health outcomes? We argue that national governments that were more collaborative in their response to COVID-19 were more successful in reducing death rates. Our original dataset offers a novel attempt to operationalise collaborative governance (CG). We undertake simple statistical tests to measure the relationship between CG and COVID-19-related mortality rates in Latin America. We then choose three case studies to assess whether collaboration was meaningful in practice. Initial evidence suggests governments that pursued CG were more effective at containing mortality rates early on in the pandemic. The collaboration helped to foster cooperation over resources; buy time to prepare for a potential case surge; and produce a unified message regarding what citizens should do to prevent viral spread.
Research Interests: Political Science, Governance, Federalism, Public Health Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and 15 moreArgentina, Comparative Federalism, Subnational Politics, Public Health, Health Policy, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Medicine, Uruguay, Collaborative Governance, Brasil, Ciencias Sociales, Ciencia política, Latinoamerica, Pandemic, and CoVid
How do governments address complex, cross-sectoral problems, like the COVID-19 pandemic? Why were some Latin American countries more successful at containing the pandemic's most devastating health outcomes? We argue that national... more
How do governments address complex, cross-sectoral problems, like the COVID-19 pandemic? Why were some Latin American countries more successful at containing the pandemic's most devastating health outcomes? We argue that national governments that were more collaborative in their response to COVID-19 were more successful in reducing death rates. Our original dataset offers a novel attempt to operationalise collaborative governance (CG). We undertake simple statistical tests to measure the relationship between CG and COVID-19-related mortality rates in Latin America. We then choose three case studies to assess whether collaboration was meaningful in practice. Initial evidence suggests governments that pursued CG were more effective at containing mortality rates early on in the pandemic. The collaboration helped to foster cooperation over resources; buy time to prepare for a potential case surge; and produce a unified message regarding what citizens should do to prevent viral spread.
Research Interests: Latin America (Comparative Politics), Governance, Federalism, Public Health Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and 11 moreArgentina, Comparative Federalism, Public Health, Health Policy, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Uruguay, Collaborative Governance, Brasil, Latinoamerica, Coronavirus COVID-19, and COVID-19 PANDEMIC
Inequality is unequally distributed across the territory, and national averages obscure this variation. Pockets of very high inequality persist at the subnational level of government, even when national governments implement large scale... more
Inequality is unequally distributed across the territory, and national averages obscure this variation. Pockets of very high inequality persist at the subnational level of government, even when national governments implement large scale redistributive policies. This study investigates which factors at the subnational level may help explaining differences in income inequality across units. The main claim is that in subnational units where local economic elites capture provincial states by occupying relevant positions in their governments have lower taxes on land, spend less in social programs, have more repression of federal labor rights, and, as a consequence, have higher inequality. The study uses a large-N analysis of original panel data for Argentina, presents a comparative study of two cases, and explores some comparative implications in the conclusions.
Research Interests: Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, Argentina, Comparative Federalism, and 15 moreSubnational Politics, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Federalismo, Social Inequality, Income inequality, Inequality, Poverty and Inequality, Desigualdades Sociales, Desigualdad, Relaciones Intergubernamentales, Gobiernos Subnacionales, State Capture, Subnational Comparative Politics, Subnational Governments, and Governance and State Capacity
RESUMEN La desigualdad se distribuye de manera desigual en el territorio y los promedios nacionales oscurecen esta variación. Este estudio investiga qué factores a nivel subnacional pueden ayudar a explicar las diferencias en la... more
RESUMEN
La desigualdad se distribuye de manera desigual en el territorio y los promedios nacionales oscurecen esta variación. Este estudio investiga qué factores a nivel subnacional pueden ayudar a explicar las diferencias en la desigualdad entre distritos. El trabajo analiza de que manera las coaliciones subnacionales resisten o apoyan políticas redistributivas de los gobiernos nacionales. El principal argumento es que el tipo de alianza gobernante nacional (regresiva o progresiva), incide en el nivel de desigualdad provincial, pero mediada por el tipo de coalición subnacional que apoye o resista a esa política nacional. Este argumento es examinado empíricamente a través del análisis de la configuración de las alianzas distributivas nacionales y subnacionales en dos provincias argentinas y en relación a las regulaciones de derechos laborales en el sector agrícola entre 2003 y 2015.
Palabras clave: Desigualdad; Alianzas; Relaciones Intergubernamentales; Derechos Laborales; Provincias; Argentina
ABSTRACT
Inequality is unevenly distributed across the territory and national averages obscure this variation. This study investigates which subnational level factors can help explain differences in inequality among districts. It analyzes how subnational coalitions resist or support national governments’ redistributive policies. The main argument is that the type of national governing alliance (regressive or progressive) affects the level of provincial inequality, but mediated by the type of subnational coalition that supports or resists that national policy. This work empirically examines this claim analyzing the configurations of the national and subnational distributive alliances in two Argentine provinces and in relation to labor rights regulations in the agricultural sector between 2003 and 2015.
