- Islam in Turkey, Comparative Politics, Middle East Politics, Politics of Secularism, Politics and Religion, Turkısh Politics, and 12 moreReligion and Politics, Political Science, Political Sociology, Democracy, Political Parties, Social Movements (Political Science), Racial and Ethnic Politics, Nationalism, Islam, Political Islam, Pakistan, and Islamist movementsedit
- Ihsan Yilmaz is a chair in Islamic Studies and research professor of political science and international relations at... moreIhsan Yilmaz is a chair in Islamic Studies and research professor of political science and international relations at Deakin University’s ADI (Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation). Previously, he worked at the Universities of Oxford and London, demonstrating a strong track record of successfully leading multi-site international research projects. At Deakin, his projects have received funding from the Australian Research Council (ARC), Department of Veteran Affairs, Victorian Government, and Gerda Henkel Foundation.
He stands as one of Australia's foremost scholars on religion & law & politics, authoritarianism, digital politics, populism, transnationalism, soft power, and sharp power, with a particular focus on Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan. His prolific authorship is evident through publications in leading political science and international relations journals across the globe.
Furthermore, he holds the position of a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Oxford University’s Regent College and is associated with the Brussels-based think tank, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
His advisory role extends to numerous government departments, policy makers, and bureaucrats in the UK, USA, EU, and Turkey. His contributions span renowned institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Brookings and Hudson Institutes, as well as esteemed media outlets including CNN, BBC, the New York Times, ABC, Sydney Morning Herald, and The Australian.
Presently, he leads two ARC Discovery projects: "Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies, and Social Cohesion: The Case of Turkish & Indian Diasporas in Australia" (in collaboration with Prof Greg Barton) and "Religious Populism, Emotions, and Political Mobilisation: Civilisationism in Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan." Additionally, he co-leads a Gerda Henkel Foundation (Germany) project titled: "Smart Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World."
He is the author of Authoritarianism, Informal Law, and Legal Hybridity (published by Palgrave Macmillan) and Creating the Desired Citizen (published by Cambridge University Press).
He held the position of professor of political science at Istanbul Fatih University from 2008 to 2016. During his time at SOAS, University of London, from 2001 to 2008, he served as a lecturer in law, social sciences, and politics. Within this role, he taught courses such as "Islamic Law and Society," "Legal Systems of Asia and Africa," and "Turkish Politics" at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels.
Before joining SOAS, he was a fellow at the Centre for Islamic Studies, University of Oxford, from 1999 to 2001. During this period, his work centred around Muslim political participation in the UK and the informal Muslim laws among young Muslims in Western countries.
https://www.deakin.edu.au/about-deakin/people/ihsan-yilmaz
https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=x7wxCQ8AAAAJ&hl=enedit
Even though Turkey’s ruling party’s (Justice and Development Party, the AKP) nation-building and desired citizen creation policies have been studied, its use of necropolitical narratives and propaganda in education has not been... more
Even though Turkey’s ruling party’s (Justice and Development Party, the AKP) nation-building and desired citizen creation policies have been studied, its use of necropolitical narratives and propaganda in education has not been investigated. This paper addresses this gap by examining how the Turkish state ruled by the AKP has propagated its religious necropolitical narrative through the national curriculum and Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in school textbooks, and magazines and comic books for children. The paper shows that these texts and comics try to indoctrinate children into a religious cult of martyrdom in different ways by encouraging them to view tragic death and getting killed for the nation as a positive event. This paper argues that these propaganda efforts are part of a religious necropolitical indoctrination campaign that seeks to create a new Islamist and jihadist generation of lifelong supporters of the AKP, which portrays itself in the educational texts as the embodiment of Islam, the Muslim Turkish nation and even the global Muslim community (ummah). This new religious generation is expected to believe that dying for the Islamist populist authoritarian regime is the greatest honour a person can bring upon themselves. This paper contributes to the necropolitics literature by showing that not only adults but also children have been targeted by authoritarian rulers’ necropolitical propaganda attempts to create desired citizens who are ready to die for the regime, believing this is a religious obligation. Further research is needed to assess if and to what extent this propaganda has an impact on children.
Research Interests:
The founders of the secular Turkish Republic, the Kemalists used secular nationalist education to build a secular Turkish nation and to create their own version of modern pro-Western secular Turkish citizens. This paper argues that... more
The founders of the secular Turkish Republic, the Kemalists used secular nationalist
education to build a secular Turkish nation and to create their own version of modern pro-Western
secular Turkish citizens. This paper argues that Turkey’s current ruling party, the AKP (Justice and
Development Party) has been using the same system of education to create its own desired citizens
with Islamist Populist ideals. This has been done without changing the secular principles of the
constitution and laws on national education since there are several constraints that would prevent
AKP to have open and declared pro-Sharia changes to the law. Thus, unlike many other Islamists in
the other parts of the world, the paper shows that the AKP has chosen to undermine the secularity of
the system, constitution, and law in an ad hoc, gradual and undeclared fashion. The paper concludes
by noting that no matter the change in political actors and their ideologies, education is monopolized
by the state for political purposes.
education to build a secular Turkish nation and to create their own version of modern pro-Western
secular Turkish citizens. This paper argues that Turkey’s current ruling party, the AKP (Justice and
Development Party) has been using the same system of education to create its own desired citizens
with Islamist Populist ideals. This has been done without changing the secular principles of the
constitution and laws on national education since there are several constraints that would prevent
AKP to have open and declared pro-Sharia changes to the law. Thus, unlike many other Islamists in
the other parts of the world, the paper shows that the AKP has chosen to undermine the secularity of
the system, constitution, and law in an ad hoc, gradual and undeclared fashion. The paper concludes
by noting that no matter the change in political actors and their ideologies, education is monopolized
by the state for political purposes.
Research Interests:
Erdogan and his ruling AKP have been very active in Pakistan, using cultural centres, facilities, schools, aid, Islamist populist movies and television drama series to transmit anti-western sentiments and propagating Turkey as one of the... more
Erdogan and his ruling AKP
have been very active in Pakistan,
using cultural centres, facilities,
schools, aid, Islamist populist movies
and television drama series to transmit
anti-western sentiments and propagating
Turkey as one of the key
countries that has countered the West
in the past and can resist western
hegemony today. This Islamist civilisational
populist narrative has
resonated with many people in
Pakistan.
have been very active in Pakistan,
using cultural centres, facilities,
schools, aid, Islamist populist movies
and television drama series to transmit
anti-western sentiments and propagating
Turkey as one of the key
countries that has countered the West
in the past and can resist western
hegemony today. This Islamist civilisational
populist narrative has
resonated with many people in
Pakistan.
Research Interests:
The 21st century has witnessed a significant shift in how the concept of nationalism is understood. A political marriage between identity politics and populism has resulted in “civilizationism,” a new form of nationalism that entails an... more
The 21st century has witnessed a significant shift in how the concept of nationalism is understood. A political marriage between identity politics and populism has resulted in “civilizationism,” a new form of nationalism that entails an emotionally charged division of society into “the people” versus “the Other.” All too often, the divisive discourses and policies associated with civilizationalist populism produce intercommunal conflict and violence. This paper draws on a salient case study, India’s Hindutva movement, to analyze how mainstream populist political parties and grassroots organizations can leverage civilizationist populism in campaigns to mobilize political constituencies. In surveying the various groups within the Hindutva movement and conducting a discourse analysis of their leaders’ statements, the paper shows the central role of sacralized nostalgia, history, and culture in Hindutva populist civilizationism. By analyzing the contours and socio-political implications of civilizationist populism through this case study, the paper contributes to the theoretical understanding of the concept more generally.
Several studies have analysed different aspects of Turkey's authoritarianisation under the AKP rule. However, there is still a gap in this literature with regards to the role of instrumentalization of narratives and discursive strategies... more
Several studies have analysed different aspects of Turkey's authoritarianisation under the AKP rule. However, there is still a gap in this literature with regards to the role of instrumentalization of narratives and discursive strategies in this authoritarian turn which has been successfully engineered by the AKP. This article addresses this gap and shows how securitizing narratives based on fear, trauma, nostalgia, ontological insecurity, grievances, and conspiracy theories have been used by President Erdoğan and his AKP as psycho-political tools of authoritarianisation. It argues that these tools have shown to be useful in securitizing the opposition to consolidate power, change the governing structure, and take other extraordinary measures, while legitimizing these acts for the public. In an attempt to provide a holistic picture, this article analyses how the AKP has securitized almost all of the significant opposition sociopolitical identities, groups and parties in Turkey. This study contributes to securitization theory by shedding light on the use of traumas, conspiracy theories, and fear in the securitization process, in legitimizing securitization and authoritarianisation.
This paper aims to investigate how emotions guide and shape diasporic communities' interpretation/perception of socio-political developments in their place of origin. Based on our study of members of the Armenian diaspora who are... more
This paper aims to investigate how emotions guide and shape diasporic communities' interpretation/perception of socio-political developments in their place of origin. Based on our study of members of the Armenian diaspora who are originally from Turkey and who now live in Melbourne, Australia, we argue that these Armenians have formed their views on political issues under the influence of their emotional experiences, stemming from direct or indirect victimhood. The paper finds that several key emotionsfear, hate (and lack of hate), anticipation, and pessimism, inform and shape the Australian Armenian diaspora's making sense of political developments in their place of origin, Turkey. The paper's contribution to the relevant scholarship is twofold. First, it contributes to the studies on emotions in diasporas by examining how emotions shape individual members of a diaspora make sense of political developments in their place of origin. Second, it contributes to the literature on modern Turkey by studying Armenians from Turkey and their emotions on socio-political phenomena.
Although populism has become a focus of research in the last decade, there hasn’t been much academic work on how militaries around the world have reacted/acted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the... more
Although populism has become a focus of research in the last decade, there hasn’t been much academic work on how militaries around the world have reacted/acted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the relationship of militaries in Latin America with various left-wing populist governments and leaders from the 1930s to 1970s. Given that populism was largely understood in the context of left-wing politics, with the rise of right-wing populism, the literature on the military and populism needs to be advanced by studying the relationship between right-wing populism and the military. This article aims to address this gap by looking at the right-wing populism case study of Pakistan, where the military has actively participated in the rise of a religious populist leader. To situate the case study within the larger literature of the military and populism, the dynamics and history of military associations with populism and populist leaders are revisited in the article’s first part.
By combining two separate strands of research, the comparative authoritarianism literature and securitisation theory, this article examines the question of why the Kurdish peace process in Turkey failed. By analysing the Turkish... more
By combining two separate strands of research, the comparative authoritarianism literature and securitisation theory, this article examines the question of why the Kurdish peace process in Turkey failed. By analysing the Turkish government's treatment of the pro-Kurdish opposition, the article argues for a novel conceptual proposition on a securitisation mechanism of authoritarian resilience in electoral politics. It argues that the incumbents attempted to use the peace process (desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue) not for democratisation but for authoritarianism (by co-opting the pro-Kurdish opposition) and when that failed, they re-securitised the Kurdish issue, repressed the opposition and established an authoritarian regime thanks to justification of securitisation. The article contributes to both securitisation and authoritarian stability theories by showing that for authoritarian stability, depending on its needs and context, a government can successfully securitise, de-securitise and resecuritise the same issue with the use of the same functional actor in each stage.
In this paper, we provide an analysis of the main dynamics behind the patterns of friendship between Muslim youth and the Anglo-Australian majority in Australia, from the perspectives of young Muslim Australians. In particular, we focus... more
In this paper, we provide an analysis of the main dynamics behind the patterns of friendship between Muslim youth and the Anglo-Australian majority in Australia, from the perspectives of young Muslim Australians. In particular, we focus on the extent to which race and religiosity play a role in shaping these friendship patterns. We use qualitative data obtained from 64 face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with young Muslims between the ages of 18 and 24. Building upon the existing notions of religious homophily, we show that our respondents separate public acquaintances from close friendships and confine their acquaintances with the Anglo-Australians to the public sphere. Young Muslim Australians perceive the drinking culture of Anglo-Australians as a major barrier to socialisation in private spaces.
Religious populism and radicalism are hardly new to Pakistan. Since its birth in 1947, the country has suffered through an ongoing identity crisis. Under turbulent political conditions, religion has served as a surrogate identity for... more
Religious populism and radicalism are hardly new to Pakistan. Since its birth in 1947, the country has suffered through an ongoing identity crisis. Under turbulent political conditions, religion has served as a surrogate identity for Pakistan, masking the country’s evident plurality, and over the years has come to dominate politics. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is the latest face of religious extremism merged with populist politics. Nevertheless, its sporadic rise from a national movement defending Pakistan’s notorious blasphemy laws to a “pious” party is little understood.
This paper draws on a collection of primary and secondary sources to piece together an account of the party’s evolution that sheds light on its appeal to “the people” and its marginalization and targeting of the “other.” The analysis reveals that the TLP has evolved from a proxy backed by the establishment against the mainstream parties to a full-fledged political force in its own right. Its ability to relate to voters via its pious narrative hinges on exploiting the emotional insecurities of the largely disenfranchised masses. With violence legitimized under the guise of religion, “the people” are afforded a new sense of empowerment. Moreover, the party’s rhetoric has given rise to a vigilante-style mob culture so much so that individuals inspired by this narrative have killed in plain sight without remorse. To make matters worse, the incumbent government of Imran Khan — itself a champion of Islamist rhetoric — has made repeated concessions and efforts to appease the TLP that have only emboldened the party. Today, the TLP poses serious challenges to Pakistan’s long-standing, if fragile, pluralistic social norms and risks tipping the country into an even deadlier cycle of political radicalization.
This paper draws on a collection of primary and secondary sources to piece together an account of the party’s evolution that sheds light on its appeal to “the people” and its marginalization and targeting of the “other.” The analysis reveals that the TLP has evolved from a proxy backed by the establishment against the mainstream parties to a full-fledged political force in its own right. Its ability to relate to voters via its pious narrative hinges on exploiting the emotional insecurities of the largely disenfranchised masses. With violence legitimized under the guise of religion, “the people” are afforded a new sense of empowerment. Moreover, the party’s rhetoric has given rise to a vigilante-style mob culture so much so that individuals inspired by this narrative have killed in plain sight without remorse. To make matters worse, the incumbent government of Imran Khan — itself a champion of Islamist rhetoric — has made repeated concessions and efforts to appease the TLP that have only emboldened the party. Today, the TLP poses serious challenges to Pakistan’s long-standing, if fragile, pluralistic social norms and risks tipping the country into an even deadlier cycle of political radicalization.
Research Interests:
By combining two separate strands of research, the comparative authoritarianism literature and securitisation theory, this article examines the question of why the Kurdish peace process in Turkey failed. By analysing the Turkish... more
By combining two separate strands of research, the comparative authoritarianism literature and securitisation theory, this article examines the question of why the Kurdish peace process in Turkey failed. By analysing the Turkish government's treatment of the pro-Kurdish opposition, the article argues for a novel conceptual proposition on a securitisation mechanism of authoritarian resilience in electoral politics. It argues that the incumbents attempted to use the peace process (desecuritisation of the Kurdish issue) not for democratisation but for authoritarianism (by co-opting the pro-Kurdish opposition) and when that failed, they re-securitised the Kurdish issue, repressed the opposition and established an authoritarian regime thanks to justification of securitisation. The article contributes to both securitisation and authoritarian stability theories by showing that for authoritarian stability, depending on its needs and context, a government can successfully securitise, de-securitise and resecuritise the same issue with the use of the same functional actor in each stage.
This book explores state–religion relations under a populist authoritarian ruling party in Turkey. In doing so, it investigates how the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) instrumentalizes state-controlled religion to further,... more
This book explores state–religion relations under a populist authoritarian ruling party in Turkey. In doing so, it investigates how the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) instrumentalizes state-controlled religion to further, defend, legitimatize and propagate its authoritarian populist political agenda in a constitutionally secular nation-state. To exemplify this, the authors examine the Friday sermons delivered weekly in every mosque in Turkey by the Turkish State’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). By analyzing all sermons delivered between 2010-2021, the book shows how the Diyanet has enthusiastically adopted AKP’s increasingly Islamist, authoritarian, civilisationist, militarist and pro-violence populism since 2010, and how it has tried to socially engineer beliefs in line with this ideology.
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY
The literature on martyrdom has not, so far, systematically analysed a constitutionally secular state’s extensive use of religion in propagating martyrdom narratives by using state-controlled religious institutions. This paper addresses... more
The literature on martyrdom has not, so far, systematically analysed a constitutionally secular state’s extensive use of religion in propagating martyrdom narratives by using state-controlled religious institutions. This paper addresses this gap in martyrdom literature. In addition, even though some studies have analysed how martyrdom narratives have been used for political purposes in Turkey for mythmaking and building a collective memory, a religious institution’s active use by the state for the purposes of mythmaking and collective memory building has not been studied. This paper shows that the contents of the Friday sermons, that reach at least 50 percent of the country’s adult males every week, have moved from Turkish nationalist understanding of militarism and martyrdom to more radical, Islamist and pro-violence interpretations that actively promote dying for the nation, homeland, religion and God. The sermons also emphasise that new generations must be raised with this pro-violence religious spirit, which is also novel.
Research Interests:
Since independence, Islamic civil society groups and intellectuals have played a vital role in Indonesian politics. This paper seeks to chart the contestation of Islamic religious ideas in Indonesian politics and society throughout the... more
Since independence, Islamic civil society groups and intellectuals have played a vital role in
Indonesian politics. This paper seeks to chart the contestation of Islamic religious ideas in Indonesian
politics and society throughout the 20th Century, from the declaration of independence in 1945 up
until 2001. This paper discusses the social and political influence of, and relationships between, three
major Indonesian Islamic intellectual streams: Modernists, Traditionalists, and neo-Modernists. It
describes the intellectual roots of each of these Islamic movements, their relationships with the civil
Islamic groups Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), their influence upon Indonesian politics,
and their interactions with the state. The paper examines the ways in which mainstream Islamic
politics in Indonesia, the world’s largest majority Muslim nation, has been shaped by disagreements
between modernists and traditionalists, beginning in the early 1950s. Disagreements resulted in a
schism within Masyumi, the dominant Islamic party, that saw the traditionalists affiliated with NU
leave to establish a separate NU party. Not only did this prevent Masyumi from coming close to
garnering a majority of the votes in the 1955 election, but it also contributed to Masyumi veering
into Islamism. This conservative turn coincided with elite contestation to define Indonesia as an
Islamic state and was a factor in the party antagonizing President Sukarno to the point that he
moved to ban it. The banning of Masyumi came as Sukarno imposed ‘guided democracy’ as a
soft-authoritarian alternative to democracy and set in train dynamics that facilitated the emergence of
military-backed authoritarianism under Suharto. During the four decades in which democracy was
suppressed in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and associated NGOs, activists,
and intellectuals were the backbones of civil society. They provided critical support for the nonsectarian
principles at the heart of the Indonesian constitution, known as Pancasila. This found
the strongest and clearest articulation in the neo-Modernist movement that emerged in the 1980s
and synthesized key elements of traditionalist Islamic scholarship and Modernist reformism. Neo-
Modernism, which was articulated by leading Islamic intellectual Nurcholish Madjid and Nahdlatul
Ulama Chairman AbdurrahmanWahid, presents an open, inclusive, progressive understanding of
Islam that is affirming of social pluralism, comfortable with modernity, and stresses the need for
tolerance and harmony in inter-communal relations. Its articulation by Wahid, who later became
president of Indonesia, contributed to Indonesia’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy.
The vital contribution of neo-Modernist Islam to democracy and reform in Indonesia serves to refute
the notion that Islam is incompatible with democracy and pluralism.
