Symphorien Ongolo

The rise of Global China or the rapid expansion of Chinese influence abroad has had a commensurate impact on transnational trade and related commercial pressure in the governance of natural resources in Africa. Rosewood with its direct link to China's cultural renaissance has had a boost in extractivism in tropical regions. Taking inspiration from common property theory and based on empirical research conducted in Ghana in 2022, we analyze the effect of the Ghana-China rosewood trade on the governance of rosewood as a 'common-pool' resource in rural Ghana. Our research broadly responds to the question of how the Ghana-China rosewood trade changes formal and informal governance arrangements in rural Ghana. In a constructive light, the study demonstrates how one community created rules to access rosewood on community lands. The results also show that more challenging influences of rosewood trade on land boundary disputes resulting from violent protests of existing rules and norms, including customary rights, contestation of rural authorities, rural leadership manoeuvrings, and corruption are increasingly prevalent since the boom in the rosewood trade at the local level. This study contributes to the debate on common-pool resources, demonstrating that with the right information and communication network, rural people can self-govern common-pool resources to their advantage despite the alarming influences that external factors pose. From a China-Africa relations perspective, this work contributes to the politics of natural resources in the context of the increasing global influence of China in Africa.

This book provides a comprehensive overview on power dynamics in African forests by linking some of those realities to contemporary challenges related to the politics of global sustainability. As such, the book brings together 11 chapters focusing on many aspects of the power relations that alter, determine or transform the governance of forestland resources at different levels in Africa. In many cases, contributing authors point out the prevalence of a domination-marginalization relationship from the colonial to contemporary period in African postcolonial countries. However, this major trend co-exists with more complex and ambiguous power dynamics in autocratic regimes in which the weak or marginalized actors are sometimes able to resist the domination of the powerful actors.

HIGHLIGHTS • Database attractiveness is independent of data quality. • Global forest products databases have different levels of quality. • Since many data users are not data professionals or statisticians, the quality of a database is not the decisive factor. • A combination of technical, political and developmental factors can explain the increasing discrepancy between the African export and Chinese import forest products trade data. • Global forest statistics providers may be motivated to put more effort into improving database attractiveness and related incentives rather than quality. SUMMARY What drives discrepancies and inconsistencies in global forest statistics? The use of global statistics has influenced academic research and sectoral policies of forest ecosystems since the first global forest assessment was conducted in 1948 or even earlier. Very little work has been done to provide a comprehensive analysis of the governance structure and the quality of predominant international forest databases. Furthermore , very little is known about the attractiveness and/or repulsiveness of global forest statistics platforms to scholars, policy-makers and other users. To reduce knowledge gap, this article examines the governance structure and strategies of three major databases which provide data on global forest products trade including timber export/import flows data, namely FAOSTAT, the United Nations Comtrade, and Chatham House's Resource Trade Earth. This paper uses conceptual and theoretical frameworks of data governance and nudge theories are used to study the production, quality, attractiveness and repulsiveness of global forest statistics and the related platforms through research on a qualitative and quantitative methodological approach. The main findings show that among the above three data platforms, only Comtrade received first-hand data directly from UN producing member states' offices, while the other organisations depend on Comtrade, transform secondhand data. More importantly, the article reveals that the levels of quality and attractiveness of the forest databases in our study are unequal and that database attractiveness is not based on quality. As a result, global forest statistics providers may be motivated to put more effort into improving database attractiveness rather than quality, which is more challenging. Consequently, it is likely that the governance structure and strategies reported in these databases can substantially affect the reliability of numbers used in academic research and policy-decisions since they are generated from the related global forest statistics. Gouvernance des statistiques forestières globales: étude de cas du commerce des produits forestiers entre Afrique Sub-Saharienne et Chine Y. ZHAO, Y.M. KROTT et S. ONGOLO Quelles sont les causes des écarts et incohérences observées dans les données statistiques globales sur les forêts? l'utilisation des données statistiques globales exerce une influence sur les travaux de recherche académique et les politiques publiques sectorielles relatives aux écosys-tèmes forestiers, au moins depuis le premier rapport de l'état globale des forêts publié en 1948. Très peu d'études ont été conduites pour fournir une analyse approfondie sur le système de gouvernance et la qualité des bases de données majeures de production des statistiques globales forestières. De même, il existe assez peu de connaissance sur l'attractivité et/ou répulsivité des plateformes globales des données statistiques forestières pour les chercheurs, décideurs politiques et autres usagers de ces données dans la société. Afin de réduire ce manque de connaissance, cet article examine le système de gouvernance et les stratégies de trois bases de données majeures qui fournissent des données quantitatives sur le commerce global des produits forestiers y compris les flux d'exportation/importation des grumes de bois: il s'agit de FAOSTAT, la base de données Comtrade des Nations Unies et Resource Trade Earth de l'organisation Chatham House. Le cadre conceptuel et théorique de cet article mobilise la théorie de la gouvernance des données et la théorie du 'coup de pouce' afin de questionner les processus de production, la qualité, l'attractivité et/ou la répulsivité des données statistiques globales sur les produits forestiers et des plateformes qui y sont associées. L'approche

