Finitude

The clients that come to Counselling Psychology do not live in a vacuum. They are located in time and space and are faced with the particular challenges presented by their contexts and their interactions with these contexts. This essay tries to show that an awareness of life-span development is essential for Counselling Psychologists in order to contextualize their clients’ experiences and use this understanding as a resource for therapeutic work. It argues in particular that the existential theme of finitude needs to be considered as impacting on life-span development. It starts by introducing the life-span perspective and its implications for practice and goes on to exemplify this view by focusing on the subject of death – particularly on death awareness and death anxiety – and its influence on people’s lives, especially during what has been called ‘the mid-life crisis’, before applying some of the ideas to the fictional character of Ivanov from Chekhov’s eponymous play. It tries to show that death assumes special significance in mid life and that this is not merely a challenge in Counselling Psychology practice but also an opportunity for growth.

Cette contribution va proposer de considérer que la « crise du sens » est interminable, et continue, et que c’est par sa mise en crise que le sens mute et se surpasse lui-même. Il va s’agir donc de savoir ce que l’on entend par le « sens » (I), puis de réfléchir à deux modèles qui s’affrontent et qui vont me permettre de focaliser les enjeux qui sont ceux de l’évolution des théories de la connaissance (II), et enfin de nous pencher sur la notion de « paradigme » et de son économie (III).

Programa da 18.ª edição da Formação de Psicoterapeutas Clássicos de Xamanismo Transcultural (Estudos Antropológicos Teórico-Práticos) que se realizará através de teleaulas e de telepráticas (por videoconferência, portanto, ao vivo, mas online) entre os dias 19 de outubro de 2024 e 8 de junho de 2025.

Neste curso os formandos colaboram (facultativamente) num estudo científico (quase-experimental) sobre a efetividade psicoterapêutica de um compósito de práticas xamânicas transculturais, praticando-as (entre os formandos e com voluntários) com supervisão.

Trata-se de um curso pioneiro, onde, pela primeira vez se aplicam métodos mistos de investigação científica, no sentido de aferir: as práticas xamânicas funcionam mesmo?

O nosso estudo preliminar deu uma resposta afirmativa. Mas, será que com a ampliação da amostra (de formandos e de voluntários), se mantêm os resultados sobre a efetividade do xamanismo?

Conforme Krippner (2002) os investigadores têm dissertado (em estudos sobre o xamanismo) com um teor predominantemente pejorativo (talvez até projetivo). Com o nosso estudo, sugerimos um novo olhar sobre o xamanismo: uma psicoterapia clássica, que pode ser estruturada e testada cientificamente conforme ocorre com outras psicoterapias.

Assim, mais do que teórico, este é um curso prático onde se aprende, fazendo. Mas, fazendo de uma forma cientificamente estruturada, ajustando as práticas xamânicas milenares às demandas e às realidades contemporâneas das sociedades ditas «modernas».

Este é um curso para pessoas com uma mentalidade integrativa, não-sectária e com interesse ontológico. Porque o «ser humano» é mais que apenas o «humano». O «ser» faz parte do «ser humano». E é no estudo do «ser» que (da nossa perspetiva) se encontra o «ouro» que complementa e torna inteiro o estudo sobre o Ser Humano.

Le problème des other minds est généralement posé de la manière suivante : à quel genre de connaissance pouvons-nous prétendre au sujet de l’esprit et des expériences d’autrui ? La réponse traditionnelle est habituellement formulée dans les termes d’une opposition entre deux genres de connaissance: une connaissance infaillible, et donc, par principe soustraite au doute (la connaissance de soi) et une connaissance essentiellement faillible, car de type conjectural (la connaissance de l’esprit des autres). Une évidente proximité se manifeste dans la manière dont Wittgenstein et Austin entendent traiter ce problème sceptique : par une dissolution de l’opposition entre les deux genres de connaissance qui sous-tend sa formulation en recourant au phénomène de l’expressivité. Toutefois, Austin admet une révision possible de notre terminologie en intégrant les cas anormaux au monde familier et ordinaire de nos relations avec autrui, là où Wittgenstein insiste plutôt sur les « distorsions » que ces cas produisent par rapport à l’usage ordinaire de nos concepts. Cette différence est finalement mineure en comparaison des divergences qui apparaissent entre les deux auteurs dans les conséquences qu’ils tirent de cette dissolution. Pour Austin, la dissolution du pseudo-problème sceptique signifie sa disparition pure et simple une fois opérée la reconduction de nos concepts épistémiques à l’usage ordinaire ; pour Wittgenstein, elle signifie la reconduction à une difficulté pratique : l’étrangeté de certaines pratiques (celles, par exemple, des vendeurs de bois dans la célèbre allégorie des Cours sur les fondements des mathématiques) à laquelle répond notre propre étrangeté aux leurs. C’est l’épreuve de cette étrangeté et la difficulté corrélative à comprendre des pratiques radicalement différentes des nôtres que prétend exprimer, sans y parvenir, la formulation traditionnelle du problème sceptique.

Corpo (in)finito? é um projeto experimental sobre corpo, corporalidade e finitude, com o objetivo de questionar a fronteira que separa as noções de vida e morte (matéria-substância / natureza-cultura), em um movimento atravessado por olhares exteriores de regulação e sentimentos de posse.