Indonesian politics. This paper seeks to chart the contestation of Islamic religious ideas in Indonesian
politics and society throughout the 20th Century, from the declaration of independence in 1945 up
until 2001. This paper discusses the social and political influence of, and relationships between, three
major Indonesian Islamic intellectual streams: Modernists, Traditionalists, and neo-Modernists. It
describes the intellectual roots of each of these Islamic movements, their relationships with the civil
Islamic groups Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), their influence upon Indonesian politics,
and their interactions with the state. The paper examines the ways in which mainstream Islamic
politics in Indonesia, the world’s largest majority Muslim nation, has been shaped by disagreements
between modernists and traditionalists, beginning in the early 1950s. Disagreements resulted in a
schism within Masyumi, the dominant Islamic party, that saw the traditionalists affiliated with NU
leave to establish a separate NU party. Not only did this prevent Masyumi from coming close to
garnering a majority of the votes in the 1955 election, but it also contributed to Masyumi veering
into Islamism. This conservative turn coincided with elite contestation to define Indonesia as an
Islamic state and was a factor in the party antagonizing President Sukarno to the point that he
moved to ban it. The banning of Masyumi came as Sukarno imposed ‘guided democracy’ as a
soft-authoritarian alternative to democracy and set in train dynamics that facilitated the emergence of
military-backed authoritarianism under Suharto. During the four decades in which democracy was
suppressed in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, and associated NGOs, activists,
and intellectuals were the backbones of civil society. They provided critical support for the nonsectarian
principles at the heart of the Indonesian constitution, known as Pancasila. This found
the strongest and clearest articulation in the neo-Modernist movement that emerged in the 1980s
and synthesized key elements of traditionalist Islamic scholarship and Modernist reformism. Neo-
Modernism, which was articulated by leading Islamic intellectual Nurcholish Madjid and Nahdlatul
Ulama Chairman AbdurrahmanWahid, presents an open, inclusive, progressive understanding of
Islam that is affirming of social pluralism, comfortable with modernity, and stresses the need for
tolerance and harmony in inter-communal relations. Its articulation by Wahid, who later became
president of Indonesia, contributed to Indonesia’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy.
The vital contribution of neo-Modernist Islam to democracy and reform in Indonesia serves to refute
the notion that Islam is incompatible with democracy and pluralism.
Research Interests:
The paper shows how a state controlled religious institution used religion, fear, trauma, insecurity, grievances, and conspiracy theories to dehumanise a religious community, and presented it as an existential threat to the nation, the... more
The paper shows how a state controlled religious institution used religion, fear, trauma, insecurity, grievances, and conspiracy theories to dehumanise a religious community, and presented it
as an existential threat to the nation, the global community of believers and religion, by investigating
the case of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs’ (the Diyanet) securitizing role under the authoritarian Islamist Erdo ˘ganist rule. The article provides an empirically rich analysis of the Diyanet’s
construction of the Gülen Movement (GM) as a source of sedition (fitne), corruption (fesat), mischief,
a social disease, and finally, as a traitor and puppet of the West that constantly conspires against
Turkey, Islam, and the Muslim World. By securitising the movement, the Diyanet legitimised the
authoritarian and violent actions of the Erdo ˘ganist regime against the alleged movement members.
as an existential threat to the nation, the global community of believers and religion, by investigating
the case of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs’ (the Diyanet) securitizing role under the authoritarian Islamist Erdo ˘ganist rule. The article provides an empirically rich analysis of the Diyanet’s
construction of the Gülen Movement (GM) as a source of sedition (fitne), corruption (fesat), mischief,
a social disease, and finally, as a traitor and puppet of the West that constantly conspires against
Turkey, Islam, and the Muslim World. By securitising the movement, the Diyanet legitimised the
authoritarian and violent actions of the Erdo ˘ganist regime against the alleged movement members.
Research Interests:
Religion in the hands of authoritarian governments can prove to be an effective political instrument to further their agenda. This paper attempts to explore this aspect of authoritarianism with the case of Turkish family laws under... more
Religion in the hands of authoritarian governments can prove to be an effective political
instrument to further their agenda. This paper attempts to explore this aspect of authoritarianism
with the case of Turkish family laws under Erdoganist Islamist legal pluralism. The paper analyzes
the AKP’s government’s attempts at pro-Islamist legislation, fatwas produced by Diyanet (Turkish
Directorate of Religious Affairs) and by pro-government right-wing religious scholars to explore
the changes that have occurred, both formally and informally, in the largely secular family laws of
the Republic of Turkey in the last decade. By focusing on the age of marriage, this paper tries to
understand the impact of Islamist legal pluralism and unofficial Islamist laws on the formal legal
system as well as the social implications of this plural socio-legal reality, particularly for vulnerable
groups such as the poor, refugees, children, and women. The trends demonstrate the informal
system’s skew towards Islamism, patriarchy and disregard for fundamental rights. This Islamist legal
plurality almost always operates against the women and underage girls, which creates profound
individual and social problems. The paper concludes by pointing out the critical issues emerging in
the domain of family law due to the link between the growing power of Islamist legal pluralism and
its political instrumentalization by the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
instrument to further their agenda. This paper attempts to explore this aspect of authoritarianism
with the case of Turkish family laws under Erdoganist Islamist legal pluralism. The paper analyzes
the AKP’s government’s attempts at pro-Islamist legislation, fatwas produced by Diyanet (Turkish
Directorate of Religious Affairs) and by pro-government right-wing religious scholars to explore
the changes that have occurred, both formally and informally, in the largely secular family laws of
the Republic of Turkey in the last decade. By focusing on the age of marriage, this paper tries to
understand the impact of Islamist legal pluralism and unofficial Islamist laws on the formal legal
system as well as the social implications of this plural socio-legal reality, particularly for vulnerable
groups such as the poor, refugees, children, and women. The trends demonstrate the informal
system’s skew towards Islamism, patriarchy and disregard for fundamental rights. This Islamist legal
plurality almost always operates against the women and underage girls, which creates profound
individual and social problems. The paper concludes by pointing out the critical issues emerging in
the domain of family law due to the link between the growing power of Islamist legal pluralism and
its political instrumentalization by the Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Research Interests:
Muhammad Rizieq Shihab has been one of the most well-known faces of the far-right in Indonesia since the late 1990s. As a radical Islamist scholar with links to Saudi Arabia, Shihab has spent the last three decades as an anti-state voice... more
Muhammad Rizieq Shihab has been one of the most well-known faces of the far-right in Indonesia since the late 1990s. As a radical Islamist scholar with links to Saudi Arabia, Shihab has spent the last three decades as an anti-state voice of the "pious Muslim majority" in Indonesia. He claims to position himself as a "righteous" and "fearless" leader who is dedicated to defending Islam-the faith of "the people." In 2020 Shihab was arrested for holding large public gatherings, as part of his 'moral revolution' campaign, in the middle of pandemic lockdowns. However, his radical Salafist message continues to inspire thousands to action.
Research Interests:
Erdogan and Khan's use of Islamist populism lays bare a highly pragmatic approach to addressing Muslim issues, rather than one motivated by Islamic social justice or humanitarianism. Their stances are designed to evoke emotions and... more
Erdogan and Khan's use of Islamist populism lays bare a highly pragmatic approach to addressing Muslim issues, rather than one motivated by Islamic social justice or humanitarianism. Their stances are designed to evoke emotions and justify their existence as populists while expanding their transnational populist appeal among other Muslim-majority nations. Yet their treatment of the "Muslim Other" within their own countries and silence over the Uighur genocide in China earn them the title of pragmatic Islamist leaders. By Ihsan Yilmaz & Kainat Shakil When pressed on why he is outspoken against Islamophobia in the West but silent about the genocide of Muslim Uyghurs in western China, the Islamist populist prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, responded: "I concentrate on what is happening on my border. " Following in the footsteps of Turkey's authoritarian (Islamist) populist leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Imran Khan has emerged as among the most prominent faces of religious populism in the (Sunni) Muslim-majority world. "There is so much debate about moderate and radical Islam, but there is only one Islam, " declared Imran Khan in 2019. This echoed the tone adopted several years earlier (in 2017) by Erdogan, who asserted "there is no moderate or immoderate Islam. Islam is Islam, and that's it." The idea of "one Islam" or "Islam is Islam" is part of a populist process of "Islamizing Islam. " This comes in the wake of the leadership gap that opened up with the withdrawal of Saudi Arabia as the Sunni Muslim hegemon. Thus, in neo-Ottoman fashion, Turkey seeks to fill this gap, with Pakistan acting as its aide to address its "ontological insecurities" (Yilmaz, 2021). In highlighting Islam in this way, both Erdogan and Khan define "the people" or "the pious" against an antagonistic "Other, "
Research Interests:
The first quarter of the twenty-first century has witnessed the rise of populism around the world. While it is widespread it manifests in its own unique ways in each society, nation, and region. Religious populism, once rarely discussed,... more
The first quarter of the twenty-first century has witnessed the rise of populism around the world. While it is widespread it manifests in its own unique ways in each society, nation, and region. Religious populism, once rarely discussed, has come to take a more prominent role in the politics of a diverse range of societies and countries, as religious discourse is increasingly used by mainstream and peripheral populist actors alike. This paper examines the rise of religious populism in Indonesia through a study of the widely talked about, but little understood, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI-Front Pembela Islam). The case study method used to examine the FPI provides a unique insight into a liminal organization which, through populist and pro-violence Islamist discourse and political lobbying, has had an outsized impact on Indonesian politics. In this paper, we identify the FPI as an Islamist civilizationist populist group and show how the group frames Indonesian domestic political events within a larger cosmic battle between faithful and righteous Muslims and the forces that stand against Islam, whether they be "unfaithful Muslims" or non-Muslims. We also show how the case of the FPI demonstrates the manner in which smaller, liminal, political actors can instrumentalise religion and leverage religious rhetoric to reshape political discourse, and in doing so, drive demand for religious populism. The paper makes two arguments: First, the FPI is an example of a civilizationist populist movement which instrumentalises religion in order to create demand for its populist solutions. Second, that as Islamic groups and organisations in Indonesia increasingly rely on religio-civilizational concepts of national identity, they become more transnational in outlook, rhetoric, and organisation and more closely aligned with religious developments in the Middle East.
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In Turkey under the rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Friday sermons of Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) frequently employ vertical populist antagonistic binaries to legitimize the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP)... more
In Turkey under the rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Friday sermons of Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) frequently employ vertical populist antagonistic binaries to legitimize the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) fight against the secular Kemalist “elite,” who are charged with being insufficiently Islamic. At the same time, horizontal binaries are employed in sermons to justify Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian rule and his harsh measures against dissidents, who are branded enemies of Islam and “the people.”
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This commentary uses a case study of Indonesia’s Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) to explore crucial questions regarding the nature of populism in Indonesia. Some see the recent ban of the FPI by the administration of... more
This commentary uses a case study of Indonesia’s Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) to explore crucial questions regarding the nature of populism in Indonesia. Some see the recent ban of the FPI by the administration of President Joko Widodo as a decisive clash between technocratic governance and right-wing Islamist populism. But while the banning of the FPI represents a significant move against Islamist populism, it will not necessarily weaken it in the longer run. Nevertheless, in a political environment largely devoid of competing forms of conviction politics, the campaigns for the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections will continue to see Islamist populism playing a significant role.
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Imran Khan is not the first to use populism to wield power in Pakistan. Religious leaders, political figures, and military generals have used faith and the promise of a better life to gain support or legitimize their actions. The... more
Imran Khan is not the first to use populism to wield power in Pakistan.
Religious leaders, political figures, and military generals have used faith
and the promise of a better life to gain support or legitimize their actions.
The uniqueness of Khan’s populism lies in the fact that he has been able
to condense a host of diverse ideologies into a coherent populist narrative
that has endeared him to “the people.”
Religious leaders, political figures, and military generals have used faith
and the promise of a better life to gain support or legitimize their actions.
The uniqueness of Khan’s populism lies in the fact that he has been able
to condense a host of diverse ideologies into a coherent populist narrative
that has endeared him to “the people.”
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With “the people” on his side, Erdogan has changed the very fabric of Turkish society. Turkey has been changing from an oppressive Kemalist state to an aggressive autocratic and vindictive Islamist state. All opposition is securitised and... more
With “the people” on his side, Erdogan has changed the very fabric of
Turkish society. Turkey has been changing from an oppressive Kemalist
state to an aggressive autocratic and vindictive Islamist state. All opposition
is securitised and deemed “the enemy,” state institutions spread Erdoganism’s
populist narratives, and democratic checks and balances have been
successfully dismantled.
Turkish society. Turkey has been changing from an oppressive Kemalist
state to an aggressive autocratic and vindictive Islamist state. All opposition
is securitised and deemed “the enemy,” state institutions spread Erdoganism’s
populist narratives, and democratic checks and balances have been
successfully dismantled.
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Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) used to be an activist party at a time when civil society was highly subdued under a military regime. Through modest civil disobedience, it has graduated to the status of a formidable opposition party. It... more
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) used to be an activist party at a time when
civil society was highly subdued under a military regime. Through modest
civil disobedience, it has graduated to the status of a formidable opposition
party. It has used populist rhetoric and tactics to delegitimize and “otherize”
the conventional parties and position itself as the ideal voice and hope
for “the people.” It has used a wide array of ideologies to support its populism,
which tapped into deep-rooted anxieties in the public’s psyche.
civil society was highly subdued under a military regime. Through modest
civil disobedience, it has graduated to the status of a formidable opposition
party. It has used populist rhetoric and tactics to delegitimize and “otherize”
the conventional parties and position itself as the ideal voice and hope
for “the people.” It has used a wide array of ideologies to support its populism,
which tapped into deep-rooted anxieties in the public’s psyche.
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The global tide of populism will leave a profound mark on Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) success during the past two decades, has hinged on Islamist authoritarian populism and been driven by its long-time leader,... more
The global tide of populism will leave a profound mark on Turkey. The
ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) success during the past two
decades, has hinged on Islamist authoritarian populism and been driven by
its long-time leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “New Turkey” is now a reality.
The AKP has been successful at dismantling the Kemalist ideals – ironically,
perhaps, by using similarly repressing techniques, such as cracking down
on civil liberties and democratic rights.
ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) success during the past two
decades, has hinged on Islamist authoritarian populism and been driven by
its long-time leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “New Turkey” is now a reality.
The AKP has been successful at dismantling the Kemalist ideals – ironically,
perhaps, by using similarly repressing techniques, such as cracking down
on civil liberties and democratic rights.
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The highly politicized, Ottomanist themes of Ertugrul Ghazi, a Turkish television drama, are a manifestation of Turkey's desire to expand its cultural borders. The show depicts Turks as the protagonists dealing with contemporary political... more
The highly politicized, Ottomanist themes of Ertugrul Ghazi, a Turkish television drama, are a manifestation of Turkey's desire to expand its cultural borders. The show depicts Turks as the protagonists dealing with contemporary political issues, "settling" accounts with their enemies as they steadfastly practise the faith of Islam. These ideals facilitates the construction of a transnational populist civilizational cultural identity which surpasses nationalism. The show and its themes have resonated with the Pakistani version of Islamist populism.
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The literature on populism overwhelmingly deals with the factors behind the rise of populism: the supply factors, and the economic and political crises. However, there is a lack of engagement in the literature on the construction of... more
The literature on populism overwhelmingly deals with the factors behind the rise of populism: the supply factors, and the economic and political crises. However, there is a lack of engagement in the literature on the construction of populist narratives and especially on the relations between populist narratives and violence. This paper addresses these gaps. Based on an empirically rich case study of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader President Recep T. Erdoğan, it shows that the populist narrative of the party and its leader is necro-political as it is based on narratives of martyrdom, blood and death. The paper also shows that to maintain authoritarian stability, the incumbents instrumentalise these populist necropolitical narratives for repression , legitimation and co-optation. We analyse this complex case by combining the literatures on populism, necropolitics, politics of martyrdom and authoritarianism, and contribute to all of them.
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ABSTRACT This paper studies the Muslim youth experience in Britain vis-a-vis vulnerability to extremist ideologies with a specific focus on the Hizb ut-Tahrir. In Britain, there is the increasingly significant phenomenon of the... more
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the Muslim youth experience in Britain vis-a-vis vulnerability to extremist ideologies with a specific focus on the Hizb ut-Tahrir. In Britain, there is the increasingly significant phenomenon of the indigenous-born, native-language-speaking Muslim youth politicized by a radicalized Islam. In the British case, socio-economic and political deprivation as far as Muslims are concerned is an everyday reality. But several other minorities suffer also from these deprivations. This paper argues that in addition to social, economic and political deprivations, Muslims in Britain have to also face multiple discriminations especially in a post-9/11 and 7/7 climate and theological deprivation. Last but not the least international incidents negatively affecting Muslims all over the world, perceived government bias against Muslims, at home and abroad, linked to Palestinian question and Rushdie incident of 1989 make young British Muslims more inclined to radi-
calism. In this context, HT’s discourse becomes attractive to the young Muslims who suffer from identity issues, exclusion, racism and discrimination. HT’s easily accessible literature
provides an alternative source of political and historical information and theological interpretation.
This paper studies the Muslim youth experience in Britain vis-a-vis vulnerability to extremist ideologies with a specific focus on the Hizb ut-Tahrir. In Britain, there is the increasingly significant phenomenon of the indigenous-born, native-language-speaking Muslim youth politicized by a radicalized Islam. In the British case, socio-economic and political deprivation as far as Muslims are concerned is an everyday reality. But several other minorities suffer also from these deprivations. This paper argues that in addition to social, economic and political deprivations, Muslims in Britain have to also face multiple discriminations especially in a post-9/11 and 7/7 climate and theological deprivation. Last but not the least international incidents negatively affecting Muslims all over the world, perceived government bias against Muslims, at home and abroad, linked to Palestinian question and Rushdie incident of 1989 make young British Muslims more inclined to radi-
calism. In this context, HT’s discourse becomes attractive to the young Muslims who suffer from identity issues, exclusion, racism and discrimination. HT’s easily accessible literature
provides an alternative source of political and historical information and theological interpretation.
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This article argues on the basis of recent case law that the judges of the Pakistan Federal Shariat Court (FSC) have asserted their right to ijtihād and have indeed engaged in collective ijtihād. While in some areas, such as freedom of... more
This article argues on the basis of recent case law that the judges of the Pakistan Federal Shariat
Court (FSC) have asserted their right to ijtihād and have indeed engaged in collective ijtihād.
While in some areas, such as freedom of religion, Islamic law has been interpreted rigidly in a
non-human-rights-friendly fashion in Pakistan, in some other areas, the flexibility and
pluralism of Islamic law has been used to improve gender equality, women’s rights and the
right to family life. By using its constitutional powers, with its collective ijtihād, the FSC
has been tackling the traditionally illiberal interpretation and application of Muslim laws in
these areas. Regardless of the methodology and process of this ijtihādic endeavor, the
output shows that the FSC has been either modifying the traditional ijtihāds or coming up
with totally new ijtihāds to answer contemporary questions faced by Islamic law. The
findings of the article once again challenge the views of scholars such as Schacht, Coulson
and Chehata, who have argued that, by the fourth/tenth century, the essentials of Islamic
legal doctrine were already fully formulated and that the doctrine remained fixed.
Court (FSC) have asserted their right to ijtihād and have indeed engaged in collective ijtihād.
While in some areas, such as freedom of religion, Islamic law has been interpreted rigidly in a
non-human-rights-friendly fashion in Pakistan, in some other areas, the flexibility and
pluralism of Islamic law has been used to improve gender equality, women’s rights and the
right to family life. By using its constitutional powers, with its collective ijtihād, the FSC
has been tackling the traditionally illiberal interpretation and application of Muslim laws in
these areas. Regardless of the methodology and process of this ijtihādic endeavor, the
output shows that the FSC has been either modifying the traditional ijtihāds or coming up
with totally new ijtihāds to answer contemporary questions faced by Islamic law. The
findings of the article once again challenge the views of scholars such as Schacht, Coulson
and Chehata, who have argued that, by the fourth/tenth century, the essentials of Islamic
legal doctrine were already fully formulated and that the doctrine remained fixed.
