Armored Warfare

In 1987, the US Army was just beginning to unlock the power of what would later become the Army's command philosophy of Mission Command. In 1987, this was know as mission tactics. Mission tactics is a concept that seeks fast, decentralized decision making. It is an important concept to the success of the AirLand Battle and must have immediate emphasis in all our tactical training. We desperately need leaders who can operate decisively with minimum guid-ance. These leaders are our greatest combat multiplier. The concept of Auftragstaktik or “mission tactics”is not new to war- fare.The Prussians in the mid-19th century adopted “mission tactics” as the logical method to control the decentralization of the battlefield...

The Battle of 73 Easting was an armored engagement during the Persian Gulf War to force the Iraqi Army out of Kuwait. The war began when Iraqi President Saddam Hussain invaded the small neighboring country of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. In response, the United States, along with other nations, establish themselves in Saudi Arabia to prepare to force Saddam to withdraw his forces; this would be known as Operation Desert Storm. Leading the Coalition was the head of the U.S. Central Command, General Norman Schwarzkopf. As part of Desert Storm, Schwarzkopf planned Operation Desert Saber, the ground-campaign followed by a month of air bombardment.  This led to the tank battle of 73 Easting. The opposing forces in this engagement was the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, part of the VII Corps against elements of the Iraqi Army’s elite Republican Guard, specifically the Tawakalna Division.

Tanks and armored vehicles are essential to conducting combined arms operations, even in an era where the increasing effectiveness of Long Range Precision Firers (LRPF), combined with multi-domain sensor networks, are making the battlespace extremely lethal. The old designs of most legacy armored vehicles, with their limited SA, restricted connectivity, and the inability to mask from enemy sensor networks, are increasingly making those vehicles irrelevant. Upgrading existing platforms with enhanced SA derived from see-through-armor systems is a promising first step to address this challenge. As AI assisted sensor-shooter neural networks evolve in the next decade, transparent armor will become essential. The ability to have crew members operate inside the protection of the vehicle’s hull, where the armor is strongest, will become essential. The vehicle commander’s ability to see and understand his surroundings and the key objects in his battlespace, will make the difference between being the hunter or becoming the hunted. As these technologies mature, the role of armored vehicles in future wars will be enhanced. In peer- on-peer combat, rather than becoming obsolete in the battlespace of 2030 and beyond, MBTs and IFVs will become essential fighting components and nodes in an increasing powerful kill-web, but only if new, clean-slate designed systems are developed.
The new era of enhanced armored vehicle SA is just beginning. The next step in armored SA will be to see both near and far, connect with every intelligent weapon system within range, visualize a holistic view of the battlespace in real-time, and do all this without increasing the cognitive load on the vehicle commander and crew. Combining the recent advancements in SA, with improved battlefield connectivity and intelligent weapons lays the foundation for a major shift in warfighting. The armored vehicle SA systems described above are the genesis of the cognitive enhanced systems that will lead the way to redefine the future of armored warfare and multi- domain operations.

One of the features to distinguish the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 from all other wars throughout recorded history was its immense scale. No conflict prior to, during, or since has rivaled the level of mobilization of men and materiel between two combatant nations nor, sadly, of its carnage and bloodshed. Despite this, many events that played a pivotal role in the war’s outcome have yet to be fully understood. Seeking to add greater clarity to this is Aleksei Isaev’s Dubno 1941: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War. This work provides much-needed context necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of the battles that took place among the towns and cities situated within the Western environs of the Kiev Military District during the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa.

As the U.S. Army continues to fight in restrictive and limited terrain, the Armor force must transform its thinking away from the open plains of Europe and the rolling sands of the Middle East. Mounted forces must overcome restrictive terrain, whether mountain passes, thick forests, or urban buildings. Using a planned attack through the ​Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) Checkpoint (CP) 8 into CP54 allowed us to work through a successful defile drill.

Prepared for a popular war gaming magazine, this paper is the nub of a longer piece in preparation about the rise and demise of the " heavy tank " concept in the armored organizations of the world's leading military powers. The paper traces the origin of German heavy tank projects and how the Fuehrer and the Wehrmacht high command solicited projects for ever-more heavy monster tanks that were largely confined to paper. Had they entered combat, it is likely that they would have served as stationary heavy gun emplacements.

