CVE

Since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, media sources have instilled a fear of Muslims in Western countries by portraying them as a homogenous, irrational group that can be triggered into extreme violence. Such narratives on Muslims encouraged perceptions that the planet is divided into incompatible cultural domains, as proposed by Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations, and laid the groundwork for marginalizing Muslims within Western societies. Mohsin Hamid appropriated the use of these narrative devices in his work, The Reluctant Fundamentalist, to expose how the media and governments exaggerated and generalized the so-called threat posed by Muslims in the West. This paper compares the narrative devices exposed by Hamid in the construction of the Muslim threat with the techniques used by the government of Stephen Harper to justify legislative and policy changes that marginalized and vilified Muslims in Canada.

The Syrian conflict has its reflection at the global level, mainly through the processes of radicalization and recruitment most visible through the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon (FTF), as well as terrorist threats and plots on sensitive targets within urban centers. These phenomena also affected the security of the Republic of North Macedonia imposing previously unknown challenges for the security services, but also society as a whole. The quick radicalization and recruitment of FTF for the terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq required a quick and adequate response by government institutions, and other actors in society as well. The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) concept promoted globally in 2015 gives a primary role in prevention from radicalization and engagement in terrorism. It involves stakeholders not traditionally connected to security. The first response to the FTF phenomenon by the Republic of North Macedonia and other countries was mainly through its security institutions, legal and repressive measures. While the CVE efforts were promoted mainly by international partners, the important prevention role was recognized by Macedonian policymakers recently. The government established new institutions, introduced new strategies, and with other actors, especially within the civil society, started to focus more on the local community. This paper critically explores and assesses measures taken by different stakeholders: government, religious communities, civil society organizations (CSOs), international and partner countries. It illustrates the level of implementation of CVE measures by type of projects, target audience, opportunities, and obstacles. The paper is based on desk research and the personal experience of the author in interaction with involved stakeholders and serves as a useful basis for future projects and initiatives.

Ranije je bit terorizma bila da se ubije jedan, a zastraše
stotine; danas se, uz pomoć medija, može ubiti jedan,
a zastrašiti milioni. Toga i mediji i oni koji se javno
oglašavaju u danima nakon terorističkog napda trebaju
biti svjesni. Zato su BBC i brojne druge ozbiljne medijske
međunarodne organizacije izradili specijalizirane
vodiče za novinare koji izvještavaju o terorizmu, a koji
prvenstveno insistiraju na neophodnosti da se izvještava
samo o činjenicama, a da se ne prenose neprovjerene
informacije, izmišljaju lažne prijetnje i preuveličava
opasnost. Jer žeđ za senzacionalizmom često i ozbiljne
novinare uvlači u opasnost da budu oni koji nesvjesno
pomažu onima protiv kojih vjeruju da se bore.

Between 2011 and 2014 the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)’s Kenya Transition Initiative implemented what was essentially a pilot program of the new Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) concept. Aiming to counter the drivers of ‘violent extremism’ (VE), this operated through a system of small grants funding activities such as livelihood training, cultural events, community debates on sensitive topics, counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder, and so on. This paper delivers lessons from the program, generated via an independent evaluation, offering insights of relevance to the broader CVE community of practitioners. A first overarching conclusion is that programming decisions would have benefitted from a more comprehensive understanding of VE in the local context. For instance, subsets of the population more narrowly ‘at-risk’ of being attracted to VE should have been identified and targeted (e.g. potentially teenagers, ex-convicts, members of specific clans, and so on), and a greater focus should have been placed upon comprehending the relevance of material incentives, fear, status-seeking, adventure-seeking, and other such individual-level drivers. A second conclusion is that the KTI team would have profited from additional top-level guidance from their donors, for instance, providing direction on the extent to which efforts should have been targeted at those supportive of violence versus those directly involved in its creation, the risks associated with donor branding, and contexts in which the pejorative term ‘extremism’ should have been pragmatically replaced by neutral terminology. As a priority donors and the wider community should also provide suitable definitions of the CVE concept, rather than leaving practitioners to construe (undoubtedly inconsistently) it’s meaning from the available definitions of VE.

