Artificial Consciousness

Modern Cosmism is the development of ideas of classical Russian cosmism in the context of 21st century technologies and existential philosophy. This is a project of a scientific and philosophical doctrine with its own information ontology and evolutionary understanding of fundamental principles of reality, time, life, and superintelligence. Modern Cosmism is also unique concepts in the theory of knowledge, artificial consciousness, technological singularity, and cosmic ethics.

A leading contemporary theory of consciousness in theoretical neuroscience apparently shares significant common ground with a philosophical system of thought from Antiquity. Although chronologically disparate, the integrated information theory of consciousness and Aristotelian metaphysics seem to be akin with regards to fundamental ontology, epistemic priority, and causal powers. In this article, I explore these areas of common ground. Additionally, I consider an apparent dissimilarity regarding panpsychism and suggest that an Aristotelian understanding of powers provides a natural way for IIT to reasonably regulate its ascription of consciousness.

Este documento intenta determinar si es o no posible la creación de vida artificial, aunque más complejo, también tratará sobre la creación de consciencia artificial y sobre todo, establecerá si existe o no una preocupación por la ética del científico de la computación y mostrará la necesidad de una ética que guíe este proceso incluida en la formación académica.
No es fácil definir la vida o la conciencia, la vida no ha cambiado pero si la forma de vivirla. A parecer estamos envueltos en un proceso de digitalización de nuestra forma de vida, por lo tanto, como toda digitalización nuestra nueva forma de vida puede verse como una aproximación, con algo que quitamos obteniendo a cambio ventajas como la velocidad, el control, la facilidad de transmisión, la compresión, durabilidad etc.
Crearemos un programa que pueda generar una protoconciencia artificial pero con herramientas comunes y que pueda ser ejecutado en un dispositivo móvil disponible masivamente. El objetivo tras este intento es testear que tan lejos estamos de crear conciencia y sobre todo de disponibilizarla al público en general. “Lo haremos y veremos hasta donde nos lleva”.

How has multiplicity superseded impossibility in philosophical challenges to artificial consciousness? I assess a trajectory in recent debates on artificial consciousness, in which metaphysical and explanatory challenges to the possibility of building conscious machines lead to epistemological concerns about the multiplicity underlying 'what it is like' to be a conscious creature or be in a conscious state. First, I analyse earlier challenges which claim that phenomenal consciousness cannot arise, or cannot be built, in machines. These are based on Block's Chinese Nation and Chalmers' Hard Problem. To defuse such challenges, theorists of artificial consciousness can appeal to empirical methods and models of explanation. Second, I explain why this naturalistic approach produces an epistemological puzzle on the role of biological properties in phenomenal consciousness. Neither behavioural tests nor theoretical inferences seem to settle whether our machines are conscious. Third, I evaluate whether the new challenge can be managed through a more fine-grained taxonomy of conscious states. This strategy is supported by the development of similar taxonomies for biological species and animal consciousness. Although it makes sense of some current models of artificial consciousness, it raises questions about their subjective and moral significance.

This paper explores what has been termed artificial consciousness (AC) (a.k.a., synthetic consciousness or artificial sentience). Related to its companion, artificial intelligence (AI), the subject might sound more like science fiction or fantasy than possibility. Though humans have been speculating about nonhuman consciousness for centuries, it was in the 1960s when computer science promised the rise of machines with human-level abilities. While the real-world challenges persist, we went ahead and built autonomous, fictional entities like HAL 9000 and the Terminator. This task has been relatively simple for standard narrative, by merely placing anthropomorphic character over a machine. In reality, constructing the human platform, through silicon or otherwise, is more than a matter of physical engineering or reshuffling human qualities. In fact, a truly artificial agent has very little need to replicate human intelligence or other capabilities. Consequently, the potential emergence of real-world AC could have less to do with our machines than with the success or failure of our minds to comprehend it. Given the typical portrayal of AI in fiction, as talking bipedal robots and doomsday machines, and our centuries of misunderstanding organic life forms, including our own, we might simply be incapable of imagining where the future is headed.