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Transactionalism is a foreign policy approach that favours bilateral to multilateral relations, focuses on short-term wins rather than longer-term strategic foresight, adheres to a zero-sum worldview where all gains are relative and... more
Transactionalism is a foreign policy approach that favours bilateral to multilateral relations, focuses on short-term wins rather than longer-term strategic foresight, adheres to a zero-sum worldview where all gains are relative and reciprocity is absent, rejects value-based policymaking, and does not follow a grand strategy. Turkey’s transactionalist turn can be best recognised in its relations with the EU, not only because of the strictly transactionalist character of the new bilateral policy agendas, but also because the transactionalist era is sharply different from the previous periods.
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This article examines young Muslim Australians’ attitudes toward implementing Sharia in Australia using 64 semi-structured interviews conducted in Melbourne and Geelong, Australia. We found that although the attitudes can be grouped under... more
This article examines young Muslim Australians’ attitudes toward
implementing Sharia in Australia using 64 semi-structured
interviews conducted in Melbourne and Geelong, Australia. We
found that although the attitudes can be grouped under the
main typologies of Legal Pluralist and Muslim Secularist, there
were a variety of responses within each category. While Legal
Pluralist A wants Sharia to be officially implemented for Muslims
in Australia, Legal Pluralist B thinks Sharia would be beneficial for
everyone in Australia. The majority of our respondents (Muslim
Secularist) think that Sharia is not suited for Australian state, legal
system and politics. Muslim Secularist A does not think that
Sharia offer any benefit to modern societies in any part of the
world. Muslim Secularist B thinks that Sharia cannot be applied in
Australia that has to remain secular because of the religious
diversity of the population and Sharia is more useful for Muslimmajority
countries. Religiosity does not predict any of these
typologies in our participant group since, with few exceptions, all
identified themselves as religious Muslims.
implementing Sharia in Australia using 64 semi-structured
interviews conducted in Melbourne and Geelong, Australia. We
found that although the attitudes can be grouped under the
main typologies of Legal Pluralist and Muslim Secularist, there
were a variety of responses within each category. While Legal
Pluralist A wants Sharia to be officially implemented for Muslims
in Australia, Legal Pluralist B thinks Sharia would be beneficial for
everyone in Australia. The majority of our respondents (Muslim
Secularist) think that Sharia is not suited for Australian state, legal
system and politics. Muslim Secularist A does not think that
Sharia offer any benefit to modern societies in any part of the
world. Muslim Secularist B thinks that Sharia cannot be applied in
Australia that has to remain secular because of the religious
diversity of the population and Sharia is more useful for Muslimmajority
countries. Religiosity does not predict any of these
typologies in our participant group since, with few exceptions, all
identified themselves as religious Muslims.
Research Interests:
This article examines young Muslim Australians' attitudes toward implementing Sharia in Australia using 64 semi-structured interviews conducted in Melbourne and Geelong, Australia. We found that although the attitudes can be grouped under... more
This article examines young Muslim Australians' attitudes toward implementing Sharia in Australia using 64 semi-structured interviews conducted in Melbourne and Geelong, Australia. We found that although the attitudes can be grouped under the main typologies of Legal Pluralist and Muslim Secularist, there were a variety of responses within each category. While Legal Pluralist A wants Sharia to be officially implemented for Muslims in Australia, Legal Pluralist B thinks Sharia would be beneficial for everyone in Australia. The majority of our respondents (Muslim Secularist) think that Sharia is not suited for Australian state, legal system and politics. Muslim Secularist A does not think that Sharia offer any benefit to modern societies in any part of the world. Muslim Secularist B thinks that Sharia cannot be applied in Australia that has to remain secular because of the religious diversity of the population and Sharia is more useful for Muslimmajority countries. Religiosity does not predict any of these typologies in our participant group since, with few exceptions, all identified themselves as religious Muslims.
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Created for the Muslims of the Indian Sub-continent in 1947, Pakistan is by design a Muslim majority state with 97 percent Muslim population. Despite the division of India and Pakistan based on distinct religious identities as per the... more
Created for the Muslims of the Indian Sub-continent in 1947, Pakistan is by design a Muslim majority state with 97 percent Muslim population. Despite the division of India and Pakistan based on distinct religious identities as per the ‘Two-Nation Theory’ (Cohen 2004), Pakistan continues to face identity crisis as evident through divisions between Islamists and secularists. The law has been an arena of this Kulturkampf (Yilmaz 2016). Islam was identified as a key element of Pakistan identity since the first deliberations on the constitution of Pakistan. In the light of the Objective Resolution of 1949, the country was declared an Islamic Republic in 1956 (Ahmed 2016). Later constitutions have also maintained the centrality of Islamic ideology in everyday affairs of Pakistan (Chak 2015). Despite a declared Islamic Republic, Islamization began in the 1970s under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and later during the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s. Under Zia, the most controversial Hudood laws were formulated and implemented. While many scholars blame the leaders of that time, especially General Zia, for the discriminatory laws against women, it is important to analyse the role of constitutional bodies responsible for ijtihad, such as the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), and the Federal Shariat Court (FSC), in relation to women rights. The aim of this paper is to present a critical analysis of both institutions in connection to some prominent, but controversial, laws vis-à-vis women in Pakistan. Despite criticism of CII’s controversial recommendation on issues pertaining women rights, the council merely has an advisory role. CII’s reports are often not discussed in the parliament, as there are bureaucratic filters. Even if passed by the legislators, FSC has the mandate to make judgements on Islamic laws. Thus, impact of CII’s recommendations on women in Pakistan cannot be judged in isolation to other key constitutional bodies, especially FSC.
In terms of the methodology of the paper, the analysis is based on the role of two selected bodies since 1980. It is the year when FSC was created and an era in which many of CII’s suggestions on Islamization were implemented during General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime.
In terms of the methodology of the paper, the analysis is based on the role of two selected bodies since 1980. It is the year when FSC was created and an era in which many of CII’s suggestions on Islamization were implemented during General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime.
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This book identifies Muslims‟ current socio-legal situation and their legal attitudes from different perspectives. The main aim of this study is to analyze the conflict between the assumptions of modern legal systems and plural legal... more
This book identifies Muslims‟ current socio-legal situation and their legal attitudes from different perspectives. The main aim of this study is to analyze the conflict between the assumptions of modern legal systems and plural legal realities. While there is a reconstruction of unofficial Muslim laws in the modern and officially uniform secular legal systems of England and Turkey, in the case of Pakistan, where Islamic laws are recognized to a great extent, legal reform attempts in the areas of Muslim family law by the Islamic Pakistani state have so far not been successful and have led to intense clashes. The study shows that Muslims in these countries react to the modern frameworks of legal systems and do not abandon their locally formulated and interpreted Muslim laws. State formulations and interpretations of Islamic law, as in the case of Pakistan, or its more or less total disregard, as in the cases of Britain and Turkey, lead people to reconstruct their own unofficial Muslim laws.
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Pek çok kişi refah ve başarının zirvesindeki Osmanlı Devleti'ni uyumun bir sembolü olarak görmektedir. Osmanlı Devleti, kendisine tabi gruplara kendi kültü-rel, dinî, ekonomik ve siyasi işlerinde göreceli özerklik vermek suretiyle, etnik... more
Pek çok kişi refah ve başarının zirvesindeki Osmanlı Devleti'ni uyumun bir sembolü olarak görmektedir. Osmanlı Devleti, kendisine tabi gruplara kendi kültü-rel, dinî, ekonomik ve siyasi işlerinde göreceli özerklik vermek suretiyle, etnik ve dinî farklılıkları yönetim sistemi içerisinde birleştirmiştir (millet sistemi) ve bu grupların üyelerinin güçlü ve önemli pozisyonlara yükselmelerine müsaade edilmiştir. Bu çalışmanın temel dayanak noktası çok basittir: Müslüman ve gayrimüslim devletler arasındaki çatış-maların yaygın olduğu bir zamanda, kanun gibi sıkı ve hassas bir alanda bile, Osmanlılar etnik, kültürel ve dinî farklılıkların kucaklandığı yüzyıllar boyunca, kültürel, etnik, dinî ve hatta yasal olarak çoğulcu bir düzeni devam ettirdi; hatta özel hukuk alanında bile gayrimüslim azınlıkların kendi etnik ve dinî yasalarını uygulamalarına müsaade edildi. Bu çalışma bütün bunları vurgulamaya gayret etmektedir.
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The present thesis seeks to test if, and to what extent, claims of the modern nation-state laws to exclusive dominance over other spheres are tenable andre-assesses the operation of law in society. The thesis exemplifies the living law... more
The present thesis seeks to test if, and to what extent, claims of the modern nation-state laws to exclusive dominance over other spheres are tenable andre-assesses the operation of law in society. The thesis exemplifies the living law theory by putting the spotlight on Muslim laws in England, Turkey and Pakistan and substantiates that the metanarrative discourse of modern legality is challenged by `local' cultures and their `unofficial' obligation systems.
In chapter 2, a model of operation of law in society is formulated. After providing a detailed account of theoretical discussions regarding legal
pluralism, chapter 2 suggests that regardless of state recognition, several laws and normative orders interact, leading to continuous reconstruction of superhybrid laws. In chapters 3,4 and 5, theoretical discussion and hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter are applied to the socio-legal sphere. The main areas of concern are Muslim marriage and divorce and, in each chapter, a different country and legal system are analysed.
In each case, it is found that there are limits to state law, that people maintain their own self-perceptions of legal affairs and that unofficial laws co-exist with official ones. Muslims redefine and reconstruct their laws unofficially even within secular frameworks and undermine and obstruct the claim of official law to have a monopoly over the socio-legal sphere as the governing law. Skilful Muslim legal navigators, as post-modern entities of the sociolegal arena, combine rules of different conflicting normative orders and reconstruct their own super-hybrid laws as law-inventing citizens.
The study suggests that states should move towards developing a `supramodern' response. This is neither a full defence of modernity, nor a complete acceptance of postmodernity, but this thesis argues for an integrated theory which envisages that various types of laws interact, that the state law is also subject to legal postulates, and that state law is in charge of this process as a referee. Supramodernity does not lead to anarchy in contrast to post-modern formulations yet recognises diversity as part of the mosaic.
In chapter 2, a model of operation of law in society is formulated. After providing a detailed account of theoretical discussions regarding legal
pluralism, chapter 2 suggests that regardless of state recognition, several laws and normative orders interact, leading to continuous reconstruction of superhybrid laws. In chapters 3,4 and 5, theoretical discussion and hypotheses formulated in the previous chapter are applied to the socio-legal sphere. The main areas of concern are Muslim marriage and divorce and, in each chapter, a different country and legal system are analysed.
In each case, it is found that there are limits to state law, that people maintain their own self-perceptions of legal affairs and that unofficial laws co-exist with official ones. Muslims redefine and reconstruct their laws unofficially even within secular frameworks and undermine and obstruct the claim of official law to have a monopoly over the socio-legal sphere as the governing law. Skilful Muslim legal navigators, as post-modern entities of the sociolegal arena, combine rules of different conflicting normative orders and reconstruct their own super-hybrid laws as law-inventing citizens.
The study suggests that states should move towards developing a `supramodern' response. This is neither a full defence of modernity, nor a complete acceptance of postmodernity, but this thesis argues for an integrated theory which envisages that various types of laws interact, that the state law is also subject to legal postulates, and that state law is in charge of this process as a referee. Supramodernity does not lead to anarchy in contrast to post-modern formulations yet recognises diversity as part of the mosaic.
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Civilising Kemalist elites of Turkey in early twentieth century employed state law as an ideological apparatus of top-down social engineering to construct a new secularised Muslim Turkish citizen identity. Unlike other Muslim countries in... more
Civilising Kemalist elites of Turkey in early twentieth century employed state law as an ideological apparatus of top-down social engineering to construct a new secularised Muslim Turkish citizen identity. Unlike other Muslim countries in the world, they decided to completely get rid of Islamic laws by transplanting the Swiss Civil Code and by criminalising centuries of old Islamic laws. However, this has paved the way for the emergence unofficial (informal) Muslim legal pluralism as a result of resistance from some sections of the people. Thus, as a result of the dynamic interactions between official and unofficial laws, new hybrid official and unofficial laws are being continuously constructed. By looking at the available case law, statistical data, official reports, surveys and field research on age of marriage, registration and solemnization of marriage, polygamy and divorce, this chapter aims to present the current socio-legal picture. Moreover, it will also look at another phenomenon, i.e., state-sponsored informal Islamist legal pluralism under the rule of the Islamist populist authoritarian regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey.
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The Kemalist hegemonic elite have endeavoured to secularize society by top-down use of law. One of their main targets has been the family, which has been the last bastion of Muslim law in the modern era. Unlike other westernist Muslim... more
The Kemalist hegemonic elite have endeavoured to secularize society by
top-down use of law. One of their main targets has been the family, which has
been the last bastion of Muslim law in the modern era. Unlike other westernist
Muslim modernizers, the Kemalists have attempted to totally secularize the
family law of Muslims in Turkey. For this reason, the Swiss Civil Code was
adopted and, based on this, a new secular civil code was enacted in 1926. This
area of the law was further reformed with a new civil code in 2001.
Nevertheless, despite the Kemalist attempts of almost 90 years, the society
has not been secularized in toto and Islam has still been influential in people’s
individual, social and public lives. Muslim family law has also been obeyed
by some people despite the fact that it is not recognized by the official law and
that, in some cases, following it is a criminal offence. In other words, unofficial Muslim family law has co-existed with the official secular civil code in
the country. As a result, several cases involving Shari’a have come before the
judges of the civil courts.
top-down use of law. One of their main targets has been the family, which has
been the last bastion of Muslim law in the modern era. Unlike other westernist
Muslim modernizers, the Kemalists have attempted to totally secularize the
family law of Muslims in Turkey. For this reason, the Swiss Civil Code was
adopted and, based on this, a new secular civil code was enacted in 1926. This
area of the law was further reformed with a new civil code in 2001.
Nevertheless, despite the Kemalist attempts of almost 90 years, the society
has not been secularized in toto and Islam has still been influential in people’s
individual, social and public lives. Muslim family law has also been obeyed
by some people despite the fact that it is not recognized by the official law and
that, in some cases, following it is a criminal offence. In other words, unofficial Muslim family law has co-existed with the official secular civil code in
the country. As a result, several cases involving Shari’a have come before the
judges of the civil courts.
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This study provides an account of the current secular Turkish Civil Code, with special focus on family law issues such as consent, age of marriage, registration of marriage, status of religious marriage ceremonies, polygamy and divorce.... more
This study provides an account of the current secular Turkish Civil Code, with special focus on family law issues such as consent, age of marriage, registration of marriage, status of religious marriage ceremonies, polygamy and divorce. The study looks at various aspects of the relationship between official law and the Muslim majority's Shari'a law. Statistics and research have shown that, in connection with certain issues in the socio-legal sphere, Shari'a laws are still operative, in spite of their contravening the Civil Code. This situation has led to some civil courts having to deal with Shari'a issues. This study looks closely at some civil court decisions where judges have taken into account public opinion and local legal postulates concerning the matter in question.
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The aim of this study is twofold. Firstly it puts that long before the foundation of Turkish Republic, the Ottoman sultans from the 18th century on gradually secularized their legal systems through transplanting Western codes and... more
The aim of this study is twofold. Firstly it puts that long before the foundation of Turkish
Republic, the Ottoman sultans from the 18th century on gradually secularized their legal
systems through transplanting Western codes and institutions with the exception of
civil code. Secondly and more assertively it argues that this secularization process did
not evoke a serious struggle between the religious and political authorities as it did in
the West thanks to the political conventions and legal characteristics the Ottoman state
carried along from its very beginning on. Secularism began to pose serious problems
from the first years of Turkish Republic on when the Kemalist establishment set about
extending the area of legal secularism and turning it to an ideology which can be called
as ultrasecularism or Kemalist laïcité with an aim to socially engineer society in a topdown
fashion by legal instrumentalism.
Republic, the Ottoman sultans from the 18th century on gradually secularized their legal
systems through transplanting Western codes and institutions with the exception of
civil code. Secondly and more assertively it argues that this secularization process did
not evoke a serious struggle between the religious and political authorities as it did in
the West thanks to the political conventions and legal characteristics the Ottoman state
carried along from its very beginning on. Secularism began to pose serious problems
from the first years of Turkish Republic on when the Kemalist establishment set about
extending the area of legal secularism and turning it to an ideology which can be called
as ultrasecularism or Kemalist laïcité with an aim to socially engineer society in a topdown
fashion by legal instrumentalism.
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This chapter begins by exploring Gillen's ideas on a wide range of subjects (diversity, pluralism, secularism, democracy, politics, and dialogue) followed by a survey of GHM's contribution in its country of origin. Giilen's discourse has... more
This chapter begins by exploring Gillen's ideas on a wide range of subjects
(diversity, pluralism, secularism, democracy, politics, and dialogue)
followed by a survey of GHM's contribution in its country of origin.
Giilen's discourse has not only had a transformative effect on Turkish society, but has garnered \ a global reach through the Turkish and Muslim
diaspora. In this context, GHM needs to be viewed as a pre-eminent example of the moderate character of Tllrkish Islam, which denies neither
democracy nor its sy mbiotic ties with the West and proposes the
natural coexistence of Islamic traditions alongside western liberal values.
In the second part of the chapter, we examine the role of GHM in
Australia by focusing on the multicultural and religiously diverse states
of Victoria and New South Wales
(diversity, pluralism, secularism, democracy, politics, and dialogue)
followed by a survey of GHM's contribution in its country of origin.
Giilen's discourse has not only had a transformative effect on Turkish society, but has garnered \ a global reach through the Turkish and Muslim
diaspora. In this context, GHM needs to be viewed as a pre-eminent example of the moderate character of Tllrkish Islam, which denies neither
democracy nor its sy mbiotic ties with the West and proposes the
natural coexistence of Islamic traditions alongside western liberal values.
In the second part of the chapter, we examine the role of GHM in
Australia by focusing on the multicultural and religiously diverse states
of Victoria and New South Wales
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For decades after the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Turkish state promoted the idea of a desired citizen. The Kemalist state treated these citizens as superior, with full rights; but the 'others', those outside this... more
For decades after the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Turkish state promoted the idea of a desired citizen. The Kemalist state treated these citizens as superior, with full rights; but the 'others', those outside this desired citizenship, were either tolerated or considered undesirable citizens. And this caused the marginalization of ethnic and religious minorities, religious Muslims and leftists alike. In this book, Ihsan Yilmaz shows how historical traumas, victimhood, insecurities, anxieties, fears and siege mentality have negatively impacted on and radicalised the nation-building projects of the two competing hegemonic ideologies/regimes (those of Ataturk and Erdogan) and their treatment of majority and minority ethnic, religious and political groups. Yilmaz reveals the significant degree of overlap between the desired, undesired citizen and tolerated citizen categories of these two regimes, showing how both regimes aimed to create a perception of a homogenous Turkish nation.
