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2017, IFRI editorials
A saying claims that trade has no religion; it even adapts to a war situation, as demonstrated by the real-time reorganisation of trade channels at the Turkish-Syrian border.
State of Syrian Cities 2016-2017
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF URBAN ISSUES FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN SYRIA2017 •
A study has been conducted to identify key methods of analysis, necessary data collection, monitoring and frameworks to address the economic assessment of urban issues for reconstruction in post-conflict Syria. The study firstly concerned the urban realities that prevailed prior to the conflict and their significant transformations during it. Syrian cities were largely affected in recent decades by the acceleration of rural-urban migration. The weakness of regional and urban planning led to the development of large informal areas around the main cities and to the rapid growth of medium and large cities. The conflict served to accelerate this extensive rural-urban migration even further, severely damaging assets and mentalities in the process. The research identified some of the principal economic strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and constraints of Syrian cities in their present situation, as well as key issues for ensuring their resilience during and after the conflict. It also identified five key economic research themes for the future: • Analysis of the war economy at the country level; • Comparative analysis of the economic and social situation of cities during the conflict, in order to define best practices and opportunities; • Detailed analysis of the socio-political-economic environment of cities and planning for recovery and reconstruction; • Syrian cities in post-conflict regional planning; • Public management of recovery and reconstruction. The research also focused on ways to assess and identify the structure of the war economy in Syria, using a collection of price data for different types of products and for labour at a certain point in the conflict (August 2016). An original method of analysing the war economy was developed based on price differentials. The resulting analysis of the flow of goods and the trade interaction between cities was shown to match observations made on the ground. Thus Turkish products flow from the “opposition”-controlled area in the North to all other regions, and Turkey has seen its exports to Syria increasing to their pre-conflict levels. Oil produced in IS-controlled (Islamic State) and SDF-controlled (Syrian Democratic Forces) zones crosses barriers to be refined into fuel oil, mostly in “opposition”-controlled zones. Additionally, a comparison of the cost of labour indicates how aid and other financial flows differ significantly between cities, even within the same control zone. Other research also points to the rapid development of narcotics production in Syria during the conflict, to such an extent as to conceivably make the conflict self-sustainable. The research conducted to date can help in identifying key practical issues for the stabilization of Syria and the resilience of its cities.
2019 •
This article is the second in a series on the alleged links between climate change, drought and the onset of Syria's civil war. In a previous article it was argued that there is little merit to the Syria-climate conflict thesis, including no clear evidence that drought-related migration contributed to civil war onset. Building on this earlier work, the present article investigates an issue which was not fully analysed in the previous one: the nature and causes of the pre-civil war agrarian crisis in Syria's northeast Jazira region, and especially in the governorate of Hasakah. This crisis is usually represented as rooted essentially in a severe multi-year drought which, it is claimed, led to multiple crop failures and in turn large-scale migration. Here it is argued, by contrast, that the central causes of Hasakah's agrarian crisis were long-term and structural, involving three main factors: extreme water resource degradation; deepening rural poverty; and underpinning these, specific features of Syria's and Hasakah's politics and political economy. The article contends, most notably, that the exceptional severity of Hasakah's crisis was a function of the nationwide collapse of Syria's agrarian and rentier model of state-building and development, combined with Hasakah's distinctive political geography as an ethnically contested borderland and frontier zone. I thus conclude that rather than supporting narratives of environmental scarcity-induced conflict, the Syrian case actually confirms the opposite: namely, political ecologists' insistence on the centrality of the political , and of conflict, in causing environmental scarcities and insecurities.
Local Economies in Syria Divisions and Dependencies
Local Economies in Syria Divisions and Dependencies Edited by Salam SaidThe debate surrounding the war in Syria has overwhelmingly focused on military developments on the ground, negotiations on a political solution, and, more recently, on post-war reconstruction. Yet, one of the main and still largely neglected issues is the impact of the war on Syrian local economies, which have undergone fundamental changes since the outbreak of the conflict in 2011. The war and the current fragmentation of Syria has had profound and lasting implications for local communities and their socio-political relations, as well as for political economy and market. With the division of the country into a number of territories controlled by different political and military forces, local economies throughout Syria have developed in various and distinct ways with differences in their approach to trade relations, both among themselves and with neighboring countries. Alongside these developments, new patterns of economic activity have emerged and a new model of political economy has been shaped at the local level.
The Levant; Search for a Regional Order
The Levant; Search for a Regional Order2018 •
Mustafa Aydin, Katerina Dalacoura, Emelie Chace-Donahue, Nader Habibi, Cihan Dizdaroğlu, Evrim Gormus, Irina Zvyagelskaya
The rapid developments of recent years have drastically altered the political and economic landscapes of most countries in the Levant. Faced with a myriad of challenges, the (re)construction of a regional order in the region remains a highly complex and difficult proposition, one with, according to many observers, slim chances for success. This book explores various issues that would limit or encourage the efforts for reconstructing a regional order for the Levant.