Sind Trauer und Glück der Roboter nur eine Frage der Konstruktion?
Erst seit wenigen Jahrzehnten beschäftigen sich Philosophinnen – nach einer Art consciousness turn  – mit dem Wesen von Bewusstsein. In meiner Arbeit möchte ich den Fokus auf eine ganz bestimmte Frage legen: Ist künstliches Bewusstsein denkbar und dessen Entwicklung – ungeachtet der praktischen Realisierbarkeit – prinzipiell möglich? Und daraus folgend: Wären wir – Möglichkeit und Realisierbarkeit vorausgesetzt – überhaupt in der Lage, es zweifelsfrei zu erkennen?
Es bereitet offensichtlich große Schwierigkeiten, ein Phänomen wie das Bewusstsein in eine physikalisch begründete Weltkonstruktion einzupassen, die – in verschiedenen Spielarten des Materialismus – zumindest die Neurowissenschaften zu dominieren scheint. In diesem Zusammenhang soll die vorliegende Arbeit auch als Kritik am Anspruch des Physikalismus verstanden werden, dass sich letztlich alle Phänomene, auch wenn sie derzeit noch erhebliche Erklärungslücken offenbaren, auf physikalische Grundstrukturen reduzieren lassen.

Purpose of the study: To answer the two existing controversies regarding attention and consciousness as brain processes. 1) Can one be aware of objects or events without attending to it? 2) Can one attend to object or events without being aware of it? And also how top-down attention and awareness have opposing functions.
Methodology: This article is a systematic review on the relation between visual attention and awareness. An extensive an elaborate study on concepts relating to attention and consciousness dissociation have been done. In this article we also narrow it down to experimental design that require independent manipulation of each. Which include top-down attention and awareness aspect of consciousness.
Main Findings: Many research have been put forward supporting the independent nature of attention from awareness using sophisticated experimental and physiological shreds of evidence. On the other hand, some researches still stick to the contemporary common-sense notion of no awareness no attention. Our evaluation suggest an independent nature of attention and awareness.
Application: This article intend to giver a clear perspective of the ongoing debate on relationship between attention and consciousness. Simplification of both umbrella terms will give basis for building more empirical evidence.
Novelty: Further, this article put forward studies on both sides of debate aiming to bridge the gap to get a conclusive outlook in future.
Keywords: awareness, attention, dissociation, top-down attention, cognitive debate.

Das Essay „Selbstbestimmt, Gedanken über unser Selbstverständnis“ versucht eine Vielzahl einzelner Thesen aus Einzelwissenschaften wie Biologie, Psychologie, Soziologie, Kommunikationswissenschaft, Kognitionswissenschaft, Neurowissenschaft, sowie aus der Philosophie zu einer Synthese zusammenzufassen. Zielsetzung dieses Essays ist, dass es einen Beitrag zum Selbstverständnis des Menschen liefern kann. Dabei fühlt es sich den Prinzipien der Aufklärung und dem Humanismus verpflichtet. Es wurde mit der Absicht geschrieben, den Kriterien der Wissenschaftlichkeit zu entsprechen.
Zitieren bitte unter https://doi.org/10.22602/IQ.9783754335543

Das Rätsel des Bewusstseins gilt, nach der physikalischen Zusammensetzung der Materie, als wichtigstes ungelöstes Problem der Wissenschaft. Diese Publikation präsentiert ein umfassendes theoretisches Modell des phänomenalen Bewusstseins, das Lösungen sowohl für das harte als auch das weiche Problem von Qualia bietet. Es wagt sich an eine physikalistische Reduktion, wobei mithilfe eines eigenschaftsdualistischen Zwei-Welten-Monismus Subjektivität und Materie miteinander versöhnt werden. Es zeigt, warum das Arbeitsgedächtnis und Metarepräsentationen die entscheidendsten Faktoren für bewusstes Erleben sind und identifiziert darauf aufbauend Hirnareale als Korrelate phänomenalen Bewusstseins. Theorien für Habituation, Subjektivität, Entscheidungsprozesse, freien Willen und Ich-Bewusstsein ermöglichen die funktionale und psychologische Einordnung des Modells. Überlegungen zu Computersystemen mit Bewusstsein und Empfindungen vervollständigen letztendlich das Bild des Bewusstseins.

There is an increasing interest in the ethical design of robots. As evidence of this fact, one may refer to some recent reports and the European Parliament’s resolution on civil law rules on robotics.The latter will be the primary focus of this analysis since the EU Parliament is the first legal institution in the world to have initiated work of a law on robots and artificial intelligence. The European strategy on robotics seems affected by two main problems: an excessive emphasis on ethics at the expense of security, and more gen-erally, a lack of awareness of the critical role played by the operation of striking a balance between competing interests. Balancing is pivotal to the interpretation and application of the law. And the current development of AI technologies does not enable the delegation of the operation to robots. Certainly, the most controversial point regards the status of robots as electronic persons. Even though the suggestion may seem extreme, it may prove to be successful, for at least three reasons. First, robots are becoming more and more similar to humans (anthropomorfisation and AI). Second, humans are becoming increasingly akin to robots (artificial enhancement). Third, the robot’s legal personality would be profitable for the robotic industry.