Keywords: Inequality; Alliances; Intergovernmental Relations; Labor Rights; Provinces; Argentina
La desigualdad se distribuye de manera desigual en el territorio y los promedios nacionales oscurecen esta variación. Este estudio investiga qué factores a nivel subnacional pueden ayudar a explicar las diferencias en la desigualdad entre distritos. El trabajo analiza de que manera las coaliciones subnacionales resisten o apoyan políticas redistributivas de los gobiernos nacionales. El principal argumento es que el tipo de alianza gobernante nacional (regresiva o progresiva), incide en el nivel de desigualdad provincial, pero mediada por el tipo de coalición subnacional que apoye o resista a esa política nacional. Este argumento es examinado empíricamente a través del análisis de la configuración de las alianzas distributivas nacionales y subnacionales en dos provincias argentinas y en relación a las regulaciones de derechos laborales en el sector agrícola entre 2003 y 2015.
Palabras clave: Desigualdad; Alianzas; Relaciones Intergubernamentales; Derechos Laborales; Provincias; Argentina
ABSTRACT
Inequality is unevenly distributed across the territory and national averages obscure this variation. This study investigates which subnational level factors can help explain differences in inequality among districts. It analyzes how subnational coalitions resist or support national governments’ redistributive policies. The main argument is that the type of national governing alliance (regressive or progressive) affects the level of provincial inequality, but mediated by the type of subnational coalition that supports or resists that national policy. This work empirically examines this claim analyzing the configurations of the national and subnational distributive alliances in two Argentine provinces and in relation to labor rights regulations in the agricultural sector between 2003 and 2015.
Keywords: Inequality; Alliances; Intergovernmental Relations; Labor Rights; Provinces; Argentina
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Argentina is a major producer of lithium, a vital mineral for making a transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy. Mining is concentrated in three Northwestern provinces, Catamarca, Jujuy, and Salta. Although they have shared... more
Argentina is a major producer of lithium, a vital mineral for making a transition from fossil fuel to renewable energy. Mining is concentrated in three Northwestern provinces, Catamarca, Jujuy, and Salta. Although they have shared historical roots, cultural traditions, socioeconomic profiles, and political institutions as provincial subnational units in a federal system, there is striking variation in how mining projects articulate with local indigenous communities. In some lithium mining projects, companies offered concessions that improved local socioeconomic indicators and mitigated environmental damage. In others, mining companies either made minimal concessions or, alternatively chose to halt projects, usually in response to organized local resistance. Why do lithium mining ventures result in negotiated, unnegotiated, or aborted extraction? The article proposes a typology of modes of extraction together with an explanatory framework that centers on the strengths and strategies of communities and subnational governments in setting the terms of mining.
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Diversos estudios sostienen que, en países federales, las elecciones se dirimen en los distritos más poblados (donde está la mayor cantidad de votantes) pero la gobernabilidad se asegura con el apoyo en el Congreso nacional de los... more
Diversos estudios sostienen que, en países federales, las elecciones se dirimen en los distritos más poblados (donde está la mayor cantidad de votantes) pero la gobernabilidad se asegura con el apoyo en el Congreso nacional de los distritos con menor población. Este, justamente, es uno de los efectos esperados de una de las principales instituciones del sistema federal, la sobrerrepresentación. Este trabajo analiza la política distributiva y las relaciones intergubernamentales durante los primeros años del gobierno de Mauricio Macri en la Argentina (2016-2019), las compara con las de los gobiernos de Néstor (2003-2007) y Cristina Kirchner (2007-2015), y analiza si tienen lugar los mismos efectos fiscales y políticos que espera parte de la literatura: distribución a las provincias más sobrerrepresentadas y coaliciones ganadoras con ellas. Para ello analiza la asignación de fondos federales discrecionales de obra pública y transferencias sociales (fondos de promoción y asistencia social y asignaciones familiares) para los veinticuatro distritos de Argentina (23 provincias y la Ciudad de Buenos Aires) entre los años 2003 a 2018. Evalúa, además, el impacto político en términos de gobernabilidad, usando un indicador de productividad legislativa. En la última sección se presentan algunas reflexiones finales sobre los resultados y las implicancias para el caso y la discusión comparada. Este análisis pretende informar a los debates sobre relaciones intergubernamentales en países federales, particularmente aquellos con grandes desigualdades entre regiones de sus territorios.
Research Interests: Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, Argentina, Comparative Federalism, and 11 moreFederalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Decentralization, Federalismo, Political Economy of Growth and Distribution, Descentralización, Federalismo Fiscal, Intergovernmental Transfers in a Federal System, Política Argentina, Distributive Politics, OBRA PUBLICA, and Coaliciones Multinivel
This article analyses the relation between mineral rents and development outcomes at the subnational level. The classical literature suggests that natural resource abundance has negative effects on well-being, a situation referred to as... more
This article analyses the relation between mineral rents and development outcomes at the subnational level. The classical literature suggests that natural resource abundance has negative effects on well-being, a situation referred to as the resource curse. However, a novel strand of research emphasizes that rentier states worldwide exhibit contrasting outcomes. To account for such variation, this investigation aligns with approaches stressing the significance of contextual (place and institutional) factors to studying the resource curse. The main claim in this work is that both structural and institutional factors related to the extractive industry help account for variation in development outcomes. It contends that mineral rents are positively associated with human development and economic industrialization when the extractive sector is not geographically concentrated in enclave economies, and subnational fiscal institutions redistribute enough rents from producing to non-producing districts. It empirically tests this argument using a time series cross-sectional analysis, a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation, and two case studies in Argentina, a country where subnational territorial units collect mineral royalties and have exogenously created their own rent-sharing regimes. It finally provides some comparative implications that may contribute to current debates on the socioeconomic impact of natural resource wealth.