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Since the mid-1920s, the top-down homogenization and secularization policies of the hegem-onic Kemalist elite have aimed at socially engineering secularist nationalist Turkish citizens. The acronym LAST (Laicist, Atatürkist, Sunni, Turk)... more
Since the mid-1920s, the top-down homogenization and secularization policies of the hegem-onic Kemalist elite have aimed at socially engineering secularist nationalist Turkish citizens. The acronym LAST (Laicist, Atatürkist, Sunni, Turk) describes this ideal citizen typology. The state has also tried to monopolize Islam and has attempted to construct a state version of Islam (Laus-annian Islam), marginalizing, vilifying and even criminalizing other Islamic interpretations. Nevertheless , non-state Islam and civil Muslim actors have not disappeared from the Turkish public sphere. One of these influential actors is the counter-hegemonic Turkish Islamists. They demand a role for Islam in the political realm, in a binary opposition to the assertively secularist Kemalists. Another influential actor, the intellectual leader of the largest faith-based movement in Turkey, Fethullah Gülen, offers a third way between these two extremes on state-religion-society relations. This paper endeavors to show that an interpretation of Muslim secularism that inhabits religious and secular worlds simultaneously, that is in critical engagement with them and that blurs conventional political lines on the hotly debated issue of state-religion-society relations is possible. This understanding of 'Islamic twin tolerations' challenges the artificially constructed binary oppositions. It also resonates with the Habermasian (2006) 'religion in the public sphere.' It argues that the faithful from all religious backgrounds can legitimately have demands based on religion in the public sphere and in the final analysis; it is the legislators' epistemic task to translate these demands into a secular language in the legislative process.
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BY The recent standoff between Turkey and several European countries shocked the world. For the first time in NATO and EU history, a member (or member candidate, in the case of the EU) state's foreign minister's plane was not allowed to... more
BY The recent standoff between Turkey and several European countries shocked the world. For the first time in NATO and EU history, a member (or member candidate, in the case of the EU) state's foreign minister's plane was not allowed to land in EU territory (the Netherlands). Another Turkish government minister was declared persona non grata and escorted back to the German border by the Dutch police. These events were a huge blow to Turkey's international prestige and were indicative of strained relations that have the potential to become another security crisis for a Western liberal democratic bloc already reeling from the rise of extreme right, populism, Trumpism, Brexit, terrorism, refugee flows and Russian meddling in Western elections. So what was behind the actions of the Dutch government and others? The key common factor is that the Turkish ministers involved were not paying official visits to these countries as national representatives. Rather, they were campaigning as political party members
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BY After the European parliament's overwhelming vote to freeze Turkey's EU accession process, the European Council summit that will get underway later today in Brussels will debate relations between Turkey and the EU. For economic and... more
BY After the European parliament's overwhelming vote to freeze Turkey's EU accession process, the European Council summit that will get underway later today in Brussels will debate relations between Turkey and the EU. For economic and strategic reasons, both the EU Council and the Turkish government want to preserve the status quo, but with every day that passes, this is becoming more difficult for the EU. Already challenged by Brexit, Donald Trump's election and rising right-wing extremist parties, the EU's prestige, normative standards and soft power have been relentlessly eroded by the Turkish government, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The EU's engagement with Turkey is now extremely limited and reduced to transactional relations. These are focused mainly on the Syrian refugee deal that Erdogan is using as a weapon against the EU capitals feeling the heat from the right wing approaches to refugees, foreigners and especially Muslims. It is startling to recall that 10 years ago there was good reason to believe Turkey would one day be an EU member, and that this prospect was supported by an overwhelming majority of Turks.
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The result of Turkey’s April 16 referendum handed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the right to expand his power practically without checks and balances. It granted him authority to control the parliament and judiciary and the power to rule... more
The result of Turkey’s April 16 referendum handed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the right to expand his power practically without checks and balances. It granted him authority to control the parliament and judiciary and the power to rule Turkey by decree.
But the razor-thin victory of the “yes” campaign has been strongly objected to by a range of groups.
Opposition parties have accepted all of Erdoğan’s electoral victories since 2002. But this time they are saying that he rigged the referendum. International observers agree with them. And, for days, hundreds of thousands of people have been peacefully protesting in the streets.
But the razor-thin victory of the “yes” campaign has been strongly objected to by a range of groups.
Opposition parties have accepted all of Erdoğan’s electoral victories since 2002. But this time they are saying that he rigged the referendum. International observers agree with them. And, for days, hundreds of thousands of people have been peacefully protesting in the streets.
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Similar to other Islamists, Turkish Islamists have also used intolerant and exclusivist rhetoric. They have used religion in a heavy-handed manner as the dominating parameter of their political ideology and have confined religious... more
Similar to other Islamists, Turkish Islamists have also used intolerant and exclusivist rhetoric. They have used religion in a heavy-handed manner as the dominating parameter of their political ideology and have confined religious concepts and values to a certain group, nationalizing, modernizing, secularizing and politicizing them. Turkish Islamists have also envisaged taking over the state and using it to socially engineer a top-down Islamist transformation in society through state centralism. Political science literature argues that via electoral participation, radical, extremist and even anti-systemic parties may moderate their agendas in order to benefit from opportunities created by a pluralist democracy. This paper argues that the opportunities provided by the pluralist tradition and the democratic experience of Turkey from Ottoman times to present have helped Turkish Islamists to transform their ideology into post-Islamism. Thanks to this pluralist experience Turkish Islamists have not only participated in elections, competed for median voters, and even democratically come to power but have also discursively and physically interacted with various Muslim groups, intellectuals, scholars, businessmen, communities and so on, in a pluralist setting. As a result, Turkish Islamists have been able to modify their ideology in tune with pluralist and democratic ideals.
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Turkey is one of the very first Muslim countries that encountered the modern west and its civilization and that attempted to respond to the challenges posed by the Western power and civilization. The questions surrounding these... more
Turkey is one of the very first Muslim countries that encountered the modern west and its civilization and that attempted to respond to the challenges posed by the Western power and civilization. The questions surrounding these challenges, how to respond to them, preventing the collapse of the Empire, modernization and, transplantation of western institutions have always been on the agenda of the Turkish intellectuals. Thus, first discourses regarding modernity and the West were formulated in Turkey in the Muslim world. Until recently, practicing Muslim Turks' discourses on these issues have not been very positive. There has always been a reluctance to enter into a dialogue with modernity and the West and cooperate with them. Rigid approaches, rhetorics and discourses have been recently replaced by more analytical, flexible and tolerant ones. Fethullah Gülen and his faith-based movement are pioneering examples in this regard. The discourse and practice of this civil movement have also had transformative influences on society in general, and state Islam and political Islam in particular with regards to views on modernity, the West and dialogue with them. This paper, thus, aims to study the 'activist' Muslims views on modernity, the West, and dialogue. The analysis will be at an institutional level. This paper looks at the discourses and activities of three different Muslim bodies: a civil non-governmental organization, the Writers and Journalists Foundation (led by Fethullah Gülen), a political (so called Islamist) party, the Virtue Party, and the state's Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Put differently, on modernity, west and dialogue, this paper tries to analyze the views, discourses and activities of civil Islam, political Islam and state Islam in Turkey. Our main emphasis is on the discourses and practices of civil Islam. Then, we shortly discuss the relevant developments in the spheres of state Islam and political Islam.
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Abstract Turkish experiment of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 has been seen by transition to democracy comparativists as an example of the cases in which the ruling elites deliberately decide that the society is diverse so... more
Abstract
Turkish experiment of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 has been seen by
transition to democracy comparativists as an example of the cases in which the ruling
elites deliberately decide that the society is diverse so this diversity needs to be
translated into the political sphere by allowing multi-party politics. However, this study
challanges this view and suggests that a close reading of the critical juncture of 1946
when the President and the leader of Republican People’s Party smet nönü decided
to allow other parties to operate shows that it was not that the President nönü
succumbed to the reality of diversity but domestic and international concerns forced
him to act towards a multi-party political structure. In his mind, he had a pseudodemocratic
system where he and his party would continue to rule the country in a
hegemonic party system setting where a ruling party monopolizes the political arena,
using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal
opposition parties any real chance of competing for power.
Keywords: Pseudo-Democracy, Tactical Liberalization, Multi-Party Politics,
Democratic Elections, Turkish Politics, smet nönü
Turkish experiment of transition to multi-party politics in 1946 has been seen by
transition to democracy comparativists as an example of the cases in which the ruling
elites deliberately decide that the society is diverse so this diversity needs to be
translated into the political sphere by allowing multi-party politics. However, this study
challanges this view and suggests that a close reading of the critical juncture of 1946
when the President and the leader of Republican People’s Party smet nönü decided
to allow other parties to operate shows that it was not that the President nönü
succumbed to the reality of diversity but domestic and international concerns forced
him to act towards a multi-party political structure. In his mind, he had a pseudodemocratic
system where he and his party would continue to rule the country in a
hegemonic party system setting where a ruling party monopolizes the political arena,
using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to deny formally legal
opposition parties any real chance of competing for power.
Keywords: Pseudo-Democracy, Tactical Liberalization, Multi-Party Politics,
Democratic Elections, Turkish Politics, smet nönü
Research Interests:
Since the mid-1920s, the top-down homogenization and secularization policies of the hegemonic Kemalist elite have aimed at socially engineering secularist nationalist Turkish citizens. The acronym LAST (Laicist, Atatürkist, Sunni, Turk)... more
Since the mid-1920s, the top-down homogenization and secularization policies of the hegemonic
Kemalist elite have aimed at socially engineering secularist nationalist Turkish citizens. The
acronym LAST (Laicist, Atatürkist, Sunni, Turk) describes this ideal citizen typology. The state
has also tried to monopolize Islam and has attempted to construct a state version of Islam (Lausannian
Islam), marginalizing, vilifying and even criminalizing other Islamic interpretations. Nevertheless,
non-state Islam and civil Muslim actors have not disappeared from the Turkish public
sphere. One of these influential actors is the counter-hegemonic Turkish Islamists. They demand a
role for Islam in the political realm, in a binary opposition to the assertively secularist Kemalists.
Another influential actor, the intellectual leader of the largest faith-based movement in Turkey,
Fethullah Gülen, offers a third way between these two extremes on state-religion-society relations.
This paper endeavors to show that an interpretation of Muslim secularism that inhabits religious
and secular worlds simultaneously, that is in critical engagement with them and that blurs conventional
political lines on the hotly debated issue of state-religion-society relations is possible.
This understanding of ‘Islamic twin tolerations’ challenges the artificially constructed binary oppositions.
It also resonates with the Habermasian (2006) ‘religion in the public sphere.’ It argues
that the faithful from all religious backgrounds can legitimately have demands based on religion
in the public sphere and in the final analysis; it is the legislators’ epistemic task to translate these
demands into a secular language in the legislative process.
Kemalist elite have aimed at socially engineering secularist nationalist Turkish citizens. The
acronym LAST (Laicist, Atatürkist, Sunni, Turk) describes this ideal citizen typology. The state
has also tried to monopolize Islam and has attempted to construct a state version of Islam (Lausannian
Islam), marginalizing, vilifying and even criminalizing other Islamic interpretations. Nevertheless,
non-state Islam and civil Muslim actors have not disappeared from the Turkish public
sphere. One of these influential actors is the counter-hegemonic Turkish Islamists. They demand a
role for Islam in the political realm, in a binary opposition to the assertively secularist Kemalists.
Another influential actor, the intellectual leader of the largest faith-based movement in Turkey,
Fethullah Gülen, offers a third way between these two extremes on state-religion-society relations.
This paper endeavors to show that an interpretation of Muslim secularism that inhabits religious
and secular worlds simultaneously, that is in critical engagement with them and that blurs conventional
political lines on the hotly debated issue of state-religion-society relations is possible.
This understanding of ‘Islamic twin tolerations’ challenges the artificially constructed binary oppositions.
It also resonates with the Habermasian (2006) ‘religion in the public sphere.’ It argues
that the faithful from all religious backgrounds can legitimately have demands based on religion
in the public sphere and in the final analysis; it is the legislators’ epistemic task to translate these
demands into a secular language in the legislative process.
Since the mid-1920s, the Kemalist power elite has been trying to consolidate their nationalist and secularist status quo by employing a sort of Gramscian consent fabrication. They have also attempted to build a monolithic Turkish nation.... more
Since the mid-1920s, the Kemalist power elite has been trying to consolidate their nationalist
and secularist status quo by employing a sort of Gramscian consent fabrication. They have also attempted
to build a monolithic Turkish nation. This study coins and conceptualizes two new analytical
terms to better comprehend what, how and why the Kemalist hegemony has tried to achieve on
this issue: ‘Homo LASTus’ and ‘Lausannian Muslim.’ The acronym LAST denotes Laïcist, Atatürkist,
Sunni Muslim, and Turk. The best citizen, LAST, meets all of these four parameters at the same
time. The conventional understanding has been that the Kemalist nation-building project has focused
on transforming individuals in Turkey to construct identical secularized Turkish citizens,
aiming at a monolithic nation. Nevertheless, this study asserts that this top-down social engineering
has actually been two tiered. While on the one hand, the Kemalist state tried to create the best
citizen (LAST) and even human (Homo LASTus), on the other, the state tried also to construct the
good citizen (Lausannian Muslim). To protect their hegemony, the Kemalist elite has also resorted
to a ‘Bureaucracy Watch’ to prevent ‘infiltration’ of the strategic state institutions by subaltern
non-LAST citizens who have constituted about 80 per cent of Turkey’s total population. Especially
for the bureaucrats, the country has been transformed into a Kemalist Panopticon. The study also
analyzes why the repressive secularist state has endeavored to construct a religious citizen identity
(Lausannian Muslim) in addition to the LAST and Homo LASTus.
and secularist status quo by employing a sort of Gramscian consent fabrication. They have also attempted
to build a monolithic Turkish nation. This study coins and conceptualizes two new analytical
terms to better comprehend what, how and why the Kemalist hegemony has tried to achieve on
this issue: ‘Homo LASTus’ and ‘Lausannian Muslim.’ The acronym LAST denotes Laïcist, Atatürkist,
Sunni Muslim, and Turk. The best citizen, LAST, meets all of these four parameters at the same
time. The conventional understanding has been that the Kemalist nation-building project has focused
on transforming individuals in Turkey to construct identical secularized Turkish citizens,
aiming at a monolithic nation. Nevertheless, this study asserts that this top-down social engineering
has actually been two tiered. While on the one hand, the Kemalist state tried to create the best
citizen (LAST) and even human (Homo LASTus), on the other, the state tried also to construct the
good citizen (Lausannian Muslim). To protect their hegemony, the Kemalist elite has also resorted
to a ‘Bureaucracy Watch’ to prevent ‘infiltration’ of the strategic state institutions by subaltern
non-LAST citizens who have constituted about 80 per cent of Turkey’s total population. Especially
for the bureaucrats, the country has been transformed into a Kemalist Panopticon. The study also
analyzes why the repressive secularist state has endeavored to construct a religious citizen identity
(Lausannian Muslim) in addition to the LAST and Homo LASTus.
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Yurtdışında mukim, Hizmet Hareketi’ne yakın, bu tefekkür ve tahassüs ikliminde yetişmiş veya bu Hareket’e sempati duyan kimselerle mülakatların da yapıldığı bir mecra. Sözkonusu mülakatlar serisini verimli bulanların yanında, bu... more
Yurtdışında mukim, Hizmet Hareketi’ne yakın, bu tefekkür ve tahassüs ikliminde yetişmiş veya bu Hareket’e sempati duyan kimselerle mülakatların da yapıldığı bir mecra. Sözkonusu mülakatlar serisini verimli bulanların yanında, bu mülakatlara olumsuz yaklaşanlar da var. Burada, benim için en önemli husus, “konuların medenice tartışılıyor olması”. Cemaat aydınlarının kendi heybelerindeki düşünce hevenglerini içtenlikle birbirlerine sunabilmeleri, birbirleriyle paylaşabilmeleri.
Bir ay içinde, bu mülakat serisi tamamlanmış olacak ve geriye, zamanında yapılmış bu yerinde konuşmaların müspet neticeleri kalacak.
Serinin bugünkü konuğu Prof. Dr. İhsan Yılmaz.
Eleştiriden, eleştirmek ve eleştirilmekten çekinmeyen biri.
Bir ay içinde, bu mülakat serisi tamamlanmış olacak ve geriye, zamanında yapılmış bu yerinde konuşmaların müspet neticeleri kalacak.
Serinin bugünkü konuğu Prof. Dr. İhsan Yılmaz.
Eleştiriden, eleştirmek ve eleştirilmekten çekinmeyen biri.
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Yilmaz, known for his straightforward style and unapologetic support of The Gulen Movement (Cemaat in Turkish) is a faculty member at the department of political science at Fatih University. His book on The Gulen Movement he co-authored... more
Yilmaz, known for his straightforward style and unapologetic support of The Gulen Movement (Cemaat in Turkish) is a faculty member at the department of political science at Fatih University.
His book on The Gulen Movement he co-authored with John Esposito, a world-renowned expert on Islam, made quite an impact in western intellectual circles. He has lectured at Oxford University and is currently a columnist at the Turkish Daily Todays Zaman.
Last week during a debate when one of the attendants confronted him and asked “Does the Movement have no mistakes? Didn’t you do anything wrong?” he responded, “Let me criticize The Movement then”. But the moderator intervened and stopped him saying, “That’s not the topic of our discussion now”.
Ferda Balancar of Agos Daily asked him about the criticism that he could not voice that day. What Ihsan Yilmaz is pointing out as an insider provides important clues about the movement, which he calls the “Hizmet” movement, and the current tensions.
His book on The Gulen Movement he co-authored with John Esposito, a world-renowned expert on Islam, made quite an impact in western intellectual circles. He has lectured at Oxford University and is currently a columnist at the Turkish Daily Todays Zaman.
Last week during a debate when one of the attendants confronted him and asked “Does the Movement have no mistakes? Didn’t you do anything wrong?” he responded, “Let me criticize The Movement then”. But the moderator intervened and stopped him saying, “That’s not the topic of our discussion now”.
Ferda Balancar of Agos Daily asked him about the criticism that he could not voice that day. What Ihsan Yilmaz is pointing out as an insider provides important clues about the movement, which he calls the “Hizmet” movement, and the current tensions.
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This edited collection deals with the challenges and opportunities faced by Muslims and the wider society in Europe following the Madrid train bombings of 2004 and the London Transport attacks of 2005. The contributors explore the... more
This edited collection deals with the challenges and opportunities faced by Muslims and the wider society in Europe following the Madrid train bombings of 2004 and the London Transport attacks of 2005. The contributors explore the challenges to the concept and practice of civility in public life within a European context, and demonstrate the contributions that can be made in this regard from the thought and practice of the global movement inspired by the Turkish Muslim scholar Fethullah Gülen. The importance and distinctiveness of the teaching of Fethullah Gülen and the practice of the movement is that it is rooted in a confident Turkish Islamic heritage while being fully engaged with modernity. It offers the possibility of a contextualised renewal of Islam for Muslims in Europe while being fully rooted in the teachings of the Qu'ran and the Sunnah of the Prophet. This volume is an important contribution to the study of the movement, which advocates the freedom of religion while making an Islamic contribution to the wider society based on a commitment to service of others. 'As an NGO representative and political activist, I enjoyed this book thoroughly. Articles by eminent scholars who are well versed in the western traditions as well as eastern values, deal with many sensitive issues, such as: the identity of Muslims in the West, integration processes, education and faith and the challenges of terrorism, violence against civilians and the benefits of intercultural living. The message is clear: science and faith are not confrontational, a true inter-religious society is the need of the hour and Muslim communities are an integral part of the West.' Bashy Quraishy Secretary General for EMISCO – European Muslim Initiative for Social Cohesion, Strasbourg and Chair of the Advisory Council of the European Network Against Racism, Brussels
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Sustainable development is a pattern of resource use which tries to meet human needs without dramatically harming the environment so that future generation can also benefit from these resources. In other words, sustainable development... more
Sustainable development is a pattern of resource use which tries to meet human needs without dramatically harming the environment so that future generation can also benefit from these resources. In other words, sustainable development combines “concern for the carrying capacity of the natural systems with the social challenges facing humanity”. Sustainable development is conceptually broken into three parts: environmental sustainability, economic sustainability and socio-political sustainability or the simultaneous pursuit of economic prosperity, environmental quality and social equity. This paper focuses on how volunteer organizations can contribute to social equity and also economic prosperity in multi-ethnic societies and global conflict zones. The study is based on a case documenting how faith-based movements can effectively utilize and direct social capital in order to achieve and/or maintain sustainable development.