Rad na osnovu građe iz Vojnog arhiva i Centralne vojne biblioteke (CVNDIB) u Beogradu, jugoslovenske vojne štampe i literature obrađuje razvoj jugoslovenske vojne doktrine o oklopnim jedinicama u periodu od 1918 do 1941. godine. Kao izvori doktrine naglašeni su francusko, britansko i nemačko iskustvo iz Prvog svetskog rata, iskustva iz Španskog građanskog rata, te operacija u Poljskoj i na zapadnom frontu 1939/1940. godine.

This paper discusses the selection of a method of fighting for US forces in future conflict. Currently the US military, and the US Army in particular, is adopting a method of war that embraces long range precision firepower (LRPF) over close, combined arms maneuver. This paper addresses these two methods of war and postulates the ramifications for the future. The author believes that the U. S. Military ~ particularly as addressed in the Army XXI and Army After Next Studies —is adopting the precision firepower approach to the detriment of a balanced, combined arms capability. The author believes that any future force concept for the US Army should not become a high-tech version of the 1940 French methodical battle.

The Battle of Chipyong-ni in February 1951 was considered the Gettysburg of the Korean War and a decisive turning point in the conflict. This chapter in the anthology "The Wrath of Achilles Essays on Command in Battle" tells the story from the American perspective and provides insights into command, decision-making, and leadership.

The modern commander has three counterattack options in restricted terrain: seize the high ground with infantry, bomb the enemy into submission or penetrate the valleys. . . . During the Korean War, we seldom had enough infantry for the first option and this approach was usually won at a high cost in blood...  The second option, bombing the enemy into submission, usually produced indecisive results. The third option, to take the valleys, bypass the heights and maneuver to secure or destroy decisive points succeeded in the Korean War on several occasions with dramatic results.

The US Army was looking for a long-term replacement for the M551A1 vehicles built in the Sixties, by the mid-Eighties. Among the contenders was the FMC Defence Systems Group "CCV", a light tanks with a powerful 105mm M68 main gun, with systems based on the firms extensive years in producing the M2/M3 Bradley series of combat vehicles.

he organization of command in the mechanized section on M80A infantry fighting vehicle is defined by the regulations and
textbooks of mechanized units. The problem that is not covered in the
regulations is the organization of subordination of soldiers of the
mounted crew when performing tasks outside the vehicle. The regulations stipulate in principle that command is executed by single seniority
and subordination, but that the mechanized section commanders organize their crews in the way they think is appropriate, in accordance
with a certain mission and tasks. The decision-making on transfering
commanding competencies and organization of subordinates in the
chain of subordination within the mechanized section is a dilemma
even for experienced commanders of mechanized units because this is
defined by general principles of performing activities, whereby it is not
known where the riflemen, sniper and machine gunners should be
when they are outside the fighting vehicle.
During preparation and execution of activities, the mechanized section commander should adapt the model of subordination in relation to
task, space, time and other factors that occur in combat operations.
Thus, it can happen that the commander or deputy commander divides
the mounted part of the mechanized section into several smaller units
(groups, teams) in order to perform some task.
The research performed by the analysis of content in regulations
and textbooks, observing the way of work during the performance of
activities, anticipating possible situations and discovering examples of
good practice of the mechanized section commanders, the models
presented in this paper have been formed.
After studying literature and questioning professional military personnel, the results of the research are the models of subordination in
the mechanized section when the mounted part of the section is outside the vehicle. The analyzed models are divided into groups of models, where the dismounted part of the section is divided into: 1) basic
model, 2) two groups and 3) three groups.

Magyar Steel is the history of the Hungarian armoured forces in Second World War. The history of the Hungarian 2nd Army's 1st Field-Armoured Division at the River Don in 1942-43 is covered in a particularly detailed form. The book contains many unpublished photos as well.