As imagens e os textos nos permitem compreender que vida e morte são rituais que expressam um esgotamento/transbordamento marcado no corpo, nessa estrutura que aprendemos a sustentar os nossos desconfortos, ressentimentos, saudades e ímpetos. Nesse sentido, os limites entre vida e morte caminham em direção ao encontro com o que não queremos ver.

O uso do fogo, da vela e das cores preto e branco constituem vivências e conexões que podemos chamar de residuais, como, por exemplo, a expressão do luto, do sacrifício e da celebração (a depender de cada sociedade/cultura). O corpo físico encontra-se diante de substâncias espelhadas, marcadas por resíduos figurativos que se espraiam em meio à contemplação. Contempla-se um ente figurado num corpo-símbolo.

Intercalado pelas insurgências do cotidiano, o ensaio também evidencia aspectos de um sistema sociocultural que aliena expressões/identidades de gênero e sexualidades, colocando-as em situação de marginalidade. É uma forma de demonstrar que o que entendemos como corpo e finitude, a depender da situação, são noções descartáveis.

Corpo (in)finito? é um caminho que pulsa. A linha do tempo, não exatamente cronológica, que torna a ancestralidade viva é sentida à medida que reconhecemos as marcas e os legados deixados no corpo e na alma. Portanto, essa ancestralidade que percorre o ensaio do início ao fim expressa a linguagem do inacabado, daquilo que nos ensina sobre a continuidade da vida/morte e de sua dimensão material e simbólica.

Ficha técnica:

Conceito e produção textual: Ramon Reis
Fotografia e edição: Selton Martins e Adriana Sena
Moda e vestuário: Fábio Purificação
Locação: Cemitério da Ordem Terceira (Belém-PA)

Resumo: O presente trabalho visa discorrer sobre a vivência do idoso mediante a aproximação da morte e o contato com a finitude. Os últimos indicadores sociais registram um aumento de idosos na população e constituem uma preocupação sobre esse público. Porém a velhice e o envelhecimento são enxergados frequentemente de forma negativa, sendo conferida quase sempre a aproximação da morte. Verificou-se que o modo como o idoso lida com esse fenômeno tem caráter significativo na elaboração e organização do luto antecipatório. Logo, buscou-se abordar a vivência da morte para o idoso sob um olhar de compreensão existencial-fenomenológico, destacando os impactos sobre o seu modo-de-ser em lidar com a morte, o idoso enquanto ser-para-a-morte e a consciência da finitude. Constatou-se a necessidade em desenvolver outros trabalhos referentes à temática, considerando o amplo alcance dessa temática e a percepção de pouco acervo teórico disponível nas bases bibliográficas da Psicologia Existencial-Fenomenológico, dentre as que puderam ser alcançadas. INTRODUÇÃO Defrontar-se com a experiência da morte é em muitos aspectos uma vivência complexa e intrínseca a cada indivíduo. Ao avesso dos nossos anseios de permanecer em uma juventude estendida, o homem inicia o processo de envelhecer no instante que é lançado no mundo. Logo, o caminho que percorre desde seu nascimento o direciona a este momento que é a única certeza de qualquer ser humano. Mas, da mesma forma, a consciência da finitude o orienta a edificar um modo de vida em que o sentido das suas experiências vai se construindo, auxiliando-o a passar pelos processos naturais da existência. Discorrer sobre a morte é um desafio diferente, pois, frequentemente busca-se evitá-la como se a convocássemos para mais perto cada vez que se enuncia sobre ela. No entanto, diversas correntes teóricas apresentam-na como um processo que faz parte do ciclo da existência. Nessa perspectiva, questiona-se como esse fenômeno pode se tornar conflitante e gerador de angústia para o indivíduo que o vive.

In a recent article, Martin McQuillan has inaugurated a vigorous Derridean critique of a “violent tone” that has recently arisen in continental philosophy, exemplified by Slavoj Žižek’s attempt to retrieve Robespierre’s notion of “Terror." This article sets out to complicate such critique, opening a new perspective on the Derrida-Žižek debate on the question of politics. In particular, it examines their respective approaches to difference and violence as differing responses to a shared problematic of constructing a consistent (immanent) politics within the horizon of a finite world. It proceeds by elaborating Žižek’s critique of Derridean deconstruction, highlighting how Derrida’s attempt to minimise violence via maximal openness to difference, within the horizon of the future-to-come, inadvertently reinscribes a minimal but problematic ontotheological trace which ironically circumscribes deconstructive openness to difference. The article goes on to examine how Žižek’s alternative construal of a purified violence and (Hegelian) self-difference ends up repeating in somewhat different terms these same problematic features of Derrida’s writings. The article concludes by arguing that each approach requires a theoretically-integrated ethos of ‘becoming other’ in which the unavoidable theoretical anticipation of difference (and the risk of invocation of the ontotheological) is ruptured by the actual encounter with difference.