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Abstract: Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality includes an argument called universal pragmatics, which human beings possess the communicative competence to bring about “mutual” understanding. Habermas, as a believer in... more
Abstract:
Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality includes an argument called
universal pragmatics, which human beings possess the communicative competence to
bring about “mutual” understanding. Habermas, as a believer in dialogue, is an
optimist who criticizes the Frankfurt School and postmodernist thought for excessive
pessimism. In Turkish Muslim scholar Fethullah Gülen’s thought and praxis, a similar
belief in mutual understanding, dialogue and optimism, in contrast to the Islamists’
pessimism, is conspicuous. Gülen’s optimism and belief in dialogue, coupled with his
intellectual-alim self-confidence, make it easier for him to be a border transgressor.
Gülen holds an inclusive, universalist and transcending Islamic conception. Gülen’s
theology of peace is based on the integrity of the individual regardless of ethnic or
religious background and approach to peacebuilding, therefore, is one of “bottom-up”
social change. In Gülen’s worldview, there are three major enemies of not only
Muslims, but also humanity as a whole: ignorance, poverty and disunity. His pluralistic,
inclusivist and peacebuilding ideas have enabled the Gülen Movement to successfully
turn its moral, spiritual, intellectual, financial and human resources into effective social
capital and utilized this social capital in establishing educational institutions from
primary school to university levels in more than 120 countries. The movement’s stance
toward pluralism, diversity, tolerance, acceptance, civil society, secularism and
democracy shows that the movement generates a bridging social capital, extremely
helpful for peacebuilding and establishing sustainable peace.
Keywords: Peacebuilding, communicative rationality, Islam, Gülen movement,
conflict resolution, bridging social capital
Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality includes an argument called
universal pragmatics, which human beings possess the communicative competence to
bring about “mutual” understanding. Habermas, as a believer in dialogue, is an
optimist who criticizes the Frankfurt School and postmodernist thought for excessive
pessimism. In Turkish Muslim scholar Fethullah Gülen’s thought and praxis, a similar
belief in mutual understanding, dialogue and optimism, in contrast to the Islamists’
pessimism, is conspicuous. Gülen’s optimism and belief in dialogue, coupled with his
intellectual-alim self-confidence, make it easier for him to be a border transgressor.
Gülen holds an inclusive, universalist and transcending Islamic conception. Gülen’s
theology of peace is based on the integrity of the individual regardless of ethnic or
religious background and approach to peacebuilding, therefore, is one of “bottom-up”
social change. In Gülen’s worldview, there are three major enemies of not only
Muslims, but also humanity as a whole: ignorance, poverty and disunity. His pluralistic,
inclusivist and peacebuilding ideas have enabled the Gülen Movement to successfully
turn its moral, spiritual, intellectual, financial and human resources into effective social
capital and utilized this social capital in establishing educational institutions from
primary school to university levels in more than 120 countries. The movement’s stance
toward pluralism, diversity, tolerance, acceptance, civil society, secularism and
democracy shows that the movement generates a bridging social capital, extremely
helpful for peacebuilding and establishing sustainable peace.
Keywords: Peacebuilding, communicative rationality, Islam, Gülen movement,
conflict resolution, bridging social capital
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The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of ‘civilizational populism’ and work towards a concise but operational definition. To do this, the article examines how populists across the world, and in a variety of different... more
The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of ‘civilizational populism’ and work towards a concise but operational definition. To do this, the article examines how populists across the world, and in a variety of different religious, geographic, and political contexts, incorporate and instrumentalize notions of ‘civilization’ into their discourses. The article observes that although a number of scholars have described a civilization turn among populists, there is currently no concrete definition of civilization populism, a concept which requires greater clarity. The article also observes that, while scholars have often found populists in Europe incorporating notions of civilization and ‘the clash of civilizations’ into the discourses, populists in non-Western environments also appear to have also incorporated notions of civilization into their discourses, yet these are rarely studied. The first part of the article begins by discussing the concept of ‘civilizationism’, a po...
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This article examines young Muslim Australians' attitudes toward implementing Sharia in Australia using 64 semi-structured interviews conducted in Melbourne and Geelong, Australia. We found that although the attitudes can be... more
This article examines young Muslim Australians' attitudes toward implementing Sharia in Australia using 64 semi-structured interviews conducted in Melbourne and Geelong, Australia. We found that although the attitudes can be grouped under the main typologies of Legal Pluralist and Muslim Secularist, there were a variety of responses within each category. While Legal Pluralist A wants Sharia to be officially implemented for Muslims in Australia, Legal Pluralist B thinks Sharia would be beneficial for everyone in Australia. The majority of our respondents (Muslim Secularist) think that Sharia is not suited for Australian state, legal system and politics. Muslim Secularist A does not think that Sharia offer any benefit to modern societies in any part of the world. Muslim Secularist B thinks that Sharia cannot be applied in Australia that has to remain secular because of the religious diversity of the population and Sharia is more useful for Muslimmajority countries. Religiosity does not predict any of these typologies in our participant group since, with few exceptions, all identified themselves as religious Muslims.
Research Interests: Islamic Law, Political Science, Legal Pluralism, Muslims in Europe, Islam, and 10 moreSharia, InterCultural Studies, Philosophy of Religious Pluralism, Shariah, Secularism, Australian Law, Islamic Family Law, Language Culture and Communication, Religius and Islamic Studies, and Muslim Christian Relation
Even though Turkey’s ruling party’s (Justice and Development Party, the AKP) nation-building and desired citizen creation policies have been studied, its use of necropolitical narratives and propaganda in education has not been... more
Even though Turkey’s ruling party’s (Justice and Development Party, the AKP) nation-building and desired citizen creation policies have been studied, its use of necropolitical narratives and propaganda in education has not been investigated. This paper addresses this gap by examining how the Turkish state ruled by the AKP has propagated its religious necropolitical narrative through the national curriculum and Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in school textbooks, and magazines and comic books for children. The paper shows that these texts and comics try to indoctrinate children into a religious cult of martyrdom in different ways by encouraging them to view tragic death and getting killed for the nation as a positive event. This paper argues that these propaganda efforts are part of a religious necropolitical indoctrination campaign that seeks to create a new Islamist and jihadist generation of lifelong supporters of the AKP, which portrays itself in the educational texts ...
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Once voted into office, populist governments have often found undemocratic means to prolong their stay. The literature on populists in power is evolving and expanding. However, it has mainly focused on how the populists in power attack... more
Once voted into office, populist governments have often found undemocratic means to prolong their stay. The literature on populists in power is evolving and expanding. However, it has mainly focused on how the populists in power attack institutions such as the judiciary, rule erosion, and dirty institutionalism. How populists make use of the law and the judiciary to prolong their authoritarian rule remains an area that is under-researched. The populists’ use of informal institutions such as the unofficial law when in power has not been studied either. This paper addresses these gaps in the populism literature by studying Turkey’s Islamist populist ruling party’s use of informal law in prolonging its authoritarian rule. The paper argues that the Islamist civilisational populist AKP has been using informal Islamist law for both the legitimation of its rule and the repression of the opposition. It shows how the AKP officials, the state’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the ...
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The founders of the secular Turkish Republic, the Kemalists used secular nationalist education to build a secular Turkish nation and to create their own version of modern pro-Western secular Turkish citizens. This paper argues that... more
The founders of the secular Turkish Republic, the Kemalists used secular nationalist education to build a secular Turkish nation and to create their own version of modern pro-Western secular Turkish citizens. This paper argues that Turkey’s current ruling party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) has been using the same system of education to create its own desired citizens with Islamist Populist ideals. This has been done without changing the secular principles of the constitution and laws on national education since there are several constraints that would prevent AKP to have open and declared pro-Sharia changes to the law. Thus, unlike many other Islamists in the other parts of the world, the paper shows that the AKP has chosen to undermine the secularity of the system, constitution, and law in an ad hoc, gradual and undeclared fashion. The paper concludes by noting that no matter the change in political actors and their ideologies, education is monopolized by the state for ...
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Most of the literature on religion’s relationship with populism is Eurocentric and has so far focused on European populist party discourses and, to a degree, on the United States, in particular, on the Christian identity populism of the... more
Most of the literature on religion’s relationship with populism is Eurocentric and has so far focused on European populist party discourses and, to a degree, on the United States, in particular, on the Christian identity populism of the Tea Party and the Trump movement within the Republican Party. However, across the Asia-Pacific region, religion has become an important component of populist discourses. It has been instrumentalised by populists in many nations in the region, including some of the most populous countries in the world, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. Moreover, the relationship between religions other than Christianity and populism has all too rarely been studied, except for Turkey. This paper therefore surveys the Asia-Pacific region to comprehend how populists in the region incorporate religion into their discourses and the impact religious populism has on Asia-Pacific societies. It asks two questions: “What role does religion play in populist discourses?” and “How h...
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Blame avoidance has been one of the most applied strategies by policy makers in both democratic and non-democratic regimes to avoid responsibility and accountability in cases of failure and tragic events. It is also known that politicians... more
Blame avoidance has been one of the most applied strategies by policy makers in both democratic and non-democratic regimes to avoid responsibility and accountability in cases of failure and tragic events. It is also known that politicians have used religion for Machiavellian purposes, as exactly advised by Machiavelli. However, a systematic empirical analysis of how religion is used for blame avoidance by politicians has not been conducted. In this article, we aim to address this gap by examining the empirical data derived from the weekly Friday sermon texts produced by Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs and delivered in more than 90 thousand mosques every week to a large segment of the population in Turkey, where the majority claims to be religious. Starting with its violent response to the peaceful Gezi protests in 2013, the ruling AKP has opened up a new phase in Turkish political history by resorting to civilizational populism: it blamed the Western world for financing an...
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Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe... more
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies.
The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish.
The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa.
The focus on the West Asian and South Asian cases is an opportunity to examine authoritarian religious populists in power, whereas the East Asian countries showcase powerful authoritarian religious populist forces outside parliament. This report compares internet governance in each of these countries under three categories: obstacles to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights. These are the digital toolkits that authorities use to govern digital space. Our case selection and research focus have allowed us to undertake a comparative analysis of different types of online restrictions in these countries that constrain space foropposition and democratic voices while simultaneously making room for authoritarian religious populist narratives to arise and flourish.
The report finds that surveillance, censorship, disinformation campaigns, internet shutdowns, and cyber-attacks—along with targeted arrests and violence spreading from digital space—are common features of digital authoritarianism. In each case, it is also found that religious populist forces co-opt political actors in their control of cyberspace. The situational analysis from five countries indicates that religion’s role in digital authoritarianism is quite evident, adding to the layer of nationalism. Most of the leaders in power use religious justifications for curbs on the internet. Religious leaders support these laws as a means to restrict “moral ills” such as blasphemy, pornography, and the like. This evident “religious populism” seems to be a major driver of policy changes that are limiting civil liberties in the name of “the people.” In the end, the reasons for restricting digital space are not purely religious but draw on religious themes with populist language in a mixed and hybrid fashion. Some common themes found in all the case studies shed light on the role of digital space in shaping politics and society offline and vice versa.
Research Interests: Populism and Cyberspace
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While victimhood has been studied from very different perspectives, the question how secular nation states have instrumentalised religion for the politics of victimhood has not been studied. This paper addresses this gap in the literature... more
While victimhood has been studied from very different perspectives, the question how secular nation states have instrumentalised religion for the politics of victimhood has not been studied. This paper addresses this gap in the literature on victimhood by analysing the empirical case of Turkey. As is well known, the constitutionally secular Turkish state, first under the rule of the Kemalists and now Erdoganists, has been using the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) to propagate the state ideology to the faithful. This paper shows that the Turkish state has recently been using Islam to construct and disseminate a religious victimhood narrative, mainly based on conspiracy theories via the Diyanet’s Friday sermons. To do this, the article investigates the texts, such as the sermons produced by the Diyanet that are read verbatim, in every mosque in Turkey during Friday prayers that are attended by more than half of the adult male population. The paper contributes to the victimh...
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Fiqh, which is the most influential factor for the minds of the Muslims, could not develop effective assumptions and norms in matters such as democracy, pluralism, equal recognition of all and respect for the rights of others. There are... more
Fiqh, which is the most influential factor for the minds of the Muslims, could not develop effective assumptions and norms in matters such as democracy, pluralism, equal recognition of all and respect for the rights of others. There are jurists and thinkers such as Fethullah Gülen who are not so few in number who struggle to change this but the results of these efforts have not yet reached the level orthodoxy dignity and prevalence. This leads to a kind of schizophrenic mental split for politics in many religious minds. In simple terms, the understanding of "Today's conditions are not suitable. Let's pursue democratic politics today, but let's implement the patrimonial fiqh when we find opportunity" stands in a compartment of the brain as a subliminal fact that many religious people are not even aware of. In Islam, the legal schools, or maddhabs, each formed in a similar way independently of the state and individuals began following the views of a leader of a maddhab, with their own subjective judgments and self-determination. While those legal schools attracting a significant number of followers continued, those which were for different reasons unable or find or retain followers did not survive the test of time and remained were relegated to history (Yılmaz 2005c). In the end, if logic operates even in such a sensitive field as jurisprudence, which entails many relevant rulings directly from the primary sources themselves, is it too much to ask that a similar logic be brought into play in social and political issues about which only such basic principles as fair governance, rule of law, freedoms and human rights can be found in the primary sources, and the details of which are left to the particular time and milieu of individuals as a means for their trial and examination? Jurists who are familiar with social sciences and methodology should state opinions and try to popularize and functionalize them in matters such as democracy, pluralism, opposition, legitimacy of the government change, equality, human rights and criticism by benefiting from instruments such as makasıd. Otherwise, the power of the religious will be nothing more than the power of the those who do second-class treatment to the ones who are not like them.
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The global tide of populism will leave a profound mark on Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) success during the past two decades, has hinged on Islamist authoritarian populism and been driven by its long-time leader,... more
The global tide of populism will leave a profound mark on Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) success during the past two decades, has hinged on Islamist authoritarian populism and been driven by its long-time leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “New Turkey” is now a reality. The AKP has been successful at dismantling the Kemalist ideals – ironically, perhaps, by using similarly repressing techniques, such as cracking down on civil liberties and democratic rights.
Muhammad Rizieq Shihab has been one of the most well-known faces of the far-right in Indonesia since the late 1990s. As a radical Islamist scholar with links to Saudi Arabia, Shihab has spent the last three decades as an anti-state voice... more
Muhammad Rizieq Shihab has been one of the most well-known faces of the far-right in Indonesia since the late 1990s. As a radical Islamist scholar with links to Saudi Arabia, Shihab has spent the last three decades as an anti-state voice of the “pious Muslim majority” in Indonesia. He claims to position himself as a “righteous” and “fearless” leader who is dedicated to defending Islam—the faith of “the people.” In 2020 Shihab was arrested for holding large public gatherings, as part of his ‘moral revolution’ campaign, in the middle of pandemic lockdowns. However, his radical Salafist message continues to inspire thousands to action.
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Imran Khan is not the first to use populism to wield power in Pakistan. Religious leaders, political figures, and military generals have used faith and the promise of a better life to gain support or legitimize their actions. The... more
Imran Khan is not the first to use populism to wield power in Pakistan. Religious leaders, political figures, and military generals have used faith and the promise of a better life to gain support or legitimize their actions. The uniqueness of Khan’s populism lies in the fact that he has been able to condense a host of diverse ideologies into a coherent populist narrative that has endeared him to “the people.”
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Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) used to be an activist party at a time when civil society was highly subdued under a military regime. Through modest civil disobedience, it has graduated to the status of a formidable opposition party. It... more
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) used to be an activist party at a time when civil society was highly subdued under a military regime. Through modest civil disobedience, it has graduated to the status of a formidable opposition party. It has used populist rhetoric and tactics to delegitimize and “otherize” the conventional parties and position itself as the ideal voice and hope for “the people.” It has used a wide array of ideologies to support its populism, which tapped into deep-rooted anxieties in the public’s psyche.
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Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions. This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part of the nation’s cultural... more
Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions. This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part of the nation’s cultural imagination and identity. During the country’s “infant” or “fragile” democratic phase, religious populism was repeatedly used to consolidate support. Religious parties and groups hold great political sway in the county. Through the use of religious populism, these factions have been allowed to nurture their own “people” who are partisan towards “others.” The weak level of governance, political turmoil, and distrust in institutional capabilities has pushed the public into the arms of religious populists.
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Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe... more
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in...
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Religious populism and radicalism are hardly new to Pakistan. Since its birth in 1947, the country has suffered through an ongoing identity crisis. Under turbulent political conditions, religion has served as a surrogate identity for... more
Religious populism and radicalism are hardly new to Pakistan. Since its birth in 1947, the country has suffered through an ongoing identity crisis. Under turbulent political conditions, religion has served as a surrogate identity for Pakistan, masking the country’s evident plurality, and over the years has come to dominate politics. Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) is the latest face of religious extremism merged with populist politics. Nevertheless, its sporadic rise from a national movement defending Pakistan’s notorious blasphemy laws to a “pious” party is little understood. This paper draws on a collection of primary and secondary sources to piece together an account of the party’s evolution that sheds light on its appeal to “the people” and its marginalization and targeting of the “other.” The analysis reveals that the TLP has evolved from a proxy backed by the establishment against the mainstream parties to a full-fledged political force in its own right. Its ability to relate...
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Several studies have analysed different aspects of Turkey’s authoritarianisation under the AKP rule. However, there is still a gap in this literature with regards to the role of instrumentalization...
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The hegemonic Turkish secularist elite, on the one hand, stigmatized, demonized and banned Islamic and Ottoman knowledge, including legal one and on the other hand with a top down social engineering approach they had tried to homogenize... more
The hegemonic Turkish secularist elite, on the one hand, stigmatized, demonized and banned Islamic and Ottoman knowledge, including legal one and on the other hand with a top down social engineering approach they had tried to homogenize society and to create ideal and favorable citizens. As a result, public expressions of Islamic law, non-Turkish ethnic identity or non-Muslim religious identity had either been banned or stigmatized. But counter-hegemonic and anti-hegemonic knowledge sources and identities have continued to co-exist as unofficial, subaltern and periphery phenomena, producing their own anti or countersystemic knowledge, including unofficial Muslim. All these have paved the way for unofficial ijtihads, micro-mujtahids, surfers on inter-madhhab, post-modern fragmentation of the unofficial Muslim law sphere and emergence of Islamic legal scholars. While all of these socio-cultural groups provide us fascinating and remarkable cases to study, in this chapter, I am only abl...
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This chapter analyses the Turkish transnational socio-legal realm to see if and to what extent Erdoganist radicalisation on the basis of anti-Western conspiracy theories may have potential impact on the minds and consciousness of the... more
This chapter analyses the Turkish transnational socio-legal realm to see if and to what extent Erdoganist radicalisation on the basis of anti-Western conspiracy theories may have potential impact on the minds and consciousness of the Turkish Muslim youth through unofficial political Islamic law, which is an emerging phenomenon of what this study calls “Islamist legal pluralism.” Islamist legal pluralism is about political issues and reflects the ideology of Islamism. The AKP elite has increasingly resorted to Islamist legal pluralism, anti-Western rhetoric, takfirism, and conspiracy theories that simultaneously try to influence the global ummah and Turkish diaspora communities that predominantly live in the West. This chapter discusses the potential impact of this rhetoric and production of unofficial Islamist takfirist and anti-Western fatwas on the transnational radicalisation of the Turkish Sunni Muslim youth in the West.
