- Veronica Anghel is a political scientist and Assistant Professor at the Robert Schuman Center at the European Univers... moreVeronica Anghel is a political scientist and Assistant Professor at the Robert Schuman Center at the European University Institute. Previously, she was a lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Max Weber Fellow in the Political Science Department at the European University Institute. Among others, she was a Fulbright Fellow at Stanford University and a Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna.
Veronica works at the intersection of comparative politics and international relations. She studies European integration and enlargement at the nexus between security-building and democratization. She previously worked as a foreign affairs adviser for the Romanian Presidency and the Romanian Senate. She is also an editorial fellow for Government & Opposition.
Veronica Anghel won the inaugural Rising Star Award of the European Consortium for Political Research in 2021. She tweets @anghel_v1.edit
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed the European Union’s attitude towards enlargement. Whereas five years previously European leaders had suggested that any expansion of the EU should be put on hold, suddenly they embraced... more
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed the European Union’s attitude towards enlargement. Whereas five years previously European leaders had suggested that any expansion of the EU should be put on hold, suddenly they embraced potential membership for Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and the Western Balkans. Enlargement is the strongest instrument that the EU has to bring stability to and foster reform in bordering countries. But that strategy invites risk. Countries might join before their democracies are stable and before European institutions are ready to accommodate a wider and more diverse membership. Nevertheless, enlargement is better than the alternative. Russian victory over Ukraine would threaten not only the security of the EU but also the functioning of the single market, efforts to fight inflation and the stability of the financial system. The EU needs enlargement to protect the European commons.
Research Interests: European integration, Geopolitics, European Security and Defence Policy, European Foreign Policy, European Union, and 15 moreEnlargement and Integration in the EU, European Foreign and Security Policy, European Union Politics, Politics of Ukraine, Central and Eastern Europe, EU Foreign Policy, EU Enlargement, Eurasian Geopolitics, Western Balkans, EU-Western Balkans relations, EU accession of Western Balkans, Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine Crisis, War between Russia and Ukraine, and Russian war in Ukraine
The Russia-Ukraine war triggered a new burst of solidarity across the Atlantic. The reactivation of the battered NATO alliance came easily under the pressure of an external shock. Yet, pulling together to react to Russia's belligerence is... more
The Russia-Ukraine war triggered a new burst of solidarity across the Atlantic. The reactivation of the battered NATO alliance came easily under the pressure of an external shock. Yet, pulling together to react to Russia's belligerence is not sufficient to announce a new era of transatlantic partnership. The reason lies in the different interests that underpin American and European policies such as reliance on economic sanctions, the promotion of democracy, NATO strategy towards Russia, and economic coordination. Loosely sharing common values is not enough to reinforce the transatlantic relationship. Neither is a decision to stop the atrocities that Russia is committing against Ukrainians. Western leadership requires a coherent vision of Western interests. In the new world order, such coherence cannot be taken for granted.
Research Interests: Transatlantic relations, European Security and Defence Policy, European Foreign Policy, European Foreign and Security Policy, European Union Politics, and 6 moreU.S. Foreign Policy, Transatlantic studies, EU Foreign Policy, NATO-Russian Relations, NATO's New Strategic Concept, and Russian war in Ukraine
What if Hungary was never a democracy? And how could we have foreseen its failure to democratize sooner? The answers are important for EU enlargement strategies. The lesson from Hungary is that the EU should assess the political criteria... more
What if Hungary was never a democracy? And how could we have foreseen its failure to democratize sooner? The answers are important for EU enlargement strategies. The lesson from Hungary is that the EU should assess the political criteria for membership with an eye to future challenges and not just current reforms or institutions.
Rather than trying to assess democratic stability by focusing on the architecture of government institutions and their record of performance, it is necessary to lay out plausible scenarios and assess what might go wrong and how poor performance can be identified early enough to allow timely correction. Ideally, such analysis would also identify who is, or should be, best able to perform the corrective intervention.
Rather than trying to assess democratic stability by focusing on the architecture of government institutions and their record of performance, it is necessary to lay out plausible scenarios and assess what might go wrong and how poor performance can be identified early enough to allow timely correction. Ideally, such analysis would also identify who is, or should be, best able to perform the corrective intervention.