Central to Levinas’ “phenomenological” approach to ethics is his identification of an “infinite signification” in the human face.  This insistence on the appearance of an infinitely signifying phenomenon has led many, notably Dominique Janicaud, to decry Levinas’ work as anti-phenomenological: little more than a novel approach to metaphysics.  A significant element of the phenomenological revolution, Janicaud insists, referencing Husserl and the early Heidegger for support, is grounded in the recognition that phenomena arise in and are circumscribed by finitude.  Any reference to an infinite phenomenon which breaks with apperception, he therefore concludes, necessarily breaks as well with the phenomenological tradition, signaling a reversion to idealism, metaphysics, and ultimately theology.  As this paper will argue however, a close reading of Husserl reveals not only the recognition of infinite phenomena; but, more significantly, the possibility that all phenomena are potentially infinite.  This means that in many ways Levinas is not only more faithful to Husserl’s project than is often admitted; but moreover, that Levinas’ work serves as a lens through which a hitherto under-emphasized element of Husserl’s work can be examined – an element which challenges the traditional critique of Levinas.  What’s more, the possibility of infinite phenomena opened up in Husserl’s work, when read through Levinas’ analysis of the ethical significance of the infinite, creates the possibility of recognizing the potential ethical value of all objects, and not merely one object in particular: the human face.  This possibility, as I will show, contributes to further blurring the already ambiguous distinction within Levinas between “good” and “bad” infinities – a blurring which, as I will argue, serves as a powerful heuristic in interpreting certain human pathologies, from obsessive compulsive disorder and certain forms of schizophrenia, to the temptation of evil.  In this way, an analysis of the status of the infinite in Husserl and Levinas provides a purely phenomenological ground for exploring issues traditionally seen as the exclusive domain of metaphysics and theology.

This essay argues that an important connection between ethics and ontology can be found in the way that finite beings handle the disunity that affects all efforts to form unified, enduring meanings. In Martin Heidegger's early lecture courses, he explores the unifying and disunifying movements of making-sense through ethically suggestive concepts, such as "ruinance," and innovative interpretations of Aristotelian concepts, such as hexis. These early developments help prefigure and even augment Heidegger's later development of his "originary ethics."

This article shows the hermeneutic-phenomenological approach of the concepts of logos and truth performed by Martin Heidegger. The focus will be on their interpretation of Aristotle's thought in the lecture curse of 1929/30, entitled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude and Solitude. Starting from the fundamental ontology developed by Heidegger in Being and Time, the human existence qua being-in-the-world is the entity characterized by having openness to the world and the worldly entity. This opening or disclosedness is Heidegger's concept of original truth, which is presupposed by any ontic discovery or propositional truth. In the lecture of 1929/30, Heidegger has as a major objective to investigate the phenomenon of the world. In the middle of this research are analyzed in detail the concepts of logos and original truth, in the sense of pre-apophantic opening. Therefore, based on this research Heidegger is possible to understand a notion of the truth not only determined by apophantic logos.

My DPhil thesis: an exploration of the theme of "weakness" (mḥilutā, in Syriac) in Isaac of Nineveh's edited and unedited writings. It is the first analysis of this theme, which is central in Isaac's thought and alludes to the ontologically finite human condition, exposed to suffering (ḥašā). The analysis adopts a phenomenological and hermeneutical method, based on the study of the original Syriac text (the translations are mine). References to authors who were essential to Isaac (particularly Paul, Evagrius, John the Solitary, the Pseudo-Macarian corpus, and the Lausiac History) are also made.

Here uploaded the Table of Contents.

The analysis of the human condition in this world reveals this condition as being marked by "weakness" and suffering. These, when perceived, awake the soul to itself (to the problem of existence) and, as a second step, to the quest for God, conceived as the consolation of suffering and the meaning of existence. The solitary life takes the shape of learning to inhabit suffering and "weakness", by encountering them and taking them on through the initiatory process of askesis. The limitations of askesis force the creature to contact his/her suffering self and to learn to be in relationship with it and the passions, that Isaac conceives as defensive reactions against the perception of one's ontological condition of "weakness". From this relational exercise ‘integrity’ can be born, to be understood as a condition of rootedness and groundedness able to adhere to one’s creatural status. Isaac describes this condition in terms of "purity" (dakyutā), "limpidity" (šapyutā), and "impassibility" (lā ḥāšošutā). Humility (makikutā), which for Isaac is the door to "impassibility", takes the shape of the only real and effective defence from the pain that suffering causes, which is completely other from the false defences of the passions because it accepts to be in contact with the suffering self and have a relationship with it. The more one finds a relationship with one’s suffering self, the more one also becomes able to be in a relationship with the Mystery who God is, and with other suffering creatures. The vital role of suffering and "weakness" in Isaac is related to awakening the subject to this transformative process, through which the problem of human existence is experientially inhabited. This process also involves experiences of extreme suffering, such as that of "abandonment" (meštabqānutā), a condition of trial where God seems absent or against the creature, and of the lack or loss of faith. The human being who accepts to enter this process, however, by learning to "bear" (ṭ‘en; sbal; Isaac also uses "to endure": ḥamsen, saibar) the weight of these conditions, which are also part of human existence, can experientially discover who is his/her God and a deeper level of faith, that Isaac describes as "trust" (tuklānā). Only accepting to inhabit this existence up to the end, then, a way to God can be found. This has a meaning in Isaac's eremitic context, but also has a meaning in other contexts, for all human beings exposed to suffering and "weakness",

The purpose of this piece is to examine the contribution made to the philosophical study of hermeneutics by James Risser’s recently published book, The Life of Understanding: A Contemporary Hermeneutics. The author argues that Risser’s emphasis on the relation of understanding to factical life places him among contemporaries, such as Donatella di Cesare and Günter Figal, who seek to advance hermeneutics beyond the context of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s approach. The author argues that Risser’s hermeneutics is distinguished by his concern for the radical finitude at stake in the experience of tradition, language, and beauty. In view of this, the author broaches questions that bring into focus the proximity between Risser’s hermeneutics and Jacques Derrida’s project of deconstruction.