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Turkey is currently going through a period of radical change; where a composite ideology of Islamist populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism is being used by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The AKP has increasingly... more
Turkey is currently going through a period of radical change; where a composite ideology of Islamist populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism is being used by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). The AKP has increasingly resorted to using the mosque (through the Diyanet) and the schools (Imam Hatip schools, national curriculum, and Islamist educational foundations) to Islamize society and raise a generation of Islamists; the kind of desired citizens they envision will characterise the new regime. This chapter argues that the AKP has been actively pursuing strategies of transnational Islamist populism and heavily resorting to state transnationalism with the intention of exporting their composite ideology to Turkish diasporas throughout the world. Several valuable academic works have analysed the Islamist usage of the mosque, the school, and the political discourse; domestically and in foreign policy. However, unofficial Islamist fatwas and Islamist legal narrative const...
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Sustainable development is a pattern of resource use which tries to meet human needs without dramatically harming the environment so that future generation can also benefit from these resources. In other words, sustainable development... more
Sustainable development is a pattern of resource use which tries to meet human needs without dramatically harming the environment so that future generation can also benefit from these resources. In other words, sustainable development combines “concern for the carrying capacity of the natural systems with the social challenges facing humanity”. Sustainable development is conceptually broken into three parts: environmental sustainability, economic sustainability and socio-political sustainability or the simultaneous pursuit of economic prosperity, environmental quality and social equity. This paper focuses on how volunteer organizations can contribute to social equity and also economic prosperity in multi-ethnic societies and global conflict zones. The study is based on a case documenting how faith-based movements can effectively utilize and direct social capital in order to achieve and/or maintain sustainable development.
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ABSTRACT Literature on intergroup contact shows that in the absence of the required structural conditions, contact is not necessarily always a positive experience and that when it is negative, it can lead to heightened conflict and... more
ABSTRACT Literature on intergroup contact shows that in the absence of the required structural conditions, contact is not necessarily always a positive experience and that when it is negative, it can lead to heightened conflict and increased prejudice toward outgroups. Therefore, this article examines intergroup contact between Muslims and non-Muslims. Specifically, we examine the experiences of intergroup contact involving young Muslims in Australia and ask how these encounters impact their experiences of discrimination and perceptions of Australian society. We conducted face-to-face, semi-structured interviews to collect rich, qualitative data from young Muslim Australian participants who live in Melbourne, a major cosmopolitan hub, where intergroup contact experiences are likely to be diverse and occur daily. Our findings show that even when met with prejudice and discrimination, young Muslim Australians were able to critically engage with and change the views of non-Muslim Australians through dialogue and creative exchanges about circulating public discourse.
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This study explores the critical barriers to English language learning for Afghan refugee women in Australia. Using data from 23 individual interviews and five focus group discussions , these show that although the participants received... more
This study explores the critical barriers to English language learning for Afghan refugee women in Australia. Using data from 23 individual interviews and five focus group discussions , these show that although the participants received formal support from the Australian Government, the majority still struggled to learn English effectively. A thematic analysis of the interview responses revealed that the major barriers to English acquisition were pedagogical and socio-cultural, and included issues of self-esteem and motivation. The findings of this study have the potential to inform language support programs for refugee women, particularly when considering the sociocultural, emotional and educational needs of female refugees learning English, and the need for provisions such as childcare to facilitate their participation in language learning classes. Q2 K E Y W O R D S Afghan women, Australia, English language learning, migration, refugees Q3 j k Int J Appl Linguist. 2020;1-14.
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This IMR Research Note examines the impact of the level of bonding social capital on access to employment among newly arrived Afghan refugees in Victoria (Australia). Based on a mixed-methods analysis of biographical interviews with 80... more
This IMR Research Note examines the impact of the level of bonding social capital on access to employment among newly arrived Afghan refugees in Victoria (Australia). Based on a mixed-methods analysis of biographical interviews with 80 Afghan refugees, it examines their use of social capital, year by year, during the first three years after their arrival. Our analysis shows that higher levels of bonding social capital are associated with greater success in finding employment during the first and second year of settlement. In the third year, however, bonding social capital for Afghan refugees in Victoria is no longer a significant predictor of employment. This Research Note helps clarify inconsistent findings in the literature on the effects of social capital on obtaining employment by suggesting that bonding social capital’s impact on refugee employment success changes significantly across the first three years after arrival. This finding has important implications for migration pol...
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ABSTRACT This article tackles the puzzle of how Turkey’s ruling Islamist populist Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to co-opt the secularist far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and to ensure the MHP’s support in creating... more
ABSTRACT This article tackles the puzzle of how Turkey’s ruling Islamist populist Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to co-opt the secularist far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and to ensure the MHP’s support in creating an authoritarian regime, despite their previous antagonistic relations and ideological opposition. We investigate this puzzle through the combination of authoritarian resilience/stability theory and securitization theory. The article develops an empirically grounded account of how co-optation has happened in Turkey. In a novel way, it shows that the ruling party’s successful securitization of the MHP’s antagonists (pro-Kurdish opposition) has facilitated the co-optation of the MHP by the ruling party. This article contributes to the authoritarian stability theory by introducing securitization theory to this literature. It also contributes to the co-optation literature by showing a novel phenomenon: a powerful incumbent party’s ideological move towards the smaller to be co-opted party. The article also contributes to the securitization theory debates about the role of securitizing actors and their audiences, as well as the “right” of functional actors in securitizing an issue, despite their initial non-decisive authority.
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Since independence, Islamic civil society groups and intellectuals have played a vital role in Indonesian politics. This paper seeks to chart the contestation of Islamic religious ideas in Indonesian politics and society throughout the... more
Since independence, Islamic civil society groups and intellectuals have played a vital role in Indonesian politics. This paper seeks to chart the contestation of Islamic religious ideas in Indonesian politics and society throughout the 20th Century, from the declaration of independence in 1945 up until 2001. This paper discusses the social and political influence of, and relationships between, three major Indonesian Islamic intellectual streams: Modernists, Traditionalists, and neo-Modernists. It describes the intellectual roots of each of these Islamic movements, their relationships with the civil Islamic groups Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), their influence upon Indonesian politics, and their interactions with the state. The paper examines the ways in which mainstream Islamic politics in Indonesia, the world’s largest majority Muslim nation, has been shaped by disagreements between modernists and traditionalists, beginning in the early 1950s. Disagreements resulted in a sc...
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The first quarter of the twenty-first century has witnessed the rise of populism around the world. While it is widespread it manifests in its own unique ways in each society, nation, and region. Religious populism, once rarely discussed,... more
The first quarter of the twenty-first century has witnessed the rise of populism around the world. While it is widespread it manifests in its own unique ways in each society, nation, and region. Religious populism, once rarely discussed, has come to take a more prominent role in the politics of a diverse range of societies and countries, as religious discourse is increasingly used by mainstream and peripheral populist actors alike. This paper examines the rise of religious populism in Indonesia through a study of the widely talked about, but little understood, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI—Front Pembela Islam). The case study method used to examine the FPI provides a unique insight into a liminal organization which, through populist and pro-violence Islamist discourse and political lobbying, has had an outsized impact on Indonesian politics. In this paper, we identify the FPI as an Islamist civilizationist populist group and show how the group frames Indonesian domestic political eve...
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ABSTRACT Focusing on women's rights, this paper provides a critical socio-legal analysis of Muslim legal pluralism in Pakistan and compares the role and differences of opinions of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Federal... more
ABSTRACT Focusing on women's rights, this paper provides a critical socio-legal analysis of Muslim legal pluralism in Pakistan and compares the role and differences of opinions of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) that were established to Islamise Pakistani society. The paper explains why these two constitutional bodies frequently contradict each other in their understanding of Islamic law by analysing legislation, case law, their membership, declarations and statements of these bodies and their members, reactions from, including criticisms, scholars to the case law and secondary literature on the topic.
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This paper explores the emerging scholarship investigating the relationship between religion(s) and populism. It systematically reviews the various aspects of the phenomenon going beyond the Western world and discusses how religion and... more
This paper explores the emerging scholarship investigating the relationship between religion(s) and populism. It systematically reviews the various aspects of the phenomenon going beyond the Western world and discusses how religion and populism interact in various contexts around the globe. It looks at Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity and how in different regions and cultural contexts, they merge with populism and surface as the bases of populist appeals in the 21st century. In doing so, this paper contends that there is a scarcity of literature on this topic particularly in the non-Western and Judeo-Christian context. The paper concludes with recommendations on various gaps in the field of study of religious populism.
Research Interests: Religion, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Populism, and 3 moreIslamic Studies, Judaism, and Religions
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This paper examines the existing literature on the relationship between religion and populism, and is intended as a starting point for further examination of the relationships between populism, religion, and emotions. This paper... more
This paper examines the existing literature on the relationship between religion and populism, and is intended as a starting point for further examination of the relationships between populism, religion, and emotions. This paper systematically reviews the various aspects of the populist phenomenon. After a discussion on different definitions of populism, this paper looks at how the literature discusses the causes of populism, mainly socio-economic factors and emotive factors. Then it discusses how religion and populism interact and can be divided in two broad categories of religious populism and identitarian populism. While, on the surface, the two share similarities, this paper reviews populist manifestations across the world to draw the distinct features between the two forms. Lastly, while pointing out the salient features of religious populism and identitarian populism, this study points out gaps in the research on the relationship between religious populism and other phenomena ...
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The paper shows how a state controlled religious institution used religion, fear, trauma, insecurity, grievances, and conspiracy theories to dehumanise a religious community, and presented it as an existential threat to the nation, the... more
The paper shows how a state controlled religious institution used religion, fear, trauma, insecurity, grievances, and conspiracy theories to dehumanise a religious community, and presented it as an existential threat to the nation, the global community of believers and religion, by investigating the case of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs’ (the Diyanet) securitizing role under the authoritarian Islamist Erdoğanist rule. The article provides an empirically rich analysis of the Diyanet’s construction of the Gülen Movement (GM) as a source of sedition (fitne), corruption (fesat), mischief, a social disease, and finally, as a traitor and puppet of the West that constantly conspires against Turkey, Islam, and the Muslim World. By securitising the movement, the Diyanet legitimised the authoritarian and violent actions of the Erdoğanist regime against the alleged movement members.
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This paper introduces an interesting aspect or variant of populism which we call ‘fluctuating populism’ through a case study of Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo, the winner of the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, and a career... more
This paper introduces an interesting aspect or variant of populism which we call ‘fluctuating populism’ through a case study of Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo, the winner of the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, and a career politician for over three decades in the country. We define ‘fluctuating’ quality of populism as the strategic adjustments made by populist leaders to their rhetoric and ideological messaging across different political campaigns in pursuit of electoral victory. Based on the Indonesian presidential elections of 2009, 2014, 2019, and 2024, the paper demonstrates the dynamic nature of populism. It reveals that over just a decade, Prabowo has undergone shifts in ideological stances, rhetorical appeals, and electoral strategies in each election cycle. He has evolved from an ultra-nationalist, chauvinist, and Islamist populist to a technocratic figure with a much softer side. We also find that within these election periods, he never fully prescribed an ideology or rhetoric, but instead fluctuated according to the political landscape. Prabowo’s success in the 2024 election underscores the effectiveness of ‘fluctuating populism’ in navigating Indonesia’s political landscape. This case study shows that this concept offers a framework for understanding the strategic adjustments made by populist leaders and warrants further examination in comparative studies of political leadership.
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This article investigates whether Turkish populism has undergone a ‘civilizational turn’ akin to what Brubaker, Haynes, Yilmaz, and Morieson have described occurring among populist parties in Europe and North America. The article applies... more
This article investigates whether Turkish populism has undergone a ‘civilizational turn’ akin to what Brubaker, Haynes, Yilmaz, and Morieson have described occurring among populist parties in Europe and North America. The article applies Yilmaz and Morieson’s definition of ‘civilizational populism’ to Turkey under the rule of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) in order to determine whether the party conforms to this definition. The article investigates how the AKP, an Islamist and populist political party lead by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has increasingly incorporated what we term ‘civilizational populism’ into its discourse. The article shows the impact of civilizational populism on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy under the AKP rule. The article finds that the AKP has increasingly, and especially since the 2013 Gezi Park protests and the mysterious coup attempt in 2016, construed opposition between the Turkish ‘self’ and the ‘other’ not in primarily nationalist terms, but in religious and civilizational terms, and as a conflict between the Ottoman-Islamic ‘self’ and ‘Western’ other. Furthermore, the article finds that the AKP’s domestic and foreign policies reflect its civilizational populist division of Turkish society insofar as the party is attempting to raise a ‘pious generation’ that supports its Islamizing of Turkey society, and its nostalgic neo-Ottomanist power projections in the Middle East. Finally, the paper discusses how the AKP’s civilizational populism has become a transnational populist phenomenon due to the party’s ability to produce successful television shows that reflect its anti-Western worldview and justify its neo-Ottoman imperialism in the Middle East.
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Turkey’s history and politics allow populism and Sunni Islamist civilizationalism to thrive. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) use of Islamist authoritarian populism in its second decade of power has widened its... more
Turkey’s history and politics allow populism and Sunni Islamist civilizationalism to thrive. The ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) use of Islamist authoritarian populism in its second decade of power has widened its “otherization” of political opponents, non-Muslims, non-Sunnis, ethnic minorities, vulnerable groups, and all those who reject the AKP’s views and democratic transgressions. To comprehend how Erdogan and his deft colleagues leverage identities of Sunni Islam and Turkish ethnicity, alongside pre-existing collective fears to develop populist authoritarianism, in this article, each category of “the others” is investigated through the lens of civilizational populism. This article specifically delves into the “otherization” process towards the Kemalists, secularists and leftists/liberals, Kurds, Alevis, and practicing Sunni Muslim Gulen Movement. The different methods of AKP’s civilizational populist “otherization” continues to polarize an already divided Turkish nation, generating incalculable harm.
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The largest democracy in the world is now moving towards authoritarianism under the Hindutva civilizational populist prime minister Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s rule. This article focuses on digital rights in India... more
The largest democracy in the world is now moving towards authoritarianism under the Hindutva civilizational populist prime minister Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s rule. This article focuses on digital rights in India that have seen a sharp decline in recent years. It explores the transformation of the internet and social media, from a relatively open and liberal space to a restricted one. This survey of India’s digital landscape finds that the rise of civilizational populist Modi and his eight years long rule have led to an upsurge in digital surveillance and control and has fostered an environment of online harassment and bullying for those who are critical of the BJP’s views and politics. The article uses a four-level framework (Full Network, Sub-Network, Proxies, and Network Nodes) to explore digital authoritarianism by the BJP government. At each of these levels, the Hindutva populist government has closed avenues of open discussion and exchange of views by enforcing new rules and regulations.
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With the recognition of populism emerging in varied forms across the Global South, the lacuna of research on populism in Asia is gradually filling. Yet, research on populism in Pakistan is still limited and focused mostly on the singular... more
With the recognition of populism emerging in varied forms across the Global South, the lacuna of research on populism in Asia is gradually filling. Yet, research on populism in Pakistan is still limited and focused mostly on the singular case of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his political party Pakistan Tahreek-e-Insaaf (PTI). There is much lesser attention to the populism of Tahreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a far-right movement-turned-party. This paper addresses this gap by comparing the two cases of populism in Pakistan – PTI and TLP – to outline the similarities and differences in their characterization of “the people,” “the elite” and “the others,” using the framework of civilizational populism. The comparative analysis of public discourse of the leadership of two parties shows an extensive use of civilizational rhetoric by both parties, with varying degrees of religious sloganeering, to cater public support. Civilizational dimension forms an overlay over the vertical-horizontal dimensions of populism. Given that 2023 is the election year in Pakistan and both parties are planning to contest elections, this is a timely piece to warn about the treacherous trajectory taken by Pakistani politics.
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Inspired by the concept of ‘transnational populism’ this paper investigates the efforts of a religious populist regime to narratively construct ‘the transnational people’ and ‘the transnational leader’ in diasporic spaces that Sunni... more
Inspired by the concept of ‘transnational populism’ this paper investigates the efforts of a religious populist regime to narratively construct ‘the transnational people’ and ‘the transnational leader’ in diasporic spaces that Sunni Muslim minorities occupy. The paper aims to show how Turkey’s ruling party is constructing an Islamist civilisational populist narrative fortified with emotions and how it is disseminating it. We show that Turkey’s current regime has expanded its definition of ‘the people’ in domestic politics to include the whole global Sunni Muslim community (the Ummah), presenting itself as the representative, protector and saviour of the Ummah that has been victimised by the Crusader West. It also expanded its definition of diaspora to include non-Turkish Sunni Muslims/Islamic communities who did not originate from Turkey. Then, similar to its propagation of this narrative and emotional rhetoric at home, it has attempted to transnationalise this Islamist civilisational populist narrative and thes emotions to the Sunni Muslim diaspora communities through state and non-state apparatuses. As a novel contribution, this paper builds a bridge between diaspora studies, religion and populism to capture this transnational aspect of populism.
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This paper examines civilizational populism in Israel and focuses on the largest and most powerful party in Israel since the 1980s, National Liberal Movement (Likud), and its most significant leader of the past twenty years, the populist... more
This paper examines civilizational populism in Israel and focuses on the largest and most powerful party in Israel since the 1980s, National Liberal Movement (Likud), and its most significant leader of the past twenty years, the populist politician Benjamin Netanyahu. We show how Netanyahu incorporates ‘civilizationism’ into his populist discourses by, first, using the notion that Jewish civilization predates all others in the region to establish the legitimacy of the state of Israel, the hegemony of Jewish culture within Israel, and at times his own political decisions. Second, through his portrayal of the Arab-Muslim world as an antisemitic and barbaric bloc that, far from being a civilization, threatens Western civilization through its barbarism. Equally, this paper shows how Netanyahu argues that Israel is akin to protective wall that protects Western Civilization from the Islamist barbarians who wish to destroy it, and therefore on this basis calls for Europeans and North Americans to support Israel in its battle for civilization and against “the forces of barbarism.”
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This article addresses an issue of growing political importance: the global rise of civilizational populism. From Western Europe to India and Pakistan, and from Indonesia to the Americas, populists are increasingly linking national... more
This article addresses an issue of growing political importance: the global rise of civilizational populism. From Western Europe to India and Pakistan, and from Indonesia to the Americas, populists are increasingly linking national belonging with civilizational identity—and at times to the belief that the world is divided into religion-based civilizations, some of which are doomed to clash with one another. As part of this process, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity have all been commandeered by populist parties and movements, each adept at using the power of religion—in different ways and drawing on different aspects of religion—to define the boundary of concepts such as people, nation, and civilization.