This article's originality and major contribution lies in its empirical roots. Based on the case study of the European Voluntary Partnership Agreement on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (VPA-FLEGT) in Cameroon, the paper questions what happens when global forest governance reforms meet domestic politics in Africa. Coupled with a carefully selected literature, this entrenchment helped to clearly identify the formal and informal strategies deployed by key actors to put or resist the European sustainable forest management policy reforms on the agenda in Cameroon from 2003 to 2019. The signing of the VPA-FLEGT in Cameroon triggered several debates on the relevance of a new legal instrument for sustainable forest management against the backdrop of an already prolific (poorly or non-enforced) legislation. This article aims, on the one hand, at analysing the process through which VPA-FLEGT was put on the agenda in Cameroon, identifying the key actors involved and examining their roles, interests and strategies as regards this global forest policy instrument. On the other hand, it seeks to investigate how the institutionalisation of VPA-FLEGT in Cameroon change or not the politics of forestland governance in national arenas. In order to attain the aforementioned objectives, we adopted a sociology of the State-based approach. The research indicates that (i) although VPA-FLEGT is an innovative policy instrument in Cameroon, it essentially relies on recycled already existing forest policies. (ii) Several technical and political roadblocks, largely underestimated or overlooked by European actors hamper the implementation of this instrument. (iii) Lastly, the legitimacy and relevance of VPA-FLEGT in Cameroon is subject to many controversies and tensions among the main actors. Our research shows that Cameroonian state bureaucracy’s commitment to this initiative was mainly motivated by a ‘cunning government’ strategy of rents capture and blame avoidance tactics.

Since the end of 2000s, many forest-rich countries have engaged into results-based deforestation reduction monitoring under REDD+ mechanisms. A set of methods and tools designed at international level is expected to be transferred to the domestic level in many developing countries, in order to generate information on how these countries contribute to global emissions reduction through local forest landscapes. Using the monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) device as an example, this paper sets out to analyze this knowledge transfer by identifying bottlenecks. It proposes an original analysis that will help to better understand how such knowledge transfers could be improved at the domestic level. Based on empirical case studies related to REDD+ projects in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, it assesses knowledge transfer and the role of sta-keholders involved at multiple levels (global, regional, national and local). For this purpose, we used the Research Integration and Utilization (RIU) model, which is an analytical framework allowing analyses showing how scientific results can be owned, integrated and disseminated to meet specific needs. Results show that there is a weakness in MRV knowledge transfer from global to local levels and back. The MRV knowledge has a strong research background, a weak MRV knowledge integration and a mitigated direct utilization. The RIU model allows us to identify significant weaknesses in the transfer of MRV knowledge, including institutional dys-function, weak institutional coordination, a lack of integration and reduced utilization of the scientific knowledge produced, despite the creation of coordinating institutions. These weaknesses are due partly to the absence of a common platform between exogenous and endogenous knowledge. To overcome these obstacles, synergies between scientists and indigenous actors should be explored and developed.

The consequence of state controlled forestry in Cameroon has been the overexploitation of forest resources often in conflict with local forest dependent communities and state conservation objectives. The failure of state controlled forestry to achieve sustainable forest management has led to the emergence of new network like arrangements amongst which is independent forest monitoring (IFM) by civil society. The aim of this paper is to scrutinize the factors which affect the effectiveness of IFM governance network in Cameroon. Our research focused on a case study of Cameroon, employing a governance network perspective. The main findings are that national civil society in Cameroon is playing a significant role in improving transparency in the forest sector and holding decision makers to account. The paper finds a shift from technical areas of forest monitoring to the monitoring of social obligations and the respect of community rights by private companies. An analysis of actors highlights a strong network of national NGOs with self-defined goals and strategies engaged in very fluid relationships with law enforcement agencies beyond traditional ministries of forests and wildlife characterised by a spectrum ranging from complementarity, substitution and rivalry. The lack of sustainable funding and weak capabilities of national NGOs to navigate these fluid relationships emerges as core constraints for network effectiveness. Accordingly, recommendations for effectiveness entail strategies for sustainable funding, capacity strengthening and network coordination to address current weaknesses but also to build trust and credibility of the governance network.