Dans la période qui suit immédiatement la publication d’ Être et temps, Heidegger accorde une place de plus en plus importante, à la fois dans son enseignement et dans ses publications, à ce qu’il appelle le « débat philosophique avec l’idéalisme allemand ». Si Kant demeure sans doute le point de référence privilégié de cette entreprise, le regard du philosophe de Fribourg s’attarde également sur les perspectives ouvertes par Fichte, Schelling et Hegel, qui lui apparaissent comme des alliés précieux, à l’encontre du néokantisme dominant, dans la tentative de redonner ses droits à la métaphysique. Un des documents les plus représentatifs de cette démarche est le cours du semestre d’été 1929 intitulé Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart, dont plus de la moitié est consacrée à une lecture linéaire de la Wissenschaftslehre de 1794. Si par après Heidegger se penchera à nouveau sur les développements de Schelling ou de Hegel, ces pages sur Fichte demeurent relativement isolées dans le corpus heideggérien. Après 1929, la Wissenschafstlehre  ne fera plus l’objet d’un traitement thématique. Tout se passe comme si Heidegger avait fixé sa position sur Fichte ; comme si le nom de Fichte pouvait désormais servir d’emblème pour une position elle-même figée.

It is uncontroversial that Cora Diamond changed deeply our understanding of the issue of solipsism, as it has been formulated by Wittgenstein and more broadly speaking. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the meaning of this change has not yet been fully made explicit. Whereas at first sight there might seem to be a discrepancy between her famous essay - “Does Bismarck have a Beetle in his box?” - and her more recent thoughts about “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy”, I shall argue that the link between both difficulties allows her to rephrase and to flesh out her previous insights on that topic. My point will not be merely exegetical, since I shall attempt to explain to what extent her approach to this problem casts a new light on it.
I shall therefore start by highlighting the continuity and also some tensions in her approach to this issue. I shall then delineate the kind of solipsism that would be best understood as embodying the sort of “resistance” of reality Diamond focused on. Notwithstanding one of her favorite examples is Elizabeth Costello, I shall finally sketch a reading of In the Heart of the Country – I will develop here some clues given by Rupert Read’s in “On “Delusions of Sense”- presented as a literary examination of the philosophical powerlessness to express the solipsistic threat.

In his writings, Isaac of Nineveh (Church of the East, 7th c.) outlines a phenomenology of pride. He identifies two forms of pride: the first results from a presumption concerning one’s ascetic virtue, and the second concerns one’s knowledge. This article focuses on this latter form of pride, through a close reading of passages selected from Isaac’s corpus. A particular emphasis is placed on the specific Syriac terms which Isaac employs. The main sources of his conceptions are also underlined: Evagrius and especially the Lausiac History. The article highlights the fact that the origin of a pride rooted in a presumption of knowledge is a misunderstanding of one’s ontological status. From this misunderstanding follows an incapacity to acknowledge what Isaac considers to be the real. As a consequence, a divergence between conceptions and facts takes place. “Practice”, which is a labour of body and soul that necessarily implies a relationship with suffering, and “rule” and “law”, which Isaac interprets as the rules of ascetic life, set a limit to the misunderstanding of one’s status in which pride is rooted, leading the subject back to what Isaac calls “the boundary of the creatures”. This makes it possible for one to gain access to an adequate relationship with reality. In this way, the subject can have a space which is his/her own, and can acknowledge the space which is proper to God.

Authors/Szerzők: Schmidt Dániel, Száva Csanád, Péter Mónika, Szőcs Krisztina, Lurcza Zsuzsanna, Veress Károly, Lázár Zsolt, Várna Levente, Talált Évike, Zsók Izabella, Papp Levente, Kovács Judit, Kerekes Erzsébet
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Veress Károly ‒ Lurcza Zsuzsanna (eds.): The Experience of Finitude: Hermeneutical and Applied Philosophical Researches (3) ‒ The volume contains studies prepared during the 3rd phase of the hermeneutical and applied philosophical project series implemented by the philosophy graduate students (BA students and PhD students of the Philosophy Doctoral School) of the Babeş‒Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca. These researches were directed at the hermeneutical aspects of the finitude of experience and the experience of finitude.
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A kötet a kolozsvári Babeş‒Bolyai Tudományegyetemen a Filozófiai Doktori Iskola doktoranduszai valamint a filozófia szakos mesterképzős hallgatók által megvalósított hermeneutikai és alkalmazott filozófiai projektsorozat harmadik szakaszának a kutatási eredményeit közli. Ezek a kutatások a tapasztalat végessége és a végesség tapasztalata hermeneutikai összefüggéseire irányultak.