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The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of ‘civilizational populism’ and work towards a concise but operational definition. To do this, the article examines how populists across the world, and in a variety of different... more
The purpose of this article is to clarify the concept of ‘civilizational populism’ and work towards a concise but operational definition. To do this, the article examines how populists across the world, and in a variety of different religious, geographic, and political contexts, incorporate and instrumentalize notions of ‘civilization’ into their discourses. The article observes that although a number of scholars have described a civilization turn among populists, there is currently no concrete definition of civilization populism, a concept which requires greater clarity. The article also observes that, while scholars have often found populists in Europe incorporating notions of civilization and ‘the clash of civilizations’ into the discourses, populists in non-Western environments also appear to have also incorporated notions of civilization into their discourses, yet these are rarely studied. The first part of the article begins by discussing the concept of ‘civilizationism’, a political discourse which emphasizes the civilizational aspect of social and especially national identity. Following this, the article discusses populism and describes how populism itself cannot succeed unless it adheres to a wider political programme or broader set of ideas, and without the engendering or exploiting of a ‘crisis’ which threatens ‘the people’. The article then examines the existing literature on the civilization turn evident among populists. The second part of the article builds on the previous section by discussing the relationship between civilizationism and populism worldwide. To do this, the paper examines civilizational populism in three key nations representing three of the world’s major faiths, and three different geographical regions: Turkey, India, and Myanmar. The paper makes three findings. First, while scholars have generally examined civilizational identity in European and North American right-wing populist rhetoric, we find it occurring in a wider range of geographies and religious contexts. Second, civilizationism when incorporated into populism gives content to the key signifiers: ‘the pure people’, ‘the corrupt elite’, and ‘dangerous ‘others’. In each case studied in this article, populists use a civilization based classification of peoples to draw boundaries around ‘the people’, ‘elites’ and ‘others’, and declare that ‘the people’ are ‘pure’ and ‘good’ because they belong to a civilization which is itself pure and good, and authentic insofar as they belong to the civilization which created the nation and culture which populists claim to be defending. Conversely, civilizational populists describe elites as having betrayed ‘the people’ by abandoning the religion and/or values and culture that shaped and were shaped by their civilization. Equally, civilizational populists describe religious minorities as ‘dangerous’ others who are morally bad insofar as they belong to a foreign civilization, and therefore to a different religion and/or culture with different values which are antithetical to those of ‘our’ civilization. Third, civilizational populist rhetoric is effective insofar as populists’ can, by adding a civilizational element to the vertical and horizontal dimensions of their populism, claim a civilizational crisis is occurring. Finally, based on the case studies, the paper defines civilizational populism as a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people.
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Civilizational Populism in Indonesia: The Case of Front Pembela Islam (FPI)
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Based on our case studies, we believe that it is possible to define civilizational populism as a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and... more
Based on our case studies, we believe that it is possible to define civilizational populism as a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite' who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people. Our definition of civilizational populism takes into account the fact that the idea of civilizationalism is the essential core in this type of populism, and is used to define populism's key signifiers in primarily civilizational terms. Civilizational populism is not, the preceding chapters show, a European and North American Christianity-based phenomenon, but evident in a variety of societies and religious contexts, including in the world's most followed religious traditions (Yilmaz and Morieson 2022a). 1
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This paper looks at the importance of ‘crisis events’ used by leaders employing populist civilisational populism in Muslim democracies. While populism is widely acknowledged and studied, various aspects remain unexplored. One feature is... more
This paper looks at the importance of ‘crisis events’ used by leaders employing populist civilisational populism in Muslim democracies. While populism is widely acknowledged and studied, various aspects remain unexplored. One feature is how populists make use of a crisis. While populists do benefit from social and political rifts, this paper goes a step further and argues that civilisationalist populists create imaginary and exaggerated ‘crises’ to sustain and prolong their relevance/position in power as well as justify their undemocratic actions. Using the case studies of Turkey (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) and Pakistan (Imran Khan) allows for a comparison to be drawn between two different leaders seeking to maintain power by using their position to either create civilizationalist crises or to frame ordinary crises as civilisational. The findings highlight that despite different political scenarios and outcomes, both these populist leaders gained political support by creating crises. We find that in most cases, populists exaggerate pre-existing insecurities and events to their benefit. The overblown claims and conspiratorial scenarios aid populists in creating a niche for their narratives by reaffirming their populist categorisation of societies. At the same time, the findings bring forth the troubling issues of the social-political cost of these Islamist civilisationalist populists.
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This paper comparatively examines the ruling religious populist governments in Turkey and Pakistan through a theoretical framework that focuses on populists’ promises, their compromises, and their attacks on democratic institutions.... more
This paper comparatively examines the ruling religious populist governments in Turkey and Pakistan through a theoretical framework that focuses on populists’ promises, their compromises, and their attacks on democratic institutions. Through our three-legged framework, we examine how these religious populists behave in power and how strategic necessities, the realities of governing, and structural constraints shape their policies. Similar to the other populists in other parts of the world, before coming to power, Islamist populists make sweeping promises to the people and quick fixes to major problems of the country—most famously, quick and substantial economic development. While they may want to retain their uncompromising style and lofty goals, the realities of governing force populists to make serious compromises to their designated ‘enemies’ and on their values once they are in power. Finally, like other authoritarian politicians, Islamist populists attack formal institutions of democracy such as the judiciary, the media, and civil society; they politicize them, evacuate them, and eventually capture them from within.
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This article addresses an issue of growing political importance: the global rise of civilizational populism. From Western Europe to India and Pakistan, and from Indonesia to the Americas, populists are increasingly linking national... more
This article addresses an issue of growing political importance: the global rise of civilizational populism. From Western Europe to India and Pakistan, and from Indonesia to the Americas, populists are increasingly linking national belonging with civilizational identity—and at times to the belief that the world is divided into religion-based civilizations, some of which are doomed to clash with one another. As part of this process, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity have all been commandeered by populist parties and movements, each adept at using the power of religion—in different ways and drawing on different aspects of religion—to define the boundary of concepts such as people, nation, and civilization.
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Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions. This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part of the nation’s cultural... more
Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions. This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part of the nation’s cultural imagination and identity. During the country’s “infant” or “fragile” democratic phase, religious populism was repeatedly used to consolidate support. Religious parties and groups hold great political sway in the county. Through the use of religious populism, these factions have been allowed to nurture their own “people” who are partisan towards “others.” The weak level of governance, political turmoil, and distrust in institutional capabilities has pushed the public into the arms of religious populists.
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The Republic of Turkey’s quest to modernize sowed the seeds of populism. For decades, the ruling Kemalists tried to assimilate the country into the ideal laicist, Sunni Muslim, and ethnically Turkish citizen; in the process, they vilified... more
The Republic of Turkey’s quest to modernize sowed the seeds of populism. For decades, the ruling Kemalists tried to assimilate the country into the ideal laicist, Sunni Muslim, and ethnically Turkish citizen; in the process, they vilified non-Muslims, non-Sunnis, non-Turks, non-laicists, and Islamists. Against this background, the AKP constructed itself as the only true representative of the victimised Sunni Muslim people and framed the Kemalists as “the evil elite.” The AKP’s rise and growing authoritarianism has led these fissures to fracture, reshaping the dynamics of Turkish populism. The AKP is constantly evolving; lately, it has been using Islamism and “external threats” to assume more control. The AKP retains some features of Kemalist “otherization” in the context of non-Sunni, non-Turk, and secular communities. The political opposition has also used populism to counter the AKP.
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This paper explores the emerging scholarship investigating the relationship between religion(s) and populism. It systematically reviews the various aspects of the phenomenon going beyond the Western world and discusses how religion and... more
This paper explores the emerging scholarship investigating the relationship between
religion(s) and populism. It systematically reviews the various aspects of the phenomenon going
beyond the Western world and discusses how religion and populism interact in various contexts
around the globe. It looks at Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity and how in
different regions and cultural contexts, they merge with populism and surface as the bases of populist
appeals in the 21st century. In doing so, this paper contends that there is a scarcity of literature on
this topic particularly in the non-Western and Judeo-Christian context. The paper concludes with
recommendations on various gaps in the field of study of religious populism.
religion(s) and populism. It systematically reviews the various aspects of the phenomenon going
beyond the Western world and discusses how religion and populism interact in various contexts
around the globe. It looks at Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Christianity and how in
different regions and cultural contexts, they merge with populism and surface as the bases of populist
appeals in the 21st century. In doing so, this paper contends that there is a scarcity of literature on
this topic particularly in the non-Western and Judeo-Christian context. The paper concludes with
recommendations on various gaps in the field of study of religious populism.
Research Interests:
Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions. This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part of the nation’s cultural... more
Since its founding, both civil and military Pakistani governments have
used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions.
This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part
of the nation’s cultural imagination and identity. During the country’s
“infant” or “fragile” democratic phase, religious populism was repeatedly
used to consolidate support. Religious parties and groups hold
great political sway in the county. Through the use of religious populism,
these factions have been allowed to nurture their own “people”
who are partisan towards “others.” The weak level of governance, political
turmoil, and distrust in institutional capabilities has pushed the
public into the arms of religious populists.
used religious populism to consolidate support and legitimize their actions.
This has paved the way for religious populism to become a part
of the nation’s cultural imagination and identity. During the country’s
“infant” or “fragile” democratic phase, religious populism was repeatedly
used to consolidate support. Religious parties and groups hold
great political sway in the county. Through the use of religious populism,
these factions have been allowed to nurture their own “people”
who are partisan towards “others.” The weak level of governance, political
turmoil, and distrust in institutional capabilities has pushed the
public into the arms of religious populists.
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Although populism has become a focus of scholarly interest in the last decade, there has been much less research on how militaries worldwide have reacted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the relationship... more
Although populism has become a focus of scholarly interest in the last decade, there has been much less research on how militaries worldwide have reacted to the rise of populist leaders. There is some timeworn research on the relationship of militaries in Latin America with various left-wing populist governments and leaders from the 1930s to the 1970s. Since it is the right-wing populism that is surging nowadays, that research offers at best partial insights. This commentary tries to fill this gap by looking at the dynamics and history of military connections to both right-wing and left-wing populist movements and leaders.
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Over the past three decades, religion has re-emerged as a key factor in domestic and international politics. One especially visible aspect of the religious revival in public life is its prominence in populist rhetoric. Even in supposedly... more
Over the past three decades, religion has re-emerged as a key factor in domestic and international politics. One especially visible aspect of the religious revival in public life is its prominence in populist rhetoric. Even in supposedly secular societies, religious identity plays an important role in populist discourse. Religious people who are drawn to the fundamentalist manifestations of their religions find themselves sometimes drawn to populism. They discover that their populism is not in tension with their religious beliefs and practices. Because religious and identitarian populism are worldwide phenomena, it may be helpful to take a brief tour of world religions, to comprehend the many different ways in which religion and populism intersect within the world’s great faiths: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, and Buddhism.
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Drawing on the extant literature on populism, we aim to flesh out how populists in power utilize religion and related state resources in setting up aggressive, multidimensional religious populist “us” versus “them” binaries. We focus on... more
Drawing on the extant literature on populism, we aim to flesh out how populists in power
utilize religion and related state resources in setting up aggressive, multidimensional religious populist
“us” versus “them” binaries. We focus on Turkey as our case and argue that by instrumentalizing
the Diyanet (Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs), the authoritarian Islamists in power have been
able to consolidate manufactured populist dichotomies via the Diyanet’s weekly Friday sermons.
Populists’ control and use of a state institution to propagate populist civilizationist narratives and
construct antagonistic binaries are underexamined in the literature. Therefore, by examining Turkish
populists’ use of the Diyanet, this paper will make a general contribution to the extant literature
on religion and populism. Furthermore, by analyzing the Diyanet’s weekly Friday sermons from
the last ten years we demonstrate how different aspects of populism—its horizontal, vertical, and
civilizational dimensions—have become embedded in the Diyanet’s Friday sermons. Equally, this
paper shows how these sermons have been tailored to facilitate the populist appeal of Erdo˘gan’s
Islamist regime. Through the Friday sermons, the majority—Sunni Muslim Turks are presented with
statements that evoke negative emotions and play on their specific fears, their sense of victimhood
and through which their anxieties—real and imagined—are revived and used to construct populist
binaries to construct and mobilize the people in support of an authoritarian Islamist regime purported
to be fighting a “civilizational enemy” on behalf of “the people”. Finally, drawing on insights from
the Turkish case, we illustrate how the “hosting” function of the civilizational aspect plays a vital
role in tailoring internal (vertical and horizontal) religious populist binaries.
utilize religion and related state resources in setting up aggressive, multidimensional religious populist
“us” versus “them” binaries. We focus on Turkey as our case and argue that by instrumentalizing
the Diyanet (Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs), the authoritarian Islamists in power have been
able to consolidate manufactured populist dichotomies via the Diyanet’s weekly Friday sermons.
Populists’ control and use of a state institution to propagate populist civilizationist narratives and
construct antagonistic binaries are underexamined in the literature. Therefore, by examining Turkish
populists’ use of the Diyanet, this paper will make a general contribution to the extant literature
on religion and populism. Furthermore, by analyzing the Diyanet’s weekly Friday sermons from
the last ten years we demonstrate how different aspects of populism—its horizontal, vertical, and
civilizational dimensions—have become embedded in the Diyanet’s Friday sermons. Equally, this
paper shows how these sermons have been tailored to facilitate the populist appeal of Erdo˘gan’s
Islamist regime. Through the Friday sermons, the majority—Sunni Muslim Turks are presented with
statements that evoke negative emotions and play on their specific fears, their sense of victimhood
and through which their anxieties—real and imagined—are revived and used to construct populist
binaries to construct and mobilize the people in support of an authoritarian Islamist regime purported
to be fighting a “civilizational enemy” on behalf of “the people”. Finally, drawing on insights from
the Turkish case, we illustrate how the “hosting” function of the civilizational aspect plays a vital
role in tailoring internal (vertical and horizontal) religious populist binaries.
Research Interests:
Over the past three decades, religion has become a key component of right-wing populist discourses the world over. Populist movements and leaders in nations as diverse as the Netherlands, Hungary, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and the US have... more
Over the past three decades, religion has become a key component of right-wing populist discourses the world over. Populist movements and leaders in nations as diverse as the Netherlands, Hungary, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and the US have increasingly practiced a discourse in which national identity is partly defined in religio-civilizational terms. The rise of religious populism has also involved the elicitation and exploitation of emotions by populists. Indeed, the addition of religion has made populism a formidable force capable of producing a range of emotions among segments of the public, thereby increasing the demand for populism.
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Most of the literature on religion’s relationship with populism is Eurocentric and has so far focused on European populist party discourses and, to a degree, on the United States, in particular, on the Christian identity populism of the... more
Most of the literature on religion’s relationship with populism is Eurocentric and has
so far focused on European populist party discourses and, to a degree, on the United States, in
particular, on the Christian identity populism of the Tea Party and the Trump movement within
the Republican Party. However, across the Asia-Pacific region, religion has become an important
component of populist discourses. It has been instrumentalised by populists in many nations in
the region, including some of the most populous countries in the world, India, Indonesia, and
Pakistan. Moreover, the relationship between religions other than Christianity and populism has all
too rarely been studied, except for Turkey. This paper therefore surveys the Asia-Pacific region to
comprehend how populists in the region incorporate religion into their discourses and the impact
religious populism has on Asia-Pacific societies. It asks two questions: “What role does religion play
in populist discourses?” and “How has religion’s incorporation into populist discourse impacted
society?” To answer these questions, the paper examines four nations which have recently been
ruled by governments espousing, to different degrees and in different ways, religious populism:
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. By choosing these nations, we can examine the relationship
between populism and Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and between religion and populism within
a variety of religious, ethnic, and political contexts. The paper argues that religion is instrumentalised
in populist discourses across the Asia-Pacific region in a variety of ways. First, religion is used to
construct ingroups and outgroups, which serve a populist narrative in which the religion of the
ingroup is superior yet threatened by the religion(s) of the outgroup(s). Second, religion is used
to empower religious authorities, which support populist parties and movements. Third, religion
is instrumentalised by populists in order to frame themselves, and in particular their leader, as a
sacred or holy figure. The paper also argues that religion’s incorporation into populist discourse
has impacted society by legitimising authoritarianism, increasing religious divisions, and justifying
the oppression of religious minorities. The paper concludes by noting some differences between
populists in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
so far focused on European populist party discourses and, to a degree, on the United States, in
particular, on the Christian identity populism of the Tea Party and the Trump movement within
the Republican Party. However, across the Asia-Pacific region, religion has become an important
component of populist discourses. It has been instrumentalised by populists in many nations in
the region, including some of the most populous countries in the world, India, Indonesia, and
Pakistan. Moreover, the relationship between religions other than Christianity and populism has all
too rarely been studied, except for Turkey. This paper therefore surveys the Asia-Pacific region to
comprehend how populists in the region incorporate religion into their discourses and the impact
religious populism has on Asia-Pacific societies. It asks two questions: “What role does religion play
in populist discourses?” and “How has religion’s incorporation into populist discourse impacted
society?” To answer these questions, the paper examines four nations which have recently been
ruled by governments espousing, to different degrees and in different ways, religious populism:
India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka. By choosing these nations, we can examine the relationship
between populism and Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and between religion and populism within
a variety of religious, ethnic, and political contexts. The paper argues that religion is instrumentalised
in populist discourses across the Asia-Pacific region in a variety of ways. First, religion is used to
construct ingroups and outgroups, which serve a populist narrative in which the religion of the
ingroup is superior yet threatened by the religion(s) of the outgroup(s). Second, religion is used
to empower religious authorities, which support populist parties and movements. Third, religion
is instrumentalised by populists in order to frame themselves, and in particular their leader, as a
sacred or holy figure. The paper also argues that religion’s incorporation into populist discourse
has impacted society by legitimising authoritarianism, increasing religious divisions, and justifying
the oppression of religious minorities. The paper concludes by noting some differences between
populists in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
Research Interests:
Since the 1990s, populism has become increasingly prevalent in Israeli politics. While scholars and commentators have often focused on the populist rhetoric used by Benjamin Netanyahu, his is hardly the only manifestation of populism... more
Since the 1990s, populism has become increasingly prevalent in Israeli politics. While scholars and commentators have often focused on the populist rhetoric used by Benjamin Netanyahu, his is hardly the only manifestation of populism within Israel. For example, Shas, a right-wing populist party which seeks to represent Sephardic and Haredi interests within Israel, emerged in the 1980s and swiftly became the third largest party in the country, a position it has maintained since the mid 1990s. Shas is unique insofar as it merges religion, populism, and Sephardic and Haredi Jewish identity and culture. Indeed, Shas is not merely a political party, but a religious movement with its own schools and religious network, and it possesses both secular and religious leaders. In this article, we examine the religious populism of Shas and investigate both the manner in which the party constructs Israeli national identity and the rhetoric used by its secular and religious leadership to generate demand for the party’s religious and populist solutions to Israel’s social and economic problems. We show how the party instrumentalizes Sephardic ethnicity and culture and Haredi religious identity, belief, and practice, by first highlighting the relative disadvantages experienced by these communities and positing that Israeli “elites” are the cause of this disadvantaged position. We also show how Shas elevates Sephardic and Haredi identity above all others and claims that the party will restore Sephardic culture to its rightful and privileged place in Israel.
ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to investigate how emotions guide and shape diasporic communities’ interpretation/perception of socio-political developments in their place of origin. Based on our study of members of the Armenian diaspora who are... more
This paper aims to investigate how emotions guide and shape diasporic communities’ interpretation/perception of socio-political developments in their place of origin. Based on our study of members of the Armenian diaspora who are originally from Turkey and who now live in Melbourne, Australia, we argue that these Armenians have formed their views on political issues under the influence of their emotional experiences, stemming from direct or indirect victimhood. The paper finds that several key emotions – fear, hate (and lack of hate), anticipation, and pessimism, inform and shape the Australian Armenian diaspora’s making sense of political developments in their place of origin, Turkey. The paper’s contribution to the relevant scholarship is twofold. First, it contributes to the studies on emotions in diasporas by examining how emotions shape individual members of a diaspora make sense of political developments in their place of origin. Second, it contributes to the literature on modern Turkey by studying Armenians from Turkey and their emotions on socio-political phenomena.