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En América Latina, a pesar de las mejoras en los niveles de desigualdad a nivel nacional, la desigualdad es aún elevada y hay indicios de que el proceso de su disminución se ha detenido. Una de las explicaciones de los límites en la... more
En América Latina, a pesar de las mejoras en los niveles de desigualdad a nivel nacional, la desigualdad es aún elevada y hay indicios de que el proceso de su disminución se ha detenido. Una de las explicaciones de los límites en la reducción de la desigualdad debe buscarse en el nivel subnacional, ya que en este nivel perviven bolsones de muy elevada desigualdad aun cuando los gobiernos nacionales apliquen políticas redistributivas. En este trabajo indagamos sobre los factores en este nivel de gobierno que contribuyan a explicar las diferencias en la desigualdad de ingresos entre las provincias de la Argentina para ayudar a comprender los alcances y los límites de los procesos nacionales de reducción de la desigualdad. Luego de describir los casos usando datos de panel inéditos de desigualdad de ingreso y revisar la literatura sobre países de la región, el trabajo avanza en la identificación de factores políticos relacionados sistemáticamente con los niveles de desigualdad de las provincias argentinas.
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Violence is unequally distributed across provinces. In Argentina, the least violent provinces have a murder rate similar to Sweden’s. The most violent ones have a murder rate comparable to South Sudan’s. What explains this unequal... more
Violence is unequally distributed across provinces. In Argentina, the least violent provinces have a murder rate similar to Sweden’s. The most violent ones have a murder rate comparable to South Sudan’s. What explains this unequal distribution of violence? This article claims that political turnover at the provincial level reduces the partisan control over police forces and challenges previous informal pacts, while being in the opposition to the president decreases the likelihood of receiving federal assistance to fight violence. When both conditions are met at the same time, crime is more likely to increase. The study examines these claims using difference-in-difference and regression analysis for panel data of the Argentine provinces between 2002 and 2015 and a case study of the province of Santa Fe (the most violent in the country). In the conclusions, it also explores the comparative implications for the discussion on the unequal distribution of violence in federal democracies.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Violence, Homicide, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, and 10 moreArgentina, Comparative Federalism, Subnational Politics, Federalismo, Violencia, Federalismo Fiscal, Relaciones Intergubernamentales, Subnational Comparative Politics, Homicidios, and Subnational Governments
En Argentina, la desigualdad interpersonal disminuyó en los primeros años de los 2000. Sin embargo, la desigualdad entre provincias se mantiene escandalosamente alta. Argentina tiene la mayor desigualdad entre distritos de los cinco... more
En Argentina, la desigualdad interpersonal disminuyó en los primeros años de los 2000. Sin embargo, la desigualdad entre provincias se mantiene escandalosamente alta. Argentina tiene la mayor desigualdad entre distritos de los cinco países más grandes de América Latina. ¿Bajo qué condiciones el gobierno nacional puede generar redistribución de las provincias ricas a las más pobres? El argumento principal de este trabajo es que los presidentes en países federales distribuyen fondos discrecionales favoreciendo no solo a sus aliados políticos. Los clivajes políticos, que dividen a las provincias en aliadas y opositoras, también se combinan con clivajes estructurales, que dividen a las provincias en ricas y pobres, pobladas y despobladas. Estos clivajes partidarios y estructurales también se articulan con el poder político (medido como apoyo legislativo en el congreso) y la popularidad presidencial para influir la distribución de fondos federales. El trabajo aborda la pregunta y evalúa el argumento analizando la asignación de fondos de obra pública (inversión real directa y transferencias de capital), que la mayoría de los especialistas consideran clave para estimular el crecimiento y la redistribución territorial. Se usan datos de la Oficina Nacional de Presupuesto (2005-2018) para analizar la distribución de obra pública durante el gobierno de Mauricio Macri, comparándolo con los gobiernos de Néstor y Cristina Kirchner. En la conclusión se exploran algunas implicancias comparadas con relación al debate sobre la desigualdad y la redistribución en países federales.
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When do oil dependent governments spend oil rents in expanding political machines through patronage and clientelism, as rentier theories claim, or in providing better public services? Using regression analysis for panel data and two case... more
When do oil dependent governments spend oil rents in expanding political machines through patronage and clientelism, as rentier theories claim, or in providing better public services? Using regression analysis for panel data and two case studies for the Argentine provinces (1983-2013), this study shows that infrastructure can rise and patronage decline during oil booms. When rents are high and the oil sector creates new jobs, incumbents tend to increase capital investment. They cannot compete with oil salaries and use infrastructure to cope with the sector’s pressures for basic services. When rents decline in contexts of job destruction in the oil sector, and the rest of the private sector cannot absorb the layoffs, incumbents tend to increase patronage to contain social turmoil and secure core voters.