本文旨在釐清牟宗三與海德格對康德「有限性」概念之詮釋，借此建立三者的溝通基礎。牟跟海一樣，認為康德對存有論的論述並不完備，需要補充；海德格認為康德哲學應下開「基礎存有論」，發展「此在形上學」。牟宗三則認為，應該發展「道德的形上學」；牟重視現象與物自身的區分，因其關乎認知與道德、感性與超感性領域之分際，並認為道德之超越性是人「可無限」的關鍵；海德格則意圖改變感性、知性的優次地位，強調感性、處境和時間性，否定人之無限性。基於以上異同，本文進一步申述兩者對康德哲學的改造與後續發展，設想他們之間的批評和回應，並評論兩者在何種意義下，更能承先啟後。
This paper aims at laying the foundation of a discourse between Mou and Heidegger’s philosophy through their interpretations of Kant’s concept of finitude. Mou tried wholeheartedly to internalize Kantian philosophy in the interest of establishing the new Chinese Philosophy which takes the moral subject as the foundation of the system. The key to success lies in the interpretative works of arguing the transcendental characters of man with the following premise: man is finite but can be infinite; Heidegger, as a phenomenologist, claims that the concept of finitude is the fundamental spirit and implicit premise of the whole Kantian philosophy. He upholds the priority of sensibility and concludes that the human finitude has to be delimited by the situation in terms of time, by which he rejects the infinitude of human existence. By the juxtaposition of their interpretations, we can see how they interpret the concept of finitude, and how they try to internalize and to go beyond Kantian philosophy.

Partiendo de la proposición 28 de la Parte I de la Ética de Spinoza, defiendo que la idea de interdeterminación que expone se forma excluyendo la indeterminación y el finalismo. Spinoza concibe la realidad como una red infinita de determinaciones singulares sin jerarquías ni exterior. La propia interdeterminación, además, sirve para explicar qué significa ser un modo finito de Dios. Este problema, no obstante, se resuelve de manera más completa a través de la noción de 'necesidad absoluta de la relación'. Una vez disponemos de esas herramientas conceptuales, podemos entender el modo en que finitud y absoluto se funden en las cosas singulares, haciéndolas cognoscibles con objetividad. Pero, que todas las cosas sean cognoscibles, no quiere decir que nosotros podamos conocerlas todas. Pues también la potencia de nuestro entendimiento es limitada. Afirmando la cognoscibilidad universal y la limitación de nuestra capacidad de conocer, Spinoza impugna tanto el escepticismo irracionalista como la confusión del pensamiento humano con el entendimiento infinito de Dios.

Central to Levinas’ “phenomenological” approach to ethics is his identification of an “infinite signification” in the human face. This insistence on the appearance of an infinitely signifying phenomenon has led many, notably Dominique Janicaud, to decry Levinas’ work as anti-phenomenological: little more than a novel approach to metaphysics. A significant element of the phenomenological revolution, Janicaud insists, referencing Husserl and the early Heidegger for support, is grounded in the recognition that phenomena arise in and are circumscribed by finitude. Any reference to an infinite phenomenon which breaks with apperception, he therefore concludes, necessarily breaks as well with the phenomenological tradition, signaling a reversion to idealism, metaphysics, and ultimately theology. As this paper will argue however, a close reading of Husserl reveals not only the recognition of infinite phenomena; but, more significantly, the possibility that all phenomena are potentially infinite. This means that in many ways Levinas is not only more faithful to Husserl’s project than is often admitted; but moreover, that Levinas’ work serves as a lens through which a hitherto under-emphasized element of Husserl’s work can be examined – an element which challenges the traditional critique of Levinas. What’s more, the possibility of infinite phenomena opened up in Husserl’s work, when read through Levinas’ analysis of the ethical significance of the infinite, creates the possibility of recognizing the potential ethical value of all objects, and not merely one object in particular: the human face. This possibility, as I will show, contributes to further blurring the already ambiguous distinction within Levinas between “good” and “bad” infinities – a blurring which, as I will argue, serves as a powerful heuristic in interpreting certain human pathologies, from obsessive compulsive disorder and certain forms of schizophrenia, to the temptation of evil. In this way, an analysis of the status of the infinite in Husserl and Levinas provides a purely phenomenological ground for exploring issues traditionally seen as the exclusive domain of metaphysics and theology.

L’enjeu de cette étude est double : la première partie de ce travail est consacrée à une clarification du sens du solipsisme. Elle montre comment ce spectre s’est diffracté en plusieurs figures dont on propose une typologie à partir d’une relecture des Méditations. Cinq figures sont ainsi distinguées : les trois premières – berkeleyenne, lockienne et leibnizienne - s’inscrivent dans un cadre cartésien, les deux suivantes – fichtéenne et schopenhauerienne - dans un cadre kantien. On envisage ensuite la spécificité des traitements analytiques du problème du solipsisme (ses différentes versions méthodologiques). Les limites des réponses constructionnistes conduisent à dégager l’angle depuis lequel Wittgenstein aborde ce problème en le replaçant dans le contexte d’une réponse aux Grundgesetze der Arithmetik de Frege. La seconde partie de ce travail, dont la démarche est évolutive, montre comment Wittgenstein déjoue chacune des figures traditionnelles du solipsisme pour mieux mettre en évidence la résistance d’une dernière figure qu’il invente : le solipsisme logique. Dans le Tractatus, Wittgenstein répond aux figures idéalistes du solipsisme et corrige les traitements russellien et frégéen de ce problème. L’universalisme logique étouffe en revanche la menace du solipsisme logique qui rejaillit durant la période intermédiaire. Alors que Wittgenstein récuse les versions empiristes du solipsisme - la figure machienne et le solipsisme méthodologique de l’Aufbau -, la rupture avec l’intentionalisme du Tractatus débouche sur le fond sceptique du solipsisme logique qui n’est pas tant réfuté dans les Recherches philosophiques que révélé pour lui-même.

