Classics and Politics

References to antiquity, and especially to Rome, became part since Maurras of the French far-right language. Indeed, the quest for the origins of France brings the nationalists, at the end of the XIXe century, to claim the inheritance of Roman power, which civilized the ancient Gaul, pacified the Mediterranean Sea, and then made Christianity the religion of the Empire. Rome would be the direct matrix of France. If the vision of an authoritarian, Imperial and Christian Rome could naturally inspire thinkers of the extreme right, some Romanists themselves fascinated by imperialism and colonialism, as Jérôme Carcopino or Léon Homo, greatly contributed to the growth of this myth of the eternal Rome from which France would be issued.

The consensus view among political scientists is that the subjective social status of low-skilled workers has declined over the last decades, and this status loss of the working class is seen as contributing to the rise of the radical right. We examine the micro-foundation of this claim by tracing the evolution of subjective status for different social classes in Europe and the US. We use all available survey rounds of the International Social Survey Programme 1987-2017 and replicate findings with the European Social Survey 2002-2016. While unskilled workers perceive their status to be lower than members of the middle class everywhere, we find no relative or absolute fall in their subjective social status over time. Unskilled workers were at the bottom of the status hierarchy in the 1990s and 2010s. Our findings throw doubt on the narrative that sees workers' falling subjective social status as a prominent driver behind the rise of the radical right.

Amidst the shifting political discourses of the twenty-first century, Greco-Roman 1 or 'classical' antiquity has emerged as a recurring theme. From North American white supremacists adopting Spartan 'lambda' symbols to the Chinese government's discussion of the 'Tacitus trap'; and from the Latin names given to EU immigration policies to the satirical critique of authority in South Africa, references to the Greco-Roman world are currently made by actors from across the political spectrum and in many different parts of the world. While excellent research has been done on individual examples, the full picture remains largely obscure. Why does classical antiquity still appeal to so many politicians and activists in the twenty-first century? Does the classical world have the same political associations across national and/or continental borders? And how are the classics used differently in different political contexts? 1 In this article, the 'classical world' is roughly equated with the Greco-Roman world. We recognise that antiquity was far more diverse than this terminology implies, that Greek and Roman societies interacted closely with a wide range of other groups, and were in many cases no clear distinction can be drawn between 'Greco-Roman' societies/individuals/communities and others. We also recognise that the designations of 'Greek' and 'Roman' are in themselves problematic, and are the subject of rich scholarly discussion. Yet this complexity is rarely or never acknowledged in the contemporary political discourses that are the primary focus of this article. We have therefore adopted this definition in the interests of brevity and coherence.

Naoíse Mac Sweeney (University of Leicester)
Samuel Agbamu (Kings College London)
Rosa Andújar (Kings College London)
Michael Okyere Asante (Stellembosch University)
Juliana Bastos Marques (Universidade Federal do Estado do Rio de Janeiro)
Gwladys Bernard (Université Paris 8)
Chiara Bonacchi (University of Stirling)
Curtis Dozier (Vassar College)
Güneş Duru (Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi)
Barbara Goff (Reading University)
Rebecca Futo Kennedy (Denison University)
Elif Koparal (Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi)
Damjan Krsmanovic (University of Leicester)
Denise McCoskey (Miami University)
Neville Morley (University of Exeter)
Julia Müller (Technische Universität Dresden)
Jan Nelis (Université libre de Bruxelles)
Anne-Sophie Noel (École Normale Supérieure de Lyon)
Grant Parker (Stanford University)
Konstantinos Poulis (ThePressProject)
Catherine Psilakis (Université Lyon 1)
Helen Roche (University of Durham)
Elizabeth Sawyer (University of Oxford)
Netta Schramm (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Michael Scott (University of Warwick)

In this paper I look at changing conceptions of liberty by examining the views of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and then Locke and Madison. I compare and contrast their views on ethics, then their views on relations between people, then the political structures they propose. I argue that the change in views on liberty began with changes in ideas of self-control leading up to Machiavelli, but the Liberal view did not replace the Republican view until Locke and Madison espoused new ideas about the state of nature emphasizing individual property rights.

Au début de l’année 52 av. J.-C. César était proconsul des Gaules et d’Illyrie tandis que Pompée se faisait élire à Rome seul consul. Tirant profit de l’incertitude qui entourait la date de la fin de sa promagistrature, mal définie par les lois qui l’avaient instituée, César chercha à obtenir du Sénat qu’il prorogea son commandement provincial jusqu’à la fin de l’année 49 et aussi à devenir consul en 48. Ne pouvant revenir à Rome en tant que proconsul, il aspirait à être candidat in absentia au consulat en 49 ce qui était interdit depuis une loi de 63. En accord avec Pompée il réussit alors par l’entremise des tribuns de la plèbe à faire approuver en février 52 un plébiscite qui l’y autorise. Au printemps 52, néanmoins, une lex proposée par Pompée lui-même, abrogea le plébiscite en question. Dans cet article sont examinées les raisons qui ont conduit Pompée à prendre une telle initiative. Nous montrerons aussi que, contrairement à l’opinion généralement admise, l’approbation de la lex Pompeia ne fut pas formellement irrégulière.
All’inizio del 52 a.C. Cesare era proconsole in Gallia e Illirico, mentre Pompeo era console unico a Roma. Nell’incertezza su quale fosse la data finale della promagistratura cesariana, non ben definita dalle leggi che l’avevano istituita, Cesare mirava a farsi riconoscere dal senato il comando provinciale fino alla fine del 49 e a diventare console nel 48. Non potendo rientrare a Roma da proconsole, aspirava a candidarsi al consolato nel 49 in absentia, ciò che tuttavia era vietato da una legge del 63. In accordo con Pompeo, riuscì allora, tramite i tribuni della plebe, a fare approvare nel febbraio 52 un plebiscito che glielo consentisse. Nella primavera del 52, nondimeno, una legge rogata dallo stesso Pompeo abrogò tale plebiscito. Nell’articolo si esaminano le ragioni che indussero Pompeo ad assumere tale iniziativa e si mostra che l’approvazione della lex Pompeia, nonostante numerosi dubbi avanzati in senso contrario dalla dottrina moderna, non fu formalmente irregolare.
Fonti particolarmente esaminate: Suet. Iul. 26.1 e 28.2; Dio Cass. 40.51.1-2 e 40.56.1-3; Caes. civ. 1.32.3.