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Does federalism encourage inequality? Or, do transfers from the central government augment redistribution? This research examines whether variation in the institutional structures as well as the mechanisms and criteria for the... more
Does federalism encourage inequality? Or, do transfers from the central government augment redistribution? This research examines whether variation in the institutional structures as well as the mechanisms and criteria for the distribution of fiscal resources in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico affect interregional and interpersonal inequality. Using descriptive statistics and regression models for original panel data from these five cases between 1983 and 2013, the study finds that a more progressive redistributive capacity of the central government is statistically associated with improvements in interregional as well as interpersonal equity, challenging the conventional view that federalism reinforces inequality. The article discusses these findings and others from competing arguments, and explores their implications for the discussion on inequality and redistribution in developing nations.
Research Interests: Colombia, Latin American politics, Federalism, Regional Inequality, Fiscal Federalism, and 14 moreFiscal federalism and decentralization, Argentina, Brazil, Comparative Federalism, Chile, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Mexico, Federalismo, Income inequality, Latin America, Inequality, Poverty and Inequality, Federalismo Fiscal, and Redistribution
¿Por qué algunos gobiernos gastan más en bienes públicos que otros? ¿Por qué varía el gasto social? Este trabajo explora algunos factores clave que explican la variación en el gasto social de las provincias argentinas. Estudiamos estas... more
¿Por qué algunos gobiernos gastan más en bienes públicos que otros? ¿Por qué varía el gasto social? Este trabajo explora algunos factores clave que explican la variación en el gasto social de las provincias argentinas. Estudiamos estas provincias porque tienen gran autonomía en la decisión de los montos a asignar como gasto social y por la gran variación en el monto que las provincias asignan a esse tipo de gasto. A partir de datos originales del presupuesto de las provincias argentinas entre 1993 y 2009, y utilizando estadísticas descriptivas y análisis de tres casos clave (las provincias de Buenos Aires, San Luis y Córdoba), mostramos que el gasto social crece a medida que disminuyen los costos del armado de la coalición electoral y de gobierno y la alternancia y rotación de cargos clave en el gobierno. El artículo discute los hallazgos en las tres provincias argentinas seleccionadas y explora las implicancias de la discusión en los determinantes políticos del gasto social y el diseño de políticas sociales, especialmente en países en desarrollo y democracias federales.
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La mayoría de los países latinoamericanos redujeron fuertemente su desigualdad durante la última década. A pesar de estas mejoras a nivel nacional, la desigualdad dentro de las provincias en la mayoría de los países es enorme. En... more
La mayoría de los países latinoamericanos redujeron fuertemente su desigualdad durante la última década. A pesar de estas mejoras a nivel nacional, la desigualdad dentro de las provincias en la mayoría de los países es enorme. En Argentina, la provincia de Tierra del Fuego es muy igualitaria para los estándares latinoamericanos, ya que tiene un índice de Gini provincial, similar a Canadá y Australia (de 0,32 en 2011). Pero Salta y Corrientes, por el contrario, son las provincias más desiguales de Argentina, con índices de Gini similares a Guatemala y Malawi (0,45 y 0,46 respectivamente). Si en los últimos años la desigualdad a nivel nacional disminuyó pero todavía hay mucha variación en la desigualdad entre provincias y al interior de ellas, en este trabajo nos preguntamos si es posible identificar factores en este nivel de gobierno que contribuyan a explicar esta variación. Luego de describir los casos usando datos de panel inéditos de desigualdad de ingreso, el trabajo identifica factores económicos, sociales y políticos relacionados sistemáticamente con los niveles de desigualdad de las provincias argentinas.
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What is the effect of political competition on subnational social spending? Using descriptive statistics and regression models for original budget panel data for the 24 Argentine provinces between 1993 and 2009, the study finds that... more
What is the effect of political competition on subnational social spending? Using descriptive statistics and regression models for original budget panel data for the 24 Argentine provinces between 1993 and 2009, the study finds that social spending increases the more electorally secure governors are and the longer they have been in office. It also finds that other arguments in the literature are relevant in explaining variations on types of spending, such as partisan fragmentation in the districts. The article discusses these findings for the Argentine provinces and explores their implications with regard to the debates on the effects of electoral competition and the design of social policies, especially in developing countries and federal democracies.
Research Interests: Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, Comparative Federalism, Subnational Politics, and 9 moreFederalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Electoral Competition, Federalismo, Political patronage, Patronage, Governors, Subnational Comparative Politics, Public policy - Social spending, and Subnational Governments
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Este artículo estudia cuáles son los principales factores que influyen en la asignación de fondos federales a las provincias en Argentina entre 1999 y 2009. La contribución principal es que incorpora el ciclo electoral junto con la... more
Este artículo estudia cuáles son los principales factores que influyen en la asignación de fondos federales a las provincias en Argentina entre 1999 y 2009. La contribución principal es que incorpora el ciclo electoral junto con la popularidad presidencial en el análisis. El argumento principal es que en los años electorales, los presidentes tienden a distribuir más fondos a las provincias más grandes y más pobladas (llamo a esto distribución electoral). En ellas está la mayor cantidad de votantes. Pero en años no electorales, los presidentes distribuyen a las provincias del interior, menos pobladas, menos ricas, pero más sobrerrepresentadas. Esto es clave para asegurar apoyo legislativo y gobernabilidad (llamo a esto distribución de gobierno). Los clivajes estructurales entre provincias ricas y pobres también se articulan con la popularidad presidencial para influir la distribución de fondos federales. Los presidentes electoralmente fuertes y con apoyo en la opinión pública tienden a aumentar las transferencias a los distritos más pobres y a reducir fondos a los distritos más ricos. Invertir en las provincias más pobres es más eficiente, los gobernadores de estos distritos tienden a apoyar a los presidentes redistributivos y además son rivales políticos más débiles que los gobernadores de los distritos más grandes y ricos. Por el contrario, los presidentes más débiles y con menos apoyo en la opinión pública tienen menos capacidad de resistir las presiones de los gobernadores de los distritos más grandes y ricos. El artículo discute estos resultados, los compara con los de argumentos competitivos (vinculados al rol de las alianzas partidarias, del congreso y de factores programáticos) y explora las implicancias para el debate comparativo.