The aim of this study is twofold. The first half of this work is dedicated to clarifying the meaning of solipsism by distinguishing between its varying forms. Within a Cartesian framework, I draw the distinctive features of Berkeleyan, Lockian, Leibnizian solipsistic forms, while within a Kantian framework I detail the distinctive shape of Fichtean and Schopenaurian forms. In France, analytical treatments of this problem have been overshadowed by a reduction of this problem to the one of intersubjectivity. Thus, I enumerate the methodological responses to the problem, in order to underline the specificity of Wittgenstein's treatment of it, which is here understood in the context of a reply to Frege's Grundgesetze. Secondly, the work aims to emphasize the ways Wittgenstein responds to each of these forms of solipsism, while highlighting the obstinate resistance to resolution of a version which I shall call logical solipsism. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein answers the idealist forms of solipism and corrects the Russellian and Fregean approaches to this problem. In the transition period, he shows why empiricist programs cannot be satisfactory, while revealing the truth of logical solipsism. Its resistance is confirmed in the Philosophical Investigations by revealing its threat rather than by its refutation.

Статья посвящена исследованию предлагаемого научно-фантастическим сериалом «Видоизмененный углерод» кейса возможного конфликта между практическими и этическими импликациями научного и религиозного дискурсов о природе человека. В частности, речь идет о столкновении биополитически присвоенной и внедренной технологии и религиозной жизни. Научный дискурс представлен «идеологией церебрального субъекта» (Ф. Видаль, Ф. Ортега), устанавливающей связь между мозгом и личностью. Кратко разбираются примеры воплощения этой идеологии в научной фантастике и ее общая логика. «Логичным итогом» в данном случае является технология загрузки сознания на цифровой носитель, позволяющая отвязать смерть индивида от телесной смерти и добиться квазибессмертия путем смены тел. Эта технология, биополитически присвоенная и внедренная государством, вступает в конфликт с религиозной жизнью неокатоликов, отказывающихся переносить сознание после телесной смерти в другое тело. Таким образом, поле столкновения вмешательства сциентизированной биовласти в жизнь индивида и его религиозной жизни размечается координатами жизни и смерти. В статье рассмотрена механика столкновения, его биополитическая подоплека и импликации.

This thesis presents an analysis of the human condition in the work of American anthropologist and author Ernest Becker (1924-1974), and the role of religion to give support to human beings in face of the fear of death. The primary source of this work is Becker’s 1974 Pulitzer Prize-winning book, "The Denial of Death".

Initially, we organize and present Becker’s main concepts to describe the human condition: the creatureliness of human beings, torn between animality and self-consciousness; the existential paradox; the fear of life and fear of death which cause anxiety, and the need to deny death; the twin ontological motives Eros and Agape that attract human beings in opposite directions; the basic need to feel a sense of self-worth and find meaning to human existence; the defense mechanisms used to repress the fear of death from consciousness; the development of human character as a vital lie; the human dependence on and fascination with an external source power, related to the psychological transference mechanism; and the oedipal transition that develops into the causa sui project, when individual socialization occur.

We also investigate Becker’s view of religion, and the reasons for considering it as one of the most effective ways of providing meaning to human life, as well as ideal forms of heroism that are not found in cultural hero systems, and possible ways of symbolically transcending human creatureliness.

Finally, we present an outline of Becker's "heroic individual", and the main reasons for him to glimpse a possibility of “fusion” between psychology and religion, together with a reflection on his expectations for this approach. The main hypothesis is that religion offers a broader possibility of heroism than culture in general, since it takes into account the dimension of the “invisible”. Also Becker’s ideia that human beings can develop a greater strength to bear the contradictions of their condition with the support of religion, which can provide a “safer” way to find meaning for existence.

The article deals with the biopolitical underpinnings of the Estonian national identity construction which is analysed by concentrating on public media coverage of (1) the Estonian Population and Housing Census 2011; and (2) the passing of the Registered Partnership Act in 2014. The object of analysis is the discourse – or the manner of speaking – that becomes apparent in the discussion of these cases. It is called the discourse of survival, since the main aim of national identity construction is to ensure the perseverance and preservation of this identity. This enables us to insert political identity construction into a biopolitical framework in which the political subject is understood as a fundamentally finite living being. In conceptualizing biopolitical finitude and the accompanying need of survival as the logic of identity construction, the article suggests the semiotic logic of this type of identity process as auto-communicative solidification of identity that has a presentist temporal structure.

O propósito deste artigo é explicitar o modo como Gadamer reformula a hermenêutica diltheiana (desenvolvida sobre o conceito moderno de vida utilizado como fundamento da noção de auto-consciência histórica), ao formular um novo modo de compreender a razão e a existência humanas, tomando como ponto de partida a experiência concreta da finitude da vida humana.