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Scholars tend to study international organisations as selective clubs. Theorising organisations as clubs, however, obscures an important aspect of their evolution that is connected to the goods they produce. Some organisations produce... more
Scholars tend to study international organisations as selective clubs. Theorising organisations as clubs, however, obscures an important aspect of their evolution that is connected to the goods they produce. Some organisations produce goods that are increasingly attractive and accessible to non-members. Those organisations face pressures to enlarge beyond the optimal size suggested by club theory, changing the experience of membership fundamentally. Over time, lower exclusivity, increased rivalry, and tighter governance structures shift the organisation from producing club-goods to managing common resource pools. The case of the European Union illustrates this transformation. By theorising the EU as a collection of common resources pools rather than a club, this study underscores how the EU accompanied the pressure for greater inclusiveness and competition for resources with reforms to strengthen member states’ self-discipline and multilateral surveillance. Such institutional reforms were and remain necessary for any international organisation to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
Research Interests: International organizations, European Union, Enlargement and Integration in the EU, European Union Politics, Central and Eastern Europe, and 7 moreEU Enlargement, Tragedy of the Commons, G20 - G8 - G7, Common-pool Resource, International Relations and European Studies, Common Pool Resources, and Economic (Club Theory)
Social media played a prominent role in the spread of vaccine-related fake news during the global COVID-19 crisis. Previous work has shown that both trait-related and situational factors influence the spread of fake news on social media.... more
Social media played a prominent role in the spread of vaccine-related fake news during the global COVID-19 crisis. Previous work has shown that both trait-related and situational factors influence the spread of fake news on social media. However, we have limited insight into how the specific contextual conditions that shape information processing on social media contribute to the proliferation of misinformation. In this article, we posit that people are more susceptible to spreading misinformation because they engage selectively, briefly, and heuristically with political news on social media. To test our argument, we rely on a pre-registered online experiment conducted in two Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, Hungary and Romania. We designed this experiment to reflect the fast and impulsive decision-making that is characteristic of online behavior on social media platforms. The results support the idea that individuals' tendency to disseminate fake news is amplified by conditions of fast-paced and impulsive decision-making. The effect is particularly pronounced among respondents with higher right-wing authoritarian attitudes. This suggests that the fast and intuition-reliant nature of decision-making on social media encourages the spread of such misinformation that is in line with individuals' ideological beliefs, which could increase social polarization in societies.
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Romania managed to resist the far end of elite attempts to alter democratic institutions along the lines of Hungary or Poland. Although the country has struggled to improve its democratic track record in the last years, it is still a... more
Romania managed to resist the far end of elite attempts to alter
democratic institutions along the lines of Hungary or Poland. Although the
country has struggled to improve its democratic track record in the last years, it is still a laggard in securing an independent judiciary, fighting corruption, and upholding human rights compared to other EU member states. This is reflected in how elites manage governance in times of crisis. Disruptive events created the window of opportunity for incumbents to deploy discretionary leadership, including in the formation and termination of cabinets. Such interventions weakened constitutional checks and balances. As a result, Romanian democracy remains a work in progress, while politicians' preferred patterns of coalition governance are a source of stagnation.
democratic institutions along the lines of Hungary or Poland. Although the
country has struggled to improve its democratic track record in the last years, it is still a laggard in securing an independent judiciary, fighting corruption, and upholding human rights compared to other EU member states. This is reflected in how elites manage governance in times of crisis. Disruptive events created the window of opportunity for incumbents to deploy discretionary leadership, including in the formation and termination of cabinets. Such interventions weakened constitutional checks and balances. As a result, Romanian democracy remains a work in progress, while politicians' preferred patterns of coalition governance are a source of stagnation.
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This paper delves into the intricate interplay between formal and informal institutions in contemporary European political landscapes. It investigates the vital role of informal institutions in supplementing and at times circumventing the... more
This paper delves into the intricate interplay between formal and informal institutions in contemporary European political landscapes. It investigates the vital role of informal institutions in supplementing and at times circumventing the formal rules that define the parameters of political functioning. The study identifies four key manifestations of the ascendant influence of informal institutions within recent European dynamics. First, the encroachment of aggressive populism and extremist discourse erodes the authority of formal institutions, challenging their efficacy and integrity. Second, alternative societal and elite behaviours emerge that contest the reinforcing functions previously upheld by informal institutions, thereby prompting a reconsideration of their impact. Third, the increasing scrutiny of informal institutions perpetuating discriminatory practices aligns with the contemporary emphasis on upholding democratic values and civil rights. Fourth, the paper elucidates the role of informal institutions in the (de-)democratization of post-communist states. The study underscores the imperative to not only analyse and aim to enact formal changes but also to delve into the resilient local practices and norms that shape the political landscape.