Scholars have critiqued the incorporation of gender into counterterrorism and countering violent extremism programs, noting they have instrumentalized the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda toward state-centric goals and essentialized the women (and men) they encounter. Furthermore, as Huckerby has outlined, the explicit inclusion of gender in security policy can produce specific gendered security harms: coercive and noncoercive practices, securitization of women's rights, and lack of attention to the gendered effects of seemingly gender-neutral policy. This article engages Huckerby's work to explore the gendered security harms produced in Nigeria's counterinsurgency against “Boko Haram.” It suggests first that a simplistic approach to ‘women’, rather than gendered power relations, leaves Nigeria ill-equipped to respond to the complex gendered dynamics of jihadist actors in the Northeast. Second, a neglect of human rights and the role of state actors in abuses actively enables gendered security harms. The article concludes that Nigeria is therefore still failing to protect women.

As the most recent high-profile instances of terrorist attacks in Colombo and Christchurch yield, the internet and social media have become effective tools for exploitation by extremist groups for disseminating radical content, poisoning young minds, and recruiting people for their cause. With one of the fastest growth rates of internet users globally, Bangladesh faces an imminent threat of youth radicalization and recruitment through online channels. In fact, four of the perpetrators of the tragic Holey Artisan Bakery attack were reported to have been radicalized online. Given this context, this CES Current Event Analysis report presents salient findings from a larger ongoing research project on the social media and radicalization of university students in Bangladesh.

This chapter deals with the conceptual and theoretical problems of strategic communication literature. They are illustrated through empirical examples ranging from the propaganda of terrorist groups to governmental measures aimed at a countering violent extremism  (CVE), to foreign information-based threats (from Russia, for example) and the debate about responding to them. The analysis identifies three key limitations within current research and debate. The conclusions are twofold: while strategic communication has an important role in countering key threats to our society and thus deserves further study, it cannot be approached in isolation from the political and social context; although strategic communication is a useful tool in shaping reality, its power should not be exaggerated, especially in the context of increasing political polarization.

This paper reviews Egypt's handling of the threat of militant jihadism. It begins with a brief overview of the nature of the threat, mainly by highlighting the experiences of two of the deadliest jihadist groups in the history of modern Egypt, the Islamic Group (IG) and the al-Jihad Organisation (al-Jihad). After presenting a concrete and factual overview of the nature of this threat, the paper then examines the strengths and weaknesses of Egypt's approach to countering violent extremism (CVE), and whether this approach is likely to drive effective responses in the future. It does so by first introducing CVE and the discussion around it and then outlining the theoretical framework used to examine Egypt's CVE approach, namely the counter-ideological response (CIR) model. Finally, the model is applied to the relevant policy responses made as part of Egypt's CVE experience, and conclusions are then drawn.

The web and its recent advancements represent a great opportunity to build universal, rich, multi-user and immersive Web3D/WebXR applications targeting Cultural Heritage field—including 3D presenters, inspection tools, applied VR games, collaborative teaching tools and much more. Such opportunity although, introduces additional challenges besides common issues and limitations typically encountered in this context. The “ideal” Web3D application should be able to reach every device, automatically adapting its interface, rendering and interaction models—resulting in a single, liquid product that can be consumed on mobile devices, PCs, Museum kiosks and immersive AR/VR devices, without any installation required for final users. The open-source ATON framework is the result of research and development activities carried out during the last 5 years through national and international projects: it is designed around modern and robust web standards, open specifications and large open-source e...

The goal of our research is to design and evaluate a distributed, collaborative virtual environment to support scientific research using a specialised scientific instrument, a nanoManipulator (nM). We began with an ethnographic study to develop an understanding of scientific collaboration, including current work practices using a nM. This understanding suggests that collaborative scientific research is cognitive work that is supported by social interaction and physical skills and tasks. Thus our design focuses on supporting cognitive work and those social and physical activities that support cognitive work. Major features of the design include: consistent shared and private work modes or spaces that provide access to all capabilities of a nM, the ability to dynamically switch between private and shared work spaces, multiple cursors that show each collaborator’s focus of attention and actions simultaneously when in shared mode, audio communications, video conferencing that provides v...

Despite the military efforts of the Kenyan, Ethiopian, and Somali Federal governments, the collaboration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces with US and coalition forces, and despite the enormous tactical and strategic set-backs that al-Shabaab has faced over the last five years, its insurgency in the Horn of Africa (HoA) remains resilient. The Kenyan government’s approach to stemming domestic recruitment to al-Shabaab remains fixated on law enforcement control and surveillance. As a result, many Somali communities are subject to daily crackdowns, interrogations, and discriminatory profiling practices whose negative effects are only heightened by current tribal and clan-based tensions in the country. Current scholarly evaluations of Kenya’s ‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE) & ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE) policies tend to adhere to three major approaches: top-down evaluations by elites repeatedly locating the protection of national security in inter-age...