Research Interests: Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, Comparative Federalism, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, and 11 moreFederalismo, Federalismo Fiscal, Redistribution, Presidential Politics, Electoral cycle, Distributive Politics, Presidente, Politics of Resource Distribution, Presidential Popularity, Popularidad Presidencial, and Ciclo Electoral
Tensions between central authorities and subnational units over centralization and fiscal autonomy are on top of the political agenda in many developing federal countries. This book examines historical changes in the balance between the... more
Tensions between central authorities and subnational units over centralization and fiscal autonomy are on top of the political agenda in many developing federal countries. This book examines historical changes in the balance between the resources that presidents and governors control and the policy responsibilities they have to deliver. It focuses on Argentina and Brazil, the most decentralized federal countries in Latin America, with the most powerful sub-national governments in the region. Using formal modelling, statistical tools, and comparative historical analyses, it examines substantive shifts in the allocation of resources and the distribution of administrative functions and explains under which conditions these changes occur. In doing so, it presents theoretical and comparative implications for the study of fiscal federalism and the functioning of developing federal democracies. This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of federalism, intergovernmental relations, decentralization, and sub-national politics and more broadly to those studying comparative politics, democratization, political elites, public policy and economics.
Research Interests: Brazilian Studies, Federalism, Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, Argentina, and 10 moreBrazil, Comparative Federalism, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Brazilian Politics, Argentinean Politics, Presidential Studies, Federalismo, Presidential Politics, Governors, and Presidente
This article studies the main factors that affect the allocation of non-earmarked federal funds to subnational units in Argentina between 1999 and 2009. The main contribution is that it brings presidential popularity together with... more
This article studies the main factors that affect the allocation of non-earmarked federal funds to subnational units in Argentina between 1999 and 2009. The main contribution is that it brings presidential popularity together with presidential structural and partisan preferences for distribution into the analysis. It argues that electorally strong and popular presidents tend to increase transfers to developing districts and reduce allocations to richer districts. Investing in developing provinces is more efficient, and governors from these districts tend to support redistributive presidents and be weaker political challengers than governors from richer units. In contrast, weaker presidents are less capable of resisting pressures from governors from larger and richer districts. There is also more distribution to developing regions when presidents have a larger share of partisan allies there and fewer in richer states. The article discusses these results, compares them with competitive claims, and explores implications for the comparative debate.
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Why do some countries redistribute more to poorer regions than others? This paper explores which factors explain variation in the degree of interregional redistribution among countries between 1983 and 2010. The main argument is that... more
Why do some countries redistribute more to poorer regions than others? This paper explores which factors explain variation in the degree of interregional redistribution among countries between 1983 and 2010. The main argument is that interregional redistribution increases with the need and capacity of strong presidents to build territorial coalitions with governors from poorer regions and, by implication, decreases with the ability of strong governors in rich districts to resist pressures to extract resources from their units. Using a multilevel structural equation model (the Generalized Linear Latent Multilevel Model, GLLAMM), the study analyzes these and competing claims on the determinants of interregional redistribution using original data from the subnational units of four types of cases, ranging from decentralized and federal to centralized, unitary countries. Empirical results indicate that the type of redistributive coalition between presidents and governors complement purely structural and institutional models to explain fiscal redistributive outcomes in the context of sharp regional inequality.
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Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries... more
Using original data from the period 1999–2011 on federal infrastructure investment for all subnational units in two federations, Argentina and Brazil, and a unitary nation, Colombia, this study shows that in developing federal countries with strong governors, presidents use non-earmarked transfers as a tool to compensate governors for sizable and secure territorial political support. The study argues that in these cases, resources do not make electoral power but chase it. In the unitary case, conversely, governors do not influence distributive politics. Variation also was found in the relevance of Congress, legislative overrepresentation, and programmatic criteria across cases. The article discusses possible reasons for these results and their implications for the comparative debate on distributive politics.