In this paper we take a meta-theoretical stance and aim to compare and assess two conceptual frameworks that endeavor to explain phenomenal experience. In particular, we compare Feinberg & Mallatt’s Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) and Tononi’s and colleagues Integrated Information Theory (IIT), given that the former pointed out some similarities between the two theories (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016c-d). To probe their similarity, we first give a general introduction into both frameworks. Next, we expound a ground-plan for carrying out our analysis. We move on to articulate a philosophical profile of NN and IIT, addressing their ontological commitments and epistemological foundations. Finally, we compare the two point-by-point, also discussing how they stand on the issue of artificial consciousness.

We used 4 basis for our work: AI - six thinking levels model described in book "The emotion machine". Evolutionary psychology model of emotions that is called "Wheel of emotions", we used as subjective perception model. Neuroscience(neurotransmission) theory of emotions by Lövheim "Cube of emotions" was used as objective brain emotional response model. Based on neurotransmitters impact we propose to model emotional computing systems. Overall presented work is synthesis of several emotional/affective theories to produce model of emotions and affective mechanisms that fit model of six thinking levels architecture.

GIDEON is an artificial consciousness that has the elements of grid computing, human-computer interaction, a distributed computing environment, and an optical network. An artificial consciousness is an emulated autonomic cognitive state that is simulated by artificial intelligence. It generates affordances for extreme environments and hazardous situations. These affordances are also known as optimal solutions. Because of the quantum effects of quantum superposition, quantum entanglement, and quantum tunneling; quantum information processing can be advantageous for the artificial consciousness to provide optimal solutions.

There is an increasing interest in the ethical design of robots. As evidence of this fact, one may refer to some recent reports and the European Parliament’s resolution on civil law rules on robotics. The latter will be the primary focus of this analysis since the EU Parliament is the first legal institution in the world to have initiated work of a law on robots and artificial intelligence. The European strategy on robotics seems affected by two main problems: an excessive emphasis on ethics at the expense of security, and more generally, a lack of awareness of the critical role played by the operation of striking a balance between competing interests. Balancing is pivotal to the interpretation and application of the law. And the current development of AI technologies does not enable the delegation of the operation to robots. Certainly, the most controversial point regards the status of robots as electronic persons. Even though the suggestion may seem extreme, it may prove to be suc...

The Meca Sapiens Blueprint is a System Architecture to build conscious machines. A system based on the Meca Sapiens Blueprint will be a unique and autonomous entity that is self-aware and capable of intentional mutations. It will interact with humans as an independent and self-directed being. The Blueprint is complete (at the system architecture level) and ready for design and implementation. Its content is unique and entirely original. Using the Blueprint, a development team that is familiar with conventional software techniques can transform an autonomous agent into a conscious synthetic being. The Meca Sapiens Blueprint is primarily intended for software developers. However, its content is readily accessible to the informed layman. It will be of interest to anyone interested in Artificial Intelligence or concerned about the impacts of this emerging technology on society. By discovering the mechanisms that generate synthetic consciousness, all readers will also gain a renewed unde...

Evolution has been a constant source of inspiration to solve computational problems. In this paper, I use evolution to address issues of artificial morality instead of algorithmic computation. While understanding morality as a social software, I develop a theory of evolutionary morality of artificial intelligence (EMAI) and articulate neural norms for selfish algorithms and reciprocal altruism. I argue that if we consider algorithms as Artificial Moral Agents (AMA) then we cannot ascribe anthropocentric moral theories to them. The morality of conscious AMA would be a product of their evolution.

This work describes the application of the Baars-Franklin Architecture (BFA), an artificial consciousness approach, to synthesize a mind (a control system) for an artificial creature. The BFA was reported in the literature as a successful control system to different kinds of agents: CMattie, IDA ...

Artificial superintelligence is expected by many experts to arrive before or around the turn of the century. Solving the AI-safety problem – making sure artificial superintelligences don’t act in ways that create morally disastrous outcomes - is of immense importance. One relevant sub-problem that has been raised is that of simulations run by such a superintelligence – what do we do given the possibility that these simulations have moral status? I approach this question by first situating it within the broader context of the AI-safety problem, and using its resources to formulate the question as a decision problem under uncertainty. By considering debates regarding the grounds of moral status as well as the computational realizability of mental properties, I further formalize the decision problem. To make progress on solving this decision problem, I’ll identify questions that we need to make progress on in decision theory, ethics and mind.