With unpredictable purposes, extremism in Pakistan has attracted considerable local and global attention, especially after 9/11. Due to war against terrorism, Pakistan has suffered tremendous losses both in terms of number of precious lives and billions of dollars in foreign investment; economic terrorism imposed by foreign sponsored and homegrown terrorist networks. The country has been facing the challenging situations in the form of target killings and bomb blasts. On 16 December 2014 the brutal terrorist attack on Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar Pakistan appeared as major catastrophe, as killing children has become a major puzzle to our understanding of terrorism. This research examines the consequences of extremist attacks in Pakistan while revealing APS attack and argues that communication strategies can be assimilated into policies as preventive measures to minimize extremism and establish peace. To investigate this, qualitative methodology has been used, based on in-depth interviews to provide comprehensive perspectives from field experts and practitioners, affiliated with the same area. Thus, with the observations of 13 Informants, the study revealed that strategic communication for countering violence extremism from both the long-term and short-time strategic approaches are expedient. The study discovered that plausible communication strategies required to counter violent extremist need to underscore preventive communication strategies and consistent use of credible sources of information. In order to support the findings, models were generated through NVivo 10. Finally, it is recommended that communication strategies should convey healthy messages regarding conduct and aptitude to far-reaching populations through media and other sources of communication.

Indonesia is one of the countries in Southeast Asia that has a long history of terrorism. In the last two decades, Indonesia was shocked by bombing attacks such as those in Bali, the Atrium Plaza, JW Marriot Hotel, The Ritz Carlton Hotel, Australia and The Philippines Embassy, Myanmar Embassies, Thamrin-Jakarta, Surabaya and many other smaller-scale terror attacks. The Islamic State (IS) wave has reached and affected Indonesia more than other countries like Malaysia and The Philippines in Southeast Asia. Among Southeast Asia countries, Indonesia is the most dangerous countries beside the Philippines in term of terrorism. It is caused by radical ideology that existed seven decades ago, started by Negara Islam Indonesia/Indonesian Islamic State (NII) and Jamaah Islamiyah that affiliated to international extremist organization Al-Qaeda. In other words, radical ideology has a strong root in Indonesia. The Indonesian counterterrorism agency has carried out many strategies in the prevention domain. We can easily find huge number of followers in social media platforms especially Facebook and Instagram. They share the appeal to do jihad and establish a caliphate in Indonesia, share ideology and violent extremism content, and also incite through social media.⁣
⁣

⁣⁣
⁣⁣
Link 👇⁣⁣
https://www.routledge.com/Terrorist-Rehabilitation-and-Community-Engagement-in-Malaysia-and-Southeast/Aslam-Gunaratna/p/book/97803674203


https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9780367817466/chapters/10.4324/9780367817466-9

This article seeks to examine the impact of the global war on terror around two main issues: the (mis)use of the war on terror rhetoric by politicians and the impact this has on Islamically associated activism. Instead of encouraging security, new forms of counter-insurgency practise such as countering violent extremism (CVE) programmes empower the very illiberal forces good-governance programmes proport to be combatting. What is more, this context forces us to rethink neat geographical boundaries separating Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East.

Our nation has a unique, long-cherished commitment to religious freedom. Indeed, the first wave of immigrants came seeking refuge from religious persecution in Europe. The free exercise of religion, regardless of one’s religious beliefs, is a fundamental right guaranteed to all Americans and embodied in the First Amendment to our Constitution. As a result, America has become a diverse nation enriched by its multiple religious communities that practice their faiths freely and peacefully. America’s unique cultural tolerance for religious diversity is due in large part to the enforcement of constitutional rights and statutory laws that protect individuals and congregations from discrimination in public accommodations, education, and employment.

While most people in America voluntarily comply with anti-discrimination laws based on a personal commitment to equality and justice for all, religious bigotry exists in American society. One need only review the increasing number of lawsuits filed by the EEOC over the past ten years. In 1997, religious discrimination lawsuits made up only 2.1% of the EEOC’s docket. By 2010, the rate of discrimination lawsuits increased significantly to 3.8%. Similarly, religious discrimination charges filed with the EEOC increased dramatically by 35% from 2001 to 2008. A disproportionate number of religious discrimination charges were filed by employees who wear headscarves, turbans, or beards for religious reasons because these practices carry a stigma that falsely stereotype them as terrorist, disloyal, or suspect.