Research Interests: Colombia, Federalism, Comparative Political Economy, Fiscal Federalism, Argentina, and 10 moreBrazil, Comparative Federalism, Subnational Politics, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Brazilian Politics, Argentinean Politics, Colombian Politics, Presidential Politics, Governors, and Distributive Politics
What is the role of presidents in the politics of distribution in developing democracies? To what extent do other political actors, such as legislators and governors, influence federal distribution? This paper studies the main factors... more
What is the role of presidents in the politics of distribution in developing democracies? To what extent do other political actors, such as legislators and governors, influence federal distribution? This paper studies the main factors that affect distributive politics in Argentina and Brazil, two highly unequal presidential federations in Latin America. The focus is on funds with high redistributive impact and over which the central government has large discretion: those for public infrastructure. Using original data on federal infrastructure spending for the 24 provinces in Argentina and the 27 states in Brazil for the period 1999-2011, we show that the distribution of infrastructure funds is fundamentally determined by executive politics. Despite this, our empirical findings indicate there is large variation between the two cases in the relevance of the partisan links between presidents and governors and the influence of congress and its committees. Furthermore, we observe that elections are not relevant in explaining distribution in either of the two cases and that presidents are mostly motivated by political considerations and that programmatic factors, such as equity and efficiency criteria, play a secondary role, especially in Argentina. We discuss some possible reasons for these results and their implications for the broader comparative debate on distributive politics.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Federalism, Comparative Political Economy, Fiscal federalism and decentralization, Argentina, and 8 moreBrazil, Comparative Federalism, Subnational Politics, Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations, Congressional Politics, Presidential Politics, Subnational Comparative Politics, and Distributive Politics
Esta investigación analiza el impacto de las transferencias federales y del gasto subnacional en el desarrollo humano y la equidad interregional. Los datos de transferencias y gasto subnacional en Argentina, Brasil, México, Chile y... more
Esta investigación analiza el impacto de las transferencias federales y del gasto subnacional en el desarrollo humano y la equidad interregional. Los datos de transferencias y gasto subnacional en Argentina, Brasil, México, Chile y Colombia, entre 1983-2011, indican que el poder redistributivo del gobierno central está asociado con mejoras en la equidad interregional, pero no con mejores valores de desarrollo humano, exactamente al contrario de lo que sucede con el gasto social subnacional.
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Several scholars have argued that decentralization benefit sub-national units, granting them more autonomy for managing their budgets and more resources to deliver their functions. Others have questioned this assertion, claiming that it... more
Several scholars have argued that decentralization benefit sub-national units, granting them more autonomy for managing their budgets and more resources to deliver their functions. Others have questioned this assertion, claiming that it makes sub-national units more fiscally dependent to central governments. This paper argues that we have to differentiate decentralization policies’ fiscal impact across states. It theoretically specifies and empirically demonstrates which states benefit during periods of decentralization and centralization. It argues that powerful presidents who centralize resources have imposed larger costs to the more developed and fiscally independent districts (which prefer to administer their own resources and can be serious challengers to presidential power) relying mainly on the support from the less developed and more fiscally dependent provinces that prefer more redistribution. I present empirical evidence for Argentina (1983-2004), a developing federation with strong governors and high cross-regional inequality, and discuss some implications for comparative studies on the topic.
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Durante el 2013, el gobierno central, y sobre todo, las provincias en Argentina enfrentaron crecientes presiones fiscales. Si bien el relativo deterioro del contexto económico repercutió en los votos recibidos por el oficialismo en las... more
Durante el 2013, el gobierno central, y sobre todo, las provincias en Argentina enfrentaron crecientes presiones fiscales. Si bien el relativo deterioro del contexto económico repercutió en los votos recibidos por el oficialismo en las elecciones legislativas, esto no alteró sustancialmente la composición de fuerzas en el Congreso. Con apoyo legislativo, la Presidenta pudo avanzar su agenda legislativa. A pesar de ello se pudo observar un cierto desgaste de la imagen positiva del ejecutivo frente a la opinión pública. Con presiones fiscales crecientes y una Presidenta debilitada, los gobernadores han profundizado los esfuerzos de coordinación frente al gobierno central. Esto hace que una de las características centrales de la política argentina durante el 2013 haya sido la intensificación del conflicto del Presidente (un primus) contra los gobernadores (sus pares).
What factors shape decentralization processes in Latin American federations? This work reviews and statistically analyzes current approaches on the topic, questions some claims of generality in their theoretical frameworks, and presents... more
What factors shape decentralization processes in Latin American federations? This work reviews and statistically analyzes current approaches on the topic, questions some claims of generality in their theoretical frameworks, and presents an argument to explain variation in decentralization processes across these federations. The main hypothesis is that the degree of decentralization (in fiscal and administrative terms) in Latin American federations has been shaped by the political power of the national executive and sub-national actors and the fiscal context in which they interact. The article presents statistical evidence (for federal and unitary countries between 1979 and 1998) to sustain some of the expectations in the argument and discusses some of its limitations.
Recent decades have witnessed the development of an extensive social scientific research program on the determinants of life satisfaction. We examine the role of political factors in affecting quality of life in the context of the... more
Recent decades have witnessed the development of an extensive social scientific research program on the determinants of life satisfaction. We examine the role of political factors in affecting quality of life in the context of the American states. In particular, we ask whether the choices made by voters, as manifested by the governments they elect, and the subsequent public policy regimes those governments establish, determine the degree to which individuals find their lives satisfying. We find that the different ideological and partisan orientations of state governments, as well as a state’s pattern of public policies, have strong effects on satisfaction with life, net of economic, social, and cultural factors. The more a state attempts to insulate citizens against market forces, the greater is satisfaction. The implications for American politics and our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that determine quality of life are discussed.