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The European Union (EU) revived the enlargement process in response to the Russia-Ukraine war. That reaction compares to how the EU utilized this process following the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. In this paper, we argue that on... more
The European Union (EU) revived the enlargement process in response to the Russia-Ukraine war. That reaction compares to how the EU utilized this process following the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. In this paper, we argue that on neither occasion was the inclusion of more states within EU borders a preferred EU working agenda. Instead, the EU used enlargement as a stabilization and security-building mechanism without guarantee-ing membership as the end state. This observation has implications for the future of the enlargement process. We argue that the out-come of the previous rounds of enlargement was reactive and context-driven. Absent those same contextual factors, and although the EU reacts to the Russia-Ukraine war in a familiar sequence of incomplete decision-making, the outcome of this war-time enlargement negotiation process points in a different direction.
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Most EU leaders have proven a firm commitment to democracy promotion against the rise of imperialist authoritarianism in Russia (Snyder 2022) and recommitted to giving a more credible perspective of EU membership to the countries of the... more
Most EU leaders have proven a firm commitment to democracy promotion against the rise of imperialist authoritarianism in Russia (Snyder 2022) and recommitted to giving a more credible perspective of EU membership to the countries of the Western Balkans (European Council 2022). However, the European Union as a whole is still considering how best
to adapt its institutions to the long term economic and security threat created by the war. This indecision raises questions about the EU’s resilience (Anghel & Jones 2022) and its capacity-building (Genschel 2022). Second, we suggest that this absence of substantive adaptation follows a familiar failing-forward logic that is risky and may eventually prove unsustainable (Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier 2016). Finally, we suggest that a policy of realistic phasing-in for the countries of the Western Balkans would bridge the EU’s current double-minded approach. In so doing, the EU would continue its process of adaptation and resilience building and increase its chances to meet its security goals.
to adapt its institutions to the long term economic and security threat created by the war. This indecision raises questions about the EU’s resilience (Anghel & Jones 2022) and its capacity-building (Genschel 2022). Second, we suggest that this absence of substantive adaptation follows a familiar failing-forward logic that is risky and may eventually prove unsustainable (Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier 2016). Finally, we suggest that a policy of realistic phasing-in for the countries of the Western Balkans would bridge the EU’s current double-minded approach. In so doing, the EU would continue its process of adaptation and resilience building and increase its chances to meet its security goals.
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The European Union’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic revealed changes and continuity in the structure and the functioning of the European project. In lieu of a conclusion to the Special Issue, this article discusses what those lessons... more
The European Union’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic revealed changes and continuity in the structure and the functioning of the European project. In lieu of a conclusion to the Special Issue, this article discusses what those lessons tell us about how Europe responds to the following crisis. We compare European responses to the pandemic to those that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We observe more differences than similarities. The same actors do not always play the central role, solidarity among Europeans is sometimes more challenging to engineer, and the requirements to make the overall project more resilient can point in different directions. Such findings show that any argument that Europe is forged through crisis is unlikely to tell us much about what Europe is or where it may be headed. In that sense, the EU is a sui generis multi-level, multi-faceted actor that can change shape in response to events.
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This paper explores how democracies handle the trade-off between public safety and fundamental democratic principles. We show that an exogenous shock, like the pandemic, creates incentives for governing elites to deploy self-empowering... more
This paper explores how democracies handle the trade-off between public safety and fundamental democratic principles. We show that an exogenous shock, like the pandemic, creates incentives for governing elites to deploy self-empowering mechanisms to avoid institutional checks and balanceswith lasting consequences for democratic performance. We examine this prospect in Italy and Romania. These cases have a long history of institutional gridlock; such history reinforces incentives to work around traditional institutions in responding to the pandemic. While the two cases vary in terms of the quality and resilience of their democratic institutions, we find that elites displayed a similar propensity to overlook the intricate institutional balances during a moment of crisis. In Italy, the executive strengthened its power relative to the legislature; in Romania, the strengthening is relative to the judiciary. This finding has implications in assessing the risk for falling standards of liberal democracy across the European Union.
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The COVID-19 pandemic led to widespread fear among the population. Early studies suggested that this resulted in exclusionary attitudes and increased support for discriminatory policy measures. We still lack an understanding of the... more
The COVID-19 pandemic led to widespread fear among the population. Early studies suggested that this resulted in exclusionary attitudes and increased support for discriminatory policy measures. We still lack an understanding of the longer-term, potentially erosive consequences that COVID-19-specific anxieties may carry for citizens' commitment to liberal democratic norms. In this research note, we present evidence from an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals' cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID-19. We implemented this experiment in Hungary and Romania – two cases where illiberal attitudes are most likely to amplify under conditions of fear – a year and a half after the outbreak of the pandemic. The results show that our intervention is successful in elevating respondents' levels of worry, anxiety and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID-19. However, these emotions do not carry secondary effects on individuals' levels of right-wing authoritarianism, nationalism or outgroup hostility, nor do they affect preferences for specific discriminatory policy measures aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID-19. We discuss these findings in light of the literature on the demand-side determinants of democratic backsliding and the consequences of emotions on political behaviour.