The book focuses attention on the reception of Thucydides in XIX Century Germany and first-half-XX Century Italy, when and where Historicism culminated, and examines some major historians and classical scholars of this age, that is the German L. Ranke and E. Meyer and the Italian G. De Sanctis, A. Ferrabino and A. Momigliano; these Italian scholars had a different relationship with the philosophy of B. Croce and different reactions to Fascism.
Gli storici europei hanno per molto tempo considerato Tucidide come il padre fondatore della propria disciplina, modello inarrivabile di ricerca severa e inflessibile della verità, capace come nessun altro di interpretare i fatti al di là delle apparenze. Quasi un culto, che ha avuto il suo culmine nella storiografia tedesca dell'Ottocento e del primo Novecento nell'epoca dello storicismo, riassumibile nei nomi di Leopold von Ranke ed Eduard Meyer, e che conobbe una stagione ricca ma più problematica nell’Italia tra le due guerre mondiali, quando antichisti come Gaetano De Sanctis, Aldo Ferrabino e Arnaldo Momigliano pensarono la storia antica in un rapporto dialettico con lo storicismo di Benedetto Croce. La ricezione di Tucidide si rivela così una sorta di prisma che permette di ripensare alla storia degli studi classici italiani nel nostro paese in una fase caratterizzata, per un verso, dalla dialettica tra storici dell'antichità e filosofia crociana, per l'altro, da un clima politico sempre più autoritario.

Xenophon's account allows us to suspect that Lysander killed the Athenian prisoners in the Hellespont because most of them were thetes, who he feared would make Athens strong again if they lived. The historian was unwilling for ideological reasons to say explicitly that the seamen of Athens were the real opponents of the Spartan commander on this occasion, but he expected that through his evasive writing his readers would conceive his message about Lysander.

http://www.brill.com/products/series/brills-companions-classical-reception#related-files Brill Companions to Classical Reception [BCCR] is designed to explore varying aspects in the history of classical reception as well as the life and work of eminent classical scholars in an all-inclusive and comprehensive way. The Series' aim is to provide Reference works for Classical Reception Studies, i.e. authoritative overviews of themes in classical reception by individual scholars within their area of specialization. Thus scholars actively engaged across the whole spectrum of classical studies and intellectual historians, as well as those working on sub-disciplines of classical studies are expected to jointly engage in well-defined projects serving the objectives and scope of BCCR.

Victor Wallis’s Red-Green Revolution is about ecosocialism as politics. He discusses the possible indispensable short-term ecosocialist reforms, particularly regarding technologies, within the necessary long-term challenge to revolutionize the capitalist mode of production. He outlines a political line of a potential ecosocialist organization within a movement as class-based, differentiating it from hyper-constructivist, anti-catastrophist and intersectional positions. Despite its indisputable merits, the argument needs some further socioeconomic theorization.

Rimpiangere la "res publica", tornare a Roma. In questo, alla fine del secondo millennio, gli studi antichistici (storici e giuridici) e quelli teorico-politici sembrano trovare una convergenza. Se lo storico di Roma Fergus Millar evidenzia gli elementi "democratici" della tarda repubblica, Philip Pettit e Quentin Skinner individuano una libertà "neoromana", ideale civico elaborato a partire da Machiavelli e applicabile anche al presente. Ciò si scontra, per molti versi, con la "cesura" tra antichità e modernità politica, fatta spesso coincidere con il celebre discorso di Benjamin Constant sulla "Libertà degli antichi paragonata a quella dei moderni" (1819). A ben guardare, però, il padre svizzero del costituzionalismo liberale si concentra soprattutto sulla Grecia, scissa tra la "quasi moderna" Atene e l'arretrata Sparta. E Roma? È su questo che il presente volume indaga, prendendo anche in considerazione i più recenti dibattiti nell'antichistica e nella teoria politica; punti di riferimento sono il pensiero di Constant, a sua volta oggetto di reinterpretazione, e le sue innumerevoli "ricadute". Risulta quindi che le critiche al 'modello' antico, già ben chiare in Hobbes, esaltate dalla Querelle degli antichi e dei moderni, e infine accuratamente delineate da Hegel e Marx, in Constant sono frutto della volontà di attaccare più Sparta (esaltata da Mably) che Roma (esaltata da Rousseau e profondamente rispettata anche da Mme De Stael). Le stesse nuove letture di Constant, che tendono a limitare le conseguenze estreme tratte da Berlin sulle due diverse libertà (democratica e liberale), ci fanno apparire il pensatore svizzero più legato al modello romano di quanto si creda in genere.