The main goal of this paper is to assess some empirical strengths of O’Donnell’s concept of delegative democracies. First, I present O’Donnell’s definition and the discussions in the literature. Based on the different dimensions in the... more
The main goal of this paper is to assess some empirical strengths of O’Donnell’s concept of delegative democracies. First, I present O’Donnell’s definition and the discussions in the literature. Based on the different dimensions in the definition, I provide an empirical classification of Latin American cases. In this descriptive section, I show that there is large variation across cases and, more importantly, variation across time within cases. Second, I try to identify what factors could explain some of these results or, more precisely, why delegative democracies are enduring in some countries, while not in others. Relying on a quantitative analysis, I show that under conditions of economic growth, low inflation, and large public support for democracy, Latin American countries are more likely to be representative than delegative democracies. Empirical results also demonstrate that there is a quadratic relationship between partisan polarization and volatility and the odds of a country being a delegative democracy. When structural conditions deteriorate and public confidence sharply diminishes, the probability of having a delegative democracy increases dramatically.
Este trabajo estudia los factores políticos y económicos que afectan la distribución federal de obra pública entre las provincias de Argentina. El foco de la investigación es la obra pública, por tratarse de fondos de alto impacto... more
Este trabajo estudia los factores políticos y económicos que afectan la distribución federal de obra pública entre las provincias de Argentina. El foco de la investigación es la obra pública, por tratarse de fondos de alto impacto redistributivo y sobre los cuales el gobierno tiene poder discrecional. Utilizando datos originales para los 24 distritos entre 1993 y 2009, este artículo explica la distribución regional de obra pública a partir de los incentivos políticos que enfrentan los presidentes para formar y mantener coaliciones electorales y mayorías legislativas. Demostramos que estos factores son más relevantes que los factores programáticos asociados a criterios de equidad o eficiencia. Los datos muestran que ni el poder legislativo ni la sobrerrepresentación influyen decisivamente en la distribución de los fondos, contrariamente a lo que identifican algunos estudios sobre los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea, respectivamente. Nuestro principal argumento es que los presidentes en Argentina tienden a ser económicamente ineficientes, socialmente regresivos y políticamente conservadores al momento de distribuir obra pública. El impacto redistributivo en distritos pobres solo es significativo cuando ellos son socios políticos fundamentales y representan una inversión política segura para el presidente. Discutimos las implicancias de nuestros hallazgos para el debate comparado.
Governors are relevant political actors in most democratic federations and even in some unitary states. Despite this, there is little we know about how to conceptualize and measure their power. I discuss the US literature on gubernatorial... more
Governors are relevant political actors in most democratic federations and even in some unitary states. Despite this, there is little we know about how to conceptualize and measure their power. I discuss the US literature on gubernatorial power, adjust a definition to compare other cases, and apply it to Latin American federations. Relying on a quantitative analysis, I examine recent trends in gubernatorial power in Argentina and Brazil, and show sharp variation between the cases over time. Finally, I provide fresh empirical evidence on the determinants of gubernatorial power using original data. I explain the diverging trends in gubernatorial power relying on the differential use of public-private resources. The stability in gubernatorial power for Argentina is associated to the trading of public employment for political support, which is relatively enduring over time. In Brazil, this exchange is more unstable and fundamentally based on social investment.
Los gobernadores son actores políticos relevantes en la mayoría de las democracias federales e incluso en algunos países unitarios. A pesar de esto, todavía tenemos una limitada comprensión conceptual y aún más escasas medidas para... more
Los gobernadores son actores políticos relevantes en la mayoría de las democracias federales e incluso en algunos países unitarios. A pesar de esto, todavía tenemos una limitada comprensión conceptual y aún más escasas medidas para comparar su poder. Discuto la literatura de Estados Unidos y comparada sobre el poder de los gobernadores, ajusto una definición para examinar tendencias recientes en el poder de los gobernadores en Argentina y Brasil, y descubro una fuerte variación entre los dos casos a lo largo del tiempo. Utilizando datos originales, también proporciono evidencia empírica sobre los determinantes del poder de los gobernadores relacionados con el uso diferenciado de fondos públicos. Sostengo que la estabilidad del poder de los gobernadores en Argentina está asociada con el uso del empleo público para conseguir apoyo político, que es relativamente estable en el tiempo. En Brasil, este intercambio es más inestable y fundamentalmente basado en la inversión social.
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Argentina is a federation that went through times of relatively rigid centralization and others characterized by profound decentralization, not only politically, but fundamentally in fiscal and administrative terms. How is it possible for... more
Argentina is a federation that went through times of relatively rigid centralization and others characterized by profound decentralization, not only politically, but fundamentally in fiscal and administrative terms. How is it possible for a federation to experience these sharp changes when there are institutional structures that should, in principle, give stability to federal relations and regulate tensions among units of government? In this paper, I explore the main characteristics of these centralizing and decentralizing tensions across time and analyze some of the main reasons for their occurrence. The main argument in this paper is that changes in the distribution of funds and functions have historically depended on the fiscal incentives and the fiscal pressures presidents and governors faced across time. In this sense, centralization and decentralization processes are not understood here as “policies.” They are the political consequences of power struggles among units the federation over the distribution of funds and functions.