The ‘failing forward’ synthesis of liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism puts European member states governments in charge of the process of integration (Jones et al., [2016]. Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the... more
The ‘failing forward’ synthesis of liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism puts European member states governments in charge of the process of integration (Jones et al., [2016]. Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration. Comparative Political Studies, 48(7), 1010–1034. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015617966). However, this placement does not show clearly whether the principals are reactive or proactive. That distinction between proactive and reactive is important in understanding what it means to say that integration is a movement ‘forward’ and what we mean by ‘success’. Moving forward could mean building out the great ideals of Europe’s political leaders, but it could also mean reacting to events in a way that solves problems, even if only imperfectly. The process of Eastern enlargement shows this distinction at work. We argue that enlargement is ‘successful’ as a reactive process and not as a proactive one. In proactive terms, the Eastern enlargement process has a consistent record of failure inasmuch as agents did not get what they wanted when they wanted it. In reactive terms, enlargement contributed to the creation of a wider and a deeper European Union.
Research Interests: European integration, Enlargement and Integration in the EU, Postcommunist studies, Eastern Europe, Romania, Postcommunism, Central and Eastern Europe, and 6 moreEU Enlargement, Intergovernmentalism, EU accession of Western Balkans, Neofunctionalism, EU Accession Negotiations, and European Union Negotiation Process
The biggest issue confronting Europe today is moving forwards with the EU project. Studies focusing on the EU as well as public discourse concentrate disproportionately on the flaws of this supranational construct, giving the impression... more
The biggest issue confronting Europe today is moving forwards with the EU project. Studies focusing on the EU as well as public discourse concentrate disproportionately on the flaws of this supranational construct, giving the impression of constant crisis. This incentivizes the counterfactual reasoning that post-World War II social and economic progress would have been possible in the absence of the EU. What is worrying about our present situation is not the increased fragmentation of views on what Europe could become but the growing acceptance (and increasing familiarity) of things as they have always been.
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Democratically immature EU member states continue to act like mere guests in the European club, taking minimum responsibility for upholding EU rules and exercising little power in Union affairs.
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The opportunistic use of early elections & elite driven democratic weakness
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In assessing the state of liberal democracy in contemporary Europe, significant scholarly and public attention has been paid to the role of leaders. Post-Communist countries in particular are often the focus of scholars who announce a... more
In assessing the state of liberal democracy in contemporary Europe, significant scholarly and public attention has been paid to the role of leaders. Post-Communist countries in particular are often the focus of scholars who announce a "democratic backsliding" engineered by populist "strongmen". This article suggests that in consolidating EU democracies, such attention is disproportionate in reference to the actual de-democratising effect of the emerging "strongmen". It draws attention to the systemic conditions that allow such leaders to surface, and focuses on state capture (the extraction of private benefits from the state by incumbent officeholders) as a joint-venture practice that precedes and outlives individual political lives and acts as a brake on further democratisation.
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Previous studies show that in multiparty systems the formation of minority governments can be a rational choice. To ensure survival and policy implementation, minority governments make concessions to non-cabinet parties. In this study, we... more
Previous studies show that in multiparty systems the formation of minority governments can be a rational choice. To ensure survival and policy implementation, minority governments make concessions to non-cabinet parties. In this study, we empirically analyse the pay-offs given to support parties under minority governments. We argue that the content of support agreements is conditioned by support party type. Results are based on a two-stage empirical investigation: a text analysis of 10 explicit support arrangements for minority governments in Romania and a within-case comparison of two Romanian minority cabinets with different support arrangements. We employ an original data set of support agreements and elite interviews with former minority cabinet members. We empirically confirm that ethno-regional parties are mostly policy-seeking and target benefits for their specific groups. In contrast, mainstream parties make stronger claims for office distribution. The analysis challenges the widespread understanding that all support parties are mostly policy-seeking.
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The institutionalisation of political parties is generally acknowledged as important for democratic development. In the pursuit of finding the most relevant measurements for progress in this area, this study utilised as an indicator for a... more
The institutionalisation of political parties is generally acknowledged as important for democratic development. In the pursuit of finding the most relevant measurements for progress in this area, this study utilised as an indicator for a party’s external institutionalisation the party’s role in institutionalisation of coalitions through the signing and implementation of coalition agreements. An investigation into the link between coalition institutionalisation and internal party institutionalisation draws us to a conclusion that lack of internal institutionalisation (in the form of lingering leadership personalisation) negatively impacts the party’s being taken seriously by other parties in shaping and implementing coalition agreements, which is an indicator of lack of external institutionalisation.