In the years immediately following the tragic September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, there was an upsurge in hatred, violence, and discrimination against Muslims, Arabs and South Asians. Despite the passage of more than ten years, pervasive discrimination persists due to a variety of factors that directly impact the workplace. For example, media images stereotyping, darkskinned, bearded males with Arabic-sounding names as representing the primary threat to the national security of the United States contribute to racial, national origin, and religious harassment in the workplace. Government selective counter-terrorism practices and policies have institutionalized a policy of discrimination against persons perceived to be Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian on the basis of their name, race, religion, ethnicity, and national origin. The government’s disparate treatment of these communities, based on the pretext of national security, legitimizes workplace harassment. The result is a conflation of the racial Arab or South Asian with the religious category of Muslim coupled with the misperception that Islam is a radical and violent religion. Therefore, efforts aimed at combatting post-9/11 religious discrimination must adopt a holistic approach that rectifies the “bias legitimizing” actions of other government agencies.

Accordingly, my recommendations are as follow:

1. Adopt creative legal theories of liability and use case briefs to educate judges about post-9/11 religious discrimination;

2. Train federal agencies about the adverse workplace consequences of selective law enforcement and immigration enforcement;

3. Train private sector employers about the rise in religious discrimination and how to proactively prevent it;

4. Normalize images of religious minorities in government publications; and

5. Diversify points of contact in outreach to religious communities about their legal rights and remedies.

One of the biggest challenges to conducting research on radicalization to violent extremism is how to further knowledge in the absence of easy access to radical individuals. This lack of access makes it particularly difficult to fulfill the demand for original data on radicalization to violent extremism and on strategies to counter it.

This chapter presents the Royal United Services Institute’s (RUSI) effort to overcome this challenge. RUSI’s milieu approach takes into consideration the importance of the context in which specific cases of radicalization take place. This is based on an understanding that research participants within these areas are able to relay contextual information about potential grievances or broader incentives impacting radicalization. The chapter highlights that these participants are frequently able to share actual knowledge of radicalization based on their lived experiences and knowledge of events affecting friends, colleagues, and family members. This approach additionally recognizes the expertise of local communities and positions authorities to learn from them.

The chapter presents the theoretical basis and the practical implications (site selection, identifying and accessing participants; selecting research methods; and analyzing data) of applying the milieu approach using case study examples of research conducted by RUSI. These include a five-country study (UK, Canada, France, Germany and the Netherlands) on gender and radicalization, research on radicalization among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities in Iraq, and the radicalization of Central Asian labor migrants in Russia. The chapter highlights the challenges faced, ways of overcoming them, and key takeaways and recommendations for those interested in applying the milieu approach.

Ce chapitre pose les linéaments d’une évaluation du « plan d’action contre la radicalisation dans les prisons » mis en œuvre en Belgique depuis 2015. Il décrit la signalétique de la radicalisation et les pratiques de catégorisation sur lesquelles il repose, signalétique et pratiques qui contribuent à l’infra-pénalisation de l’islam en prison.

La question du rôle d’Internet et des sphères numériques en ce qui a trait aux phénomènes de radicalisation et d’extrémisme violent fait l’objet d’une attention croissante depuis plusieurs années, et ce tant du côté des pouvoirs publics que des milieux universitaires. En témoigne un volume important de travaux de recherche développés sur cette thématique, principalement dans le monde anglo-saxon, et à quelques exceptions près en France. Si l’intérêt public pour cette question n’est pas nouveau en soi, les discours communs, qu’ils soient médiatiques, profanes, voire universitaires, demeurent encore trop souvent simplificateurs, pour ne pas dire réducteurs. Souvent fondées dans une lecture « techno-déterminisme » d’Internet et des réseaux sociaux nombreuses sont les interprétations qui conduisent à faire du Web un vecteur omnipotent des formes de radicalités contemporaines et d’amplification de l’extrémisme violent sous toutes ses formes. Cet article propose un bref éclairage sur cette question à partir d’une étude réalisée en 2015 par les auteurs pour le compte de Sécurité publique Canada. L’analyse se concentrera sur 15 études de cas qu’il s’agira de classifier au sein d’une typologie alliant trajectoires de radicalisation et la nature du rôle qu’a joué Internet dans celles-ci. Cette typologie fut construite, avec, comme toile de fond, une relecture des écrits en psychologie sociale pouvant nous informer sur le rôle d’Internet dans les processus s’apparentant à la radicalisation.