Research Interests:
Authoritarian regimes do not only target and oppress their opponents at home, they also try to repress dissident diaspora members abroad. The literature on transnational (extraterritorial) repression has shown that authoritarian regimes... more
Authoritarian regimes do not only target and oppress their opponents at home, they
also try to repress dissident diaspora members abroad. The literature on transnational
(extraterritorial) repression has shown that authoritarian regimes normally use
transnational organs of the state such as intelligence services as part of their usual
transnational repression activities. However, since they do not have sovereignty in
the countries, their transnational repression has limits. This article argues that loyal
diaspora supporters help these regimes as additional repression and violence
apparatuses by trying to repress diaspora members from the same country of
origin. However, the discursive mechanism behind this phenomenon has not been
studied. This study aims to address this gap. Based on the competitive authoritarian
Turkish case, it introduces the concept of “transnational securitization” to
securitization theory. The article argues that what makes this type of securitization
different is that the audience (pro-government Turkish and non-Turkish Muslim
diaspora groups) is not only convinced by the securitization narrative that
legitimates the use of extraordinary means that are normally undertaken by the
state, but takes it upon themselves to carry on the anti-dissident repressive and
violent actions. The article contributes to both transnational repression and
securitization literatures.
also try to repress dissident diaspora members abroad. The literature on transnational
(extraterritorial) repression has shown that authoritarian regimes normally use
transnational organs of the state such as intelligence services as part of their usual
transnational repression activities. However, since they do not have sovereignty in
the countries, their transnational repression has limits. This article argues that loyal
diaspora supporters help these regimes as additional repression and violence
apparatuses by trying to repress diaspora members from the same country of
origin. However, the discursive mechanism behind this phenomenon has not been
studied. This study aims to address this gap. Based on the competitive authoritarian
Turkish case, it introduces the concept of “transnational securitization” to
securitization theory. The article argues that what makes this type of securitization
different is that the audience (pro-government Turkish and non-Turkish Muslim
diaspora groups) is not only convinced by the securitization narrative that
legitimates the use of extraordinary means that are normally undertaken by the
state, but takes it upon themselves to carry on the anti-dissident repressive and
violent actions. The article contributes to both transnational repression and
securitization literatures.
Research Interests:
Once voted into office, populist governments have often found undemocratic means to prolong their stay. The literature on populists in power is evolving and expanding. However, it has mainly focused on how the populists in power attack... more
Once voted into office, populist governments have often found undemocratic means to
prolong their stay. The literature on populists in power is evolving and expanding. However, it has
mainly focused on how the populists in power attack institutions such as the judiciary, rule erosion,
and dirty institutionalism. How populists make use of the law and the judiciary to prolong their
authoritarian rule remains an area that is under-researched. The populists’ use of informal institutions
such as the unofficial law when in power has not been studied either. This paper addresses these gaps
in the populism literature by studying Turkey’s Islamist populist ruling party’s use of informal law
in prolonging its authoritarian rule. The paper argues that the Islamist civilisational populist AKP
has been using informal Islamist law for both the legitimation of its rule and the repression of the
opposition. It shows how the AKP officials, the state’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the
pro-AKP Sharia scholars, and other informal religious authorities employ the civilisational populist
Islamist legal narrative to argue that according to Sharia it is obligatory to choose the side of the God
that is represented by the AKP and to vote against the infidel opposition that is an existential danger
to the pure Muslim people of Turkey and their religion. The paper combines and contributes to two
theoretical strands. The first is civilisational populism, and the second is the informal institutions,
with a focus on informal law and legal pluralism.
prolong their stay. The literature on populists in power is evolving and expanding. However, it has
mainly focused on how the populists in power attack institutions such as the judiciary, rule erosion,
and dirty institutionalism. How populists make use of the law and the judiciary to prolong their
authoritarian rule remains an area that is under-researched. The populists’ use of informal institutions
such as the unofficial law when in power has not been studied either. This paper addresses these gaps
in the populism literature by studying Turkey’s Islamist populist ruling party’s use of informal law
in prolonging its authoritarian rule. The paper argues that the Islamist civilisational populist AKP
has been using informal Islamist law for both the legitimation of its rule and the repression of the
opposition. It shows how the AKP officials, the state’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the
pro-AKP Sharia scholars, and other informal religious authorities employ the civilisational populist
Islamist legal narrative to argue that according to Sharia it is obligatory to choose the side of the God
that is represented by the AKP and to vote against the infidel opposition that is an existential danger
to the pure Muslim people of Turkey and their religion. The paper combines and contributes to two
theoretical strands. The first is civilisational populism, and the second is the informal institutions,
with a focus on informal law and legal pluralism.
Research Interests:
Blame avoidance has been one of the most applied strategies by policy makers in both democratic and non-democratic regimes to avoid responsibility and accountability in cases of failure and tragic events. It is also known that politicians... more
Blame avoidance has been one of the most applied strategies by policy makers in both
democratic and non-democratic regimes to avoid responsibility and accountability in cases of failure
and tragic events. It is also known that politicians have used religion for Machiavellian purposes, as
exactly advised by Machiavelli. However, a systematic empirical analysis of how religion is used for
blame avoidance by politicians has not been conducted. In this article, we aim to address this gap by
examining the empirical data derived from the weekly Friday sermon texts produced by Turkey’s
Directorate of Religious Affairs and delivered in more than 90 thousand mosques every week to a
large segment of the population in Turkey, where the majority claims to be religious. Starting with its
violent response to the peaceful Gezi protests in 2013, the ruling AKP has opened up a new phase
in Turkish political history by resorting to civilizational populism: it blamed the Western world for
financing and masterminding the protests, using the protestors as internal pawns to attack Turkey
and the Muslim World, suppressed the protests brutally and entered into a populist authoritarian
regime. Our paper shows, following this turn, how the Diyanet sermons started using religion to help
with the AKP’s blame avoidance. The Diyanet either parroted the AKP’s conspiratorial narrative or
tried to convince the citizens that all negativities are works of God and with these humans are being
tested by God. The AKP’s use of religion to avoid blame is a text-book case of how both a religious
institution and religious discourse can be used to help the incumbent avoid responsibility. Whenever,
there was a problem that would the AKP votes, the Diyanet’s sermons tried to shift the blame to
either God or citizens or conspiratorial enemies.
democratic and non-democratic regimes to avoid responsibility and accountability in cases of failure
and tragic events. It is also known that politicians have used religion for Machiavellian purposes, as
exactly advised by Machiavelli. However, a systematic empirical analysis of how religion is used for
blame avoidance by politicians has not been conducted. In this article, we aim to address this gap by
examining the empirical data derived from the weekly Friday sermon texts produced by Turkey’s
Directorate of Religious Affairs and delivered in more than 90 thousand mosques every week to a
large segment of the population in Turkey, where the majority claims to be religious. Starting with its
violent response to the peaceful Gezi protests in 2013, the ruling AKP has opened up a new phase
in Turkish political history by resorting to civilizational populism: it blamed the Western world for
financing and masterminding the protests, using the protestors as internal pawns to attack Turkey
and the Muslim World, suppressed the protests brutally and entered into a populist authoritarian
regime. Our paper shows, following this turn, how the Diyanet sermons started using religion to help
with the AKP’s blame avoidance. The Diyanet either parroted the AKP’s conspiratorial narrative or
tried to convince the citizens that all negativities are works of God and with these humans are being
tested by God. The AKP’s use of religion to avoid blame is a text-book case of how both a religious
institution and religious discourse can be used to help the incumbent avoid responsibility. Whenever,
there was a problem that would the AKP votes, the Diyanet’s sermons tried to shift the blame to
either God or citizens or conspiratorial enemies.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This article tackles the puzzle of how Turkey’s ruling Islamist populist Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to co-opt the secularist far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and to ensure the MHP’s support in creating an... more
This article tackles the puzzle of how Turkey’s ruling Islamist populist Justice and
Development Party (AKP) was able to co-opt the secularist far-right Nationalist
Action Party (MHP) and to ensure the MHP’s support in creating an authoritarian
regime, despite their previous antagonistic relations and ideological opposition. We
investigate this puzzle through the combination of authoritarian resilience/stability
theory and securitization theory. The article develops an empirically grounded
account of how co-optation has happened in Turkey. In a novel way, it shows that
the ruling party’s successful securitization of the MHP’s antagonists (pro-Kurdish
opposition) has facilitated the co-optation of the MHP by the ruling party. This
article contributes to the authoritarian stability theory by introducing securitization
theory to this literature. It also contributes to the co-optation literature by showing
a novel phenomenon: a powerful incumbent party’s ideological move towards the
smaller to be co-opted party. The article also contributes to the securitization
theory debates about the role of securitizing actors and their audiences, as well as
the “right” of functional actors in securitizing an issue, despite their initial nondecisive
authority.
Development Party (AKP) was able to co-opt the secularist far-right Nationalist
Action Party (MHP) and to ensure the MHP’s support in creating an authoritarian
regime, despite their previous antagonistic relations and ideological opposition. We
investigate this puzzle through the combination of authoritarian resilience/stability
theory and securitization theory. The article develops an empirically grounded
account of how co-optation has happened in Turkey. In a novel way, it shows that
the ruling party’s successful securitization of the MHP’s antagonists (pro-Kurdish
opposition) has facilitated the co-optation of the MHP by the ruling party. This
article contributes to the authoritarian stability theory by introducing securitization
theory to this literature. It also contributes to the co-optation literature by showing
a novel phenomenon: a powerful incumbent party’s ideological move towards the
smaller to be co-opted party. The article also contributes to the securitization
theory debates about the role of securitizing actors and their audiences, as well as
the “right” of functional actors in securitizing an issue, despite their initial nondecisive
authority.
Research Interests:
With the Pakistani government implementing rules and regulations to control the online sphere, particularly through the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), digital authoritarianism has emerged as a significant governance tool in... more
With the Pakistani government implementing rules and regulations to control the online sphere, particularly through the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), digital authoritarianism has emerged as a significant governance tool in the country. Concerns have been raised regarding potential abuses stemming from the vague definitions of cybercrime within PECA and the extensive monitoring authority granted to intelligence services. However, despite the rise of digital authoritarianism, a countervailing force exists. Pakistan’s judiciary has displayed resistance, and the nation boasts a robust civil society that includes human rights organizations focusing on digital rights. These groups express concerns regarding data security, privacy regulations, and the internet access of marginalized communities. This study aims to examine the dynamics of digital authoritarianism in Pakistan and evaluate the role of civil society organizations in promoting and protecting digital rights.
Research Interests:
Pakistan’s democracy has a turbulent political history. In the seven decades since its creation, the country has faced four military-led dictatorships and another two decades under indirect military rule. Given this political trend,... more
Pakistan’s democracy has a turbulent political history. In the seven decades since its creation, the country has faced four military-led dictatorships and another two decades under indirect military rule. Given this political trend, authoritarianism is not a novel phenomenon in the country. Digital authoritarianism, however, is a relatively new domain of oppression. This paper looks at how a political party in power and the “establishment” (military elite and its civilian collaborators) have been increasingly controlling digital mediums as well as weaponizing cyberspace. This dual control and usage allow for growing digital authoritarianism.
Using the case study of Islamist civilizational populist Imran Khan’s government (2018-2022) and its collaboration with the military establishment in enforcing digital authoritarianism, this article provides a four levels of assessment of internet governance in Pakistan: 1. whole network level, 2. sub-network level, 3. proxy level, and 4. user level. In addition, the role of Khan’s political party’s Islamist civilizational populist outlook in contributing to authoritarianism is also discussed. A lot of censorship happens around the ideas of protecting Islam and Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Thus, Pakistan’s digital space is oppressive where ideas of religion, ontological insecurity, and nationalism are weaponized to legitimize the state’s growing authoritarianism.
Using the case study of Islamist civilizational populist Imran Khan’s government (2018-2022) and its collaboration with the military establishment in enforcing digital authoritarianism, this article provides a four levels of assessment of internet governance in Pakistan: 1. whole network level, 2. sub-network level, 3. proxy level, and 4. user level. In addition, the role of Khan’s political party’s Islamist civilizational populist outlook in contributing to authoritarianism is also discussed. A lot of censorship happens around the ideas of protecting Islam and Pakistan’s Muslim identity. Thus, Pakistan’s digital space is oppressive where ideas of religion, ontological insecurity, and nationalism are weaponized to legitimize the state’s growing authoritarianism.
Research Interests:
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe... more
Turkey, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia span one of the longest continuously inhabited regions of the world. Centuries of cultural infusion have ensured these societies are highly heterogeneous. As plural polities, they are ripe for the kind of freedoms that liberal democracy can guarantee. However, despite having multi-party electoral systems, these countries have recently moved toward populist authoritarianism. Populism —once considered a distinctively Latin American problem that only seldom reared its head in other parts of the world— has now found a home in almost every corner of the planet. Moreover, it has latched on to religion, which, as history reminds us, has an unparalleled power to mobilize crowds. This report explores the unique nexus between faith and populism in our era and offers an insight into how cyberspace and offline politics have become highly intertwined to create a hyper-reality in which socio-political events are taking place. The report focuses, in particular, on the role of religious populism in digital space as a catalyst for undemocratic politics in the five Asian countries we have selected as our case studies.
Research Interests:
Several studies have analysed different aspects of Turkey's authoritarianisation under the AKP rule. However, there is still a gap in this literature with regards to the role of instrumentalization of narratives and discursive strategies... more
Several studies have analysed different aspects of Turkey's authoritarianisation under the AKP rule. However, there is still a gap in this literature with regards to the role of instrumentalization of narratives and discursive strategies in this authoritarian turn which has been successfully engineered by the AKP. This article addresses this gap and shows how securiti ¶ zing narratives based on fear, trauma, nostalgia, ontological insecurity, grievances, and conspiracy theories have been used by President Erdogan and his AKP as psycho-political tools of authoritarianisation. It argues that these tools have shown to be useful in securitizing the opposition to consolidate power, change the governing structure, and take other extraordinary measures, while legitimizing these acts for the public. In an attempt to provide a holistic picture, this paper analyses how the AKP has securitized almost all of the significant opposition socio-political identities, groups and parties in Turkey. This study contributes to securitization theory by shedding light on the use of traumas, conspiracy theories, and fear in the securitization process, in legitimizing securitization and authoritarianisation.
Research Interests:
Islamophobic experiences didn’t deter these young Muslim Australians from engaging with non-Muslim Australians. In fact, they indicated they were keen on engaging with the very group of Australians likely to be prejudiced against them.
Research Interests:
One of the most widely used and influential ways of creating foundational myths for authoritarian legitimation is to construct a necropolitical narrative around the significance of dying for the nation, homeland, state and the leader,... more
One of the most widely used and influential ways of creating foundational myths for authoritarian legitimation is to construct a necropolitical narrative around the significance of dying for the nation, homeland, state and the leader, i.e. martyrdom. Mbembe's concept 'necropolitics' (the right of the sovereign to determine who shall live and who shall die) has been expanded to include the pollical instrumentalization of martyrdom narratives. However, the literature has not analyzed the necropolitical martyr-icons. This paper aims to address this gap by looking at two historical episodes in Turkey, one in the 1930s dominated by secularists and post-2016 dominated by Islamists.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
This article is a historical empirical study of the Albanian Muslim migrant community of Shepparton. Through analysing newspaper reports, the authors discuss how these migrants were portrayed as liminal between their first arrival and... more
This article is a historical empirical study of the Albanian Muslim migrant
community of Shepparton. Through analysing newspaper reports, the authors
discuss how these migrants were portrayed as liminal between their first
arrival and acceptance as Australians a generation later. This is characteristic
of a practice which the authors term “migrant hazing”, where a migrant group
is demonized as a threat to the society during the liminal phase. Migrant
hazing occurs in public discourse, particularly the media, and ceases with the
replacement of the group by newer migrants, who are subjected to the same
process. Furthermore, migrant hazing remains present in contemporary
depictions of Australian Muslims. In this longitudinal study, media reports on
Albanian Muslims revolved around three persistent themes: their supposed
criminality, the wrongful use of land and the threat of dual-loyalty. These
three items constituted the main weapons of the media in hazing the first,
liminal generation.
community of Shepparton. Through analysing newspaper reports, the authors
discuss how these migrants were portrayed as liminal between their first
arrival and acceptance as Australians a generation later. This is characteristic
of a practice which the authors term “migrant hazing”, where a migrant group
is demonized as a threat to the society during the liminal phase. Migrant
hazing occurs in public discourse, particularly the media, and ceases with the
replacement of the group by newer migrants, who are subjected to the same
process. Furthermore, migrant hazing remains present in contemporary
depictions of Australian Muslims. In this longitudinal study, media reports on
Albanian Muslims revolved around three persistent themes: their supposed
criminality, the wrongful use of land and the threat of dual-loyalty. These
three items constituted the main weapons of the media in hazing the first,
liminal generation.
Research Interests:
This study explores the critical barriers to English language learning for Afghan refugee women in Australia. Using data from 23 individual interviews and five focus group discussions , these show that although the participants received... more
This study explores the critical barriers to English language learning for Afghan refugee women in Australia. Using data from 23 individual interviews and five focus group discussions , these show that although the participants received formal support from the Australian Government, the majority still struggled to learn English effectively. A thematic analysis of the interview responses revealed that the major barriers to English acquisition were pedagogical and socio-cultural, and included issues of self-esteem and motivation. The findings of this study have the potential to inform language support programs for refugee women, particularly when considering the sociocultural, emotional and educational needs of female refugees learning English, and the need for provisions such as childcare to facilitate their participation in language learning classes. Q2 K E Y W O R D S Afghan women, Australia, English language learning, migration, refugees Q3 j k Int J Appl Linguist. 2020;1-14.
This IMR Research Note examines the impact of the level of bonding social capital on access to employment among newly arrived Afghan refugees in Victoria (Australia). Based on a mixed-methods analysis of biographical interviews with 80... more
This IMR Research Note examines the impact of the level of bonding social capital on access to employment among newly arrived Afghan refugees in Victoria (Australia). Based on a mixed-methods analysis of biographical interviews with 80 Afghan refugees, it examines their use of social capital, year by year, during the first three years after their arrival. Our analysis shows that higher levels of bonding social capital are associated with greater success in finding employment during the first and second year of settlement. In the third year, however, bonding social capital for Afghan refugees in Victoria is no longer a significant predictor of employment. This Research Note helps clarify inconsistent findings in the literature on the effects of social capital on obtaining employment by suggesting that bonding social capital's impact on refugee employment success changes significantly across the first three years after arrival. This finding has important implications for migration policy and the prioritization of resources toward services for newly arrived refugees.
Research Interests:
The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Indonesia on 14 February 2024 are poised to involve over 200 million citizens out of a total population of 285 million. Among these eligible voters, approximately 115 million belong... more
The upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Indonesia on 14 February 2024 are poised to involve over 200 million citizens out of a total population of 285 million. Among these eligible voters, approximately 115 million belong to the millennial or Gen Z demographic. Within this electoral landscape, the presidential race features a diverse array of candidates, where populism plays a significant, albeit not the dominant, role in shaping the campaigns and agendas of three key contenders. This study aims to explore the relationship between various forms of competing populisms and their utilization of digital technologies. It examines how these dynamics intersect with the digital divide, democracy, pluralism, and social cohesion within Indonesia’s electoral framework. Additionally, the paper outlines potential areas for further research in this domain.
Research Interests:
Muhammad Rizieq Shihab has been one of the most well-known faces of the far-right in Indonesia since the late 1990s. As a radical Islamist scholar with links to Saudi Arabia, Shihab has spent the last three decades as an anti-state voice... more
Muhammad Rizieq Shihab has been one of the most well-known faces of the far-right in Indonesia since the late 1990s. As a radical Islamist scholar with links to Saudi Arabia, Shihab has spent the last three decades as an anti-state voice of the “pious Muslim majority” in Indonesia. He claims to position himself as a “righteous” and “fearless” leader who is dedicated to defending Islam—the faith of “the people.” In 2020 Shihab was arrested for holding large public gatherings, as part of his ‘moral revolution’ campaign, in the middle of pandemic lockdowns. However, his radical Salafist message continues to inspire thousands to action.