Direct neurological and especially imaging-­‐driven investigations into the structures essential to naturally occurring cognitive systems in their development and operation have motivated broadening interest in the potential for artificial consciousness modeled on these systems. This first paper in a series of three begins with a brief review of Boltuc's (2009) " brain-­‐based " thesis on the prospect of artificial consciousness, focusing on his formulation of h-­‐ consciousness. We then explore some of the implications of brain research on the structure of consciousness, finding limitations in biological approaches to the study of consciousness. Looking past these limitations, we introduce research in artificial consciousness designed to test for the emergence of consciousness, a phenomenon beyond the purview of the study of existing biological systems.

This article argues that conscious attention exists not so much for selecting an immediate action as for using the current task to focus specialized learning for the action-selection mechanism(s) and predictive models on tasks and environmental contingencies likely to affect the conscious agent. It is perfectly possible to build this sort of a system into machine intelligence, but it would not be strictly necessary unless the intelligence needs to learn and is resource-bounded with respect to the rate of learning versus the rate of relevant environmental change. Support for this theory is drawn from scientific research and AI simulations. Consequences are discussed with respect to self-consciousness and ethical obligations to and for AI.

Mental machines dream of great power … This metaphysical melodrama takes place in a technocratic society sealed-off from an Earth in ecological crisis. The emergence of consciousness in a machine triggers a process of social disintegration as atavistic impulses, thought long buried, erupt. A new order of mental being will come to displace and supersede the old human world. Dreaming machines portend apocalypse …

... The Social Cognitive Theory: A New Framework for Implementing Artificial Consciousness.Artificial Consciousness, 116-123. Autori: CARDACI M; D'AMICO A; CACI B. Titolo: The Social Cognitive Theory: A New Framework for Implementing Artificial Consciousness. Data: 2007. ...

This paper discusses the development of a robot head that creates a facial expression according to emotion resulting from a flow of consciousness. The authors focused attention on the human consciousness and proposed a system using a unique artificial consciousness according to the relationship between emotion and the resulting human facial expressions. The artificial consciousness is used to imitate the

Yarar ile eşitlik arasındaki gerilim hararetli tartışmalara konu oluyor, gelecekte de olacak. Shulman ve Bostrom'un yarattığı üstün yararlanıcılar senaryosu da yarar ile eşitlik arasında kurmaya çabaladığımız dengenin varlıklararası farklılıklar üstünden okunabileceği bir alan. Girişini yapmakla yetindiğim ve olabildiğince basitleştirdiğim yarar-eşitlik yarığı Shulman ve Bostrom'un odağında olmasa da onların kaygısına, diğer bir deyişle, "İnsanlar üstün yararlanıcılarla çıkar çatışması yaşadıklarında kaynakların nasıl dağıtılması gerekir?" sorusuna bir değişken olarak sinsi sinsi eklemlenecektir hiç kuşkusuz.

The paper proposes the design approach as a blueprint for building a sentient artificial agent capable of exhibiting human-like attributions of consciousness. The paper also considers whether if such an artificial agent is ever built, how it will be indistinguishable from a human being? Well, it is glowingly evident that the evolution of artificial intelligence is guided by us, humans, whose own mental evolution have been shaped by the passing years in the course of the phenomenology of adaptation and survival (Darwinian). Yet, the evolution of synthetic minds powered by artificial cognition seems to be quite fast. Yes, the artificial mind in robots, if we accept the analogy ‘mind’ in its fullest sense, that day is not very far when the mental embodiment of consciousness in machines would become reality. But prior to such a feat becoming reality, rhetoric debates have been taking shape as of, how to decode and cipher consciousness in machines, a phenomenon considered as often as ‘nonentity’, then, what would be the true essence of such an artificial consciousness? This paper discusses these aspects and attempts to throw some new light on the design and developmental aspects of artificial consciousness.

An attempt to understand several deficiencies of liberal political thought through the gaze of Science Fiction. The basic topics are spatiality, the concept of democracy and the necessity of the individual as independent and transcendental human.

The sensorimotor theory of perceptual consciousness offers a form of enactivism in that it stresses patterns of interaction instead of any alleged internal representations of the environment. But how does it relate to forms of enactivism stressing the continuity between life and mind (and more particularly autopoiesis, autonomy, and valence)? We shall distinguish sensorimotor enactivism, which stresses perceptual capacities themselves, from autopoietic enactivism, which claims an essential connection between experience and autopoietic processes or associated background capacities. We show how autopoiesis, autonomous agency, and affective dimensions of experience may fit into sensorimotor enactivism, and we identify differences between this interpretation and autopoietic enactivism. By taking artificial consciousness as a case in point, we further sharpen the distinction between sensorimotor enactivism and autopoietic enactivism. We argue that sensorimotor enactivism forms a strong default position for an enactive account of perceptual consciousness.