Durante los últimos años, Argentina ha experimentado una profunda transformación de sus instituciones públicas, producto de la redefinición del rol del Estado en la economía, de la redemocratización del sistema político y del cambio en el... more
Durante los últimos años, Argentina ha experimentado una profunda transformación de sus instituciones públicas, producto de la redefinición del rol del Estado en la economía, de la redemocratización del sistema político y del cambio en el modelo de inserción internacional, entre otros. Ciertamente una de las dimensiones centrales de esta transformación, además del alcance de la intervención estatal, ha sido su naturaleza, particularmente en el plano de la división de tareas entre distintos niveles de Gobierno. En efecto, uno de los ejes principales del proceso de reformas acontecido en los años noventa en Argentina ha sido la descentralización. El punto a destacar en este libro es que la descentralización consiste en una transformación de la estructura político-institucional y de la dinámica de incentivos de las relaciones intergubernamentales que, al modificar los modos de operar de los diferentes niveles de gobierno en una estructura federal como la Argentina, impactan en las políticas públicas, tanto en su naturaleza como en su calidad. En este contexto, la dimensión intergubernamental deviene una dimensión clave, aunque frecuentemente soslayada, para comprender la problemática de la formulación e implementación de políticas estatales en la Argentina actual. Esto implica poner el acento en los problemas de coordinación interjursidiccional, de construcción de coaliciones políticas interregionales, de la interrelación entre acuerdos políticos y transferencias de recursos, para explicar la configuración de las políticas públicas. En síntesis, el presente trabajo analiza el impacto de los cambios en las tres dimensiones de la descentralización (política, administrativa y fiscal) sobre los gobiernos subnacionales (provinciales y municipales) y sobre la dinámica de relaciones entre niveles de gobierno en Argentina. Para ello, se coordinan los esfuerzos de investigadores de diversos centros académicos en la Argentina y el exterior que están actualmente desarrollando trabajos de investigación en las aéreas que abarca este proyecto.
Durante los últimos años, Argentina ha experimentado una profunda transformación de sus instituciones públicas, producto de la redefinición del rol del Estado en la economía, de la redemocratización del sistema político y del cambio en el... more
Durante los últimos años, Argentina ha experimentado una profunda transformación de sus instituciones públicas, producto de la redefinición del rol del Estado en la economía, de la redemocratización del sistema político y del cambio en el modelo de inserción internacional, entre otros. Ciertamente una de las dimensiones centrales de esta transformación, además del alcance de la intervención estatal, ha sido su naturaleza, particularmente en el plano de la división de tareas entre distintos niveles de Gobierno. En efecto, uno de los ejes principales del proceso de reformas acontecido en los años noventa en Argentina ha sido la descentralización. El punto a destacar en este libro es que la descentralización consiste en una transformación de la estructura político-institucional y de la dinámica de incentivos de las relaciones intergubernamentales que, al modificar los modos de operar de los diferentes niveles de gobierno en una estructura federal como la Argentina, impactan en las políticas públicas, tanto en su naturaleza como en su calidad. En este contexto, la dimensión intergubernamental deviene una dimensión clave, aunque frecuentemente soslayada, para comprender la problemática de la formulación e implementación de políticas estatales en la Argentina actual. Esto implica poner el acento en los problemas de coordinación interjursidiccional, de construcción de coaliciones políticas interregionales, de la interrelación entre acuerdos políticos y transferencias de recursos, para explicar la configuración de las políticas públicas. En síntesis, el presente trabajo analiza el impacto de los cambios en las tres dimensiones de la descentralización (política, administrativa y fiscal) sobre los gobiernos subnacionales (provinciales y municipales) y sobre la dinámica de relaciones entre niveles de gobierno en Argentina. Para ello, se coordinan los esfuerzos de investigadores de diversos centros académicos en la Argentina y el exterior que están actualmente desarrollando trabajos de investigación en las aéreas que abarca este proyecto.
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Tensions between central authorities and subnational units over centralization and fiscal autonomy are on top of the political agenda in many developing federal countries. This book examines historical changes in the balance between the... more
Tensions between central authorities and subnational units over centralization and fiscal autonomy are on top of the political agenda in many developing federal countries.
This book examines historical changes in the balance between the resources that presidents and governors control and the policy responsibilities they have to deliver. It focuses on Argentina and Brazil, the most decentralized federal countries in Latin America, with the most powerful sub-national governments in the region. Using formal modelling, statistical tools, and comparative historical analyses, it examines substantive shifts in the allocation of resources and the distribution of administrative functions and explains under which conditions these changes occur. In doing so, it presents theoretical and comparative implications for the study of fiscal federalism and the functioning of developing federal democracies.
This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of federalism, intergovernmental relations, decentralization, and sub-national politics and more broadly to those studying comparative politics, democratization, political elites, public policy and economics.
This book examines historical changes in the balance between the resources that presidents and governors control and the policy responsibilities they have to deliver. It focuses on Argentina and Brazil, the most decentralized federal countries in Latin America, with the most powerful sub-national governments in the region. Using formal modelling, statistical tools, and comparative historical analyses, it examines substantive shifts in the allocation of resources and the distribution of administrative functions and explains under which conditions these changes occur. In doing so, it presents theoretical and comparative implications for the study of fiscal federalism and the functioning of developing federal democracies.
This text will be of key interest to scholars and students of federalism, intergovernmental relations, decentralization, and sub-national politics and more broadly to those studying comparative politics, democratization, political elites, public policy and economics.