In 2017 and 2018, the British Council along with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Georgia State University, conducted dialogue-based research to explore how civil society organizations and local municipal government bod- ies in the United States, MENA, and Europe have dealt with the issue of youth engagement and mobiliza- tions. We sought to identify best practices, untapped opportunities, and obstacles to progress across and between these sectors. Three major themes emerged through these discussions that warrant the attention of policy makers and practitioners: 1) Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism 2), Youth Engagement and Digital Culture, 3) Pathways to Civic Engagement, and 4) Violence Prevention and Intervention. Amongst the themes lies another key policy sector: preventing/countering violent extremism.

Der vorliegende Report widmet sich der Frage nach zentralen Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschieden in den Distanzierungsbeobachtungen von autarken und begleiteten Fällen sowie der Präsentation der Zwischenergebnisse in den als relevant identifizierten Kategorien.2 Hier steht (auch) die Frage im Zentrum, was professionelle Distanzierungsbegleitung ausmacht, was sie (nicht) leisten kann und wie sich Distanzierungsprozesse in „unbegleiteten“ Fällen abspielen (können). Die Beantwortung dieser Fragen ist naturgemäß nicht nur für die Distanzierungsforschung von Interesse, sondern kann auch ganz konkrete Implikationen für die praktische Distanzierungsarbeit haben.

Although the Islamic State (IS) and its ‘Islamic caliphate’ have been defeated, IS’ narrative of resurrecting the so-called caliphate continues to have an extraordinary appeal among its followers and other like-minded violent jihadists. They stake their effort to establish a caliphate on the claim that it is an integral part of the Islamic faith, specifically, that it is among the requirements of tawḥīd (The doctrine of Divine Unity). The other ideological narrative pervading some radical quarters is based on the Ghazwatul Hind narrative (the final apocalyptic war that would be taking place in India). Radical understanding of both the Caliphate and the Ghazwatul Hind is deeply flawed. The caliphate is not a core element in the Islamic creed. Nor is starting a war with India or in the region based on a proper understanding of the relevant hadiths (Prophetic Sayings). Muslims should instead, fix their sights on more crucial areas such as education, economic advancement and political stability

The topic of today’s hearing — federal civil rights engagement with Arab and Muslim American communities — bears a great deal of importance on the question of how the federal government should balance its protection of civil rights and liberties of all Americans with America’s national security needs.

While this topic warrants a more extensive analysis, my testimony highlights four key points that I believe are paramount to a successful federal civil rights engagement program with Arab and Muslim American communities.

First, for federal engagement to be effective, community representatives at engagement meetings must encompass the rich diversity of the Arab and Muslim American communities, including but not limited to, ethnicity, socio-economic background, youth, women, political viewpoint, and race. Often times, a limited number of individuals who are male, Arab or South Asian, and over the age of 35 are repeatedly invited to government engagement meetings. As a result, discussions are constrained by the limited experiences and viewpoints of a select few purportedly representing tremendously diverse communities. This impedes the communities’ efforts to seek redress on civil rights grievances as well as the government’s ability to meaningfully identify and resolve civil rights issues.

Second, the federal government and any participant local and state entities should not use community engagement meetings in furtherance of national security, surveillance, investigative and prosecutorial objectives, but rather to develop trust and constructive relations with their constituents towards the common goal of protecting individual rights and public safety for all Americans. Unfortunately, recent news reports prompt serious concerns that some government engagement meetings are pretext for gathering intelligence, conducting investigations, and eventually pursuing prosecution of meeting attendees or their families and associates – as opposed to good faith efforts to build relationships between government and constituents. Absent credible evidence and binding mechanisms that guarantee the government is not conducting engagement based on false pretenses, engagement efforts are doomed to fail as mere public relations exercises aimed at diverting attention from critiques of government overreaching.