In the Eighties, beyond the regions of NATO, U.S. interest were being threatened in numerous places in the last decade since the Vietnam War. How the U.S. prepared to meet these threats became the requirements for U.S. military units, generically classed as "projection units". Included in the article are discussion of various non-NATO regions, including the Persian Gulf and Iran,  the Eastern Mediterranean, the Korean peninsula, and various non-Soviet threat areas - including changes made at US Central Commandd (USCENTCOM).

No where in the world are there unconventional forces more numerous than within the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) and under the command of he Reconnaissance Bureau, Pyongyang. It is an "offensive"-oriented military force, focused on unconventional tactics, high-level of individual training, and supported by extremely low-flying AN-2 Colt and light helicopters for insertion functions. One need only look at the circumstances of a small unit attack on South Korea's presidential residence (Blue House) a few years earlier to understand how dramatic their impact might be.

[Note: The Light Infantry Brigades and their command organization has undergone extensive changes since this article was written but the origins of today's forces lies within the mid-Eighties organizations.]

Orwell wrote his famous "1984" fictional account of the future world conditions; this is a speculative account of the idea between Moscow's political objective and Beijing's involving "the unequal treaties" dominates China's thinking. After all, they already has small scale fighting between local units along the Amur River in years past.

Moscow's political-dominated strategy would have to focus on "leadership change" in Beijing - with one more favorable with Moscow. By the early-Eighties, a Soviet pre-emptive military attack against China's nuclear facilities was maybe no longer a realistic option to keep China's strategic capabilities from expanding.

The article postulates a hypothetic war and its various aspects, including air mobility as a key military aspect; the war at-sea; the Soviet Far East Military District,  Transbaikal MD, and Siberial MD forces and the role for each Military District.

One conclusion is the Soviet Union's tank forces (T-72/-62) are far superior to PLAN armor, and, second, the interrelated PLA concepts of fighting a defensive war with the Soviet Union and using the "strategic reserve" of Wuhan Military Region as the hub-of-a-wheel that is the basis for Chinese confrontation of any enemy, in any border area.

The article includes several tables comparing confronting Military District / Military Region's, tables of organization, naval dispositions and forces of the two navies, and a map of Northeast Asia.

This is the third of a series of article devoted to North Korea's military forces.If was should begin on the peninsula, it is likely the North is prepared to accept a higher level of damage risk than most Western leaders would be willing to consider. The Armor Command is an offensive-oriented command and is expected to seize territory immediately after the airborne and infiltration attacks of the Special Purpose Force (SPF) command.

Los próximos días 7 y 8 de junio se celebrará el Congreso Internacional Cien años de fuerzas y medios acorazados en España, que ha sido organizado por el Instituto CEU de Estudios Históricos y el Instituto de Historia y Cultura Militar del Ejército de Tierra. Se llevará a cabo un análisis pormenorizado de las fuerzas acorazadas españolas y de sus actuaciones desde sus inicios, hace justo un siglo, hasta el futuro cercano; además, contará con la intervención de los los mejores especialistas en el tema.

Se realizará en el Instituto de Historia y Cultura Militar del Ejército de Tierra, sito en el Paseo de Moret, n.º 3, Madrid y está abierto a todo el público interesado.

Armored warriors no longer fight from mounted positions inside
tanks on an open battlefield. As our mounted forces continue
to dismount and fight ground battles, it is time to take a hard
look at an armored cavalry unit’s modification table of organization
and equipment (MTOE) and determine if we, like the squire,
are equipping our mounted warriors with the right equipment.

