The analysis and modeling of foreign trade in centrally planned economies (CPEs) have attracted substantial interest in the lit erature dealing with the problems of socialist countries. The theoretical framework was developed by Prior... more
The analysis and modeling of foreign trade in centrally planned economies (CPEs) have attracted substantial interest in the lit erature dealing with the problems of socialist countries. The theoretical framework was developed by Prior (1963), Wiles (1968), van Brabant (1973), and Holzman (1974, 1976). These authors analyzed a classical CPE with inconvertible currency and arbitrary fixed domestic prices. The national export sector in their models was isolated from any changes in the terms of trade and in the exchange rate of domestic currency. The volume of export production, as well as the consumption of imported goods, were defined by central planners. Within this framework it has been demonstrated that many familiar basic Western textbook concepts and mechanisms of foreign trade could not be applied to the CPE. For example, changes in the terms of trade do not produce a direct effect on CPE external trade patterns because export and import volumes are the strategic figures for cen...
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In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the... more
In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., moving towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., moving away from the Walrasian amount).
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... References. 1. R. Amir, Sahi, S., M. Shubik and S. Yao, A Strategic Market Game with Complete Markets. J. Econ. Theory 51 (1990), pp. 126143. Article | PDF (748 K) | MathSciNet | View Record in Scopus | Cited By in Scopus (23). ...
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Research Interests: Information Systems, Information Technology, Development Economics, Labor Economics, E Government, and 15 moreICT, Media, Human Resource, Human Resources, Applied Economics, Performance indicators, Control Systems, BASIC, Image, Learning, Adverse Selection, Communication Technology, Communication technologies, Components, and Inspection
Research Interests: Development Economics, Economic Growth, Developing Countries, Applied Economics, Dummy Variables, and 15 moreDebt, Currency, Business Cycle, Depreciation, Current Account Deficit, Absolute Value, Commodity, Devaluation, Advanced Countries, Balance Sheet, Advanced economies, Current Account, Debt Service, Capital inflow, and Dependent Variables
Monitoring technologies and pay for performance contracts are becoming popular solutions to improve public services delivery. Their track record is however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper develops a principal agent... more
Monitoring technologies and pay for performance contracts are becoming popular solutions to improve public services delivery. Their track record is however mixed. To show why this may be the case, this paper develops a principal agent model where agents’ motivations vary and so does the effectiveness of monitoring technologies. In such a set-up the model shows that: (i) monitoring technologies should be introduced only if agents’ motivations are poor; (ii) optimal pay for performance contracts are nonlinear/ non-monotonic in agents’ motivations and monitoring effectiveness; (iii) investments aimed at improving agents' motivations and monitoring quality are substitutes when agents are motivated, complements otherwise; and (iv) if the agents’ “type” is private information, the more and less motivated agents could be separated through a menu of pay for performance/non pay for performance contracts, such that only the less motivated choose the pay for performance ones.
Research Interests: Development Economics, Political Economy, Capital Structure, Monetary Policy, Externalities, and 15 moreCost of Capital, Leverage, Interest Rates, Debt, Macroeconomic Models, Business Cycle, Business Cycles, Financial intermediation, Interest Rate, Liquidity risk, Demand curve, Negative Externalities, Capital Requirements, Externality, and Levy
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In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the... more
In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., moving towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., moving away from the Walrasian amount).