Third, government engagement efforts with Arabs and Muslims must be holistically focused on the host of social, economic, and political factors that affect the vitality of Arab and Muslim communities across the nation. The government’s primary interest in working with Arab and Muslim communities based solely on national security issues reinforces false stereotypes that these communities warrant extra scrutiny, thereby increasing the risk of private acts of discrimination and perpetuating counterproductive counterterrorism tactics. Moreover, communities’ suspicions that engagement efforts are merely investigative tools employed as part of broader counterterrorism objectives are reinforced, thereby hindering the potential for developing sustainable relationships based on trust and mutual respect.

Finally, government civil rights engagement programs must be subject to independent citizen and Congressional oversight to ensure stated objectives are in fact met. Notwithstanding the best of intentions, the efficacy of government engagement programs should not be left to the discretion of government employees left unaccountable to impartial and independent third parties. Various models of citizen oversight used in other contexts can guide the creation of effective monitoring and oversight mechanisms for government engagement projects.

In the end, failed engagement efforts risk worsening relations between Arab and Muslim communities and government, in addition to wasting limited government resources during challenging economic times.

Developing effective strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE) has proven to be elusive. Despite the plethora of conferences, reports, and expenditures, governments continue to struggle to find the right formula to decrease politically motivated violence. Because the underlying causes of violent extremism are complex and country specific: no one size fits all solution. Each nation must consider its unique economic, political, and social circumstances when seeking to protect its citizens from violence perpetrated by extremists. But government officials should be careful that their CVE strategies do not exacerbate the underlying marginalization, discrimination, and disenfranchisement that create fertile grounds for terrorist recruitment.

This paper argues that America’s domestic CVE practices create a paradox: law abiding citizens and residents who openly and legally express their oppositional views or orthodox religious practices are targeted by the state in the form of surveillance, infiltration, investigation, entrapment, and prosecution. Thus, targeted communities reasonably suspect that the campaign against homegrown terrorism is not so much about public safety as it is about irrational bigotry. Members of these communities become less willing to cooperate with law enforcement because they view CVE as merely political scapegoating at the expense of their liberty and livelihoods. When contextualized within America’s aggressive police tactics in the 1960s and 1970s against civil rights, Black Nationalist, and anti-war groups and coupled with the disproportionate focus on African Americans in the ongoing War on Drugs, such suspicions are not far-fetched.

Accordingly, this paper makes three recommendations that address the paradox of punishing the innocent for openly expressing grievances shared by the guilty, or worse merely sharing the same immutable characteristics. First, an effective program to counter violent extremism must prioritize protecting the ability of individuals to exercise civil and human rights without fear of state retribution. Second, the American governments must balance the tight rope between engaging Muslim communities to protect them from hate crimes or bolster public safety and heightened attention to Muslims that signals to the public that Muslims warrant extra scrutiny from the state. Selective engagement risks a backlash where the majority resents what it perceives as favoritism towards Muslims or interprets engagement efforts as legitimizing suspicion of Muslims. Either response often leads to private acts of discrimination or violence in employment, schools, mosques, and public places. Third, CVE programs that empower communities as stakeholders in preserving public safety and protection of rights must be careful not to perpetuate existing disparities within Muslim communities along gender, age, class, and race. Insensitivity to internal tensions risks placing the government as an enabler of intra-community gender bias, intra-community ethnic conflicts, and class divisions.

In the end, the legitimacy of CVE policies hangs in the balance. The extent to which governments are able to uphold individual rights while preserving public safety directly contributes to defeating the use of violence as a means of seeking justice.

In many cases of jihadist radicalisation, the direct environment perceived signs and/or knew about the plans of the individual to join a terrorist group (Gill et al., 2014, p. 429). Yet, it can be assumed that only a small number of these persons reported their observations to the competent authorities. The fear of putting the relationship with the radicalising individual or themselves at risk can lead these persons to keep their observations a secret (Williams et al., 2015). This paper argues that the establishment of local points of contact where trained resources persons operate as so-called gatekeepers (Williams et al., 2015, p. 45) could be a meaningful step towards overcoming the lack of trust in the relevant CVE service providers. The establishment of these points of contact as exemplified by the regional prevention network of the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg advances the crucial transition from prevention work to deradicalisation through the qualification of locally embedded resource persons. The points of contact can implement prevention strategies in the districts which are tailored to local requirements and specificities (White House, 2015). Therefore, local points of contact operate at the intersection of prevention work and the federal deradicalisation unit. The concept of a regional prevention network demonstrates the possibility to establish an early warning system with respect to the radicalisation of youths.