Oрганизација командовања у механизованом одељењу на
борбеном возилу пешадије М80А одређена је правилима и
уџбеницима механизованих јединица. Проблем који није обрађен у
правилима јесте организација субординације војника укрцног дела
посаде када извршава задатке изван возила. У правилима је начелно одређено да се командује начелима једностарешинства и
субординације, али да командири механизованих одељења сами
организују своје послуге на начин на који мисле да је прикладно, у
складу са одређеном мисијом и задацима. Доношење одлуке о
преношењу командних надлежности и организовању потчињених у
ланцу субординације унутар механизованог одељења је недоумица чак и за искусне командире механизованих јединица, јер је то
одређено општим начелима извођења активности, при чему се не
зна где би стрелци, снајпериста и пушкомитраљесци требало да
буду када су искрцани ван борбеног возила.
Током припреме и извођења активности командир механизованог одељења треба да прилагоди модел субординације у односу
на задатак, простор, време и остале чиниоце који се јављају у борбеним активностима. Тако се може догодити да командир или заменик командира подели укрцни део механизованог одељења у
више мањих целина (група, тимова) ради извршења одређеног задатка.
Истраживањем које је изведено анализом садржаја у правилима и уџбеницима, посматрањем начина рада током извођења активности, предвиђањем могућих ситуација и откривањем примера
добре праксе командира механизованих одељења, обликовани су
модели који су представљени у овом раду.
Након проучавања литературе и испитивања професионалних
војних лица, резултат истраживања јесу модели субординације у
механизованом одељењу када је укрцни део одељења искрцан
ван возила. Анализирани модели су подељени на групе модела,
где је искрцни део одељења подељен у: 1) основни модел, 2) две
групе и 3) три групе.

The defense of Taiwan is a two-dimensional problem. First, geography creates certain unusual problems for the Republic of China (ROC) government, and, second, the disparity in size and potential strength of the military forces of the PRC are such that the Taipei government would be unlikely to defend the island over the long-haul - without external assistance.

The article surveys the air, sea, and land environment and forces available to Taiwan, considers some of the alternative naval options available in the early-Eighties to strengthen forces, reviews the internal security issues, and recent missile development in Taiwan.

The article is supported by several tables, including: Significant Army Busy from the U.S.; Non-U.S. Arms Purchases; ROC Army Deployment; ROC Navy Fleet; and, ROC Air Force Deployment.

Armor soldiers fight effectively while dismounted — this is a fact. The old adage of “death before dismount” no longer exists in the armor community. Our soldiers and leaders now train with the latest in dismounted equipment, understand dismounted patrolling tactics, and are well versed in skills formerly associated only with our infantry brethren. Two years after a call for the right equipment, soldiers now deploy with the latest in protective gear, are well trained in advanced optics, and are comfortable with the lethal employment of small arms. These skills must always remain within the armor community. Ensuring our soldiers maintain a lethal edge, both mounted and dismounted, ensures our future success,

Bourque describes the successful execution of AirLand Battle doctrine and the dominant capabilities of the Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley fighting vehicle, and the Apache attack helicopter during Operation Desert Storm. Noting the the 1991 Persian Gulf War saw the first large-scale maneuver of U.S. armor divisions since World War II, Bourque covers armor doctrine, training, and technology.  He then demonstrates its brilliance application in ground combat dominated by the Army maneuver force.

The United States was mobilizing its technological efforts for the future battlefield environment known as "Air-Land Battle 2000", which is providing the guidance for new technologies and weapon systems to be available during any future European war.

The article survey: the concepts for Air-Land Battle; reviews the perceived characteristics of a future land battle in Europe; reviews the VISTA (Very Intelligence Surveillance and Targeting Acquisition program; the  technologies involved in moving from "smart" to "brilliant" munitions; how Third Generation programs are improving some systems (M109 howitzer/AHAMS-ADS munitions carrier , etc.) and artillery shells (beyond Copperhead); reviews the Enhanced Self-Propelled Artillery Weapon System (ESPAWS & AIFS); updates progress with land-mine warfare (ADAM); and, looks at progress with liquid propellants and ramjet technologies as to their potential within Air-Land Battle (ALB).

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been reforming its military doctrine and strategy in order to meet the demand of the modern warfare. Those early steps at doctrinal and organizational changes began in the post-Sino-Vietnam War decade of the Eighties, and were continuing into the Nineties decade, in hopes of achieving a modern, professional military force by the stated Year 2000.

Dans le Rif marocain, pour venir à bout de la résistance des insurgés d'Abdelkrim, la France mobilise des effectifs considérables et engage avec des succès divers des moyens modernes comme les chars (et les avions) dans un conflit d'une intensité inattendue. Cette intervention dynamise à la fois l'innovation et la réflexion au milieu des années 1920.