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Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the outcomes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the upper hand over coalition... more
Coalition governments are a regularly studied feature of parliamentary democracies. Debates still linger in the field as to what extent the outcomes of these studies are also applicable in determining who has the upper hand over coalition formation in semi-presidential regimes. This article explores the dynamics of government formation under semi-presidential regimes using evidence from Romania (1990–2016) and discusses the formal and informal potential of the president to shape coalitions. It covers a lacuna in qualitative studies by using evidence gathered from in-depth interviews with prime ministers, cabinet members, and key party decision makers and shows that under certain circumstances presidents can play an influential role in government formation, but these are rather the exception than the rule. Using a case that presents the incentives for an increase in the presidentialization of politics, I show that the mechanisms of a multiparty regime mostly limit the president’s exclusive bargaining advantage to nominating the prime minister and then, much as in a parliamentary democracy, render him or her dependent on the coalition potential of his or her own party.
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Romania is a semi-presidential republic with a multi-party parliamentary system. During the 28 years of democratic state-building, this institutional design has forced political parties to build electoral alliances and form coalition... more
Romania is a semi-presidential republic with a multi-party parliamentary system. During the 28 years of democratic state-building, this institutional design has forced political parties to build electoral alliances and form coalition governments. The article illuminates the reasons for an alliance of the Romanian parties in their quest for winning votes in the post-communist setting. It reflects on the most successful alliance-building models in the seven electoral cycles of parliament that have taken place between 1990 and 2016. Two alternating patterns for electoral success in Romania can be identified: (type 1) alliances around one managerially efficient dominating party (mostly the Social Democratic Party / PSD); and (type 2) negative single-issue based alliances (" the anti " political campaigns). This type of alliance-strategies was reinforced by the results of the latest parliamentary elections in December 2016. It illustrated the success of the PSD and the subsequent government formation together with its satellite party, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats / ALDE (type 1 alliance). As for the near future, considering there is little difference on the supply side of party alternatives, we have good reasons to expect a continuation of the political configurations discussed. Type 2 strategies remain the best strategy for opposition parties to have a chance for reaching executive power.
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Previous studies show that in multiparty systems the formation of minority governments can be a rational choice. To ensure survival and policy implementation, minority governments make concessions to non-cabinet parties. In this study, we... more
Previous studies show that in multiparty systems the formation of minority governments can be a rational choice. To ensure survival and policy implementation, minority governments make concessions to non-cabinet parties. In this study, we empirically analyse the pay-offs given to support parties under minority governments. We argue that the content of support agreements is conditioned by support party type. Results are based on a two-stage empirical investigation: a text analysis of 10 explicit support arrangements for minority governments in Romania and a within-case comparison of two Romanian minority cabinets with different support arrangements. We employ an original data set of support agreements and elite interviews with former minority cabinet members. We empirically confirm that ethno-regional parties are mostly policy-seeking and target benefits for their specific groups. In contrast, mainstream parties make stronger claims for office distribution. The analysis challenges th...
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Developments in European Politics considers what Europe is, where it came from, and what European citizens can make of it. It brings together specially commissioned chapters by leading authorities to give an up-to-date and systematic... more
Developments in European Politics considers what Europe is, where it came from, and what European citizens can make of it. It brings together specially commissioned chapters by leading authorities to give an up-to-date and systematic analysis of European political developments – in institutions, processes and policy – at national, regional and international levels. It provides wide-ranging and clear analysis of the factors influencing European politics, from populism and extremism in national politics to the broader forces of globalization, immigration, climate change and international terrorism.
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The European Union (EU) reactivated the enlargement process in response to the Russia-Ukraine war. That reaction compares to how the EU utilized enlargement following the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. On neither occasion was the inclusion of... more
The European Union (EU) reactivated the enlargement process in response to the Russia-Ukraine war. That reaction compares to how the EU utilized enlargement following the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. On neither occasion was the inclusion of more states within EU borders a preferred EU working agenda. Instead, the EU is primarily using the lure of enlargement as a stabilization and security-building mechanism without making membership a guaranteed end state. In this paper, we argue that the end-result of the previous phase of enlargement was contextual and that those contextual factors are not present in the case of current candidate states from the Western Balkans or the Eastern Neighborhood. The domestic situation of candidate states is different in complexity from that which characterized successful applicants in the past. The European Union has also changed. As a result, although the Russia-Ukraine war shows the EU reacting in a familiar sequence of incomplete decision-making, the outcome of this wartime enlargement negotiation process will point in a different direction.