Syftet med min avhandling är att utifrån teoribildningen om sociala representationer söka förståelse för hurudana självrepresentationer unga muslimer som rest till Syrien under konflikten och återvänt har av sig själva samt hur de upplever att de positioneras av omvärlden. Jag är även intresserad av hurdana behov de anser sig själva ha efter hemkomsten. Vidare granskar jag hur aktörer inom Finlands Exit-verksamhet ser på de unga vuxna samt hurudana behov de professionella uppfattar att dessa unga har. Avhandlingen avser redogöra för eventuella skillnader och likheter mellan de ovannämnda gruppernas uppfattningar samt diskutera möjliga konsekvenser av dessa i kontexten politiska åtgärder mot radikalisering och terrorism. I dagens läge är forskningsfältet gällande Syrienresenärer bristfälligt, trots ständigt pågående diskussioner gällande myndighetsåtgärder och stödtjänster för återvändande Syrienresenärer. Därmed är syftet att bidra med kunskap inom socialt arbete gällande återvändande Syrienresenärers livssituationer och behov av stöd.

Som datainsamlingsmetod valde jag kvalitativ intervju. Fyra intervjuer gjordes med professionella involverade i Finlands Exitverksamhet. Därtill intervjuade jag tre unga vuxna som återvänt från Syrien till Finland och en ung vuxen som fortfarande befann sig i Syrien. Av de fyra professionella som jag intervjuat till min studie arbetar tre personer inom den tredje sektorn och en för finska myndigheter. De unga vuxna jag intervjuat har alla finländskt medborgarskap, gruppen består av både män och kvinnor och samtliga är muslimer, en del berättar att de börjat praktisera religionen först i tonåren eller vuxen ålder. Alla de unga vuxna jag intervjuat har tillbringat kortare eller längre tider i Syrien.

Studien visar att de personer som intervjuats rest med intentioner att hjälpa de lidande i Syrien genom humanitär hjälpverksamhet. En del av de unga vuxna var beredda att delta i militär krigsföring mot Bashar al-Assads regeringsstyrkor inför resan till Syrien, men deltog aldrig i strider på plats. De huvudsakliga motiven bakom samtliga informanters resor till Syrien verkar ha varit ett starkt medkännande med lidande muslimer samt upplevelser av ett hårt samhällsklimat, känsla av utanförskap och islamofobi i hemlandet Finland.

De centrala teman som framträdde i de unga vuxnas berättelser om tiden efter hemkomsten var upplevelser av behov, möten med myndigheter, vikten av kulturell och religiös förståelse, vikten av rätt terminologi, upplevelser av skam samt konstruktionen av en positiv själv-identitet. Sammanfattningsvis visar resultatet i studien att den mediala och samhälleliga representation av Syrienresenärer upplevs som ensidig, stigmatiserande, felaktigt vinklad och en stereotyperad syn på Syrienresenärer som kriminella, potentiella terrorister och dehumaniserade individer. Syrienresenärer kategoriseras som ”den Andra”, en representation som både de unga och de professionella tar tydligt avstånd från. De unga vuxna positionerar sig genom sina tal som vanliga unga vuxna i förhållande till representationen om unga Syrienresenärer som hot mot samhällets säkerhet och som riskindivider. De positionerar sig som individer med mångfacetterade motiv bakom sina resor, i motsats till den upplevda ensidiga och misstolkade framställningen av dem som ett kollektiv av radikala och kriminella individer. På basen av de unga vuxnas berättelser kan man dra slutsatsen att alla återvändande Syrienresenärer inte behöver stödåtgärder efter hemkomsten. Dock kan man konstatera att en del av de återvändande kan befinna sig i en extra sårbar situation vid hemkomsten. De största behoven bland återvändande ungdomar efter hemkomsten framträder dock som behov av ett gott och neutralt bemötande från myndigheter, oavsett personens bakgrund och eventuella brottsutredningar. Behovet av praktisk hjälp och handledning framträder även som en vital del för en del av de återvändande. En del av de professionella motiverar stödåtgärderna för unga efter hemkomsten med en minimering av säkerhetsrisk, en representation om unga återvändande förankrade i en riskdiskurs, vilket de unga i sin tur tydligt tar avstånd från i sina uttalanden.