À luz dos novos estudos sobre subjetividade e poder conduzidos pela Teoria Crítica, o presente trabalho se propõe a analisar as influências e origens do individualismo normativo na modernidade, necessário e presente inclusive para a configuração imperativa dos Direitos Humanos, que aqui abordamos tal como entendido por Hans Joas. A escolha desse autor se dá pela possibilidade de correlação das suas noções de “evidência subjetiva” e “intensidade afetiva” com o conceito de experiência em Aristóteles. É propósito desta pesquisa investigar os
primórdios da lógica aristotélica e como os axiomas nominalistas, ao radicalizarem os pressupostos da epistemologia, polarizaram o debate normativo entre o positivismo e o direito natural na contemporaneidade
ainda que, paradoxalmente, compartilhando a centralidade teórica das ideias de pessoa e vivência. Para tanto, embasados em Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereira, usamos da hipótese de que a finitude e a reminiscência podem figurar como solução ao problema dos universais e, a posteriori, fundação laica de uma genealogia dos valores.

É certa a finitude do corpo. Mas e quanto à finitude da consciência? Como suporte para várias reflexões e para procurar responder a esta questão foi analisado o filme “Se eu ficar” (IMDb, 2015). É explorada a consciência da finitude, os dilemas de um estado de coma, as angústias inerentes a uma decisão de «ir ou ficar», a luz atrativa relacionada com as intencionalidades das experiências de quase-morte, a importância do «deixar ir» e salientam-se estudos que poderão mudar o sentido da experiência humana sobre a vida e sobre a vida da consciência depois da finitude corpórea.
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The finitude of the body is certain. But what about the finitude of consciousness? As a support for several reflections and to try to answer this question, the movie "If I stay" (IMDb, 2015) was analyzed. The awareness of finitude, the dilemmas of a coma, the anguish inherent in a decision of 'go or stay’, the attractive light related to the intentionalities of a near-death experience and the importance of ‘letting go’ are explored. Studies that may change the meaning of human experience about life and about the life of consciousness after bodily finitude is also emphasized.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the works of Franck Fischbach and Frédéric Lordon, two French philosophers whose common project is to combine some main Spinozian concepts with Marxian intuitions in order to develop a critique of the recent ideological and material mutations within neoliberal capitalism. In doing so, we will see how the two authors offer a new conception of alienation based on the Spinozian notion of finitude. The capitalistic alienation will be described as an attempt to deny the human finitude through a triple process of subjectivization, de-objectification and fixation of desire. Finally, we will investigate the idea of an imaginary of “positive finitude” as a way of emancipation avoiding the illusory pitfalls of powerlessness and omnipotence, characteristic of a capitalistic subjectivity in lack of finitude.

Expanding on Foucault and Bataille’s work, this essay explores the archaeological a priori that has come to define our understanding of the world’s finitude in an age of environmental crisis. It first shows how – by giving a political form to biological conceptions of life and death – classical political economy first forged and shaped the notions of scarcity and production that still inform debates over the current state and limits of the planet. The paper thus suggests how an alternative thematization of the finitude of man and of the world might contribute to understanding today’s environmental crisis.

How does the temporal continuum “birth-life-death” encounter, on the one hand, the atemporal and eternal entirety and, on the other hand, “immortality”? By means of what effect and operation does it have contact with them? By means of the effect of the infinite power of existing, which insures “forever” the eternal possibility of the present, that of an incarnation in time, the very possibility of the “present.” For Schelling, eternity is—is nothing but—the eternal possibility of the present. The word “eternity” does not refer to the “immeasurable vastness of eternity,” which “does not suit human thought.” The distinctive feature of eternity is “the possibility of an incarnation of time in a present at any moment, at any time.” Time is thus born when this “puissantial flux” (“flux puissanciel”) is enacted in reality, which enables eternity to be transformed into an actual realization without the continual outpouring ever affecting eternity. Time is born from the overflowing of ever-infinite substance; it is born when this puissantial flow comes down to the level of reality, where it is incarnated in things: time is inner time.
This article provides an introduction to these notions and to the issues that they raise.

Apesar das suas relações pessoais com vários autores existencialistas, Eric Weil considerava essa posição filosófica, que supunha centrada na categoria discursiva do Finito, como insuficientemente determinada para responder quer aos problemas teóricos, quer aos desafios sociais e políticos da contemporaneidade. Neste artigo, reconstituímos o sentido global desse entendimento crítico. 

In spite of his personal relations with various existentialist authors, Eric Weil considered this philosophical position, which he supposed focused on the discourse category of the Finite, as insufficiently determined to answer both the theoretical problems and the social and political challenges of contemporary times. In this article, we reconstitute the global meaning of this critical understanding.

The interplay between the notions of perfection and imperfection has been crucial to Christian ascetic-mystical reflection from an early stage. Isaac of Nineveh (7th c.), the best-representative of the Syriac ascetic-mystical tradition, offers an original perspective on the theme, that the article examines for the first time through analyzing his edited and unedited writings. Isaac’s thought is characterised by a strong tension between the desire for perfection and an awareness of the ineradicable nature of imperfection. Although problematic, this tension can become highly generative for the subject who accepts to remain within it, “inhabiting” it, instead of looking for a solution or the prevailing of a single pole. When this “inhabiting” occurs, the passions born of the fear of imperfection decrease and a new form of perfection can mysteriously emerge, which does not expel ‘the negative’ nor integrates it into a synthesis, but acknowledges and respects its distinctive space.