With about 107 million hectares of moist forest, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a perfect paradox of a natural resources endowed country caught in repeated economic and socio-political crises. Democratic Republic of Congo possesses about 60% of the Congo basin's forest on which the majority of its people rely for their survival. Even if the national forest land in the countryside is mainly exploited by local populations based on customary rights, they usually do not have land titles due to the fact that the state claims an exclusive ownership of all forest lands in the Congo basin including in DRC. The tragedy of "bad governance" of natural resources is often highlighted in the literature as one of the major drivers of poverty and conflicts in DRC. In the forest domain, several studies have demonstrated that state bureaucracies cannot convincingly improve the governance of forestland because of cronyism, institutional weaknesses, corruption and other vested interests that govern forest and land tenure systems in the country. There are however very few rigorous studies on the role of traditional leaders or chiefdoms in the governance of forests and land issues in the Congo basin. This research aimed at addressing this lack of knowledge by providing empirical evidence through the case study of Yawalo village, located around the Yangambi Biosphere Reserve in the Democratic Republic of Congo. From a methodological perspective, it used a mixed approach combining both qualitative (field observations, participatory mapping, interviews, focal group discussions, and desk research,) and quantitative (remote sensing and statistics) methods. The main findings of our research reveal that: (i) vested interests of traditional rulers in the DRC countryside are not always compatible with a sustainable management of forestland; and (ii) influential users of forestland resources at the local level take advantage of traditional leaders' weaknesses-lack of autonomy and coercive means, erratic recognition of customary rights, and poor legitimacy-to impose illegal hunting and uncontrolled forest exploitation.

This study aims to understand, through the example of Cameroon, why industrial logging companies adopt or avoid sustainable certification or labelling systems of their forest operations in the Congo Basin region. From a methodological standpoint, the research is based on a sample of three empirical case studies of logging companies operating in Cameroon: an 'anti-certification' company (the model, due to the majority trend of non-certified logging companies in this region), a company in the process of certification (the intermediate case), and a certified company (the marginal case, due to the scarcity of certified companies in the study area). While focusing on these three cases, we chose to avoid reifying the dominant case of anti-certification companies. Hence the choice of highlighting this majority trend by carrying out a comparative study with an intermediate and a marginal case. The analysis of these three case studies reveals that the high cost of long term certification, the risks of patronage and cronyism in Patron-Client (customer-provider/boss) relationships that feature sustainable labelling processes are the main reasons for the low level of commitment of logging companies to forest certification in Cameroon. At the end of the research, we recommend that other complementary and more specific research should focus on the flaws in patron-client relationships that characterize forest certification processes on the one hand, and on the necessary conditions to avoid patronage and cronyisms risks or excesses in these relations on the other hand, especially in a poor governance context like Cameroon. Similarly, we encourage that new research be carried out to better understand whether and how transaction and opportunity costs influence the decisions of industrial logging companies in favour of or against forest certification. Pourquoi les entreprises forestières adoptent ou rejettent la certification forestière dans le bassin du Congo? Cas du Cameroun. I. NDOUMBE BEROCK et S. ONGOLO Cet article vise à comprendre pourquoi les entreprises du secteur de l'exploitation industrielle du bois adoptent ou se détournent des processus de certification ou de labellisation durable de leurs activités dans le bassin du Congo. Sur le plan méthodologique, cette recherche s'appuie sur un échantillon de trois cas d'étude empiriques des entreprises forestières en activité au Cameroun: une entreprise hostile à la certification (modèle, du fait de la tendance majoritaire des entreprises non certifiées), une entreprise en cours de certification (cas intermédiaire), et une troisième entreprise certifiée (cas marginal, du fait de la rareté d'entreprises certifiées dans la zone d'étude). En articulant les trois cas, l'option privilégiée est d'éviter de réifier le cas dominant des entreprises hostiles à la certification. D'où le choix d'une mise en perspective de cette tendance majoritaire par une étude comparée d'un cas intermédiaire, et d'un cas marginal. Il ressort de l'analyse de ces trois cas d'étude que la question du coût élevé de la certification sur le long terme, les risques de clientélisme dans les relations client-prestataire/patron qui caracté-risent les processus de labélisation durable représentent les principales raisons du faible taux d'engagement des entreprises forestières dans la certification au Cameroun. Nous proposons en conclusion de cette étude, que d'autres recherches complémentaires et plus spécifiques se penchent sur les failles des relations client-patron qui caractérisent les processus de certification forestières d'une part, et les conditions néces-saires pour éviter des dérives de type clientélistes dans ces relations d'autre part. De même, nous encourageons le développement de nouvelles recherches permettant de mieux comprendre si et comment la question des coûts de transaction et du coût d'opportunité influence les décisions des industriels du secteur forestier en faveur ou contre la certification forestière. ¿Por qué las empresas madereras adoptan o rechazan la certificación forestal en la cuenca del Congo? Perspectivas del Camerún I. NDOUMBE BEROCK y S. ONGOLO El objeto de este estudio es comprender, a través del ejemplo de Camerún, por qué las empresas madereras industriales adoptan o evitan sistemas de certificación o etiquetado sostenibles de sus operaciones forestales en la región forestal de la Cuenca del Congo. Desde un punto

Du fait de leur multifonctionnalité, les forêts tropicales constituent
un objet d’étude privilégié pour analyser les politiques environnementales à l’échelle locale et globale. Qu’elles soient
considérées comme richesses nationales, bien public mondial ou
ressources communautaires, elles sont au cœur des débats environnementaux portés sur la scène internationale depuis les
années 1990. En suscitant des intérêts divers chez des acteurs agissant
à des échelles variées, elles permettent de comprendre la construction et l’articulation des politiques de biodiversité entre local et global, marquées par des tensions entre exploitation et conservation.