The quality of studies drawing primary data from terrorists and violent extremist respondents varies substantially, with this body of literature exhibiting a variety of repeating methodological issues. For instance, researchers often uncritically accept interviewee responses at face value, overlook key theoretical insights, downplay or neglect potentially important explanatory variables, fail to offer sufficient information about their sampling methods, and deliver findings with inferences beyond what their sample allows. Indeed, certain studies demonstrate a number of these flaws, including the United Nations Development Programme’s recently published Journey to Extremism in Africa report. Within this context, the dual purposes of this article are (a) to discuss ways to overcome these specific methodological problems, and (b) to provide broader guidance for face-to-face research with such respondents.

Gatekeepers are those in a position to recognize, in others, potentially problematic presenting issues, and who are willing and able to connect those persons to relevant service providers. In the domain of violence prevention, they represent a network of those who can serve as ‘first responders’ with respect to helping those in need. Therefore, it is important to understand both the facilitators and inhibitors of gatekeeper intervention, or what has been termed ‘vicarious help-seeking:’ the intent to help others who appear in need of help, but who are not actively seeking help. The present set of studies demonstrated both an expansion of the theory of vicarious help-seeking and a replication of its original four tenets (Part 1). Part 2 examined how gatekeepers would prefer to intervene in a violence prevention context: their natural inclinations with respect to doing so. Part 3 examined reasons preventing gatekeepers from reaching out to a third-party for assistance. Part 4 further ...

Daesh with its proto-state and its shining aura of invincibility and unstoppable expansion, attracting myriads of foreign volunteers to the Levant, is rapidly coming to an end. What happens next ? Worst-case predictions often grab the headlines. But jihadism has waxed and waned over the last three decades. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the fascination with Daesh will die out as a result of the failure of its state project, since this constituted a critical part of Daesh’s force of attraction. This offers a window of opportunity for addressing the conducive environments that permitted Daesh’s success in widely different locations around the world, including in Europe. If we fail to seize this moment, at some point in the future the re-emergence of yet another jihadi wave cannot be ruled out.

For over two decades, preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) has proven a daunting challenge for foreign assistance policy makers and implementers. The challenges are rooted in its rapid emergence, continuous and uneven development, and lingering skepticism about its future and effectiveness. The purpose of this study is to provide policy makers and practitioners with a deeper understanding of how certain factors have driven the development of P/CVE policy. The research questions focused on the nature of policy alignment at all policy levels and the identification and nature of the factors that have driven rapid P/CVE policy change. The theoretical framework included the use of punctuated equilibrium theory, policy feedback theory, and path dependence. A qualitative case study and document analysis design was used. The study completed 7 semi-structured interviews with P/CVE specialists and a document analysis of 37 policy documents. Data from the interviews and documents were coded and categorized for thematic analysis and comparison. Results indicated a robust policy alignment across policy levels but also reflected a very uneven policy evolution due to numerous intervening factors. Participants also expressed a significant degree of skepticism about P/CVE effectiveness and its distinctiveness from other development tools.  The implications for social change include informing practitioners and policy makers of the importance of effective, coordinated, and well-considered P/CVE policy at all levels of government. Doing so assists policy makers and practitioners to achieve important foreign assistance objectives and improve the lives of those adversely affected around the world.

Violent extremism has become the global concern especially after the beginning of 21st Century. Therefore, understanding the various aspects of violent extremism particularly multifaceted communication strategies which will be fit to handle the modern challenges has become imperative. On incidences of terrorism and violent extremism, Pakistan has lost on socio, economic, cultural and educational grounds. Meanwhile, there are contending positions that the incessant attacks are due to the gap in proper Communication between security apparatus, government and the extremist groups. In view of this, the article examines the roles of strategic communication in the countering of violent extremism and its influence on Pakistani society. The paper also brought to the open, some of the critical context and drivers of violent extremism. Based on this, the paper proffers a model which captured the contemporary communication strategies for countering violent extremism. It also argues that strate...

The article outlines preventive actions against so-called Islamist extremism in Germany as a hegemonic project. The reasoning is based on reflections on the essential characteristics of prevention as well as insights into practical implementations of preventive actions and their impacts on targeted individuals and groups. Making use of Ernesto Laclau’s theory of hegemony, the central point of the article is the question of how preventive actions against Islamist extremism are constituted as a universalized mode of any state and non-state interaction with Muslim communities and individuals in Germany.

Language of article: German