Washington institute
SECTARIANISM IN SYRIA'S CIVIL WAR2018 •
Syria's sectarian fragmentation was not created when the war began in 2011; it had its genesis in an inherited Ottoman millet system whose traits were accentuated by the "divide to reign" policies of Hafiz al-Assad. The war has compelled Syrians to cling to their sectarian identities more tightly, whether out of socioeconomic self-interest or simply to survive. Examining these identities is therefore crucial to answering the most fundamental questions about the ongoing upheaval. In many ways, the Syrian conflict has been taken out of the hands of Syrians themselves, becoming a proxy war between regional and international forces that often exploit the country's divided society for their own benefit.
Economic Recovery in Syria: Mapping Actors and Assessing Current Policies
Early Recovery in Syria: An Assessment of the Regime’s Role and Capability2019 •
The structure of the laws pertaining to economic policies adopted gradually by the Syrian regime in the decades preceding the conflict that erupted in 2011 affected its approach in dealing with developments in the country in the years that followed the conflict. A detailed study of this structure reveals three main characteristics of its associated policies. First: The politicization of laws, which have been designed to favor the regime’s patronage networks, composed of a coalition of businessmen, senior bureaucrats, military figures as well as warlords who have been gradually added over the years of the conflict. Second: The selective application of policies to serve the interests of certain groups or geographic areas at the expense of other groups or areas, either as deliberate punishment strategy by the regime or because of a lack of financial resources required for enforcement. Third: A growing push towards centralization which has manifested politically as support for the regime’s institutions, and economically as support for loyalist economic networks in a manner that both ensures the regime’s survival and reinforces loyalty of those networks. The regime’s practices and policies for managing the early recovery phase so far in areas it controls—which are likely to grow to cover most of the Syrian regions in the next few years—reveal that there have been few changes in how the regime approaches these efforts. Notably, the regime has heavily focused its early recovery and infrastructure rehabilitation efforts on areas that were always under its control. By concentrating its investments in these less damaged areas and in more profitable sectors, the regime hopes to secure the cash it requires to gradually move on to work in the areas of greater damage. The regime pursued a policy of isolating the areas that it brought back under military control, first from one another and then from their regional surroundings. The regime tightened its security grip on these areas by utilizing security clearances and arbitrary detentions, as well as intensifying compulsory conscriptions. In general, recaptured areas experienced insecurity and saw sharp declines in their economic conditions and in local service provision after they came under regime control. One of the main reasons for this was the control imposed by pro-regime militias and armed groups over these areas and their economy, which led to a collective reluctance to return to the areas among internally displaced persons and refugees, consequently undermining the chance of recovery. The Syrian regime’s policies are not likely to lead to early recovery throughout the country in the long run for several reasons, the most important of which is the nature of the investments focused in the real estate and financial services industries. A large portion of the revenue generated by these industries is controlled by the private sector and the economic networks allied with the bureaucratic elite. Additionally, Iran and Russia have gradually taken control of the Syrian economy which will impact the policies related to the allocation of investment, and the support to the governorates according to the interests of these countries and their local economic networks. Furthermore, the regime’s policy of attracting capital and investments without seeking to restore the depleted labor force, and even targeting the remaining labor force through compulsory conscription, will undermine the recovery capabilities of economic sectors that depend largely on a strong labor force such as industry, agriculture, and infrastructure. It will also ensure that large swathes of the country, namely the formerly opposition-held areas remain marginalized and poor in terms of their human and financial capital.
This report intends to establish a first approach for an urban recovery framework for post-conflict housing in Syria. This recovery framework has been established taking into account the country past experience in housing construction, as well the facts on the ground during the conflict, including the massive damages and destructions and the unprecedent flow of displacement and refugees. It tries to imbed the housing reconstruction in its physical, economic, financial, social, legal, administrative, governance and politicaleconomy environment. Special focus is made on the human rights and financial considerations. The final objectives of this framework approach is to create a public debate, mainly amongst Syrians, and to foster research on the major issues involved.
Special Issue, Uluslararasi Iliskiler, Vol 15, No 60, December 2018 - The Levant: Search for a Regional Order
The Levant: Search for a Regional Order, Uluslararasi Iliskiler, Vol 15, No 60, December 2018Transnational Press London (July 5, 2018) ISBN-10: 9781910781845 ISBN-13: 978-1910781845
Post-Cold War Relations between Turkey and Syria2018 •
Movements: Journal for Critical Migration and Border Regime Studies
Border Contestations, Syrian Refugees and Violence in the Southeastern Margins of Turkey2017 •
Institut français d’études anatoliennes
Turkey-Iran Relations after the JDP2019 •
Foreign Policy Analysis
Differential Threat Perceptions: How Transnational Groups Influence Bilateral Security Relations 12016 •
Middle Eastern Studies
Oil and intra-state conflict in Iraq and Syria: sub- state actors and challenges for Turkey's energy security2017 •
Atlantic Council Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East
Rethinking Stabilization in Eastern Syria: Toward a Human Security Framework Atlantic Council RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST2018 •
2019 •
Sufi Therapy Counselling
THE EAGLE IN CAGED CADET: Victim of ISIS THE JULY 15-SELF COUP2019 •