Depuis les années 1980, les pays en développement ont régulièrement été sous pression d’un agenda de réformes de leurs politiques publiques, pensées, voire imposées, par les acteurs extérieurs à l’exemple des institutions financières internationales. Dans le secteur environnemental, les pays tropicaux sont notamment exhortés à internaliser une doctrine de « bonne » gouvernance visant à promouvoir la conservation des forêts ; la gestion durable, la décentralisation ou la protection des services  co-systémiques forestiers comme la séquestration du carbone.
En Afrique, cette vague réformiste se heurte d’une part au caractère néo-patrimonial de l’Etat et d’autre part à la montée d’un discours d’ « émergence » où l’exploitation accélérée des ressources naturelles est au centre des ambitions de prospérité économique des gouvernants.
L’étude de la mise en oeuvre de ces politiques à l’échelle d’un pays offre donc un terrain privilégié d’observation pour comprendre les stratégies de réactions, d’influence et de
négociation que déploient les bureaucraties récipiendaires face aux pressions externes de réformes. A travers une étude de cas du Cameroun, cet article vise à comprendre comment un Etat, à ‘‘souveraineté limitée’’, peut se soustraire des contraintes externes de réformes forestières et tenter d’imposer son agenda dans ses politiques publiques.

SUMMARY
The stakes are high for tropical forestlands in multi-actor power relations because of their interdependence (climate change mitigation), their above- and below-ground resources (wood, mines) and their arable lands. In tropical countries, where the State owns most of the forestlands, many governments feel that any external initiative to change their forestland use policies infringes on their sovereignty. The governments’ reactions to pressure for forestland governance reforms advocated by the international community may reflect the level of their national strength,
international credibility and the attractiveness of offsets for forestland use conversion. Governments either use a tactic based on strength or on cunning, in the Machiavellian sense of the term, to impose their domestic agenda. Referring to the two last decades of forestland use policy reforms in Cameroon, this article seeks to understand why and how some governments of developing countries like Cameroon use cunning strategies to circumvent the implementation of undesired forest policy reforms while avoiding blame from the international community.

Keywords: politics, forest governance, aid conditionality, blame avoidance, Cameroon

Governance of tropical forests at both the international and the national level is more and more fragmented because of the large constellation of actors, ideas and interests influencing forestland policies for their conservation or change. In public policy area, fragmentation is to some extent the result of competing interests and objectives that lead to a power play in policy-making between actor groups (both public and private), i.e., state bureaucracies, Intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations and private companies. In this power relationship for the control of tropical forestlands, the hegemony of state bureaucracies in forest governance processes is increasingly contested because of the growing influence of external actor groups in forest governance. Our findings show that the fragmentation of forest governance, which might be considered specific to pluralistic systems, became banal even in tropical countries with a state-centred system like Cameroon where the state claims hegemonic ownership of forestlands. This fragmentation is particularly reinforced in limited statehood where state bureaucracies are attracted to/dependent on external resources for dealing with weak institutional capacity and to face the government's lack of ability to supply public goods and services. But despite the governance fragmentation constraints, this article reveals that some governments and sectoral bureaucracies in limited statehood are capable of using cunning behaviours to secure their own interests in domestic forestland policies and avoid pressure from external actors. In the case of Cameroon for example, the strategy being used relies on a wait-and-see game, uncertainty and recourse to sudden, ambiguous decisions; this is what we call “gecko politics”. Broadly, this article seeks to understand how a government or state bureaucracy in limited statehood with a state-centred system can try to impose its own interests in the context of forest governance fragmentation?

This book addresses historical perspectives and contemporary challenges of the politics of forestland governance and the related sustainability crisis in Africa. It focuses on the power dynamics between key actors involved in the governance of forest-related resources either for their exploitation or with regard to biodiversity conservation policies promoted at international arenas. The book provides conceptual and empirical contributions on what happens when global sustainability ambitions and the related policy instruments meet the realities of political-economic contexts in Africa. It reveals that several actors in forest-rich countries, especially those with contested or more restricted sovereignty, have often employed complex informal strategies as the ‘weapon of the weak’ to resist the domination of the most powerful actors of global environmental politics.