Este livro sintetiza os trabalhos discutidos e apresentados ao longo do evento, o qual ocorreu nos dias 26 e 27 de maio de 2021. Todavia, mais do que isto, o Leituras da Lógica promove um diálogo perene entre múltiplas instituições e departamentos de filosofia; os dois dias do evento servem como o compartilhamento de pesquisas realizadas de forma contínua nos diferentes grupos de trabalho que o compõe. O V Leituras da Lógica congregou pesquisadores do nível de graduação à pósgraduação, em grupos liderados por professores doutores com reconhecida produção acadêmica na área. A cada edição vemos um maior engajamento das instituições já participantes, bem como a adesão de novos pesquisadores a este esforço conjunto de pesquisa. Como forma de materializar a crescente importância do Leituras da Lógica, neste ano passamos a integrar o World Logic Day, promovido pela UNESCO em parceria com o Conseil International de Philosophie et de Sciences Humaines. Estimula-se a compreensão hermenêutica do texto hegeliano ao mesmo tempo no qual se incentiva um diálogo interdisciplinar para lidar com a complexidade da lógica. Nesse sentido, esperamos que este livro venha a somar os esforços das edições passadas no que tange à disseminação da filosofia de Hegel; do mesmo modo abrem-se aqui possibilidades para pesquisas e textos futuros.

A presente investigação intenta discorrer acerca dos dois princípios constitutivos apontados como fundamentais pela analítica heideggeriana, a saber: a unidade e a finitude de Dasein. Para tal, partindo do § 39 de Ser e Tempo, percorrer-se-á o caminho de definição do existencial do cuidado (Sorge) como princípio de unidade de todo Ser-no-mundo, de modo a culminar na investigação acerca do Ser-para-morte e da finitude que a ele é implicada. Em suma, trata-se do cerne da compreensão de Dasein como ente privilegiado, bem como um dos elos de ligação entre os patamares do ôntico e do ontológico.

En este trabajo analizamos las consecuencias antropológicas del modelo de explicación metafísico y cosmológico schellinguiano que, desde 1809 en adelante, confiere al mundo y al hombre, bajo las categorías de la finitud, el mal y la libertad humana, un nuevo rol central que se desmarca de su pensamiento monista e inmanente previo (1801-1804). La hipótesis que defendemos consiste en afirmar que las críticas a las nociones de inmanencia e identidad a partir de los conceptos de separación (Zertrennung, Scheidung) y fundamento (Grund) sitúan al hombre en un rol privilegiado para continuar en la historia humana, obra de la libertad, el proceso iniciado por Dios con la creación de la naturaleza. Sin embargo, este repliegue de Dios respecto del destino del mundo, que permite al individuo humano tomar las riendas de su destinación y de asumir sobre sí toda su responsabilidad metafísica y moral, nos sitúa frente al escenario problemático de la pérdida de la universalidad y del ateísmo que vinculan a nuestro autor a las tradiciones filosóficas contemporáneas. Esta es la diferencia esencial, pues, entre Dios y el hombre, o como veremos, entre el Dios que es y el Dios que deviene.

Este livro sintetiza os trabalhos discutidos e apresentados ao longo do evento, o qual ocorreu nos dias 26 e 27 de maio de 2021. Todavia, mais do que isto, o Leituras da Lógica promove um diálogo perene entre múltiplas instituições e departamentos de filosofia; os dois dias do evento servem como o compartilhamento de pesquisas realizadas de forma contínua nos diferentes grupos de trabalho que o compõe. O V Leituras da Lógica congregou pesquisadores do nível de graduação à pósgraduação, em grupos liderados por professores doutores com reconhecida produção acadêmica na área. A cada edição vemos um maior engajamento das instituições já participantes, bem como a adesão de novos pesquisadores a este esforço conjunto de pesquisa. Como forma de materializar a crescente importância do Leituras da Lógica, neste ano passamos a integrar o World Logic Day, promovido pela UNESCO em parceria com o Conseil International de Philosophie et de Sciences Humaines. Estimula-se a compreensão hermenêutica...

Na última década, cresceu consideravelmente o número de trabalhos que assinalam a existência da temática propriamente ética em Heidegger. Dahlstrom (1992) afirma que Ser e tempo "oferece algo como uma meta-ética fenomenológica ou, melhor, o ponto de partida de uma ética que, se desconhecida, leva ao empobrecimento da filosofia moral" (p. 167). Riedel (1992) detém-se na interpretação heideggeriana do conceito de éthos, como lugar do morar humano em meio aos entes, para concluir daí "a necessidade de repensar a tarefa da ética na época da física atômica" (p. 100). Dallmayr, além de criticar a objeção de decisionismo irracional, reconstrói, de maneira cuidadosa, a interpretação heideggeriana do conceito do mau (das Böse), em Schelling, e a sua recuperação do conceito de justiça a partir da díke de Anaximandro. Bernasconi escreveu vários artigos nos quais adverte os levinasianos de que Heidegger, em 1928, mostrou que a analítica do Dasein de Ser e tempo não implica o egoísmo (1993, p. 25) e que há nela um "lugar para a ética" que não é mais "simplesmente subordinada à ontologia e assim reduzida a um tipo de apêndice ou suplemento" (p. 39).